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
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of Detroit

in memory of her brother
Col. William Henry Coyt
1894.



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THE MODERN REVIEW.



THE MODERN REVIEW

A QUARTERLY MAGAZINE.

"INQUE BREVI SPATIO MUTANTUR SÆCLA ANIMANTUM
"ET QUASI CURSORES VITAE LAMPADA TRADUNT."

LUCRETIUS.

VOL. IV.—1883.

London :

JAMES CLARKE & CO., 13 & 14, FLEET STREET.

MANCHESTER: JOHN HEYWOOD.

AGENT FOR THE UNITED STATES: GEORGE H. ELLIS, BOSTON.

1883.



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THE MODERN REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1883.

*THE LITERATURE OF ISRAEL.**

THE reader of the Old Testament who consults the traditional beliefs as to the date and authorship of the several books, is asked to believe that the Pentateuch, or Law, was written by Moses, some thirteen or fifteen centuries before the birth of Jesus.

After this he is (or ought to be) perplexed to find a period of about five centuries of comparative barbarism, during which a highly organised nation has fallen into a loose federation of clans, an elaborate ritual with a jealously exclusive official clergy has been superseded by a crude and uncouth cultus presided over by an irregular and personal priesthood, and the trained strength of a disciplined army coextensive with a victorious nation has disappeared, leaving the oppressed Israelites dependent upon flashes of individual and undisciplined valour for even temporary relief from their sufferings.

Almost without warning the docile reader is now hurried from the wild and barbaric virtues and vices of the period of the judges into the marvellous spiritual depth and maturity of the Psalms, and is asked to believe that the hero who stood with one foot in the period of Gideon and

* *Die Geschichte der Heiligen Schriften Alten Testaments.* Entworfen von EDUARD REUSS. Braunschweig. 1882.

Jephthah (to say nothing as yet of his own doings and beliefs) composed those portions of the Old Testament which stand nearer than any others to the feelings and aspirations of Christianity.

Again we leap over two or three centuries, during which not even the faintest after-vibrations of David's harp are to be heard, and we are then startled by the apparition of the prophets—true sons of the earth, in the freshness and verve of their appeal, speaking like men whom a sudden sense of what should be has startled and horrified by its contrast with what is, and who turn in all the passion of new-born conviction to force the truth upon a heedless or astonished world.

A few centuries more, and all is plunged into sudden darkness. For five hundred years before the birth of Christ, Israel, to the ordinary reader of the Bible, is without a religious history.

Ecclesiastical tradition has had its own way of evolving order out of the chaos. The whole of the Old Testament has been strung upon the golden thread of prophecy concerning the Christ. Darkly shadowed forth by type and symbol in the Mosaic dispensation, foreseen and sung by the Royal Psalmist, the Christ appears in the very details of his divine function, and the manifold splendour of his sacred titles, in the revelations of the prophets. And thus the succession Law, Psalms, Prophets, is not only that of the traditional chronology, but appears fairly to conform to the only line of internal development which the traditional view recognises.*

It is not so easy to explain why the free school of historical criticism which unhesitatingly rejected what we may call the Messianic Synthesis of Hebrew literature long remained attached to a great, if not the greater, part of the old conception of the relative chronology of the Old Testament books. From the position to which modern researches have at last led us, it is difficult to understand

* Cf. Kuenen, *The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel*. Pp. 2—4.

how some of the old ideas could resist so much as the first touch of a critical method of inquiry, or an attempt to discover the lines of a really historical development; for the truths which were only reached by a series of laborious and acute investigations extending over many decades, now strike us as almost self-evident.

To the venerable scholar, whose latest work is cited at the head of this article, belongs the credit of having instinctively grasped the chief results of the newest school of criticism—so far as they affect the main lines of literary chronology—very nearly fifty years ago; and he has the singular satisfaction of expanding in his old age, as a recognised leader of the dominant school, those very theses which he hardly ventured to throw out in their audacious novelty, when he first appeared, as a young and almost unknown scholar, above the theological horizon.

It is, indeed, strange to think how recently critical authority has fallen into line with common sense, and has presented us with a view of the literature of Israel capable of appealing successfully to the feelings and impressions which every intelligent reader of the Bible, learned or unlearned, must have experienced in attempting to conceive of the Old Testament as a chapter of human history; but we may now boldly assert (and may congratulate Professor Reuss as we do so) that modern criticism has arrived at conclusions attached with equal firmness at the one end to exhaustive technical investigations, and at the other to clear and coherent historical results—results which can hardly fail to secure the assent of the thoughtful public when once they are clearly grasped.

It will be the purpose of a series of articles, by various hands, to lay before the readers of the *Modern Review* some of these results, freed from scholastic technicalities, and exhibited in their vital connection with the growth and development of Israel's religion.

In the following pages, which are intended as an introduction to the series, I shall confine myself to a rough attempt to explain the grounds on which Professor Reuss and others substitute the series Prophets, Law, Psalms, for

the series Law, Psalms, Prophets, and to indicate, in the merest outline, the bearings of this substitution upon the treatment of Israel's religious history. If I can succeed in thus rendering the general framework distinct and comprehensible to the reader's mind, he will, I hope, go on to the study of special portions of the subject with some clue to their wider significance, and be able to appreciate the relative importance of the various questions discussed.

To begin, then, with the Law. If we look through the "Five Books of Moses" we can hardly repress our amazement that in their present form they could ever have been supposed to stand at the opening of Israelitish history—so obviously have they a long Israelitish history *behind* them. It would be as easy to persuade a geologist that a sandstone or even a conglomerate dated (as Miss Bremer puts it) from "the first creative day," as to persuade a critic, or any intelligent reader in whom the critical faculties have been roused, that the Pentateuch is without a long history of growth and consolidation. In a word, the "Law" reveals itself, even to the casual and superficial reader, as a literary "deposit-rock." Embedded in its very centre appear again and again fragments that tell us they were wrenched from some distant cliff of civilisation or barbarism wholly different in character from those that have contributed the surrounding matter; fossils of belief or custom lie preserved in the successive layers to tell how widely human life and thought differed at the several epochs in which the strata were deposited; and (to drop the metaphor) side by side in motley contrast and variety lie the maturest and the crudest products of the religious imagination.

In the very first pages of our Bible the contrast forces itself upon us. What is there in common between the majestic Elohim (God) of the first creation story, evolving from chaos by his creative word the orderly successions of nature, and the half-human Yahveh (the LORD, or Jehovah) fashioning the moistened earth into a man, blowing the life-breath into his nostrils, and taking a rib out of his side as he

sleeps, closing the flesh over its vacant place, and "building" a woman out of it?*

Or, again, what is there in common between the Yahveh of Genesis, who fears the rivalry of man, should the fruit of the tree of life be added to that of the tree of knowledge, or should the success of the tower of Babel provoke bolder attempts, or who sits and eats with Abraham and rebukes Sarah for laughing at his words behind his back, and the Yahveh of Deuteronomy, the lord of nations, the divine object of Israel's gratitude and devotion?

Or, to take another class of phenomena, what contrast could be sharper than that between the express statement on the one hand, "In all places where thou shalt celebrate my name I will come unto thee, and I will bless thee" (Ex. xx. 24, according to the original reading), and the anxious limitation of worship to a single altar, which runs through the whole body of the legislation, on the other hand? Or what more striking instance is there of an incongruous and, as it stands, incomprehensible survival embedded in a system to which it is wholly foreign than is supplied by the ceremonies of the great day of atonement and the part that the demon Azazel plays in them? (Lev. xvi., where we should read "Azazel" instead of "the scapegoat"). And how is the attentive reader startled when he finds towards the end of the concluding chapter of Leviticus the tranquil remark that if a human being has been "devoted" or vowed to Yahveh, he must, under no circumstances, be "redeemed," but must "surely be put to death"!

These are but specimens of innumerable phenomena which lead irresistibly to two conclusions: 1st, that there are in the Pentateuch (and book of Joshua) several distinct strata of narrative and legislative matter; 2nd, that each great stratum is itself in larger or smaller degree a "deposit," composed of various and often incongruous elements.

Confining ourselves to the consideration of the great strata, we at once perceive that the Book of Deuteronomy

* The stately language of the Authorised Version partly veils the sharpness of the contrast; but it still remains clear enough even to the English reader.

stands by itself. This is so obvious that it has always been recognised in some fashion, and is expressed in the very name given to the book by the old Greek translators, and thence (through the Vulgate) adopted by ourselves. A little familiarity with the very marked characteristics of tone, style, and language that distinguish this book will soon enable the reader to detect a few scattered passages in Exodus and considerable sections of Joshua as unmistakably belonging to the same "formation," though possibly not from the hand of the same individual author.

When we have cut out the Deuteronomic passages, the remainder falls again into two great divisions. The contrast between the first and second creation stories in Genesis may give us a first clue to their division, and a careful investigation reveals the fact that the former narrative is the beginning of a continuous work which may be traced all through the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua, though the fragments into which it has been split are often separated by intervening masses of other matter. This work has been called "The Book of Origins" or "The Priestly Codex."

After the removal of all this, there still remains a complex mass of narrative (with a comparatively small amount of legislative matter) that is itself anything but uniform. Different designations of the divine being, varying and conflicting accounts of the same thing, and differing expressions and literary artifices indicate once more a twofold origin; but here the results of a literary analysis fail to reveal any noteworthy differences of religious conception or level of general culture between the two documents, though each of them contains traditions adopted from earlier and ruder times. In a word, each is a conglomerate, and each has its own peculiarities of formation; but there is nothing to indicate an important difference either in the dates or the component elements of the two. This composite narrative, which appears at one time to have had an independent existence, is sometimes called the work of the "Prophetic Narrators."

Here, then, we may pause, and may briefly characterise

the three great strata, the existence of which has been pointed out.

To the work of the Prophetic Narrators we owe almost all the graphic and pathetic touches that endear the stories of Genesis to us, together with much that is picturesque in Exodus and Numbers; but, on the other hand, nearly all that shocks our sense of reverence in the representations of the deity, and by far the greater number of those passages which surprise us by their naively primitive morality—or immorality—belong to the same group. The deity of this literature is essentially of the same family as those of the heathen nations. Passionate and capricious, but gracious and generous to his favourites, the Yahveh or Elohim of the Prophetic Narrators is tolerably indifferent to such offences as theft or lying,* but already shows the incipiently ethical character he had assumed in the eyes of his worshippers by the sternness with which he visits the grosser violations of the moral law. Occasionally the touch of a grander conception shows that the writers already stood upon a higher spiritual level than that of the traditional matter they handled, and indicates clearly enough that possibilities of religious development were not wanting in the atmosphere in which they lived.

We are therefore the less surprised to note the strongly ethical character of the legislation which is associated with the work of these narrators. It is found principally in Ex. *xxi.*—*xxiii.* 19. This primitive, but just and enlightened code lays far more stress on social and moral than on ceremonial matters. It assumes (as an allied fragment—see Ex. *xx.* 24—expressly states) that worship might be legitimately conducted at any suitable place. It pre-supposes that every Hebrew lives within easy distance of a sanctuary. It gives not the slightest indication of any exclusive hereditary or official claim to the priesthood, and, indeed, rather implies than states the existence of any priests at all. This code has been called “The Book of the Covenant.”

When we turn to Deuteronomy, we find ourselves in a

* This seems to apply with much greater force to the work of one of the Prophetic Narrators than to that of the other.

very different atmosphere; but the work of the Prophetic Narrators is everywhere presupposed. The numerous references to historical and legendary matter which we meet with in the Deuteronomic writings invariably find their explanation in the work of the Prophetic Narrators, while the Deuteronomic legislation constantly builds upon and carries out that of the Book of the Covenant.

From a religious point of view, however, there is a very marked advance. The keynote of the whole book is struck in Deut. vi. 4, 5, "Hear, O Israel: Yahveh our God, Yahveh is One; and thou shalt love Yahveh thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might." The passion of loyalty which breathes through the work makes it one of the most stirring appeals that ever fell from human lips, and even the details of the ceremonial legislation that has now assumed such ample proportions are, on the one hand, interwoven with the precepts of a tender and human morality, and, on the other hand, inspired by an intensity and directness of religious consciousness that raises them out of the region of pure ceremonial. There is, doubtless, much that, as a matter of fact, is almost purely traditional in the observances enjoined by the Deuteronomist, but his living zeal lays hold of everything and transforms all that he approves into an act of direct loyalty and homage to Yahveh, all that he denounces into a more than formal apostasy. The fact is, that in his precepts we feel that a genuinely formative principle is at work, and that religious instinct goes hand in hand with priestly tradition in severing the practices that will bind Yahveh's people more closely to him from those that have the taint of idolatry upon them and will lead the unwary worshipper astray.

To the Deuteronomist there is but one lawful sanctuary—the place where Yahveh has set his name. All sacrifice elsewhere is idolatry. And there is but one tribe—that of Levi—by whom the priesthood can be filled. There is no distinction, however, between the priests and the ordinary Levites. In matters of ritual, then, the Deuteronomist shows

an advance in discipline and organisation upon the Book of the Covenant, but as yet knows nothing of the elaborate system with which the central books of the Pentateuch make us familiar, and which confines the priesthood proper to the family of Aaron, relegating all other Levites to subordinate or even servile offices in connection with the sanctuary.

Lastly comes the Book of Origins, partly narrative, but chiefly legislative. The author of this great work has laid down its main lines with so firm and masterly a hand that although he does not even approach the Prophetic Narrators in graphic power or the Deuteronomist in eloquence and fervour, he has, nevertheless, stamped his chief conceptions indelibly upon the mind of all after generations. His *résumé* of history and his scheme of legislation hold undisputed sway as the received version, and succeed in giving the reader his dominant and abiding impressions. When we speak of "the Law," it is invariably the ideas of this author that are, consciously or unconsciously, in our minds.

The unequalled sublimity of the opening passage of the Book of Origins tells how Elohim (God) created the heavens and the earth, and, at the very beginning of the world's history, instituted the observance of the Sabbath day. Still as Elohim he appeared to Noah after the flood and made a covenant with him, of which the rainbow was the token and by which the greatest of all moral and ceremonial transgressions (murder and the eating of blood) were prohibited. Later on, as El Shaddai (God Almighty), he singled out Abraham and his family for the privilege of a closer union with himself, of which the rite of circumcision became the token; and, finally, as Yahveh, he chose Moses for his prophet and Aaron for his priest, and entered into his eternal covenant with the people of Israel.

In this preliminary historical sketch we already note the two main characteristics of our author—his love of system and his devotion to ceremonial observances. By the successive institutions and precepts gradually revealed we are led up to the great legislative scheme that forms the body of his work; and the orderly evolution and systematic

framework of the patriarchal history finds its counterpart in the elaborate and symmetrical impossibilities of the account of Israel's march through the wilderness and final settlement in Canaan.

It is, as already hinted, in the legislative portions of his work that we find the true purpose of the author of the Book of Origins. All else is introduction or supplement. On comparing his legislation with that of the Deuteronomist we find unmistakable proof of his later date. The simple assignment of the priesthood to the tribe of Levi has grown into a scheme by which the ordinary Levites are degraded to the lower offices, the priesthood is confined to a single family and the highest functions of the priesthood itself to a single individual. Moreover, an anxious scrupulosity and occasionally a certain feebleness have taken the place of the Deuteronomist's inspired zeal. The connection between the ceremonial injunctions and the sanctity they aim at securing has become less vital and immediate, more arbitrary and technical; tradition and system have taken the place of any formative principle. The Law has become an end almost more than a means, a life rather than a manifestation of life. In a word, we find ourselves at last in the atmosphere with which we are rendered familiar by the general impression of Jewish piety left on our minds by reading the Pentateuch—and by studying the New Testament.

The sketch just given brings out with sufficient clearness the internal evidence of the Pentateuch as to the relative antiquity of its several strata. The external evidence is quite as striking and is in entire harmony with it. We know from the twenty-second and twenty-third chapters of the second Book of Kings that in the eighteenth year of King Josiah (say B.C. 621) a book of the Law of Yahveh was "discovered," which the king, deeply moved, proceeded to make the basis of a sweeping reformation. This book (as will be shown in a subsequent article, by another hand) was the substance of Deuteronomy. In perfect agreement with this we find that the literature of the period intervening

between Josiah's reign and the return from the Captivity (*e.g.*, Jeremiah and Kings), shews direct acquaintance with the contents of Deuteronomy, while never presupposing (but implicitly excluding) the existence of the Book of Origins.

On the other hand, when we go back to the prophets of the eighth century B.C. (Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah), who lived before Josiah's reign, we find in their writings not the smallest indication of acquaintance with Deuteronomy, but abundant proof of familiarity with the substance of the stories known to us through the "Prophetic Narrators."

Thus in the eighth century literature we find direct proof of the existence of the earliest stratum of the Pentateuch (Prophetic Narrators), and indirect proof that the other two strata did not exist. At the end of the seventh century we have an account of the discovery and introduction of Deuteronomy. In the sixth century we have direct proof of acquaintance with the Deuteronomic literature, and indirect (but very strong) proof that the Book of Origins did not exist. And finally we read that in the fifth century Ezra came from Babylon to Jerusalem "with the law of his God in his hand"* (B.C. 458), and in conjunction with Nehemiah enforced a code which we recognise as that of the Book of Origins† (B.C. 444). Henceforth the literature (*e.g.* Chronicles) bears unmistakable evidence of acquaintance with the system of the Book of Origins and acceptance of its authority.

If anything were wanting to complete the chain of evidence it would be found in the unquestioned fact that pious Israelites are shown by history not to have conformed to the special precepts even of Deuteronomy in the time of the Judges and early monarchs, while evidence is sought in vain for any kind of observance of the special precepts of the Book of Origins before the time of Ezra.

Our examination has already led us in substance to reverse the traditional succession of "Law and Prophets," in favour of "Prophets and Law," and we have reached the conclusion (which ought not to be a startling one) that

* Ezra vii. 14. † Nehemiah viii.—and Ezra and Nehemiah *passim*.

that portion of the Old Testament which throws most light upon the outward forms and regulations of Jewish piety in the time of Jesus belongs not to the earlier, but relatively to the later formations of Hebrew literature.*

But before we can make any satisfactory use of the knowledge we have gained another great question remains to be settled. What is the relative and approximate date of the bulk of the Psalms?

What most people want in history is not consecutive and coherent ideas, but vivid and fascinating pictures. Such a picture is furnished by the "royal psalmist," the "sweet singer of Israel," the shepherd-boy whose shepherd was the Lord.

It is not easy to dislodge an idea that is rooted in pious associations by appeals to the historical, or even to the moral and religious sense; and although one would think that both the Psalms themselves and the David of history must be the gainers by the severance of the monstrous union that has been established between them,† yet it is probable that few critical opinions are more offensive to the mass of even intelligent readers of the Bible than the conclusion that David did not write a single one of the Psalms.

Did the belief in David as the author of many of our Psalms rest upon any less potent or less unreasonable foundation than that of association, it would hardly survive a moment's reflection or investigation. It is undoubtedly possible that a man may write very beautiful religious poetry, and yet sink to actions of the utmost moral turpitude. Instances of the like are but too easy to find. Still it is stretching possibilities rather far to apply this theory to David as the reputed author of the Psalms. We must recollect that offences which we may well condone in a half-barbarous adventurer and despot such as David (with all the striking and generous traits of his character)

* In a note at the end of this article will be found a concise summary of the results of the literary analysis of the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua.

† Cf. Kuenen in *Modern Review*, October, 1880, pp. 697—702.

appears from history to have been, become unspeakably odious when thought of as committed by a man of refined and cultivated moral sense, quickened by intense religious fervour. But even if such a moral contradiction were possible; even if we were to declare (as seems often to be implicitly maintained), that the existence of such spiritual beauty side by side with such treachery, lust, and cruelty, is consoling and encouraging rather than revolting; it would still remain true that no man can belong to two totally distinct *epochs* of thought and feeling. We cannot conceive of *In Memoriam*, as written by St. Lewis or Alfred the Great. Such a supposition would involve no moral or religious absurdity, but would be a gross violation of psychological chronology. In like manner, even if David had been as saintly as the French or the English King I have named, we should still say, it is impossible that the same man pathetically complained, when exiled from Palestine, that he was "driven out from the land of Yahveh, and bidden to go and serve other gods" (1 Sam. xxvi. 19), and cried to the same Yahveh, "Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?" that he hung the seven sons of Saul to appease the wrath of Yahveh (2 Sam. xxi.), and said, "Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it;" that he wrote the most spiritual religious poetry in the Old Testament, and had an image of a household god (teraphim) close at hand on an emergency (1 Sam. xix. 13). It is not a question of inconsistency of character, but one of widely-severed epochs of religious life and development. Were we not blinded by the tradition, and, therefore, possessed by an idea of David derived from the Psalms themselves, we should see how exquisitely impossible the tradition is.

But we may approach the investigation from another side. As we read the Psalms we can hardly fail to be struck by a few passages that proclaim themselves unmistakably as of high relative antiquity. Like ancient rocks thrust up through later deposits, they remain to tell the tale of earlier ages, lest we should suppose that things had always been as we see them now. Conspicuous amongst these antique

remnants of poetry are Psalm xxix. and the fragment preserved in Psalm xxiv. 7-10. It would, perhaps, be hard to cite a third specimen. Now these very Psalms, so obviously belonging to an earlier system than the rest, offer curious internal evidence as to their date. The former represents Yahveh as sitting in his heavenly palace (v. 9), and the latter obviously celebrates the return of Yahveh (*i.e.*, the ark of the covenant, cf. 1 Sam. iv. 3-9) from war, and his entering the temple doors at Jerusalem. But the temple was not built till the time of Solomon, and previously Yahveh was supposed to "walk in a tent," and not to "dwell in a house" (2 Sam. vii. 6). Hence he could neither be borne in triumph through the "gates" of an earthly temple, nor conceived by analogy as seated in a heavenly palace, until after the time of David. The earliest Psalms, then, are later than the building of Solomon's Temple.

If we now inquire how late we must bring down the composition of more modern Psalms, the answer we get is quite unequivocal. Some of the Psalms were composed as late as in the times of the Maccabees (say 166 B.C.). This can hardly be questioned. The general character of Psalms xliv., lxxiv., lxxix., is such that they cannot with any show of reason be assigned to any other period, and they abound in minute indications which confirm the truth of the conclusions to which a first inspection leads us.

It appears, therefore, that we have strong evidence in support of the statement that the stream of extant Hebrew Hymnology does not begin to flow till considerably later than the time of David, and continues at least till the time of the Maccabees.

Let us now consider the prevalent character of the Psalmic literature, and endeavour to ascertain the relationship in which it stands to the Prophets and the Law, which we may now regard as roughly fixed in their chronological positions.

When we compare the Psalms and the Prophets in their general aspects we can hardly doubt where the priority lies. The Prophets endeavour to *teach* Israel that which the Psalmists sing in the name of Israel. The Psalms, in short,

are the answer which tells—surely after no small interval of time—that the appeal of the Prophets had not been in vain. The prophetic teaching had in long years, nay, in the lapse of perhaps many generations, sunk at last into the hearts of the people, and it rises again, transformed and chastened, in the spontaneous devotion of the Psalms.

When we read the Prophets we are in the presence of great spiritual heroes who knew that they were almost completely alone in the midst of what, judged by their standard, must be pronounced a godless community. In the name of God they plead, they threaten, they entreat, they promise, they rebuke. Themselves, for the most part absolutely unshaken in their faith, with a personal religion of passionate intensity, they speak to men who, hearing, hear not, and in whose hearts even they themselves seem almost to despair of their own words waking an echo. In the Psalms we constantly recognise the utterances of a religious *community*, small indeed, surrounded by oppressors and scoffers, but itself united by a common hope, a common trust, a common love. The Prophets speak in the name of God to his rebellious and sinful people. The Psalmists speak to God in the name of his united worshippers. The fundamental religious conceptions are identical; but the side from which they are approached is completely changed even where the very words are almost identical. “To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? I am full of the burnt-offerings of rams and the fat of fed beasts,” says the Prophet, in the name of God; or “Rend your hearts and not your garments, and turn unto Yahveh your God!” And the Psalmist answers, after many years, in the name of a repentant people, “Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it; thou delightest not in burnt offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.” “Come, now, and let us reason together,” cries the Prophet, in the name of God. “Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red as crimson, they shall be as wool.” And the Psalmist gives back the yearning cry of the conscience

smitten, "Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow." "Though they dig down into the shadow-land (Sheol), thence shall mine hand take them," cries the Prophet, in the name of God; "though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down." "If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in the shadow-land, behold thou art there!" says the Psalmist. "I was like the husbandman, taking the yoke from the ox's neck and spreading the fodder before it," says the Prophet, in the name of God. "Yahveh is my shepherd, I shall not want," answers the Psalmist, in the name of Israel. "Can a woman forget her sucking child? Yea, she may forget, yet will I not forget you!" cries the Prophet, in the name of God. "When my father and my mother forsake me, then Yahveh takes me up," is the answer of the Psalmist, in the name of Israel.

In a word, the discourses of the Prophets are addressed to a people who have to be brought to a belief in the truths they preach. The Psalms rise from the heart of a people who already hold these truths as their dearest possession. The truths preached by the Prophets to those who, to all appearance, had eyes but saw not, and ears but heard not, were deeply rooted into the hearts of the men by whom and for whom the Psalms were written; and all that, in the old days, came to man in oracles from God by the mouth of his servants the Prophets, now ascended to God in prayer and praise in the music of the Psalmists.

The relation between the Prophets and the Psalms is hardly to be mistaken. If we ask which is the tree and which is the fruit, we cannot long hesitate as to our answer.

No less distinct is the answer we receive to the question, what is the relation of the Book of Psalms, as a whole, to the "Law of Moses," introduced by Ezra and Nehemiah.

To very many of the Psalmists "the Law" was not only well known, but had acquired a position of unquestioned religious supremacy, had become the object of a veneration in and for itself, which seem almost Talmudic in their character. "Blessed is the man," we read, "that

walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful. But his delight is in the Law of Yahveh, and in his Law doth he meditate day and night;" or, "While the princes gather together to take counsel against me, I meditate still on God's commandments. His testimonies are my delight, of them take I counsel!" This note recurs again and again in the Psalms. Even songs which had come down from more ancient times, and had nothing whatever in common with this sentiment of admiration for the detailed precepts of the law-givers, must be changed or supplemented to bring them into harmony with it. Devotion to the Law must, indeed, have been long established and deeply rooted before it can have been felt needful to supplement the hymn that opened with the majestic appeal to the testimony of nature,

The heavens declare the glory of God,
And the firmament sheweth his handiwork,

with a glowing panegyric on the Mosaic Law with its thousand regulations—finer than gold, sweeter than honey, refreshing the soul, making the simple wise, perfect, joy-bringing, eternal!

And the Temple was the symbol of the Law. Round it and the worship it protected, the fondest hopes and memories of the devout Jew clung. The place it occupied in his religious conceptions in the third century B.C. may be inferred from the Books of Chronicles. And here again we find in the Psalms the reflection of the later phases of Jewish feeling. Not only do they throb with the deepest longing to take part in the temple worship—

A day in thy courts is better than a thousand.

I would rather be a door-keeper in the house of my God
than dwell in the tents of the wicked—

but they ring with the temple-music which the Chronicler takes delight in describing, and in this way, as in so many others, proclaim themselves in no doubtful terms "the hymn-book of the second Temple," though hardly as Prof.

Reuss would have us believe, "the hymn-book of the Synagogue."

Our conclusion, then, is plain enough, and again there is nothing in it that need surprise us. The Psalms, though some of them doubtless go far back into the prophetic and regal ages, belong on the whole to the later centuries of Jewish history, gravitate to the generations that succeeded Ezra, and form the third and last term of the series, Prophets, Law, Psalms. And what is it to assert this, save to assert that that book in which are most clearly reflected the deep and tender piety that alone made the work of Jesus possible, the formalism not only of outward observance, but even of inward feeling that made that work so hard, and the glow of vindictive hatred against the heathen that so constantly threatened to distort it, is not one of the earliest, but one of the latest books of the Bible?

And no sooner have we accepted these conclusions—based upon purely critical considerations, and not dictated by the exigencies of any philosophical scheme of history—than we find that an intelligible account of Israel's development becomes possible. The history that began with the Pentateuch and (after an interval of barbarism) the Psalms, that went on with the Prophets and ended in a silence and stagnation of five centuries was simply unintelligible. The history that begins with the Song of Deborah and the adventures of the strolling Levite (Judges v., xvii., xviii.), that goes on through David, Elijah, Elisha, Jehu, and the Prophetic Narrators, to the era of the great Prophets of the eighth century, Prophets and Lawgivers of the seventh and sixth, Lawgivers and Psalmists of the fifth and following centuries, is eminently intelligible, and moreover leads to the goal we know that it actually reached in the New Testament.

The reconstruction of the history of Israel's religion has, therefore, gone hand in hand with the reconstruction of the literary chronology of the Bible, and the main lines on which it has proceeded seem hardly likely to be reversed.* Ever

* These main lines (affecting the Law, the great Prophets, and the Psalms), which have been traced in the text, are common to Reuss and the school of Kuenen. Reuss, however, is inclined to place the books of Samuel

since Graf (himself a pupil of Reuss's) published his *Historical Books of the Old Testament* (1866), followed at no great interval by Kuenen's *Religion of Israel* (1869-1870), the consensus of unpledged opinion has tended with ever-increasing rapidity and certainty towards the conclusions that may now claim to have won their way to general recognition amongst the critics of Germany, Holland, and England. The unrivalled mastery with which Kuenen (who first perceived the far-reaching significance of the new critical conceptions) handled the subject, together with the uncompromising opposition with which the established critics of Germany at first met the revolution (for it was no less) in their science, fixed the name of "the Dutch school" upon the rising theory of Israelite literature and history; but Germany is now proud to dispute with Holland the priority of discovery, and will join as heartily as any of her sister countries in welcoming the volume—full, like all his works, of wit and wisdom—which the ever-youthful veteran of Strasburg has presented to us as (*absit omen*) his "last work."

Though nominally giving us a history of the sacred writings of the Old Testament, Professor Reuss has in reality presented us with a handbook alike to the history, the antiquities, and the literature of Israel; and it would be hard to find a guide with a brighter eye, a more elastic step, or a more winning smile than his. It is impossible to read the book without feeling as if one knew the author—with his affectionate regard for his colleagues and his pupils, his unconcealed pride in his magnificent library (a suspicion of any defect in which would evidently hurt him more than an attack on his own learning or candour), his constant earnestness, and his scarcely less constant sense of humour.

and Judges earlier than the Dutch scholars do, and, on the other hand, the gravitation of Psalms and Proverbs to a late period is more marked in his system than in theirs. The Books of Ruth and Job (about which last the Dutch critics are not themselves agreed) have no certain points of attachment in Reuss's system. He does not accept Kuenen's hypothesis that Ruth and Jonah emanate from the party that opposed Ezra and Nehemiah, but places the one earlier and the other later than their time. Minor points of difference might be multiplied.

Under such guidance it can hardly be the dry and thankless task it is sometimes supposed to trace the processes and results of modern criticism, and to see how they work into the modern conception of Israel's religious history.

I cannot here attempt, even in hasty outline, to sketch that history itself, as read in the light that now falls upon it; but in conclusion we may dwell for a moment on one of the great lessons it seems to teach—viz., that the end of one spiritual battle is almost necessarily the beginning of another, and the apparent victory of an ideal is seldom purchased save with an accompanying loss.

The prophetic monotheism of the eighth century B.C. is one of the most striking of historical phenomena. It was itself the outcome of a long and painful development, and to it our own religion may be traced distinctly back. No sooner had it become self-conscious than its votaries flung themselves with passionate intensity of conviction and devotion into the task of bringing home its truths to every heart in Israel. By their own preaching, and by the influence they could bring to bear upon some of the kings and nobles, they sought to gain their end. Again and again their attacks were beaten back by the selfishness or the superstition of their countrymen. It seemed as though their standard was too high, their religion too pure, to make way. They failed, generation after generation, but their religion seemed only to grow the purer and deeper. But at last the hour of their triumph came. Their principles were accepted and applied. But in that very application their purity was lost, and their fervour tempered. The mass of half-idolatrous custom and ritual against which the early prophets had inveighed was now consolidated by those who thought themselves (and, indeed, in one sense, were) their sincere disciples, and the victory of Prophetic Yahvism meant the death of prophecy and the deification of the ceremonial laws. Prophecy strove to assimilate the life of the nation. As long as it failed it remained pure. When it began to succeed it began *itself to be assimilated*. Yet the purer religion did not die. It

still lived and grew, though no longer in conscious opposition to a national life that had in outward semblance accepted its consecration. Thus the Psalms, as well as the Law, grew up. For a time the contradiction between a pure spiritual religion and an iron system of external observances was veiled. The protection of the outward shell was felt more than its oppression, and the flowers of the soul were sheltered by it from the storm. But at last it became too clear that true religion was cramped and deformed by what appeared to give it strength; and then all was ripe for the next great religious reform. Again a higher and purer standard was uplifted; again war was declared upon the existing religion of Israel; again there was a struggle that lasted through many generations; again the victory was won, but not without a heavy price, and again the twin birth of spirituality and formalism was seen in the Catholic Church. Christianity had partly assimilated the world, and had been partly assimilated by it; had she failed in the first she would have escaped the last; but, as it was, Augustine's "Confessions" could rise in the bosom of the "Church" and remain unconscious of any want of harmony between their own glowing spirituality and the rigid formalism so fast closing upon them.

It would be easy to carry on the history, and it is superfluous to draw the moral.

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

NOTE.

A summary statement of the results of the literary analysis of the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua may be interesting to the reader. The following assignment of passages to the various

documents is. (with very trifling modifications) that of Professor J. Estlin Carpenter.

THE BOOK OF ORIGINS OR PRIESTLY CODEX.

GENESIS I. II. 1—4a. V. 1—28; 30—32. VI. 9—22. VII. 6; 7; 8b; 9; 11; 13—16a; 18—22; 23b; 24. VIII. 1; 2a; 3b—5; 13—19. IX. 1—17; 28; 29. X. 1—7; 13—20 in part; 22—32 in part. XI. 10—32 XII. 4b; 5. XIII. 6; 11b; 12. XVI. 1; 3; 15; 16. XVII. except v. 17. XIX. 29. XXI. 2—5. XXII. 20—24. XXIII. 2—20. XXV. 1—20; 26b. XXVI. 34; 35. XXVII. 46. XXVIII. 1—9. XXXI. 18. XXXV. 9—16a; 19; 20; 22b—29. XXXVI. 1—39 in part. XXXVII. 1; 2 in part. XLVI. 6—27. XLVII. 5; 6a; 7—11; 27b; 28a. XLVIII. 2 in part; 3—7. XLIX. 1a; 28b—33. L. 13.

EXODUS I. 1—7; 13; 14. II. 23—25. VI. 2—12; (13—30?). VII. 1—13; 19; 20a; 21b; 22. VIII. 5—7; 15 in part; 16—19. IX. 8—12. XI. 9; 10. XII. 1—20; 28; 40—51. XIII. 1; 2; 20. XIV. 1—4; 8; 9 in part; 15—18 in part; 21 in part; 22; 23; 26; 27 in part; 28a; 29. XV. 27. XVI. XVII. XIX. 1; 2a. XXIV. 16; 17. XXV. 1—XXXI. 17. XXXII. 15a. XXXIV. 29—35. XXXV.—XL.

LEVITICUS.

NUMBERS I. 1—X. 28. XIII. 1—17a; 21; 25; 26 in part; 32 slightly altered. XIV. 1—10; 26—38. XV. XVI. 1a; 2 in part; 3—11; 16—23; 24 in part; 26 in part; 27 in part; 35—50. XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. 1 in part; 2—13; 22—29. XXI. 4 in part; 10; 11. XXII. 1. XXV. 6—19. XXVI.—XXXI. XXXII. 1—6; 16—33 in part; XXXIII. 1—39; 41—51; 54. XXXIV. XXXV. XXXVI.

DEUTERONOMY XXXII. 48—51; (52?). XXXIV. 1—3; 5—9.

JOSHUA IV. 19. V. 10—12. IX. 15b; 17—21. XIV. 1—5. XV. 1—12; 20—62. XVI. in part. XVII. 1—10. XVIII. 11—28. XIX. 1—43. XX. XXI. 1—42. XXII. 9—32 in part.

DEUTERONOMY AND THE DEUTERONOMIC SCHOOL.

GENESIS XV. XXVI. 2—5.

EXODUS XIII. 3—16. XV. 26. XIX. 3b—6. XX. 2—17. XXXII. 7—14. XXXIV. 9—27.

DEUTERONOMY. All except XXII. 48—52. XXXIV. 1—3; 5—9.

JOSHUA I. 3—9; 12—15. VIII. 30—35. X. 28.—XII. mostly. XXII. 1—6. XXIII. XXIV. 1—25.

When these two later works have been removed, nearly all that is left belongs to the Prophetic Narrators, or, at least, to the earliest stratum of the Pentateuch and Joshua. There are, however, traces of the hands of yet later editors in many parts of the Pentateuch; and in a few cases (especially Ex. XX.) the

reader might go astray by taking for granted that everything which is neither Deuteronomic nor part of the Priestly Codex is necessarily early.

A simple and striking picture of the history and composition of the Pentateuch may be gained (and at the same time a powerful instrument for the further study of Biblical criticism constructed) by washing all the passages assigned to the Book of Origins in faint blue, for instance, and the Deuteronomic passages in some other colour, leaving the earliest stratum unpainted. Reference to a Bible thus coloured will enable the student instantly to see to which stratum any passage may belong to which reference is made by a prophet or historian, and will also make it easy to read any one document continuously.

The first outcome of our investigation, as regards the main current of Old Testament literature, may now be presented thus :—

Not later than the 8th century B.C. (end of 9th, according to Reuss) : THE PROPHETIC NARRATORS.

8th century : AMOS, HOSEA, MICAH, ISAIAH.

7th century : Idolatrous reaction under Manasseh and Amon, followed by revival of Yahvism. DEUTERONOMY.

6th century : JEREMIAH (prophetic activity begun late in 7th century). EZEKIEL. 'SECOND ISAIAH.' (Isaiah XL.—LXVI.)

5th century : BOOK OF ORIGINS, OR PRIESTLY CODEX.

7th to 2nd centuries : PSALMS. Possibly a few earlier than the 7th, but the great bulk belonging to the 5th—2nd centuries.

NATURAL RELIGION.

THE deep and widespread interest excited, half a generation ago, by *Ecce Homo*, was due only in part to the actual teaching of the book itself. Both the welcome it received, and the apprehension and even horror and pious anger which it aroused, were to be ascribed in no small measure to a secret hope or fear of what had yet to come as the sequel to this "Survey of the Life and Work of Jesus Christ." There was enough, indeed, that offended against the traditional and established Christianity to startle and distress those to whom the author's whole method of treating his subject was strange; and there was, at the same time, a certain caution and intellectual reserve that diminished the interest and attention of readers of a more radical turn of mind, who cared more for the questions left out than for those which were discussed. Still the author had the advantage of keeping, in the main, to neutral ground. So long as he accepted, as the sufficient record of the work of Christ, the matter that was common to the first three Gospels, and meddled with no questions of criticism or of theology, he seemed tolerably safe; and from the great body of Christians who occupy a position between the extremes of conservatism and radicalism in religion, he gained generally a patient and respectful hearing, and often even an enthusiastic one. Certainly few, of any school of thought, could question the interest and significance of that endeavour to form a consistent picture of the founder of Christianity in his purely human relations, "as a moralist speaking with authority, and perpetuating his doctrine by means of a society."

But it was very evident that the matter could not end

here. There was worse or better to come. The questions which the author had deliberately kept out of view were by far the deeper and more searching ones. We might agree in his "rudimentary conception of the general character and objects" of Christ; and whether we called the uniting principle in the kingdom which he came to establish by its old name of "Love," or by its new one of "The Enthusiasm of Humanity," we were within the circle of common Christian ideas, of Christian morality, of Christian experience. But when this principle had done its work, when—to follow the author's own words—men were united together, and cured of their natural antipathies and their selfishness, they were seen to have other enemies beside themselves, and to have need of protections and supports which morality cannot give. Man "is at enmity with Nature as well as with his brother-man. He is beset by two great enemies with whom he knows not how to cope. The first is Physical Evil; the second is Death." "What comfort Christ gave men under these evils, how he reconciled them to nature as well as to each other by offering them new views of the Power by which the world is governed, by his own triumph over death, and by his revelation of eternity," this was reserved for a separate treatise, the subject of which was described, in another place, as "Christ as the creator of modern theology and religion."*

It is not, however, in these definitions of what had to be dealt with in the sequel to *Ecce Homo* that we find the true foreshadowing of *Natural Religion*—it is rather in the following significant passage. After speaking of Christianity as only one of many revelations, and as being very insufficient by itself for man's happiness, which wants, besides, "some physical conditions, animal health and energy, also much prudence, knowledge of physical facts, and resource," the author refers to the other mighty revelation which has been made to mankind in these latter ages.

We live under the blessed light of science, a light yet far from its meridian and dispersing every day some noxious super-

* *Ecce Homo*, pp. 323, 324, Pref. vi.

stition, some cowardice of the human spirit. These two revelations [Christianity and Science] stand side by side. The points in which they have been supposed to come into collision do not belong to our present subject; they concern the theology and not the morality of the Christian Church. The moral revelation which we have been considering has never been supposed to jar with science. Both are true and both are essential to human happiness. It may be that since the methods of science were reformed, and its steady progress began, it has been less exposed to error and perversion than Christianity, and, as it is peculiarly the treasure belonging to the present age, it becomes us to guard it with peculiar jealousy, to press its claims, and to treat those who, content with Christianity, disregard science as Christ treated the enemies of light, "those who took away the keys of knowledge," in his day. Assuredly they are graceless zealots who quote Moses against the expounders of a wisdom which Moses desired in vain, because it was reserved for a far later generation, for these modern men, to whom we may with accurate truth apply Christ's words and say that the least among them is greater than Moses.*

It was not likely that a clear-headed and courageous thinker who had shown himself so susceptible to the influences of the scientific spirit, should confine his view of the revelation in science to that aspect of it in which it is good chiefly for "arranging the physical conditions of well-being." The claims of science in relation to the whole sphere of human life and thought have been pushed far beyond the limits formerly recognised on both sides of the controversy between it and religion; and the period which has elapsed since *Ecce Homo* was written has been fruitful in discoveries and theories which have effected nothing less than a revolution in the current ways of thinking and speaking in regard to some of the most momentous topics of human life. At least it has been within that time that the effects have been most fully realised, not only by the men of science and the theologians, but, directly or indirectly, by the community at large, of those forces which had already been projected into the world of modern thought. And the extent of the change that has been

* *Ecce Homo*, p. 328.

wrought in the aspects of the fundamental questions, both of science and of religion, is most strikingly indicated in the remarkable book which is one of the most important of recent contributions to the great controversy.

When the author of *Ecce Homo* came really to take in hand the further task he had set himself in undertaking to treat of Christ as the creator of modern theology and religion, he would have first of all to determine what he meant by theology and religion; and, the longer he considered the matter, the more plainly he would see how rapidly the conditions of the whole problem had been changing.

And the question might at last resolve itself into this, "In what sense can Christ be said to be the creator of modern theology and religion at all?" or, looking at the matter from a different point of view, "Does Christianity, in our modern society, include all that is covered by the terms theology, religion, and worship?" And so it has come to pass that in place of a treatise on Christian theology, we have one on Natural Religion, or a religion occupying the same field with science, and limited by the same horizon. That "other revelation" of Science has, in the author's view, been assuming more and more the character and functions of a religion. What that religion is, what it has in common with the older faith whose supremacy it disputes, and how far it is qualified to perform the same offices for humanity, is what the author has felt to be the subject of most pressing importance and present interest, and it is this that forms the main topic of his new book, which he has briefly defined as an essay on the province of religion.

His answer to these questions is, in its general outlines, too well known by this time to need any detailed repetition here. His definitions of religion and worship, and his view of the threefold religion the objects of which are verifiable by science, have already become the commonplaces of discussion and criticism.

Religion is "that higher life of man which is sustained by admiration." "It is the influence which draws men's

thoughts away from their personal interests, making them intensely aware of other existences, to which it binds them by strong ties, sometimes of admiration, sometimes of awe, sometimes of duty, sometimes of love." In its elementary state it is "what may be described as habitual and permanent admiration." Religion in the individual is synonymous with culture; in its public aspect it appears to be identical with civilisation. And the definition of Worship will, of course, correspond to that of Religion. Its essence is "some kind of enthusiastic contemplation seeking for expression in outward acts;" it is made up of "the combined feelings of love, awe, and admiration;" and it is directed towards any object by which those feelings may be excited. According to this definition, it is not *exclusively*, then, that religion is directed towards God, but only *par excellence*. "If the object of [habitual and regulated admiration] be unworthy we have a religion positively bad and false; if it be not the highest object we have an inadequate religion; but irreligion consists in the absence of such habitual admiration, and in a state of the feelings not ardent, but cold and torpid" (p. 129).

What, then, are the objects which Science recognises as the highest and the worthiest to receive the homage of this worship? The religion of Science is threefold. Its first form is the worship of the Unity of Nature, that Eternal Law of the Universe the conception of which has been becoming continually more distinct and more impressive, as science has penetrated further and further into the secrets of Nature and marked the workings of Power which is infinite and eternal. Its second form is the worship of the Forms of Nature, that is, the individual objects which excite feelings of admiration or love by their greatness or their beauty. Its third form is the worship of Humanity, distinguished from the others, not as going beyond the known realm of Nature, which, in the full meaning of the word, includes Man, but as having regard to men in their relations to one another. The religion of Nature, or Science; the Religion of Art, or the higher Paganism; the religion of Humanity, or Natural Christianity.—these

all imply a real theology which is verifiable by the methods of inductive science. Together they constitute that Natural Religion, the nature and province of which it is the author's purpose to discuss. It is "simply worship of whatever in the known universe appears worthy of worship;" and, whether this be Nature in its Unity, worshipped by the man of science, Natural forms in their beauty, worshipped by the artist, or Humanity in its moral and social relations, worshipped by those whose religion has Man for its object, in each case the object of such worship may be truly called God, and the worshippers are theists, and have a theology. Science and Art, therefore, are not secular—they have the essential character of religion, and Secularity is defined as "the absence not of one of these kinds of worship, but of all; in other words it is the paralysis of the power of admiration, and as a consequence, the predominance of the animal wants and the substitution of automatic custom for living will and intelligence" (p. 132). And as the secularist is the man who is incapable of habitual and regulated admiration, and is a stranger to the "higher life" either of Science, Art or Morals, so the atheist is not one who "disbelieves in the goodness of God, or in His distinctness from Nature, or in His personality." He must disbelieve "in the *existence* of God, that is"—notice the definition—"in *any* regularity in the Universe to which he must conform himself under penalties." This almost inconceivable state of mind in any sane person is afterwards characterised by the general term of *wilfulness*, and, in a modified degree, is ascribed to those who, "fully believing in an order of the Universe, yet have such a poor and paltry conception of it that they might almost as well have none at all." It is the pitiable state of moral starvation to which a man is reduced who never lets his mind dwell on anything great, who, from an excess of caution, turns away from that contemplation of laws and principles by which the soul of man lives. "For him there is no longer any glory in the universe. For all beauty or glory is but the presence of law; and the universe to him has ceased to be a scene of law and has become an infinite litter of detail, a

rubbish-heap of confused particulars, a mere worry and weariness to the imagination " (p. 32).

Here, in his character of atheist, we should have recognised at once our old acquaintance the typical Philistine, even if the author had not identified him in the next sentence. He is the man who has not got culture, which "would seem to be merely the *alias* which the Natural Religion of the modern world has adopted, being forbidden by orthodoxy to use the name that properly belongs to it" (p. 143).

It is rather puzzling at first, in reading a treatise on religion, to find almost all the terms which belong to the vocabulary of religion employed in a different sense from that which has the sanction of common usage. We have to keep reminding ourselves at first that "God" may stand for Nature, or for Humanity, or for any ideal, either moral or intellectual; that "religion" and "worship" describe an attitude of the mind which is illustrated by the remark that Mazzini declared Italy to be itself a religion, and that an American in Europe translates his American ways of thinking into a creed. We have to remember, too, that "Natural Religion" does not denote the religion that is natural to man, nor yet the belief in a God the evidences of whose existence are found in Nature, but, as we have said, a religion which does not go beyond the known and the natural. A further difficulty is occasioned by the ambiguous use of the words "Nature" and "Science." The former signifies sometimes, as in its commonest acceptance, the physical universe as distinguished from the moral and intellectual life of man, sometimes, and more generally, the universe including man—that is, the whole range of existence that is amenable to the methods of inductive science. And "science" itself has a corresponding two-fold meaning. It is very frequently confined to the "natural sciences," which are concerned with nature in the first and more limited sense of the word. But it is also used for the science which includes humanity in its scope, thus taking in politics, morals, and history—in fact, everything that the scientific mind recognises as within the sphere of *knowledge*

in the world of mind or matter. It is not till we are somewhat familiar with the author's argument that his uses of the technical terms he employs become distinct and self-explanatory, and there is no longer any risk of our taking his words, clear and concise as his style is, to mean something more or something less than his actual thought.

On one point of great interest, if not of actual importance so far as the main argument of the treatise is concerned, the author has had to confess that he has apparently failed to make his position generally understood. In a short preface to a later edition of the book he explains that his purpose was, as he had said at the commencement, "not to try the question between religion and science but simply to measure how much ground is common to both." Hence he made no attempt, he says, to show that the negative conclusions so often drawn from modern science were not warranted, but admitting freely for argument's sake all these conclusions, he argued that the total effect of them was not to destroy theology or religion, or even Christianity, but in some respects to revive and purify all three.

In general the negative view is regarded in this book not otherwise than as I find it to be regarded by most of those to whom the book is principally addressed, viz., as a fashionable view difficult for the moment to resist, because it seems favoured by great authorities, a view therefore concerning which, however unwillingly, we cannot help asking ourselves, What if it should turn out to be true? But if I were asked what I myself think of it, I should remark, that it is not the greatest scientific authorities who are so confident in negation but rather the inferior men who echo their opinions, but who live themselves in the atmosphere not of science but of party controversy; that fashion, it seems to me, is little less influential in opinion than in dress; that it is not on the morrow of great discoveries that we can best judge of their negative effect upon ancient beliefs; and that I am disposed to agree with those who think that in the end the new views of the Universe will not gratify an extreme party quite so much as is now supposed (*Preface to Second Edition*).

We are not then to assume that in arguing for the

sufficiency of Natural Religion for the higher life of man, and dismissing the supernatural as an accident, not an essential, of religion, the author is defining his own theological position, or that he admits that science will in the end establish any claim to limit religion to Nature. Nay, he makes the confession after all, in almost his closing words, that the religion which he has been describing may fail us at the last.

The more our thoughts widen and deepen, as the universe grows upon us and we become accustomed to boundless space and time, the more petrifying is the contrast of our own insignificance, the more contemptible become the pettiness, shortness, fragility of the individual life. A moral paralysis creeps upon us. For a while we comfort ourselves with the notion of self-sacrifice; we say, What matter if I pass, let me think of others! But the *other* has become contemptible no less than self; all human griefs alike seem little worth assuaging, human happiness too paltry at the best to be worth increasing. The whole moral world is reduced to a point, the spiritual city, "the goal of all the saints," dwindles to the "least of little stars"; good and evil, right and wrong, become infinitesimal, ephemeral matters, while eternity and infinity remain attributes of that only which is outside the realm of morality (P. 262).

These impressive words have already been often quoted, and they will not easily be forgotten. The thought which they so powerfully express will haunt the mind of many a reader of *Natural Religion*, even when he is most carried away by the author's own intense interest in his subject and by the vigour and earnestness with which, speaking on behalf of science, he has demanded the recognition of its claim as the religion of the modern world. We cannot help feeling that they are on the side of all our strongest convictions and deepest faith, and that they plead for a religion which science cannot give us, but which is in entire harmony with science, and is capable of being enriched and strengthened by it in a thousand ways.

The author has dwelt upon the surpassing grandeur of the modern scientific view of the universe, as an object of that awe and admiration which he represents as the essence

of religion. "The scientific man," he says, "has a theology and a God. A most impressive theology, a most awful and glorious God." If he meant by this simply that the conception of the universe has been widened and made in every way grander and more wonderful by the discoveries and theories of science, and that we are having ever nobler and more awe-inspiring revelations of God in Nature, few theists, either inside the Christian Church or outside, would question the fact of this fundamental harmony between the revelations of science and of religion, or would hesitate to go with the author when he characterises the former as a revelation *supplemental* to the older one. But of course he means more than this. It is not God revealed *in* Nature, but revealed *as* Nature, that is presented here as the supreme object of the worship of science; and the question is whether this is sufficient for the recognised functions of religion in relation to man's higher life. The author undertakes to show that it is. The scientific man, he says, "feels himself in the presence of a Power which is not himself and is immeasurably above himself, a Power in the contemplation of which he is absorbed, in the knowledge of which he finds safety and happiness. . . . A true theist should recognise his Deity as giving him the law to which his life ought to be conformed. Now here it is that the resemblance of modern science to theology comes out most manifestly. There is no stronger conviction in this age than the conviction of the scientific man, that all happiness depends upon the knowledge of the laws of Nature, and the careful adaptation of human life to them." Again, Nature inspires a genuine love, "though of a lower kind," than love, justice, or goodness inspires. "Nature, even if we hesitate to call it good, is infinitely interesting, infinitely beautiful. He who studies it has continually the exquisite pleasure of discerning, or half-discerning, *laws*." The imagination is set in motion. The contemplation of Nature gives endless delight and surprises into overpowering awe. And even the feeling of personal connection and as it were relationship which a worshipper should have for his Deity is not wanting. The worshipper of Nature

"cannot separate himself from that which he contemplates. . . . The same laws whose operations he watches in the Universe he may study in his own body. Heat and light and gravitation govern himself as they govern plants and heavenly bodies." (See pp. 19—22.) It is difficult to see in this presentment of the analogies between the worship of Nature and the worship of the God of Nature anything more than a proof of the insufficiency of science by itself to fulfil what we have learnt to think of as the highest and most sacred functions of religion, to inspire the love, the sense of "happiness and safety," the personal communion, the conscious life in God, which are of the very heart of faith. We might almost be pardoned if, for the moment, we questioned the seriousness of a writer who could ask us to see a counterpart of the love which unites the heart with God in spiritual communion, in the intellectual pleasure we take in beautiful and interesting things, or to find that communion itself in the sense that we are an integral part of Nature, and that we are subject to the same laws which govern the growth of a tree or the movements of the planets.

The author's strongest point in treating of the religion of natural science is in his representation of the feelings of awe and wonder which enter into religion, and which, no doubt, are in large measure derived from the contemplation of the infinitude of Nature, the "immensities and eternities" by which our little life is surrounded. We are continually receiving, through science, new and more wonderful revelations of God in Nature. And if, as our idea of God has been enlarged, and separated from many particular beliefs about Him which religion had cherished, but which science has dismissed as erroneous or imperfect, we seem to lose something of the distinctness and sense of reality which characterised the more childish or superstitious view, it is because the idea is mightier, truer, more adequate, and therefore less easily grasped by the intellect or realised by the imagination. It cannot be denied that the current conceptions of the personality and unity of God, the methods of His action in the

outward universe, and the ways in which He is revealed in Nature and in History, have all been deeply affected by the doctrines in which science expresses its fullest knowledge and its latest speculations about the universe. Even that "average Christian," for whose theology the author has but small respect, will be found to have unconsciously had his horizon widened, and to feel himself living in a more wonderful and more divine world. It is not, however, quite fair to set off the average Christian against the average scientific man, as far as what we may call the intellectual side of religion is concerned. The latter is one of a comparatively small and select class, the former is one of the great mass of men of all orders of capacity and culture; and it would be more just to select for the comparison a fair type of a fairly thoughtful and intelligent believer in Christianity. It would probably be found that his faith was no longer predominated by the old idea of the supernatural as manifested exclusively or especially in signs and wonders, which the author includes amongst the contents of the current doctrines of supernatural religion; and his belief in a personal Will as the cause of the universe would not stand or fall with the belief that that Will has "sometimes interfered by miracle with the order of Nature." No doubt the criticisms on *Natural Religion* which have appeared in orthodox or in neutral quarters, are not the productions of "average Christians," but of picked men of culture, theologians by profession, or writers who are well acquainted with the present attitude of modern theology; but the position they have taken up with regard to the fundamental question of the supernatural marks the change that has come over men's thoughts in relation to miracle. While none of them perhaps, at least none who write from a theistic point of view, would deny the *a priori* possibility of miracles, and few of them probably would question the fact of those ascribed to Jesus,—they seem almost with one consent to abandon the appeal to miracle as a proof either of the uniqueness of the mission of Christ, or as the ground for believing that the laws of Nature are the expression of a divine Will.

Their appeal is substantially from the science which knows nothing beyond the methods and laws and phenomena of Nature, not to miraculous evidences of the revelation in Christ, but to the testimony of the mind, the conscience, the religious affections and aspirations of humanity, to the unseen and unsearchable Presence revealed as causal Power in Nature, as Righteousness and as Love, first and most manifestly, in our own inner life.

We are evidently in the region of ideas which belong more distinctly to the religion that inspires the higher life when, going beyond the teachings of natural science, we come to that branch of the threefold religion which is identified with the science of Humanity. The author himself frequently asserts its supremacy; and though he makes a point of showing that the religion of natural science or the religion of art may exist apart from morals, and still have its proper effect in keeping life above the lower levels of secularity and conventionalism,* he yet does not contemplate their permanent separation from the religion which is concerned with men's relation to one another. We should not, therefore, be delivered over by science merely to a worship of the awful Being who is revealed in the impersonal forces of Nature, which are as often terrifying and destructive as they are beneficent and life-giving in their effects.

We should read His character not merely in the earthquake and fire, but also in the still small voice; not merely in the destroying powers of the world, but, as Mohammed said, in the compassion that we feel for one another; not merely in the storm that threatens the sailor with death, but in the lifeboat and the Grace Darling that put out from shore to the rescue; not merely in the intricate laws that confound our prudence, but in the science that penetrates them and the art which makes them subservient to our purposes; not merely in the

* See the remarkable pages (120 *sqq.*) in which a portrait is drawn of the artist, who "would rather on his death-bed have it to reflect that he had painted a really good picture, or written a really good poem, than that he had done his duty under great temptations and at great sacrifice;" and of the scientific investigator who thinks "How much better it is to have advanced our knowledge of the laws of the universe only by a step than to have lived the most virtuous life or died the most self-sacrificing death!"

social evils that fill our towns with misery and cover our frontiers with war, but in the St. Francis that makes himself the brother of the miserable, and in the Fox and Penn that proclaim principles of peace (p. 69).

This is well and strikingly said, and the facts to which it calls attention are of avail, as far as they go, to relieve the feeling of helplessness and the sense of nothingness in presence of "the pitiless immensity of the power that is not ours," the "great Necessity," which science substitutes for Providence, the awful impersonal Unity of Nature in which our little moment of individual life—nay, the whole duration of our present world in Time—is but as one beat of the pendulum of Eternity. But suppose our view of human life as well as of nature is tinged with pessimism; suppose we are not able to believe in any preponderance of good over evil; suppose that the unity of Nature and Humanity should seem to us the most evidently realised when man moves calmly on his own path, with the same unimpassioned, irresistible order as that of the forces of Nature, and with as little regard to the consequences for good or evil. Nero or Theebaw may be said to be as true a type of human nature in some of its aspects as any saint or hero; and if we accept the purely scientific view of humanity, and reduce all the springs of human conduct to the working of certain motives and feelings which begin and end with man in his relation to his fellows as part of the known universe, we do not see why the deeds which are called evil should arouse moral condemnation, any more than do the devastations of a hurricane or an earthquake. All that we can reasonably say is that there is some use in visiting with our displeasure and punishing the selfishness or the crime which inflicts injury on others, because this will have its influence in restraining the offence; while it is no use being angry with the fire that has burnt us or the flood that would drown us. There are laws, says our author, which are not pitiless. "There are laws under which churches and philanthropical societies are formed, under which misery is sought out and relieved and every evil that can be discovered in the world

is redressed. Nature . . . includes all the pity that belongs to the whole human family " (p. 68). Yes, but Nature in its unity includes all the cruelty too, all the wickedness, all the darkness as well as the light. If we are to select as worthy of our worship the things which call forth our admiration and love, what are we to do with those which inspire us with horror and fear in Nature, or with sorrow, or anger and condemnation in Humanity? It is one thing to set before our minds an ideal Unity of Law as an object of enthusiastic contemplation, or an ideal of natural Beauty, or an ideal of Humanity. Science is limited to a knowledge of things as they are. It makes us acquainted with a physical world in which the working of the changeless laws of nature issue in countless forms of suffering and destruction as well as of happiness and life; and a moral world in which the virtue and the happiness are set off against a dark background of vice and misery. Any view of nature and life which gives us the thought of a Power working for *good* in and through all this, of a divine purpose being effected, a divine meaning expressed, —this may indeed reveal a unity in which the contradictions are reconciled, and the true, the beautiful, and the good are seen and worshipped as the manifestations of that unity; and it may enable us to set before ourselves an ideal of virtue, of holiness of love in humanity. But this is to go beyond what science reveals, unless, indeed, science takes cognizance of those faculties of the human mind which are concerned in that religion which at present is represented as being under a cloud, that faith in an unseen world and a living God which has generally been assumed to be of the essence of religion.

And this suggests the further remark that the word "Humanity" does not stand only for the facts of our outward and inward life in our relation to one another and to the universe. It includes all the aspirations, the affections, the hopes and beliefs which connect it with that which is above and beyond humanity, and above and beyond the nature of which it is a part. Our author's persistent use of the term Natural Religion for a religion which is directed towards

the unity of Nature as apprehended by science, has almost made us forget the meaning which rather belongs to it by right of general usage. And he himself seems to have forgotten, or at least to have dismissed from his view, as having no claim to be even considered by the philosopher and man of science, that Theism, which both exists as a distinct type of religion, and is the ultimate faith which is partially obscured in the Christian and other systematised theologies by certain associated doctrines which it seems impossible to reconcile with it. Its inspiration is an affection which responds to a divine call, its revelation is in the law of truth in the reason, of right in the conscience, of love in the affections. How far this faith in God as a living God, transcending Nature, and revealing Himself in the hearts of His children, is a part of the spiritual inheritance which, in the case of Christian civilisation, can never be separated from the teaching of Christ and the principles which underlie the doctrines of Christianity, is a question which need not here be discussed. Certain it is that an increasing number of those who refer their faith to the historical revelation embodied in the Gospels, as well as those who take the position of what is called pure Theism, as distinguished from any particular traditional form of it, do refer their faith, in the last resort, to the normal inspiration of God in the soul, and see no more reason for doubting the veracity of the faculties which report to them concerning the supernatural world than that of the senses and the intellect by which they know the facts of the natural world. And with regard to the branch of Natural Religion which our author bases on a sense of the relations of man to man as members of the human family, we may see how in the Christian or Theistic view it is not less "natural" to refer the law of right, and the feelings and motives which connect men in a common *brotherhood* and build up States, to a source in a supreme righteousness and love that are not ideal but real.

We have spoken of the Theistic view of the universe as a part of the common heritage of Christendom, received in due course of historical descent from the founder of

Christianity, who himself had carried on the great line of religious development the history of which is to be read in the Old Testament. The author of *Natural Religion* makes the same claim for "the religion of ideal humanity," by which phrase he expresses what he conceives to be the essence of Christianity. It is a religion which is independent of supernaturalism, but at the same time is historic, not abstract, not breaking with the Christian tradition or discarding the Christian documents as obsolete. This view is set forth in the highly-interesting and important chapter on "Natural Christianity." We must be content to refer our readers to it for the author's extremely suggestive remarks on what constitutes the true unity of the Bible, which he finds to be "the idea of morality inspired and vivified by religion" (pp. 169—176); also for the distinction drawn between Christianity considered as supernatural law enforced by rewards and punishments, and as a religion according to its larger conception (pp. 158—161). The author concludes that, in the former sense, Christianity is not likely just now to have a revival. But, as there is a religion "which is concealed under the name of culture, and which lies at the basis of all art and science," is there not similarly, he asks, "a religion hidden under morality, and may not this moral religion be called Natural Christianity?" His answer is that the "ideal religion of humanity" may claim this title by right of historic descent. "The miracles of the Bible, if the world should ultimately decide to reject them, would fall away, and in doing so would undoubtedly damage the orthodox system. But the Natural Christianity sketched in this chapter would not be damaged." No, nor would Christianity that is supernatural, in the true acceptation of the word, be damaged either. But then, it is not the miracles only that Christianity is asked to part with. It is the higher supernaturalism of the Bible—the belief in a personal Deity, a living Spirit in conscious relations with the human spirit, the God whom Christ worshipped. We are invited, in the name of science, to eliminate from Christianity the conception of a Being whom its founder spoke of in words of matchless simplicity and reality as a

living God, a Father whose love responds to our love, who knows our thoughts and hears our prayers; a God whom we worship not only in admiration, awe, and love on our part, but in a spiritual communion in which He comes to us as we draw nigh to Him, and which death can only make more near and real. But if we are to get rid of the supernatural in this its higher essential meaning, and imagine a Christianity without a personal God and a future life, might not what is left be better called "unnatural" than "natural" Christianity?

This residuum, however, is what the author seems to think alone worth considering as a form of religion which, to judge from the tendencies and pretensions of science to-day, is likely to survive the revolutions of modern thought; and he connects with it much of the equanimity with which he tries to contemplate the possible loss of the supernatural element from the current beliefs and worships. He asks whether we may not look forward to a revival of the essential part of Christianity. "May we not hope to see a religion that shall appeal to the sense of duty as forcibly, preach righteousness and truth, justice and mercy, as solemnly and exclusively, as Christianity itself does, only so as not to shock modern ideas of the universe?" Well, this depends upon what the modern ideas of the universe are which shall have justified their claims to such consideration, and whether the negations of science are to be considered as established, as well as its affirmations. The author, as we have seen, only admits the negations for argument's sake, and he considers that they are characteristic of the inferior men rather than of the greatest scientific authorities. This being the case, it does seem too much to expect the Christian Church to put "Humanity" for "God," even for argument's sake, till the negations of science have proved to be something more than a fashion of opinion. The author's argument, however, goes much further, and is advanced more confidently, than this. He says that, as virtue can only show itself in our relations to our fellow-men, the religion which leads to virtue *must* be a religion that worships *men*. But we fail to see that he justifies this position by the very true

remark: "If in God Himself we did not believe qualities analogous to the human to exist, the worship of Him would not lead to virtue; the worship of God not as we believe Him, but as we see Him in non-human nature, would be likely, taken by itself, to lead to pitiless fanaticism" (p. 167). Christian Theism emphatically affirms that the words, love, goodness, justice, mean to us nothing as describing the attributes of God if they do not mean the same thing as when they are used of human character. But it is a very violent measure to turn this affirmation of supernaturalism to its own destruction, and to say that if you worship a God whose image is reflected in humanity, you are in fact worshipping men.

If Christianity, in so far as it embodies a doctrine of the supernatural, has played its part and is to be finally discredited by the new revelation of science, it may be time to call upon it to give place to the worship of Nature, to the higher Paganism, to the religion that begins and ends with Humanity. But the author's resolute determination to look facts in the face and be satisfied with no unrealities does seem to fail him when he tries to persuade us that there is anything of the character of reconciliation in the proposal that Christians should agree, for the time being, to terms by which Science holds all its own, and Christianity gives up just what has hitherto been allowed by common consent to be its supreme possession.

It is so evidently more serviceable, in dealing with a speculative book, to discuss some of the points which do not command our assent, or to follow out some line of thought suggested by what we have been reading, that it hardly need be said that the view we have taken of the author's general position does not afford any measure at all of the value we set upon his wonderfully interesting and stimulating book. Nor have we made the vain attempt to give, in the compass of a short article, any adequate idea of the whole course of its argument, or the sum of its practical conclusions.

It is impossible to read the book, and exercise our own independent judgment in doing so, without a distinct intellectual and moral gain. The boldness and freedom with

which the author discards every merely traditional method of dealing with religion, the determination with which he clears away the conventionalisms, the make-believes, the timidities with which it is unhappily so liable to be surrounded, is in every way wholesome and refreshing. Where he is least convincing, he is not least stimulating, and when we hesitate to accept his position, or are dissatisfied with the answer he gives or suggests, we are forced to ask ourselves what our own position is, and what answer we ourselves should give. When we find him so dealing with the distinctive terms of theology and religion as scarcely to leave one of them possessed of just its current meaning or its current limitations, we may demur to his new definitions; but at least we are compelled to consider what we ourselves mean and understand by the words we are constantly using—whether they stand for facts in our own religious experience, or are among the sacred conventionalities which a spurious reverence forbids us to meddle with. And we are started on a line of inquiry the most fruitful in practical issues, when we have been made to feel the necessity of knowing whether the most vigorous forces actually at work in fashioning the lives of men are for us or against us, what beliefs are worthy of the name, and what is the faith by which we really live. There is a moral enthusiasm and seriousness of purpose throughout the whole treatise which is notable in these days of sceptical indifference or of aimless diletantism. Even when the author is evidently, and perhaps confessedly, not satisfied with the view he is urging, and where, at any rate, he does not commit himself to it, he is always bent on making the best, and not the worst of it. Indeed, in this respect we do not think that in his representation of the Science which occupies such a large space in his argument, he has really done what he says—in his new explanatory Preface—he felt bound to do in pursuance of his plan, viz., to take the scientific view “frankly at its worst.” He has assumed, for the sake of argument, that science does not recognise as an object of knowledge the existence of any reality which its own methods will not avail to discover.

But he has not taken it as estimating the quality and worth of life by its meaner origins, interpreting the great by the small, the grand by the paltry, and minimising the wonder and the beauty which we are to discover and admire. Nor does he take it in that form in which alone he says it penetrates, either of useful information or else of a negative doctrine opposed to religion. It is not science at its worst, but in some respects at its best, which presents us with an idea of the universe which is vast, awful, and inspiring, and which includes in its survey the phenomena of the life of man, "with whatever more awful forces stir within the human heart." And in taking it thus the author has done a genuine service both to the science with which he has connected the emotions and thoughts most in harmony with religion; and to the theology which will never be true to the facts of religion until it has intensely realised the universe as the realm of universal law, and seen the revelation of God in the grand course of Nature, in the world of matter and of mind—God *in* Nature, God *in* Humanity.

We have said enough on the few points we have been able to consider in the author's teaching to show that we do not think he has succeeded, even from the point of view which he has assumed (which is not necessarily his own personal position), in vindicating for the new disturbing forces a reconstructive power by which they may be qualified to succeed to the inheritance of Christianity, and build up a Church with Nature and Humanity as its God, and Civilisation or Culture as its religion. And while we may see no reason for refusing to grant the distinction drawn between *religions* and *a religion*, and to extend the secondary uses of the word worship to the emotions of awe and admiration which may be felt in the presence of Nature in its unity, or in the contemplation of the virtues of the saints and heroes of humanity, we are not prepared to sacrifice, at the bidding of Science, what seem to us the highest and deepest meaning of the words. And we think that the attempt to identify the essential qualities of the religion of Nature, or Science, and the religion of God, or religion

par excellence, must always fail when it is brought to the test of the facts of the highest life of man.

We lay down the book, then, after repeated perusals, and say that it has seemed richer each time in suggestiveness, and more impressive in its earnestness and serious courage, more searching in its criticisms of life. And yet the feeling of disappointment and misgiving does not pass away. Instead of having been reassured and made more hopeful, we have felt increasing doubt whether such high enthusiasms and eager interests and admirations as the author has connected with Natural Science, with Art, and with the Science of Humanity will ever exercise the true controlling power of religion, except in the case, perhaps, of the comparatively few whose nature is more highly strung, and who belong—to borrow the author's phrase—to the "genius party" in science; or are capable in the possible measure of their influence on the "average man" of ever lifting humanity as a whole to any high religious conception of life, or of taking the place of that faith in the living God and a Future Life, of which Science, *per se*, professes to know nothing, but which is the inspiration of duty and the sanction of hope and love. It is the author's own saying that, "when the supernatural does not come in to overwhelm the natural, and turn life upside down, when it is admitted that religion deals in the first instance with the known and the natural, then we may well begin to doubt whether the known and the natural can suffice for human life. No sooner do we try to think so than pessimism raises its head" (p. 261).

We entirely demur, however, to the justice of the representation of supernaturalism here as coming in to "overwhelm the natural and turn life upside down." This can only be said of supernaturalism as identified with the miraculous—and with the miraculous in a sense which seems to be retiring more and more from the foreground of Christian doctrine, even where it has not disappeared from view altogether. To make the belief in the supernatural revealed in the constant order of Nature stand or fall, with its alleged manifestations in certain events which were supposed to be

beside that order, is to confuse the whole view of the subject; and we can only wonder that a writer so anxious to dispel the misconceptions occasioned by the misuse of words should have himself introduced a verbal confusion into such an important passage as we have quoted above. He himself has said that "the thought of a Supreme Being . . . is excited at least as much by law itself as by the suspension of law;" and he cannot mean that the natural is overwhelmed and life turned upside down by the faith that sees in the steadfast order of nature, and in all the course of human life, the working of a divine will and the working out of a divine purpose. It seems strange that this faith should have been scarcely recognised in an essay on the province of religion, except apparently in inseparable connection with certain views of the miraculous credentials of Christianity and all the associated doctrines of traditional orthodoxy.

The author does not deny—indeed, he frequently asserts with emphasis—that Christianity has in it something far higher and deeper, and more ennobling, than the religion of Nature or of Art. It is when he contrasts the "average scientific man" with the "average Christian" that he represents the latter as having so much poorer a type of religion. And so he has, no doubt, if he has nothing better than the idea of God that has been "degraded by childish and little-minded teaching," by which "the Eternal and the Infinite and the All-embracing has been represented as the head of the clerical interest, as a sort of clergyman, as a sort of schoolmaster, as a sort of philanthropist" (p. 19).

It must be admitted that there is a vein of exaggeration and caricature in this; and keenly alive as we may be to the constant descent of the popular religion from its high argument, and the way in which the imagination has been allowed to materialise and degrade instead of heightening and vivifying the conceptions of religion, we think, as we have already said, that the author has not allowed for the extent to which the teachings of science have already enlarged the conception of God, even in connection with the

current beliefs of average Christians. They certainly are apt to withstand the conclusions of science when these seem to come into direct conflict with what they have been accustomed to think of as the infallible Word of God in the Bible. But even here our average Christian begins to show some signs of discrimination; and surprising concessions are every now and then made, which are so many victories of science and common-sense. And as to the "definite facts and actual computations" by which the scientific man is said, rather oddly, to realise infinity and eternity, there are few of those who are within reach of the merest elements of ordinary education who do not get some glimpse into those infinite vistas of space and time which science has opened to the mind.

And this suggests the obvious remark that, in fact, neither science nor religion, considered as two different things, have ever been able to exist independently of one another. If on certain points they have seemed to come into collision and to be mutually exclusive, there are a hundred respects in which they are inseparable, a hundred ways in which they influence one another. Man cannot live by science alone, neither can he live by religion alone. The intellectual part of our nature requires, and always gets in a healthy life, its share of nurture and its sphere of action. So also does the spiritual and emotional part. The man of science and culture stands in the same actual relation to the unseen spiritual world (if it exists) as does the most unscientific of Christians, and he may have the more spiritual faith of the two if his whole nature is cultivated; but he has it not by virtue of his intellectual knowledge by itself, but by the religious feeling and the consciousness of a divine presence which accompanies it.

It is all very well, in theory, to represent science as realising the awful thoughts of infinity and eternity. These thoughts, of and by themselves, are simply bewildering and baffling to the intellect; and the idea of the "immensities" and the "eternities," if they are only filled by the "silences" from which comes no word of mind, or will, or love, are to the heart of man too solemn and terrible to inspire a

feeling of "safety and happiness." What there is of religious adoration and trust in these excursions of the mind "as far off as the fixed stars," and beyond the beginning of time, is due, we may venture to believe, to the real, though it may be the obscurely felt and scarce recognised, presence of the Being who fills the universe. Certainly the theist will be the last to deny that science, in so far as it gets at the truth of things, is helping to reveal God by giving us a truer knowledge of the laws by which He governs the universe of Nature or of Man, and by "dispersing every day some noxious superstition, some cowardice of the human spirit." If he has a living religion, and not merely a set of opinions petrified into obsolete dogmatic forms, he will welcome with eagerness the wonderful revelations, made by science, of the methods of the divine working in Nature, including the organic laws of human society and individual character. But then he will also think it the most natural thing in the world that God should reveal Himself to man in other ways than those which science is inclined at present to recognise; and that if man is indeed His child "made in His image and likeness," He will be with him in the hidden life, in some real spiritual communion, in dim mysterious feelings of awe and love, or in the commanding voice of conscience and the uplifting power of divine affection. When, therefore, it comes to asking how far science can provide us with a working substitute for faith, and what function the Church can fulfil when she has become universal by limiting her creed to that residuum of deity which may be left when we have taken away everything which is not included in Science, we may ask whether, in the nature of things, the religious life is capable of being so manipulated, and what would be the gain to science which would compensate for the loss to religion, supposing the elimination were effected.

The author speaks of some common *action* which might be for the first time possible if we would but confine our attention to the things in which science and religion agree. But this is possible in any case when we unite for a common object affecting our intellec-

tual or moral life. And as to the "doctrine of civilisation" which is to redeem an unscientific and Philistine world, is not its diffusion the chief object, however imperfectly appreciated and carried out, of all the most powerful and flourishing institutions of society? What else is the use of our schools and universities, our literature, our art exhibitions and science lectures, our philanthropies, and all our contrivances for making humanity richer in knowledge, in moral good, in happiness, in essential life? Why have the immense interests and almost resistless intellectual forces which Science has at its disposal been able, with all this machinery, to do so little to regenerate the world? Surely such a weak thing as the Church is represented as being cannot have had any power to interfere.

The author reproaches it, with only too much justice, though in exaggerated terms, for its failure to present to the conscience of the nation a true ideal of national greatness, or, indeed, any ideal at all.* "Its teaching," he says, "is so archaic as to be in great part scarcely intelligible without the aid of ancient history, while the methods of tests and exclusions has drained it of intellectual vigour, and has left it mainly under the control of anxious, nerveless minds; so that it is hardly listened to by men of the world, except on the ground that Anility and Puerility after all are forces, and might do untold mischief if they were needlessly provoked. The religious world, which ought, one would suppose, to cherish the high ideal that the community wants, has, in fact, an ideal almost lower than that of the community" (p. 135). So far as this is true, the Church has been leaving the field more and more free for the operation of those new and vigorous forces which science has at its disposal. And yet the author's complaint is that "science only penetrates either in the form of useful information, or else in that of a negative doctrine opposed to religion; as itself a main part of religion, as the grand revelation of God in these later times, supplementing rather

* We must refer our readers to the admirable pages, in which the author exposes the false ideals, or rather the absence of any ideal in our national life (pp. 133—135).

than superseding the older revelations, it remains almost as much unknown as in the dark ages" (p. 209). If this be so Natural Religion would seem to be in not much better case than Supernatural, even when the latter is described in the scathing words which we have quoted, and which apply only too truly to much that passes for religion in these days.

Science is free where religion is fettered; it is strong, buoyant, self-asserting, where religion is timid and conventional; it concerns itself with practical interests, and provides for the happiness and safety of the community, while religion, in its prevailing forms, has no close association with men's ordinary thoughts and feelings and their strongest motives of action. And yet science has done so little for the higher life! The inference would seem not an unsound one that science has not yet proved its claim to fulfil the functions of religion, and that the Church may still have time to reform itself, not by any reversion to an obsolete past, or by a more strenuous preaching of doctrines which are out of harmony with the best culture and the most deeply felt interests of the age; still less by an act of practical self-effacement, which would, as the phrase goes, "reform it off the face of the earth;" but by awakening to a new enthusiasm, a new trust in every revelation of truth, every source of light and knowledge. The author's description of what the Church of Natural Religion should be which would be equal to the functions required of it by the present age, will apply almost to the letter to the Church of God which bears its witness to the unseen spiritual life and is founded on the rock below the shifting sands of opinion and the knowledge that passes away. It is called to undertake new duties, to be, as it once was, a power that holds society together, and keeps an ideal of civilisation before it. "The clergy of such a Church, if it should have a clergy, would be subjected to no tests of opinion, but only to tests of character and competence. It would be held that liberty of opinion was the first condition of efficiency as teachers." It must be bound by no rigid formularies and articles; it must have its life not in the past, but in the present and the future. "Life looks onward, not backward."

The preparations for such a vital reform have been long going on, openly or without observation, in all the Churches of Christendom; but the hindrances to its practical realisation are numerous and formidable enough to discourage the most sanguine. If they prove insuperable, we may be sure that it is revolution, not reformation, that is imminent. Religion and science are hardly likely ever to agree to such articles of peace as those we have been called upon to discuss. But if religion will but come boldly forth from the cloister, and breathe the air of freedom, and have its being in the great world of life and thought, and learn to look "not backward, but onward," it may yet convert its rival or enemy into its fast ally, and find that it has once more on its side all the strongest convictions, and the most ardent hopes and aspirations, and the deepest faith of humanity.

THE EDITOR.

PROGRESS AND POVERTY.*

DURING the last half-century much thought and investigation have been devoted to the study of the conditions and prospects of poverty. What can the State do to lift to a richer level the poorest stratum of its subjects? has been the problem of problems with thinker after thinker, with philosopher and prophet and poet and practical man of the world. And what has resulted from all this thought and from many a hard-won legislative triumph? If we see our way any clearer, can we see our way to *doing* anything? Or are the conditions of the poorest decidedly better than they were? Undoubtedly, those who will read these pages, and most of those whom our readers employ, are respectively better supplied with necessities and luxuries than were people in like position in the early part of this century. And perhaps the poorest boy in a large town has occasional enjoyments which were beyond the attainment of princes fifty years ago. But the question is not whether shoemakers in regular work to-day are better off than the regularly employed shoemakers of the past, or whether more bread and groceries a head are consumed per annum now than in the year 1840. The question is, whether we have at the poorest level of the social strata a class whose struggle for the necessities of life is as hard and as hopeless as that of the corresponding class in the past; and whether this class is as large as ever. And more, are we any nearer to a remedy for the ills of the very poor; do we know any better how to prevent the existence of masses of dense poverty?

* *Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions, and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth. The Remedy.* By HENRY GEORGE. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1882.

As to the probable numbers and poverty of our very poor we cannot consult a more hard-headed and reliable authority than Professor Fawcett. In 1871, when Free Trade and kindred forces had received at least as fair a trial as since, and had provided their arrays of statistics startling enough to silence the most querulous grumblers, Professor Fawcett wrote as follows * :—

We are accustomed to hear much boasting about the vast wealth of England. We are told that our exports and imports are rapidly increasing ; glowing descriptions are given of our Empire upon which the sun never sets, and of a commerce which extends over the world. Our mercantile marine is ever increasing ; manufactories are augmenting in number and in magnitude. All the evidences of growing luxury are around us ; there are more splendid equipages in the parks, and the style of living is each year becoming more sumptuous. This is one side of the picture ; and if we could look upon it and close our eyes to other sights and close our ears to other sounds that are around us, we might fold ourselves in the mantle of self-complacency, and repeat the platitudes so often uttered that nothing can exceed the happiness and prosperity of England. But let us look on another side of the picture, and what do we then observe ? Side by side with this vast wealth, closely contiguous to all this sinful luxury, there stalks the fearful spectre of wide-spread poverty and of growing pauperism ! Visit the great centres of our commerce and trade, and what will be observed ? The direst poverty always accompanying the greatest wealth. . . . Official returns show that in London there are never less than 125,000 paupers, and that as each winter recurs the number rises to 170,000. There is abundant reason to conclude that a number at least equally large are just on the verge of pauperism, often struggling with admirable resolution to obtain their own livelihood, and frequently suffering far more than is endured by the recipient of parochial relief. But it is not only in our large towns that this widespread poverty is to be observed ; the condition of the rural population is scarcely more satisfactory.† . . . How

* *Pauperism : its Causes and Remedies.* The substance of a course of lectures in the University of Cambridge. Macmillan.

† If our personal observations do not convince us of the justice of Mr. Fawcett's sentence as to rural life, we must remember how easily the poor can now move into the towns and swell the ranks of poverty there.

comes it that the augmented produce is so distributed that the condition of those who till the soil has not only not improved, but has in some cases retrograded ? How, again, does it happen that the greater is the wealth accumulated in our large towns, the deeper seem to be the depths of poverty into which vast multitudes sink ? By an official return just issued it is shown that there is at the present time (1871) an annual increase, amounting to £10,000,000, in the export and import trade of this country. . . . Mr. W. J. Fox, who was, perhaps, at one time, the most distinguished orator of the party (Anti-Corn Law League), when addressing a large meeting in Covent-garden Theatre, asserted that the abolition of protection would exterminate pauperism ; and he predicted that in a few years the ruins of the workhouses would mark the extinction of protection. If any one, a quarter of a century since, could have foreseen all that was about to take place ; if he could have known that trade was soon to be trebled ; that railways would be taken to almost every *small* town in the kingdom, would it not have appeared absolutely incredible that all these favourable agencies should have produced so little effect that *it may now be fairly disputed whether the poverty of the poor has been perceptibly diminished ?* There has, no doubt, been an unprecedented accumulation of wealth, but this wealth has been unhappily so distributed that the rich have become much richer, *whilst the poor have remained as poor as they were before.*

This may fairly be taken as the verdict of our most skilled inquirer. To say, in the face of such evidence, that the condition of our very poor is progressing surely, although slowly, is rather stupidity than optimism. An unskilled judge will more rationally conclude that, slowly but surely, things are getting worse.

But, it will be replied, we, at least, see our way to grappling with the advance of this evil. Those who have depicted these harrowing facts, and have sympathised most radically with the poor, have also discovered with scientific precision the causes of poverty and its remedy.

Yes ; we are told by the same authority that the causes are very obvious, and the remedies are simple, though not easy. There is no disputing them. On this point, happily, politicians of both parties are agreed. There is a patriotic concord as to the only means of deliverance from our most

distressing and alarming ill at home. The remedy is educational and not revolutionary. Thrift and abstinence from improvident and injudicious marriages, &c., will prevent poverty and low wages. Without these any other attempt at remedy will only make the condition of the poorest worse. To encourage hopes of alleviation from any other sources in lieu of these is cruelty. The false, mistaken kindness of the Poor-Law and of benevolent private effort has hindered people from seeing and learning the natural and inevitable consequences of common human actions. All we can do for the permanent improvement of the poor is to teach them how to help themselves by conforming to the irresistible laws of nature.

And so, many who have been most anxious for the enrichment of the poor, if necessary even at the expense of the rich, are compelled by sheer common sense to own themselves and all philanthropy and statecraft helpless. Their helplessness has been enormously self-compensating. Their conviction of the impotence of the State or of money to lift out of their poverty the recurring generations of the very poor has filled them with more pitying inventive many-sided personal zeal. The characteristic of those who have been most prominent and energetic and self-sacrificing of late in attempts to cope with the masses of poverty has been a certain hardness. Hardness has become the religion of philanthropists, and every religion has its phrases which degenerate into cant on the lips of some of its devotees. "No pauperising" has become a second "No Popery" shriek. "Is there a market for you?" has been the successor of "Are you saved?" Yet no one who knows them for a moment doubts that there has been a nobility and heroism and tenderness and stern martyr-like self-repression about many who have seemed hard as flint in their dealings with the poor. They have been merciless as the gentlest warrior may be merciless in some dreadful critical battle upon which hangs the fate of unseen homes and unborn babes. And the very voices that have cried alike to kid-gloved alms-givers, whose ready hands were in their well-filled pockets, and to tender-hearted

Communists eagerly grasping at the pockets of the State, "Hands off, in the interests of the unborn poor," have been the first to say that the rich may find plenty to do for the poor, in beautifying and refining their homes and haunts, and in sharing with them some of their own most costly privileges. Much energy has been liberated which would have been spent in political agitation had there been any measure to fight for which, like the abolition of the Corn Laws and Protection, promised wide-spread relief to poverty. This energy has had its out-put in varied and blessed channels which might otherwise have never been opened. Such bodies as the Kyrle Society and others, which bring the rich into close contact with the poor, probably number among their most active members men and women who might have been leading Revolutionists had not the unanswerable science of political economy taught them that nothing great can be hoped for from legislation; that no new legislative stroke, however revolutionary, can diminish poverty, that the laws of population and supply-and-demand are as unerring as the law of gravitation. We have concluded that patience is a necessity, and have made a virtue of this necessity. The utmost which our intelligence would allow our democratic sympathies to do has been to give a moral, but unasked-for support to trades-unions, &c. We may have wished that the country would turn its attention to Mill's doctrine about the un-earned increment. But we have at the same time felt that this would be of very little use to the poor. For we have seen that, with every increase of their wealth, there must be a fatally disproportionate increase in the number of hungry mouths. Practical legislative effort has been forbidden by those dogmas, those unquestionabilities of political economy which have inherited that abandoned air of absolute finality which was once supposed to attach exclusively to the formularies of the clergy. I am not joking or exaggerating. There are hundreds of men, beneath middle-age, of vigour and ability, to whom inaction on behalf of poverty has been intensely painful and yet a solemn duty. If current doctrines have checked nothing else, they have checked hope and thought in the

direction of solutions of our problem. From such a point of view there has seemed to educated Englishmen to be an ineradicable hopelessness in things themselves. They have seen all that Mr. Mallock has cleverly palmed off upon himself as his contribution to a new science; and more, for the science which has forbidden their hopes has been much more definite and elaborate than any that can possibly group itself around his fragment.

Mr. Mallock's work * reminds us that it may not be waste of time to emphasize this fact, that the science of political economy has been intensely anti-revolutionary in its bearings. The philosophising radicals whom he would fain deter in their course of destruction really need nothing more deterrent than their own theories supply them with. His book shows no familiarity whatever with the common leading tenets of our English political economists. Had he devoted a single page of his work to a *résumé* of the main principles enunciated by Mill, Fawcett, and Thorold Rogers, he might have spared his efforts to prove the impossibility of universal pecuniary equality,† and the need of any further ingenuity in this direction; unless his object is to fortify the hearts of those two splendidly-dressed ladies in the carriage whom he shields from Mr. Bright's wanton shafts. He has mistaken the combination of Radical and political economist in the same man for a proof that political economy is the source of Radicalism. But it is easier and more natural to suppose that the man made political economy his study because, to begin with, he had democratic sympathies, than that his desire and hopes of ameliorating the condition of the masses sprang from his devotion to political economy, which has hitherto been a revelation of the complex and permanent difficulties presented by nature to any attempt to alter existing proportions in the distribution of wealth. Mr. Mallock does not even seem to be aware that political

* *Social Equality: a Short Study in a Missing Science.*

† His book should rather have been entitled, "Pecuniary Equality," or "Economic Equality." A veritable work from his hands on social equality would be most interesting, especially if he broke his convenient silence as to the fact that he has in Mr. Matthew Arnold a foeman worthier of his peculiar metal than Mr. John Bright.

economy has generally been regarded, alike by philanthropists and socialists, as the "dismal science," forbidding hope in their direction. *E.g.*—"With regard, however, to voluntary poverty, it will be one main object of these pages to prove that the leniency and want of firmness with which it has been treated may probably be regarded as the most powerful of all the agencies which have produced the widespread distress which afflicts even the most wealthy countries."*

Philosophic Radicals like Mill and Fawcett have been so anxious for national education, because they have felt that only an educated people could rise to a scientific appreciation of the real difficulties which beset their financial progress. Ill educated people might imagine that, if the State were to appropriate the land and to distribute the capital of our millionaires, poverty would be annihilated. An educated people will be able to understand economic laws, to see which are laws of nature, and which, "subject to certain conditions, depend on human will," to see how helpless the State is unless the people who compose it conform to the permanent laws of nature.

Let us try to state in a few sentences how the problem of poverty will present itself to a people well enough educated to read Mill and Fawcett.

These economists teach that wages tend always to a certain minimum rate; that there is a certain minimum of earnings on less than which people cannot, or will not, live; and that the natural state of things tends to force the wages of the worst paid labour down to this minimum. According as this minimum is lowered or raised will the whole scale of wages in a country be lowered or raised; for the wages of the higher grades of skill are acted upon by the same causes as force up or down the lowest grade. Wages tend down to this minimum rate because population tends to increase as fast as wages will allow. If through any improvement, lessening the cost of common articles, the value of wages is increased, or if emigration

* Fawcett, *Pauperism*, p. 9.

raises the wages of those who remain behind, the downward tendency will again operate, because population will increase with the increased ease of livelihood.

To say the same thing in slightly altered language, the rate of wages depends on supply and demand. The Capital of the Country, or the Wages Fund, furnishes the total wages of that country to the masses of the people. Thus capitalists will have to pay a rate of wages large or small according as the population of the country is so scarce or so plentiful that there is little or much competition against one another on the part of the people for the lump sum of capital at their disposal. But the higher wages are, the more rapidly will population increase, and the increased competition of wage receivers will thus always tend to bring down the rate of wages to the minimum on which the masses of the people can or will subsist. If capitalists were to pay a higher rate of wages than that fixed by the inter-action of supply and demand, they would increase the difficulties of a future day, for they would enable population to outstrip its natural limits. And this is the effect on a smaller scale of all alms-giving to the poor, and of a lenient Poor-Law. And so much more are Communistic schemes forbidden by the facts of life.

Thus have our scientific political economists stated the causes which impede the progress of the poorest classes. They have elaborated and enforced this main thought with pages of arguments and facts which are eloquently and simply set forth in such chapters as those of Mill on "The Law of the Increase and Production from Land" (Book I., 12, 13), and those on wages (Book II., 11—13). To sum up the case in a motto from Mr. Mill, which Mr. Mallock might have taken for the hat-band of his newly-dressed scarecrow, "The niggardliness of nature, not the injustice of society, is the cause of the penalty attached to over-population." (I. 13, ii.)

To shirk the acknowledgment of, or to be sceptical about, these iron conditions which environ poverty, has hitherto been condemned as rank ignorance or criminal folly by the very men who have often been regarded by society as

dangerous democratic doctrinaires. At the same time, the force of these ideas has silently seized the minds of all people sufficiently educated to entertain abstract questions, and an unmentioned Malthusianism dominates the thought of our most Conservative Poor-Law reformers and charity organisationists.

I have dwelt thus lengthily on the condition of dominant economic thought in England, because only those who realise the air of finality which prevails on this subject can appreciate the enormous importance of Mr. George's *Progress and Poverty* as a new contribution to the science of political economy. The kind of sacred obligation which attaches, in the minds of our most serious and sober social reformers, to the principles I have quoted, accounts, I suppose, for the silence that has been accorded to the book and has kept most English readers unaware that there has been circulating in our libraries for some two or three years a well-sustained impeachment of the main current principles of political economy. Only a skilled economist is capable of dealing adequately with the chain of Mr. George's argument. The damaging effect upon the influence of our economic writers which has ensued from their blank silence is very dangerous and lamentable.* They, beyond most men, have been trusted by thoughtful people as are pilots who know the shape and character of shoals in unsounded depths. We expected them at least to speak, if other guides, so evidently competent as Mr. George shows himself, declared their old warnings to be hocus pocus.† It is the specialists who must thoroughly sift Mr. George's complicated attacks upon their life-work. I can only lay

* A hundred thousand copies have been sold in America, the cheapest edition there being 2s. Since the sixpenny edition appeared in England, in September, about 20,000 copies have been sold (November).

† Professor Fawcett has lately mentioned Mr. George by name, but not the characteristics differentiating his work from the political economy of his own school. M. E. De Laveleye has an article on "*Progress and Poverty*," in the *Contemporary Review*, November, 1882. He agrees in his main conclusions with Mr. George, but his article fails to thoroughly grapple with the book by its omission to notice Mr. George's account of industrial depressions.

before my readers the leading conclusions he has arrived at, and the bearing they have upon popular thought, political and social. I would premise, however, that the book is, of its kind, unusually easy reading, that it is worthy at once of a poet and a man of science, full of observant detail, and chastened, honest emotion, which we may suppose are due to the writer's original artisanship, and that nothing I say about it can give a fair account of the unity and force of the work as a whole.

Mr. George opens with a statement, touching beyond description, of the problem which I preferred to couch in the language of Professor Fawcett in order to show that the opposing parties are agreed as to the actually existing concomitance of "Progress and Poverty," and of "Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth," and because the verdict of Professor Fawcett as to the facts will be accepted by Englishmen who might be indisposed to accept the statement of an American.

The great fact that poverty and all its concomitants show themselves in communities just as they develop into the conditions towards which material progress tends, proves that the social difficulties existing wherever a certain stage of progress has been reached, do not arise from local circumstances, but are in some way or another engendered by progress itself.

The new forces, elevating in their nature though they be, do not act upon the social fabric from underneath, as was for a long time hoped and believed, but strike it at a point intermediate between top and bottom. It is as though an immense wedge were being forced, not underneath society, but through society. Those who are above the point of separation are elevated, but those who are below are crushed down" (*Progress and Poverty*, "The Problem").

All agree then in asking, "*Why, in spite of increase of productive power, do wages tend to a minimum which will give but a bare living?*" But in his reply Mr. George flings himself into direct conflict with those current statements which I have enumerated. He denies that wages are drawn from capital.

If it be true that wages depend upon the ratio between the

amount of labour seeking employment and the capital devoted to its employment, then high wages (the mark of the relative scarcity of labour) must be accompanied by low interest (the mark of the relative abundance of capital), and, reversely, low wages must be accompanied by high interest. This is not the fact, but the contrary. Eliminating from interest the element of insurance, and regarding only interest proper or the return for the use of capital, is it not true that interest is high where and when wages are high, and low where and when wages are low? Both wages and interest have been higher in the United States than in England (I, 2).

The counter proposition which Mr. George lays down as to the source of wages is, "*That wages, instead of being drawn from capital, are in reality drawn from the product of the labour from which they are paid.*" On the face of it this seems very absurd. Cannot every one see that the capitalist pays the wages of his *employés* long before the goods they have made are sold? Yes, but to think accurately on economic processes it is an universal axiom that we must put out of our minds, as much as possible, the thought of money—mere counters in the process of exchange—and set our minds exclusively on the wealth which money represents. Mr. George contends that before the Saturday night, when wages are paid, the labourers have presented the capitalist with his goods as they existed at the commencement of the week augmented in value by the week's labour expended upon them. His capital on Monday was worth £1,000, and on Saturday it is £1,000 plus the value added by the week's work; and he receives this before he pays the wages. It has been more convenient to him not to have sold the goods during the week. Had he done so and received on Saturday night their money's worth before he paid the wages, it would have been evident to him that he received the capital at the hands of the labourers before he paid them their wages out of it. And so Mr. George asks, "As in the exchange of labour for wages the employer always gets the capital created by the labour before he pays out capital in the wages, at what point is his capital lessened even temporarily?"* The

* Book I., ch. 8.

current theory that wages are drawn from capital finds its most plausible shelter in the case of agricultural work. But if readers have followed me so far, they will understand Mr. George's meaning when he asserts that the farmer before he pays on Saturday night has got an increased amount of money's worth in his land. It is not the custom that farms should change hands except at stated seasons. If it were, and valuation were made on any Saturday, any farm would fetch so much more than its holder gave for it on the previous Monday, and he could get this increased amount before he paid the wages; in which case it would be evident that the labourers had advanced something to him, and not he to the labourers. Mr. George does not question that capital is a valuable auxiliary to labour. I must ask my readers' patience when I say that his book indeed claims to be written in the interests of capital. What he does deny is that wages are drawn from anything more solid than, or over and above, the product of the labour which created them and something else into the bargain. In simple primitive cases the truth is evident. If a labourer devotes himself to gathering berries, and is paid at the end of the week a certain share of the berries, no one would say that he was paid out of capital existing beforehand.

Capital has never to be set aside for the payment of wages when the produce of the labour for which the wages are paid is exchanged as soon as produced; it is only required when the produce is stored up, or what is to the individual the same thing, placed in the general current of exchanges without being at once drawn against—that is, sold on credit. But the capital thus required is not required for the payment of wages, nor for advances to labour, as it is always represented in the produce of the labour. It is never as an employer of labour that any producer needs capital; when he does need capital, it is because he is not only an employer of labour, but a merchant and speculator in, or an accumulator of, the products of labour. This is generally the case with employers (I., 3).

Readers must see for themselves how Mr. George, alike

from simpler and complex instances, elaborately illustrates and fortifies this conclusion, that—

If each labourer in performing the labour really creates the fund from which his wages are drawn, then wages cannot be diminished by the increase of labourers, but, on the contrary, as the efficiency of labour manifestly increases with the number of labourers, the more labourers, other things being equal, the higher should wages be (I, 5).

It is manifest that if Mr. George be right, our problem is not so eternally hopeless as it would otherwise seem to those who cannot anticipate any popular submission to Malthusian conduct. Our author next confronts these Malthusian theories to which he has been led by the proviso, "*other things being equal*," in his last sentence. It was the doctrine of the Rev. Mr. Malthus, and political economists ever since have, with varying modifications, accepted the doctrine, that, to use the words of Mr. Mill* :

"After a certain, and not very advanced, stage in the progress of agriculture, it is the law of production from the land that, in any given state of agricultural skill and knowledge, by increasing the labour the produce is not increased in an equal degree; doubling the labour does not double the produce; or, to express the same thing in other words, every increase of produce is obtained by a more than proportional increase in the application of labour to the land." And this law applies not only to agriculture†:—"All natural agents which are limited in quantity . . . yield to any additional demands on progressively harder terms." A greater number of people cannot, in any given state of civilisation, be collectively so well provided for as a smaller. The niggardliness of nature, not the injustice of society, is the cause of the penalty attached to over-population."‡

Thus the increasing population of any country have not only to compete against one another for wages, but have to buy all their food, tools, and clothing at an increasing cost of production as soon as improvements in production cease to multiply in proportion to the increased difficulty in acquiring the increased demand for raw material. Right-

* *Political Economy*, I., 12, ii. † *Id.* I., 12, iii. ‡ *Id.* I., 13, ii.

ously, then, did Mill pen that famous note about the squires and clergy. Patriotic is the bishop of that once famine-smitten diocese of factory-hands, if, as is reported, he punishes the curates who marry. But what says Mr. George?

He first examines—too lengthily for quotation—the inferences from the facts of various countries, boldly selecting India, China, and Ireland, in behalf of whose populations, ravaged with chronic hunger, Malthusians have pathetically besought the world to suppress its prejudices. Mr. George's reply with regard to India is well worth reading if it be only as a piece of nervous and persuasive English. The misrule of man, not the superabundance of population, is the cause to which he traces recurring famine.

As to Ireland, he has a like account to give. After describing the conditions under which tenants have worked, he goes on :

But even under these conditions it is a matter of fact that Ireland did more than support eight millions. For when her population was at the highest, Ireland was a food exporting country. Even during the famine, grain and meat and butter and cheese were carted for exportation along roads lined with the starving, and past trenches into which the dead were piled. For these exports of food, or at least for a great part of them, there was no return. So far as the people of Ireland were concerned, the food thus exported might as well have been burnt up or thrown into the sea, or never produced. It went not as an exchange, but as a tribute—to pay the rent of absentee landlords (II., 2).

Examining the inferences from analogy in support of the Malthusian theory, Mr. George elicits as the real law of population—not that population will always increase with increased abundance, but that a contrary tendency will set in. "Give more food, open fuller conditions of life, and the vegetable or animal can but multiply; the man will develop."

That besides the positive and prudential checks of Malthus, there is a third check which comes into play with the elevation of the standard of comfort and the development of the intellect,

is pointed to by many well-known facts. The proportion of births is notoriously greater in new settlements, where the struggle with nature leaves little opportunity for intellectual life, and among the poverty-bound classes of older countries, who in the midst of wealth are deprived of all its advantages and reduced to all but an animal existence, than it is among the classes to whom the increase of wealth has brought independence, leisure, comfort, and a fuller and more varied life (II., 3).

He does injustice here in ignoring the fact that Mill and others have propounded as a possible remedy for the tendency to over-population, extensive emigration—schemes which, by suddenly raising the “standard of comfort” amongst a population, and by giving them experience of a better condition, will make them less likely to throw away their new comforts by imprudent over-populating. And Malthusians may answer that, if these conditions which Mr. George apprehends come into operation, of course, the evil they forebode will be averted in the way they recommend and desiderate. . So it is necessary for Mr. George to advance a “disproof of the Malthusian theory;” and to this he applies himself.

The question of fact into which this issue resolves itself is not in what stage of population is most subsistence produced? but in what stage of population is there exhibited the greatest power of producing wealth? For the power of producing wealth in any form is the power of producing subsistence—and the consumption of wealth in any form, or of wealth-producing power, is equivalent to the consumption of subsistence. . . . If I keep a footman I take a possible ploughman from the plough (II., 4).

“Does the relative power of producing wealth decrease with the increase of population?” The question is declared to be one of fact, and not for abstract reasoning.

That the production of wealth must, in proportion to the labour employed, be greater in a densely populated country like England than in new countries, where wages and interest are higher, is evident from the fact that, though a much smaller proportion of the population is engaged in productive labour, a

much larger surplus is available for other purposes than that of supplying physical needs. In a new country the whole available force of the community is devoted to production—there is no well man who does not do productive work of some kind, no well woman exempt from household tasks. There are no paupers, no beggars, no idle rich, no class whose labour is devoted to ministering to the convenience or caprice of the rich, no purely literary or scientific class, no criminal class who live by preying upon society, no large class maintained to guard society against them. Yet with the whole force of the community thus devoted to production, no such consumption of wealth in proportion to the whole population takes place, or can be afforded, as goes on in the old country; for, though the condition of the lowest class is better, and there is no one who cannot get a living, there is no one who gets much more—few or none who can live in anything like what would be called luxury or comfort in the older country. That is to say, in the older country the consumption of wealth in proportion to population is greater, although the proportion of labour devoted to the production of wealth is less—or that fewer labourers produce more wealth; for wealth must be produced before it can be consumed (II., 4).

Indeed, we should not be engaged in this inquiry, which occupies the attention of Malthusians as keenly as that of Mr. George, were it not for this very fact that “want appears where productive power is greatest and the production of wealth is largest.”

It is intensely interesting to speculate as to what answer Mr. Fawcett will make when his silence is broken, or he has unravelled Mr. George's tangled skeins of argument. It is open to a student of Mill to anticipate that all Mr. George alleges is true, on the Malthusian theory of any old country, such as that which Mr. George antithesises to a new colony, until the old country has reached that “Stationary State” (Mill, *Political Economy*, IV., 6), in which the increase and improvement of productive arts and sciences has ceased to keep pace with the increased pressure of population, and capital and population have ceased to overflow into new countries. But our author might fairly ask the objector to point to such a country or the likelihood of any such prospect.

Of course Mr. George, in his anti-Malthusian ardour, is not foolish enough to question that often it may be poverty-producing for a particular individual to have a large family. Nor, in questioning the *possibility*, does he deny the *conceivability* of this globe being over-populated. What he does deny is—the very plausible induction of a Malthusianising law of population from the frequently observed fact that an individual impoverishes himself by improvidence in marriage, or the deduction of such a law from the admitted conceivability that on the surface of a globe thickly populated the abstract theory of Malthus would be realised.

Mr. George claims, then, to have discovered, in his investigation into the source of wages and the Malthusian theory—

That the cause which, in spite of the enormous increase of productive power, confines the great body of producers to the least share of the product upon which they will consent to live, is not the limitation of capital, nor yet the limitation of the powers of nature, which respond to labour. As it is not, therefore, to be found in the laws which bound the production of wealth, it must be sought in the laws which govern distribution.

At this point it is cheering to one who, like myself, has had all his old schooling in political economy exposed as absurd, to be told that there is one great law laid down by the standard political economists which he has not to unlearn. And the law as to which there is this relieving concord is an important one. In the words of Mill—"It is one of the cardinal doctrines of Political Economy, and until it was understood no consistent explanation could be given of many of the more complicated industrial phenomena." It is the law of Rent, and is stated as follows by Mill—"The rent, which any land will yield, is the excess of its produce, beyond what would be returned to the same capital if employed on the worst land in cultivation."* Or, in Mr. George's almost identical terms—"The rent of land is determined by the excess of its produce over that which

* *Political Economy*, II., 16; iii.

the same application can secure from the least productive land in use." Any one unfamiliar with this law will see its truth when stated in this slightly shifted form—"The ownership of a natural agent of production will give the power of appropriating so much of the wealth produced by the exertion of labour and capital upon it as exceeds the return which the same application of labour and capital could secure in the least productive occupation in which they freely engage" (III., 2).

The produce of any piece of land has to be divided into Rent, Return to the Farmer for his own labour and capital, and Wages. Or, classing the reward of the farmer, *quâ* farmer, for his labour of superintendence, as wages of superintendence, and calling the return to his capital interest; Produce = Rent + Wages + Interest; or, Wages + Interest = Produce - Rent.

Thus wages and interest do not depend upon the produce of labour and capital, but upon what is left after rent is taken out; or upon the produce which they could obtain without paying rent—that is, from the poorest land in cultivation. And hence, no matter what be the increase in productive power, if the increase in rent keeps pace with it, neither wages nor interest can increase (III., 2).

Mr. George proceeds on the same lines to gather the law regulating wages. In a new colony it is evident that a man's wages will be what he can earn by working for himself on land for which he has to pay no rent. Any one who employs labour will have to pay the equivalent of what a labourer can earn for himself on land as yet unappropriated; otherwise as long as there was land unappropriated he would get no one to work for him. At first, then, in such a new colony, wages are very high. But as fast as the better land is appropriated, and people who work for themselves have to work on inferior lands, the rate of wages will fall to the amount that can be earned on those inferior lands. Thus, according to the law by which rent rises to a greater and greater share of the produce as a country is more and more thickly populated, and there is less and less

unappropriated land, wages at the same time fall in rate to a smaller and smaller share in the produce, because the amount which a labourer can earn for himself by leaving his master, and working at unappropriated land or natural resources is becoming less and less.

And if this be true, the rate of *all* wages will gradually fall as there is less and less opening for labourers on non-rent-producing land. For employers of all kinds of unskilled labour will only have to give the same wages, or a shade more, than men can earn for themselves on the as yet unappropriated land. And the various kinds of employers of skilled labour in all its ascending grades will only have to give each so many shades more than can be got on this best unappropriated land. Thus, in proportion as the best unappropriated land to which recourse can be had is of a lower and lower productiveness, the wages of all kinds of labour, skill, and superintendence will fall. And we get as the universal law of wages that "*Wages depend upon the margin of production, or upon the produce which labour can obtain at the highest point of natural productiveness open to it without the payment of rent.*"

The plausible, and at first sight unquestionable dictum, that the rate of wages depends on supply and demand, is only true of each separate kind of labour. The wages of shoemakers, or jewellers, or clerks, will, of course, depend on the supply and demand in their respective occupations. But beneath the temporary causes regulating the *relative* values of wages of clerks, &c., as compared with jewellers, &c., is the common permanent cause operating on the rates of wages in *all* occupations, and raising *all* or lowering *all* according to the rate that prevails for the lowest stratum. Mr. George asserts that to speak of supply and demand as a law covering the whole question of wages is an absurdity in terms. For "supply" is seen to be the same thing as "demand" when each is logically traced to the material which it stands for. The "supply" of the universe is the whole labour of mankind; and the demand of the universe is what collective mankind possesses to offer in return for supply—viz., the whole labour of man-

kind. And so to talk of *universal* over-production, *universal* over-consumption, or over-population (short of an overcrowded globe) are absurdities in phraseology.

Having shown the effect upon wages and rent of the increased influx of population as long as there is land to be had in a new country, Mr. George proceeds to examine what effect material progress, the increase of population and of improvements in the productive arts, will have.

Improvements in the arts of production will counteract the tendency of wages to sink beneath the cause which we have just found to be in universal operation. Like increase in population, these improvements will also add to the amount of production which goes to rent; for all productions above what is yielded by land at the margin of lowest cultivation will still go to rent. However much the productiveness of a factory, a shop, or a field may be increased by improved methods of production, the owner of the bit of land will be able to subtract from the produce raised on his ground, be it in a factory, a shop, or a field, all that is produced beyond what could have been produced on an equal bit of the poorest land in cultivation, or the most inconvenient site eligible. The greater the improvements the more will rents rise. And as $\text{Wages} + \text{Interest} = \text{Produce} - \text{Rent}$, Wages and Interest may well be low, as they are in an old and wealthy country as compared with a new and undeveloped one.

But material progress has a still further tendency to increase rent and diminish the comparative return to labour and capital.

Speculation for land, of course, sets in with material progress. Land of inferior quality, where land is to be had, must be resorted to before certain lands of superior worth are cultivated, because speculators hold back lands from use with a knowledge of their certain rise in value, and thus the wage-adjusting margin of cultivation is forced even lower. Here Mr. George's American experience has turned his eyes to facts which will surprise Englishmen. This speculation in land, he concludes, is

the force, evolved by material progress, which tends con-

stantly to increase rent in a greater ratio than progress increases production, and thus constantly tends, as material progress goes on, and productive power increases, to reduce wages, not merely relatively, but absolutely. It is this expansive force which, operating with great power in new countries, brings to them, seemingly long before their time, the social diseases of older countries; produces 'tramps' on virgin acres, and breeds paupers on half-tilled soil (IV., 4).

This brings our author to the cause he assigns for industrial depressions.

Given a progressive community, in which population is increasing and one improvement succeeds another, and land must constantly increase in value. This steady increase naturally leads to speculation in which future increase is anticipated, and land values are carried beyond the point at which, under the existing conditions of production, their accustomed returns would be left to labour and capital. Production, therefore, begins to stop. Not that there is necessarily, or even probably, an absolute diminution in production; but that there is what in a progressive community would be equivalent to an absolute diminution of production in a stationary community—a failure in production to increase proportionately, owing to the failure of new increments of labour and capital to find employment at the accustomed rates.

This stoppage of production at some points must necessarily show itself at other points of the industrial network, in a cessation of demand, which would again check production there, and thus the paralysis would communicate itself through all the interlacings of industry and commerce, producing everywhere a partial disjoining of production and exchange, and resulting in the phenomena that seem to show over-production or over-consumption, according to the standpoint from which they are viewed.

The period of depression thus ensuing would continue until (1) the speculative advance in rents had been lost; or (2) the increase in the efficiency of labour, owing to the growth of population and the progress of improvement, had enabled the normal rent line to overtake the speculative rent line; or (3) labour and capital had become reconciled to engaging in production for smaller returns. Or most probably all three of these causes would co-operate to produce a new equilibrium, at which all the forces of production would again engage, and a season of activity

ensue ; whereupon rent would begin to advance again, a speculative advance again take place, production be again checked, and the same round be gone over again (V., 1).

Whatever may be the fate of this newly propounded account of industrial depressions, it is evident that it *has* the appearance of *accounting* simply for phenomena which have hitherto been the battle-ground of conflicting theorists, and which, one after another, have been proved untenable by one leading economist or another. General over-production, whilst we all want more than we have. General over-consumption, whilst people are standing idle who would gladly supply consumers with what they want. Speculation in *goods*, which is known to have a beneficially equalising effect in its play. Over-population, when crowds of able-bodied men are in need of goods and are ready to make goods in return for what they need. These incoherent causes dwindle into insignificance and inadequacy as *accounting* for depressions compared with the undoubtedly and universally operative force to which Mr. George points.

Thus the cause of industrial depressions, and of increase of want with increase of wealth, is stated to be the private ownership of land.

Mr. George gives us vivid illustrations of his law in active operation in San Francisco, California, and the United States :—

The present commercial and industrial depression which first clearly manifested itself in the United States in 1872, and has spread with greater or less intensity over the civilised world, is largely attributed to the undue extension of the railroad system, with which there are many things that seem to show a relation. I am fully conscious that the construction of railroads before they are actually needed may divert capital and labour from more to less productive employments, and make a community poorer instead of richer ; . . . but to assign to this wasting of capital such a widespread industrial dead-lock seems to me like attributing an unusually low tide to the drawing of a few extra bucketfuls of water. The waste of capital and labour during the civil war was enormously greater than it could possibly be by the construction of unnecessary

railroads, but without producing any such result. And, certainly, there seems to be little sense in talking of the waste of capital and labour in railroads as causing this depression, when the prominent feature of the depression has been the superabundance of capital and labour seeking employment.

Yet, that there is a connection between the rapid construction of railroads and industrial depression, any one who understands what increased land values mean, and who has noticed the effect which the construction of railroads has upon land speculation, can easily see. Wherever a railroad was built or projected, lands sprang up in value under the influence of speculation, and thousands of millions of dollars were added to the nominal values which capital and labour were asked to pay outright, or to pay in instalments, as the price of being allowed to go to work and produce wealth. The inevitable result was to check production, and this check to production propagated itself in a cessation of demand, which checked production to the furthest verge of the wide circle of exchanges, operating with accumulated force in the centres of the great industrial commonwealth into which commerce links the civilised world (V., 2).

It is not so easy to trace concrete instances of this law in operation in an old country like ours, with its elaborate industrial development. But we have only to think of the enormous rents in our great cities to see that, if what goes to capital and labour out of their joint production is that production *minus* rent, then rent and speculation for rent must have the same effect in England as elsewhere, must lower the rate of wages and diminish the return to capital which otherwise would accrue from material progress until the return to labour and capital is so small that production is checked, and the symptoms of industrial depression ensue.

Thus Mr. George has led us on step by step to a conclusion startling in its simplicity. I can see no flaw in his process. The facts tally with one another. They must be summarised in Mr. George's own words :—

The simple theory which I have outlined (if, indeed, it can be called a theory which is but the recognition of the most obvious relations) explains this conjunction of poverty with wealth, of low wages with high productive power, of degradation amid

enlightenment, of virtual slavery in political liberty. It harmonises, as results flowing from a general and inexorable law, facts otherwise most perplexing, and exhibits the sequence and relation between phenomena that, without reference to it, are diverse and contradictory. It explains why interest and wages are higher in new than in older communities, though the average, as well as the aggregate production of wealth is less. It explains why improvements which increase the productive power of labour and capital, increase the reward of neither. It explains what is commonly called the conflict between labour and capital, while proving the real harmony of interest between them. It cuts the last inch of ground from under the fallacies of Protection, while showing why Free Trade fails to permanently benefit the working classes. It explains why want increases with abundance, and wealth tends to greater and greater aggregations. It explains the periodically recurring depressions of industry without resource either to the absurdity of "over-production" or the absurdity of "over-consumption." It explains the enforced idleness of numbers of would-be producers, which wastes the productive force of advanced communities, without the absurd assumption that there is too little work to do, or that there are too many to do it. It explains the ill effects upon the labouring classes which often follow upon the introduction of machinery, without denying the natural advantages which the use of machinery gives. It explains the vice and misery which show themselves amid dense population, without attributing to the laws of the All-Wise and All-Beneficent defects which belong only to the short-sighted and selfish enactments of men" (V., 2).

Private ownership in land, then, stands condemned, unless Mr. George's account of low wages and industrial depressions can be disproved. And this condemnation of private ownership has a totally different basis from the many that have been often advanced previously. Hitherto educated people in England, though perhaps not on the Continent, have generally felt that the various schemes for the extrusion of our present landowners have been as questionable in expediency as in justice, and that their possible alleviation of our present evils was small and unpromising compared with the risks entailed. But if Mr. George's political economy be correct, it becomes a public cruelty and wickedness to allow private ownership to continue unmitigated as at

present. And the paramount problem is as to how the required change is to be effected.

Mr. George's proposed remedy is as simple in appearance as his demonstration of the evil. He would not have the State directly extrude a single landowner. He would throw all taxes on ground rent.* Thus land, having lost its rent-producing value for private owners, would cease to be the subject of speculation as at present, and the common cause of industrial depression would no longer exist. Capital and labour would be relieved of their present load of taxation, every penny of which, as Mr. Fawcett told his hearers the other day, presses indirectly on the denizen of the dingiest garret. There would be no new expense of collection; no wasteful State management of landed property; no positive need for people who use land productively, or who are rich enough to indulge in the enjoyments of large landownership, to give up any of their domains. Improvements would not be impeded as at present, for the tax would be confined to ground rent, which valuers can approximately eliminate from the total value of the land to its owner. And even if there were some risk that improvements would not escape taxation, they would not be taxed in so many ways as at present.

I have here dealt with less than the first three-fifths of our author's volume. The remainder, which space forbids me to notice now, deals with the justice of his proposals and their probable economic and social effects. As to these chapters, M. E. de Laveleye's words will be more telling than any of my own.

"I can but unreservedly approve the elevated views of the future in store for modern society which terminate Mr. George's book. I also believe that if Democracy do not succeed in effecting a more equitable distribution of property and of the produce of men's labour, it will perish amid corruption and anarchy, and finally end in Cæsarism.

* He carefully distinguishes between ground rent and interest on improvements which is not to be taxed; for, unlike ground rent, it is produced by effort or labour.

The picture which the author draws of the vices which growing inequality is developing in the noble institutions of America is really fearful, and, I suspect, not in the least exaggerated.”*

It only remains for me now to point out how the propositions of our author, granted their economic proveability, are likely to strike a public at present strongly under the dominion of the views I have enlarged upon in the earlier part of this paper.

I speak of the probable effect upon educated people in all classes. I do not allude to the appeal which may be made to the greed of the masses, nor do I attempt to estimate the effect the book will have upon people who, if intelligent enough to read it, are yet sufficiently ill-educated or fanatical to lump together all the wide-spread craving for social change as motivated by jealousy of the rich. The direct appeal to the masses will be nothing more than has been made by other schemes; indeed it will be less forcible, for the masses will be slow to sympathise with Mr. George's regard for capital. At present, Democracy in England trusts its Parliamentary and political leaders. Till they are won, no scheme at present has any chance of success. The kind of appeal inherent in this new political economy is one which will have as much cogency with educated and patriotic landowners as with other kindred minds.

1. A dead weight will be lifted off the hopes of all who have hitherto turned away from politics, because economic science has compelled them to see that whatever the State may imagine, she can no more relieve the burdens of poverty than she can stop people from marrying. A great amount of hope, enthusiasm, and intelligence will be set free, and will turn aside for a time from their exclusive devotion to slower personal methods of helping the poor towards this rift in the clouds of pessimism and hopelessness. If there is anything in this discovery it is the discovery of a new Cobden, and it will call forth such political energy as has had no object or manifestation since some one found out that Protection made every mouthful of the poor man's

* *Contemporary Review*, November, 1882.

food harder to get, and Cobden and his friends gave tongue to the discovery. There is even an element in this new discovery which will fire the imagination of philanthropists far more than did the Anti-Corn Law Agitation. It was cruel enough to maintain laws which made every mouthful of food dearer. But it is an aggravation of this cruelty to maintain a state of things which has not only kept back from the poorest classes of the nation the fresh food which Free Trade has furnished, but must always leave them and all classes of the community to be tossed backwards and forwards between plenty and poverty by upheavals and depressions, as it were of mother earth herself, which we know must succeed one another, but cannot foresee or avert. The appeal of economic science will be, not any longer as hitherto, in the name of mercy to hold off our hands; nor will the appeal of the new economic creed be to take something from the rich and give it to the poor, but to cut away the perennial cause of industrial calamity and to take care that that unearned increase of wealth, which is the mechanical outcome of increasing population and productiveness, shall no longer be allowed to impoverish labour and capital. The appeal is essentially to the thoughtful.

2. There is nothing "communistic" in the scheme. It will not interfere with, or seek to check, any natural inequalities in wealth which flow from inequalities in genius, thrift, or industry. "Social equality" will be as far off as even Mr. Mallock could wish it to be. M. E. de Laveleye's fear seems to be that the relief to taxation would be chiefly advantageous to capital.

3. It is not easy to say who will be most interested in opposing or supporting the reform. Unlike other schemes, this does not affect merely agricultural rent. The landowner with a thousand acres will lose less than many an owner of a little patch of ground in a crowded neighbourhood. The Corn Law Reform was chiefly resisted by "the landed interest," and every one thought that the landowners would be great losers; but the result has been that rents have increased enormously. The owners of agricultural land, so many of whom have "farms on their hands" at

the present time, will all benefit *as farmers and capitalists*; and who will deny that in countless instances it would be a happy thing for agricultural England, and for themselves, if a greater number of landowners worked their farms themselves, and earned as capitalists what they would lose in rent? This would naturally occur in cases where the tenant farmer is at present in the shakiest condition, and where it is least desirable for himself or his neighbours that his existence as tenant should be prolonged. The larger farmers, who are possessed of capital, would probably become owners instead of tenants, as they would be the chief competitors in the new state of things for any land in the market. Evidently the reasons for resistance upon the part of the counties would be much less violent than they were at the time of the Corn Law Repeal. And the forces on the side of the reform in towns would consist of all who are capitalists rather than rent-owners.

4. If Mr. George's economic arguments be accepted by politicians as sound, it will not follow that they will be acted upon as thoroughly or as speedily as he recommends, even by those who heartily accept them. He will get very few educated English people to act with him upon his conclusion that the nation has a right to claim compensation from the landlords for past wrongs rather than landlords from the nation for the injury done to them by fresh legislation. At the same time, I believe, most people will be surprised to see how much Mr. George can urge, in the name of justice and necessity, against any compensation except to widows and orphans. But a distinguishing characteristic in the application of this new economic theory is that it can be made gradually without inflicting any of the individual cruelties of sudden revolutions. Taxes will be gradually shifted on to the land if there prevails even a strong suspicion of the economic truth of these new propositions; and it is not absurd to argue that so the scheme may become law without either compensation or cruelty.

5. And supposing that the work should be proved to be a tissue of economic fallacies, it is too brilliant a production to be lost sight of rapidly. For a generation to

come it will be talked about more than most books, if it be only by English-speaking economists, who will find in it the richest illustrations and the most elaborate specimens of the fallacies which economists exist to confute. If it be a failure as an attempt to account for industrial depressions, it will have done at least this service to political economy, that, for good or evil, it will have brought home with unprecedented force to the public mind that law of rent, of which Mill says, "It is one of the cardinal doctrines of political economy."

I have said enough to call the attention of readers better qualified than myself to the study of *Progress and Poverty*. Let those who condemn the author for extravagances remember that, at worst, he has not imposed upon them in the problem, that it exists and cries to heaven and earth for solution.

GEORGE SARSON.

*PFLEIDERER'S VIEW OF ST. PAUL'S DOCTRINE.**

THERE is much loose talk afloat about Paul as the real founder of Christianity. This is a favourite thesis of the Positivists, and is intelligible enough on their part. The catholic and mediæval form of Christianity, which alone Comte knew, might easily, when contrasted with the Christianity of the Gospels, produce such an impression on a mind like his. But it would be about as correct to say that Comte was the founder of Humanity.

Still, in such a statement there is just as much truth as leads us to characterise it as a loose, rather than a false, one. Humanly speaking, it is impossible to see how Christianity could have passed into human history without Paul. It seemed likely, but for him, to become only another of the sects that swallowed up, in a dusty desert of Judaism, the river of the water of life. But, then, humanly speaking also, it is hard to see how Christianity could have become what it has been for Europe without that association with the Roman Empire which has to this day invested the Church with so much practical power and prestige at the cost of so much simplicity, purity, and spiritual force. It would not be true to say that the Roman Empire was the foundation of the Christian Church. Neither can it be accurate to say that Paul was the real founder of Christianity. The *form* of the organised Church to-day is largely, perhaps mainly, due to elements, not always vicious, borrowed from the political world. And, in the same way, the current and popular forms of organised doctrine may be said to owe

* *Paulinism: a Contribution to the History of Primitive Christian Theology.* By OTTO PFLEIDERER, Doctor and Prof. of Theology at Jena. Translated by Edward Peters. 2 Vols. (Williams and Norgate. 1877.)

more to Aristotle and Paul than to Christ. But it was neither Paul nor Aristotle that made these doctrines winged words any more than it was the effete Roman Empire that made Christianity the creed of Europe. The dynamic element of the Church did not come from the Empire. And it was not Paul that sent life and blood coursing through the doctrinal systems of Christian belief. Paul was but an apostle, after all. He was not a Saviour. Original as he was, his system, no less than his mission, was derived. And the question is in respect of his system, with which alone we here deal—what was its derivation? He has much to say himself about the way in which he derived his commission. He has but little expressly to say about the process by which he derived his creed. If I may use the language of a philosophy that is happily becoming influential in England, he is copious and explicit about the origin of his divine knowledge in its immediacy, but he was little concerned to pursue and record closely the steps of the process by which it became mediated in the action of his mind.

But there are two reasons why at the present moment an inquiry like this should be of special interest and unusual fascination. In the first place, having so recently lost the great English apostle of the method of development, it lies close to our hand to remember that in the sphere of religious history this idea has come to play a prominent and fruitful part. Indeed, there is no other method than the evolutionary now possible to the historian of doctrine. "The true criticism of a doctrine is its history," says Baur; and the word is most true. It is a waste of time and a contempt of providence now to treat the past of any doctrine as if it were a dead and mechanical thing. Doctrines are not fetishes, however some people may treat them. They are living creatures with a reasonable soul. They have a power to grow and vary in the struggle among faiths for existence. The engrossing intellectual interest in the history of the Church is to watch the development of doctrine from its first crude germs to its highly organised forms. And the more profound our belief, and therefore

our interest in any doctrine is, the more eagerly and sympathetically shall we practise our new power of standing by its childish years, watching its tottering steps, and marking its growth in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and man.

Nor are we satisfied to have traced the growth of a doctrine in the Church or in the world alone. The history of the child does not begin with its introduction to society, or even its first glimpse of the light. Darwinism has, we may almost say, called the science of embryology into being—at least, it has given that science an extraordinary and fertile interest. Let us apply this inevitable metaphor to the matter in hand. The scientific study of the development of doctrines cannot leave out of account the period of their gestation in those creative spirits who bore them into the world. The origins of Christian theology in Judaism and in Platonism have been so well discussed, that we may take some credit to ourselves if we still believe any connection to exist at all. But, after all, that is not the most fascinating *preparatio evangelica*. It cannot compare for absorbing and even passionate interest with that preparation which transpires in silent, dramatic, nay, tragic, process within a vast and fiery soul like Paul's. We are compelled to go beyond the philosophical *entourage* and the social *milieu*, which made a cradle for our creed's infant years, into the psychological processes and genetic stages through which it passed while it was made in secret, and curiously wrought in the deepest parts of the apostle's soul.

That is the first impulse which acts so powerfully towards the genetic study of beliefs—the general spread of the historical and developmental method in all departments of scientific research. And that is the positive factor in this new and living interest in the dogmatic past. But there is another and a negative factor as well. It consists in the great change which has taken place in the ideas of inspiration and revelation. The old Jewish and mechanical theory of inspiration is gone. The account it gave of the origin of Paul's system left no room whatever for development either in the history of the Church or in the soul of the apostle.

He was simply the copyist of a certain theological paradigm which was thrown upon the screen of his inspired soul, and held there long enough to be reproduced in a complete and infallible replica. It is clear that such a theory offered no encouragement to any speculation about the origin of the Pauline doctrine. It was almost blasphemy to speak of the Pauline doctrine. It was not Pauline. It was immediately divine. All that was left for human and rational exertion to do was simply to piece together in various forms, in a more or less mechanical way, the system which the Spirit had strangely enough left in a rather slipshod and discontinuous shape. The transcript of Paul's mind which resulted from such treatment might be likened to a mosaic of the apostle picked out upon the tessellated Roman pavement of the Catholic Church. It was allowable to form a rational harmony of the Epistles, but only in the same mechanical sense as it was permitted to form an historical harmony of the Gospels. As for dreaming that certain sides of Paul's belief were more completely developed than others, and that there were consequent contradictions which he himself had not harmonised to his own mind in a systematic way—such a dream only escaped contempt because too dangerous. Well, that theory—that view of Inspiration—has broken down along the whole line. The living consciousness and individuality of prophet and apostle has become a real and powerful factor in his mission and revelation. And consequently to the question still asked, and more imperatively asked, about the origin of the Pauline system, we must answer in a biological, instead of a mechanical, way. It was a new era for Christian thought and Christian piety when it was found that Paul's system was a part of himself; when we were made to see, as it were, by the critical microscope a continuous circulation maintained between his heart and his brain. It is a newer and richer era still which shows us not the fact merely, but the process; Paul's system *growing* out of himself by psychological necessity; not merely reflecting himself, but in the very process of developing from himself his thought in the act of springing from his nature.

There are many points of deep and touching analogy between this greatest and tenderest of the apostles and the tenderest and, in some respects, the greatest of the prophets. Leaving for the time all other resemblances, we are here reminded of one in particular. They were both "born prophets" in a sense almost unique. Their mission was more closely identified with their character than in the case of any of the rest. Amos was a prophet but for the nonce. He was the herdsman of Thekoa, who went on a special errand for his master, and when it was done resumed his crook and quiet. Even Isaiah carries less of his individuality into his vocation, and owes more to his call than to his predestination for his work. But Jeremiah was a prophet from the womb (i. 5). His personality was intertwined and almost identified with his vocation, and his call comes in no outward experience like the vision that ordained Isaiah (vi. 1), but in the very structure and idiosyncrasy of his mind and soul. So it was with Paul, notwithstanding the crucial episode at Damascus. From his beginning the tinder was laid for that spark—nay, more, it had been carefully saturated with intense combustibles all through his life. Both his character and his training were charged with a divine intent, a latent providence, and a prophetic strain, which did as much to produce the conversion as the conversion to give them free voice and course. When, therefore, we can trace the peculiar gospel of Paul as already implicit in his pre-Christian character and culture, we by no means depreciate the quality or question the reality of his Inspiration. We do but widen its compass and deepen its tone. To fuse the Pauline and the historical Christ, for example, implies a divine teleology in the whole previous development of Hebrew thought. We extend the action of the prophetic providence which bestowed him as no hasty boon upon the world, but as a deeply-considered gift, selected early and prepared long, choicely distilled, and duly matured for the special use of the Master of the Feast—himself, as it were, a lamb slain from before the foundation of the world.

Now it is this characteristic and genetic origin of Paul's

creed that is shown to us in Pfeiderer's book. It is an exposition of Pauline doctrine from the genetic, or what may be called the embryological, point of view. I am speaking of the first volume only. The second contains an account of the development of the Pauline system in the Church after it passed from the apostle's own age and control.

The first great scholar to rehabilitate Paul, of course, was Baur. All that has been done since has been done on the basis he laid. But Baur's exposition of Paul's system, fresh, original and searching as it was, was not attached to the apostle's religious life, culture, and experience in a sufficiently close and organic way. The great step in that direction was taken by Holsten. It is Holsten that has given the key and impulse to all the latest, best, and truest interpretation of Paul. He broke ground first, so far as I know, in a pamphlet, published in correction of Baur in 1853, and dealing with the crucial point of Paul's attitude to the law, as set forth in the third chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians. Then in 1867, he published in book form, an expansion of an article which he had contributed to Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*. And now he is publishing the completest form of his theory in the shape of a commentary on the Pauline epistles. Pfeiderer is, and professes to be, a disciple of Holsten, though sometimes criticising him freely. His *Paulinism* is the result of Holsten's book of 1867, and develops the theory in a more complete way than Holsten had done so far; though Holsten's present work aims at being even more complete than Pfeiderer's. It is only in his masterly introduction that Pfeiderer keeps up the form of a spiritual and intellectual biography of the apostle. In the rest of the first volume he arranges his chapters according to subjects,—Sin, The Law, Righteousness, &c. Holsten is dissatisfied with his pupil's method in this respect, and his commentary is written, not from the purely exegetical point of view, but with the object of tracing the genetic process by the aid of the documents themselves. Not *in* the documents. That point is worth attention. It has been usual, in the delight of finding Paul to be a man whose convictions grew upon

him like our own, to spread the development of his system over his whole life and try to trace it in the positions successively occupied in his great epistles. Pfeiderer seems to some extent to support this view. But Holsten declares it to be extreme. He distinguishes between the real period of development in Paul's views and the subsequent period of their mere modification and application to fresh circumstances. The period of true development or transformation was the three years subsequent to his conversion, in which he fought his way out of Judaism into Christianity. It was then that he besieged and took the intellectual position which afterwards he only fortified more strongly. Holsten's words are worth quoting : " Whoever enters society as an apostle to preach the gospel of a new life must have the development of his own conscience and all the warfare that entails behind him. It is because the apostle believes that he demands belief and gets it."

But what is the precise problem that Holsten and Pfeiderer set before them? Loosely put, it might be said to be this: Given the man Paul, Pharisaism, and Judaic Christianity, to construct the Apostle. But that is a very loose and by no means distinctive way of putting it. Their problem is to find a key which shall at once explain the conversion of Paul and his special and peculiar gospel. The current idea is that Paul became converted into a Christian, and then gradually the idea developed in his mind that Christianity was universal and antinomian—a gospel to the heathen as well as the Jew. But in the Epistle to the Galatians, when challenged about his mission to the heathen, he narrates his conversion. Now, on the usual theory, that course was quite irrelevant on his part. It was not his Christianity, his conversion, that was challenged, but his universalism. It is clear that Paul felt that the keynote of his distinctive gospel was also the keynote of his conversion. We have not been without efforts even in England to trace some preparation in Paul's previous life for his sudden conversion. Mr. R. H. Hutton has made perhaps one of the best of such efforts. But, as Pfeiderer says, they

have all laboured under this disadvantage, that they were hypotheses which there was no means of testing. Now, he says we have got a canon. "We require the psychological antecedents of his conversion to exhibit at the same time the root of his peculiar gospel." We seek "such a psychological explanation of the conversion of Paul as may contain at the same time the germ of his special doctrine." It is clear that one tendency of this quest and of this book is to accentuate the value of the rational dogmatic intellectual element in the conversion of the Apostle without destroying its specially religious form and reality. It may be regarded with particular attention by those who think that they can safely extract the intellectual sinew from the deepest religion, and leave the "unbraced and downgyved" residuum of piety and goodness to stand for genuine faith.

What, then, is the key which affords at once a psychological explanation of the conversion and the gospel of Paul? It was the idea of the crucified Messiah. "Is that all?" says the scorner. "*Nascitur ridiculus mus.*" But we have been brought up in Paulinism. We cannot easily realise how gritty that idea was in the teeth not only of the Pharisees, but of the apostles and the Jewish Christians generally. They did not glory in the cross. They extenuated it. Christ was to them Messiah, not because of the cross, but in spite of it. In the first teaching of the apostles in the Book of Acts, the cross, as such, has no saving efficacy. But to Paul Jesus was the Messiah, not in spite of, but because of, the cross. He did not extenuate it; he emphasized it. It was to him primary; to the others secondary. He valued the resurrection because of the cross, not the cross because of the resurrection. To the other Christians, the cross was at best the fulfilling and completion of the law. To Paul, it was the abrogation and replacement of law. It did not give us power for the old kind of righteousness, but instituted a new kind. He found here a happy solution of the great Pharisaic antinomy, that the people must be righteous before Messiah could come, and yet it was the coming of Messiah that was to make

them a righteous people. It was this new kind of righteousness, the righteousness of the cross and of faith—the ideal not the actual righteousness—that was needed to prepare the way for the Messiah's glorious coming. The cross was the central point of his gospel. Was it the central factor in his conversion? It was, just because it was so utterly incompatible with the Pharisaism which to Paul was true Judaism. If Christ was right, the Pharisees were not only wrong, but ruined. There was no middle ground of escape. They had cursed and killed the Messiah, and no crime of their national history could compare with that, because it was for the Messiah they existed. The question of the divinity of the cross was one of life or death for Pharisaism. And Paul was too thorough-going in mind and in temperament, far too acute and passionate in his religion, not to see that. He therefore hated with no common hatred, the Christians who declared that they could prove by the Scriptures and by the resurrection that the Crucified was the Messiah of God. Being a Pharisee, however, he was amenable to both those lines of argument. He shared with the Christians the Jewish method of interpreting and venerating the Old Testament. And the resurrection was a cardinal Pharisaic doctrine. Add to all this the supplementary evidence flowing in the way of moral impression from the gladness with which the Christians took suffering for the sake of their faith, and we begin to see that the awful possibility of the cross being his nation's glory instead of a malefactor's shame must have grown upon him, and made his position as inquisitor a perfect torment to him. Throw finally into the scales of wavering conviction the moral and spiritual echo which he heard among the Christians, of a note with which he was early familiar in the prophetic and ethical side of the Old Testament. Let all this act on his peculiar and epileptic temperament, and we have the conditions for that scene near Damascus—the most momentous probably for history of any outside the life of Christ himself. He has poor ideas of the supernatural who refuses to call this a supernatural revelation because there was no physical reality before Paul's eyes in the air, and because the event

was led up to by a prolonged and fevered process in the very depths of the apostle's rational soul.

Having shown that the suffering and crucified Messiah is the master key to both the conversion and the gospel of Paul, Pfleiderer goes on, in the greater part of his first volume, to trace with detail the development of Paul's theology from this central and formative thought. There is space here neither to follow nor to criticise him. This is the part of his work that will seem most novel and striking, as well as most dangerous to some existing beliefs. Put briefly it may be said that Pfleiderer's method of accounting for the genesis of some of Paul's great beliefs is a method of compound reflection. And this does not mean only that the Pauline system is an intellectual projection or reflection of the apostle's Christian consciousness. It implies that ; but what is particularly meant is this—that the apostle had a habit of thinking back from conclusions to new premises which were more or less incongruous with those from which he started. This is exemplified with special force in the doctrine of Law.

The question is this—What necessity was there that this incurred penalty [of sin] should be suffered at all, when the divine willingness to show grace existed before the expiation, and, indeed, was necessary to make it possible? . . . [The usual explanation] has no slight obstacle to encounter in the presuppositions of Paul himself. . . . The law is to him not a thing valid unconditionally and eternally, and therefore against Christ Himself. It is something which has intervened for a passing purpose between promise and fulfilment—the purpose being to increase sin and awaken mankind out of the impotent slavery of its bondage into faith. Now, how can this law, so temporary in its scope from the first, and so subordinate to Christ, raise against Christ, its Lord by the very constitution of things, a claim which could be satisfied only by his death of expiation and blood? Does not a claim which was to be valid only for a certain period expire of itself at the end of that period without the need for any other release? . . . This contradiction is very simply explained by the genesis of the system, and the point is the most instructive one from the deep insight it allows us into the structure of Paul's dogmatic thought.

For so much is clear. If Paul's notion of the law with its religious inadequacy and its temporary significance had been his original notion, and the origin and basis of his system, then he could not possibly have conceded what he does. He could not have conceded that the claims of a law rated so low must be satisfied only by the accursed death of the Messiah as a vicarious expiatory sacrifice. The law would have been for him (as it was for John) a lower and dawning stage, which vanished of itself in the light of grace and truth in Christ; and the death of Christ would have had no relation whatever to the extinct claims and threats of the law. But the fact is, that with Paul it is just the reverse. Like every Jew he held from first to last that the law was the unconditional decree of the divine will, and its validity was unlimited. Its abrogation by the death of Christ, opening a new way of salvation, could therefore only take place in such a way as at once to admit and satisfy its claims. An adjustment or compromise should thus be effected between the new principle of grace and the legal principle of justice—such a compromise as we found in the expiatory death of Christ. The expiatory death of Christ has abrogated the law. That point is established. Proceeding then from that, he faces the farther task of reconciling this conditional and passing validity with the unity and unchangeableness of God. . . . Paul did this by deducing from the temporary intercalation of law between promise and fulfilment, the inference that it had, in the divine intention from the first, merely this conditional and intermediate character, and was not an absolute and final end. *Thus Paul, starting from his initial hypothesis of the indestructible validity of the law, and still influenced by it in viewing the death of the cross as an expiatory sacrifice, was ultimately driven by the logical consequences of the doctrine of the cross itself to a conclusion about the law which completely destroyed his hypothesis.* This striking discord . . . might easily be concealed from the mind of its author—the experience of all times furnishes similar examples. On the other hand it was probably the main reason that the system of Paul could not be taken up by others without undergoing a change, nor be retained in its original sense in the Christian community.* (I. 101—4.)

The logical process, it may be seen, is the psychological reversed. The light from his experiential premisses (to risk

* I have ventured somewhat to amend and simplify Mr. Peters's careful translation. The italics are mine.

pedantry), impinges at an angle on the surface of his first conclusion, only to be reflected at the same angle to a position in the rear of the premiss. This position, though in the process the goal, becomes in the system the premiss, and the psychological *terminus ad quem* becomes the logical *terminus a quo*. Paul's belief, for example, as to the pre-existent Christ, is reached by a process which, starting from the glorified Christ of the present, concluded towards the glorious Christ of the eternal future, and then rebounded on a belief in a Christ glorious in all past eternity. But in Paul's scheme of reality everything is represented as flowing from the act and quality of surrender by which the Son gave up his premundane glory, and though he was rich, yet for our sakes became poor. So the objective value of the death of Christ, in Paul's system is ascribed to his habit "of fixing the connection between the ethical consequence and its religious foundation in an immediate and objective fashion without reference to the subjective psychological process by which it [the connection] is brought about." That is, the objective Atonement is but the hypostatized projection of the moral and spiritual process which the death of the cross sets up in the Christian soul. "That which is realised in the Faith in the Crucified by means of an inward moral process, viz., the dying of the old man, or of the flesh (the principle of life which rules the natural man), is connected by the Apostle with the crucifixion of Christ, as if it had actually happened there once for all as an objective fact. Christ himself has, through His death, died to sin (is placed out of all relation to it) : Sin (thought of as an objective power) has been put to death on the cross" (I. 23).

To take one example more, Paul's experience of sin led him to conclude that sin was an independent power or principle in the universe. This conclusion rebounded beyond his own datum of experience, nay, beyond human consciousness, and settled in his view of sin as an objective reality anterior to man altogether, a preadamite principle which only "entered" the world by the orifice of the first transgression.

It would follow, of course, from such accounts of the

origin of these beliefs that parts of the Apostle's system, while not necessarily in themselves false, are in the system inconsistent and incompatible with the rest, though the inconsistency is one that he himself was not aware of. And our author, while extending the continuity of Paul's doctrine over his life (before as after his conversion), curtails it considerably in respect of the logical coherence and complete assimilation of his whole scheme.

Now, without elaborately criticising this account of the Pauline creed in any serious way, these remarks may be allowed to stand.

We note first, and briefly, by what a strange Nemesis the system of that Pharisaism which was so sternly opposed by Jesus, returns through Paul to colour and define, to a partial extent at least, the thought of all these Christian centuries, and some would say to reproduce the vices which made Christ its foe.

Secondly, I, at least, do not feel forced to deny the truth or reality of Paul's great doctrines, because the method of their revelation to Paul's mind has been shown to me, and I am enabled to see their psychological mediation. They may be untrue—I do not think they are—but they are not untrue *for that reason*. To discredit them on that ground is to reproduce in our own sphere an error which we justly condemn when Haeckel commits it in his. All the facts of Darwinism about our origin from apes do not destroy the reality of our spiritual nature to-day. How we came to be does not settle for us what we are. In the last and spiritual resort it is the end which explains the beginning, and not the beginning the end. He is Alpha and Omega who has the keys of life and death. And so here. Because Paul did not come by these truths in a violent way corresponding to special creation, have we any right to say that they are not truths? Have we any presumption against them even? Is not all our best truth at once immediate and mediated? Do we trust our vision the less when we learn that between the thing and the thought are interposed not only a fine nervous mechanism, but one or more acts of judgment, by heredity made latent, and all but unconscious? Must a

conclusion always be less reliable in the sphere of reason than an inspiration? Is intuitive truth the only truth, and immediate vision the only certainty? Is God less sure and immediate to us because Christ is our mediator? Is the Father less of a present reality because no man cometh unto the Father except by him? Must it affect the substantial truth of a doctrine to find that it came "by the hand of a mediator," "by a dispensation of angels," by the intervention of certain steps in a psychological process? Let us beware in our own sphere of the error of thinking that we have exploded an idea when we have seen it arising, and found it to be derived and mediated instead of due to special and direct revelation. The truth of a doctrine depends far more on its quality than on the mode of its introduction to us men. To recur to a previous illustration; there is more fine gold in Jeremiah, who has little to say about the circumstances in which he received his "word," than in all Ezekiel, who almost buries his prophetic Revelation in the imposing details of the act of Inspiration. It is the Revelation that is the best test of the Inspiration. It is not the Inspiration that guarantees the Revelation. Were this but well understood, it might dethrone some extant Christian idols, but it would also take the wind out of many anti-Christian sails.

If Paul, in his central idea of the cross, grasped, as I believe he did, the thought of Jesus himself, the probability is that his rightness there would exercise an organic influence for rightness in his farther development of it. If it be true, as Pfeiderer says, that "Paul's whole doctrinal system is neither derived from tradition nor the result of abstract speculation, or extraneous philosophical dicta,* but is derived from reflection on the blessings of salvation granted in the death and resurrection of Christ, as these presented themselves to the faith of Paul as facts of his inward experience," in so far as that is true, it seems to me greatly to raise the value and truth of his system. It is not extravagant to ascribe unusual vision to that unique

* This, observe, is not to say that it owed nothing to tradition or antecedent thought, a statement which our author plentifully refutes.

spiritual experience. We need not hold that his system is at every point final or complete. We cannot so think. A complete system, even from an apostle, would be the death of his eternal idea. We may well enough be able to give this living idea of the reconciling love of God to man in Christ Jesus a philosophical form better corresponding on some points to the thought and needs of our time. But let us be sure that we grasp the central idea as thoroughly as did Paul before we set to amend his work or dismiss his results. We may still feel, I think, that on the whole the theology of Paul is the best account that has yet been given of the dogmatic side of the Christian religion, unless we follow the religious fashion of the day, and become agnostic pietists, who deny the possibility or need of any theology at all.

And the last remark is this. We find in those unconscious, though not fatal, inconsistencies of Paul's system an explanation of the disheartening differences that have discredited theology to the modern mind. What is bred in the bone will come out in the flesh. If the Act be in any respect self-contradictory, its working is sure to be marked by confusion. Paul's system has been regarded as the common charter of all theologians, and, at the same time, as completely coherent and infallible. It was beyond criticism. It was only to be expounded and enlarged. The flaws in his system consequently have only repeated themselves enlarged in these developments of it. Current theology is Paulinism magnified. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that his incongruities and hiatuses are enlarged also. If the Bible be not harmonious, and yet be received as a supreme and coherent dogmatic authority, we must expect that the theologies and institutions developed from it shall be inharmonious also. And herein there is much hope for the future. In the first place the presence even of incongruities in Paul's system need not, any more than the discovery of its genetic origin, destroy our faith in its divine origin. The apparent mal-adaptation in parts of Nature does not destroy for us all faith in its divine creation. It only prolongs the divine action beyond the initial fiat up to our own day, releases deity from a godless and fateful finality,

brings the Creator to our very doors, and makes God our Salvation nearer than when we first believed. And in the second place, thought has already approached the task of framing a theology which shall be not merely Biblical, but rational. We may look forward to a development which shall cease to repeat, on an enlarged scale, the maladjustments of the first gigantic, but imperfect, effort of the Christian consciousness to render an account of its own belief. No longer burdened with the figment of apostolic infallibility, we may well go on sustained by the pre-eminence of apostolic insight. It is but very, very slowly that thought can and should progress on these, the profoundest themes of the mind and soul. Remembering this we can have but little sympathy with those who already would almost make a clean sweep of the apostolic creed. It is just possible that, on the whole, Paul did know better about some things than even the nineteenth century. But if the nineteenth century or the twentieth should be able to correct Paul, assuredly it is not the old Paul, the devotee of new truth and the champion of fresh "revelations of the Lord," the martyr of conscientious fidelity, the preacher of the manifold unsearchable riches of Christ and his treasures of wisdom and knowledge—it is not that Paul that will rise up in judgment against the men of this generation. If he rose to judge us at all it would be because we were too little bold in our thought, too shallow, and too full of a spurious and almost "too superstitious" reverence for the prestige of his own great name.

P. T. FORSYTH.

THE ABOLITION OF JUDICIAL OATHS.

It is not sufficient that a witness feels himself bound to speak the truth from a regard to character or to the common interests of society, or from fear of the punishment which the law inflicts upon persons guilty of perjury. Such motives have, indeed, their influence, but *they are not considered as affording a sufficient safeguard for the strict observance of truth.*—Taylor : *On the Law of Evidence*, II., 1120.

Our law, like that of most other civilised nations, requires a witness to believe, not only that there is a God and a future state of rewards and punishments, but also that, by taking the oath, *he imprecates the Divine vengeance upon himself* if his evidence shall be false.—Phillips : *Treatise on the Law of Evidence* (c. 8).

. . . For anoyding some restraint of his libertie for a time, or for the onely retaining of his wonted credite and estimation, that a man which hath any feare of God at all, or but any tender sparke of Godlinesse and true religion; would wilfullie (through periurie) throwe his owne body and soule into hell; neither *lawe* nor yet any *nation* in the world that I can reade of, did euer presume.—*An Apologie of sundrie proceedings by Iurisdiction Ecclesiasticall*. Part III., Chap. vii., p. 79.

IN considering the question whether it is desirable to abolish the administration of oaths in a Court of Justice, it is above all things necessary that we should clearly understand and always remember the assumptions and principles on which that custom is based. It is assumed that no one can be relied on to speak the truth or to keep his promise unless he is first sworn. It is assumed that he who has taken an oath will speak the truth, or, at least, be far more inclined to do so; and this for the very obvious reason that an oath is a prayer by which a juror calls down on himself exceptional evil if he does not tell the truth. It follows, as a practical corollary from these principles, that the oath is useless, except to those who thoroughly realise its exceptional character, and believe the assumptions

which give it a unique influence as a truth-compelling power.

These assumptions do not correspond with our actual experience. "No one," says Max Müller, "is so sure to go wrong, whether in public or in private life, as he who says in his haste 'all men are liars.'" On the other hand, the assertion that the oath can be relied on to make men truthful must be regarded either as an utter delusion or as a piece of vain rhetoric. Perjury is of common occurrence, and is said to be on the increase. It would be a mere waste of time to prove its existence. But it may be well for us carefully to consider the circumstances in which it is committed, in order that we may arrive at a proper estimate of the precise value of the judicial or forensic oath.

Witnesses may be divided into three classes—those who will speak the truth to the best of their ability, whether they are sworn or not; those who will tell a lie when it is their interest to do so, whether they are sworn or not; those who will tell a lie when it is their interest to do so, when they are *not sworn*, but who will tell the truth when they are sworn. Our first difficulty arises from the fact that we cannot always distinguish these different types. Here, for example, is a "white-haired old gentleman, the very embodiment of respectability, who turns his venerable face to the committee, incipient tears visible in his eyes, and makes a most affecting appeal to them, asking, in a voice broken by emotion, whether a man who has lived all his life in the borough without a stain upon his character ought to be exposed to the insult of such questions." The committee unseated the employer of that venerable man; "I know," says Serjeant Ballantine, "that he had received five hundred sovereigns which he had distributed most honourably in bribing the electors."*

The oath is administered to all who do not choose to say that they have conscientious objections against its administration. It is worse than useless in the case of the conscientious man whom it insults with a doubt as to his

* *Some Experiences of a Barrister's Life*, II., 49.

integrity. This was felt at Athens, where, according to Cicero, when an upright citizen had given evidence, and was approaching the altars for the purpose of confirming his affirmation by an oath, all the judges exclaimed, with one voice, forbidding him to swear.* The oath is powerless over the reckless liar, and therefore is no protection to society; while it certainly is a mockery of sacred things, as horrible as it is useless. The case for the retention of the oath, therefore, rests upon the power which it has to convert liars into truthful men.

At the outset, we cannot have a very high opinion of a set of people who can only be trusted to speak the truth in order to avoid the torments of hell. They remind us of what Johnson said of another kind of habitual liar. When Boswell argued that it was as well for men to drink freely because of the old proverb, *In vino veritas*, "Why, sir," said Johnson, "that may be an argument for drinking if all men were liars. But I would not keep company with a fellow who lies as long as he is sober, and whom you must make drunk in order to get the truth out of him."†

In the affairs of ordinary life we do not put people on their oath, and if a man takes an oath unsolicited, we are apt to condemn him for the use of coarse and blasphemous language, and to suspect the honesty which requires such confirmation. In *Hamlet*, the Player Queen deprecates the idea of a second marriage in the strongest terms—

Nor earth to give me food, nor heaven light !
Sport and repose lock from me, day, and night !
Both here, and hence, pursue me lasting strife,
If, once a widow, ever I be wife !

But Queen Gertrude, who has gone through it all, and knows the binding power of an oath, says quietly—

The lady protests too much, methinks.

And when, in the story of "Five Hundred Dollars," Mr. Isaacs, the Jew pawnbroker, says: "So help me gracious, I have not the least soospicions, like the babes unborn, those

* *Table Talk*.

† *Epist. Attic: Lib. I., 16.*

goods are stolen," we know at once, before the narrative explicitly states the fact, that the assertion is a bare-faced lie.

The same suspicion clings to the untruthful man when put upon his oath. "If there is a man whom I could induce to lie," says Cicero, "I could easily persuade him to commit perjury." At any rate, such a man might easily fall into perjury, the old habit of untruthfulness proving too strong for the new, or very unusual, sense of awe.

From what has been said, it will be observed that there is not an antecedent probability that the oath will be of much use if administered. But the untruthful man has various ways of avoiding the test; ways provided for him, or invented by him. You cannot boast much of the efficacy of physic unless it is taken, and in the present day no one need take this physic unless he likes. He has only to say that he has a conscientious objection to taking an oath, and he may make affirmation instead. But how are you to know that such a non-juror will tell the truth? He may avail himself of this permissive legislation because he does believe in the terrors of the oath, because he does feel its truth-compelling power, and because he does not intend to be compelled to tell the truth by the fear of hell if he can possibly help it.

These thinking they're obliged to troth
In swearing, will not take an oath.

But supposing the witness has consented to be sworn without intending to speak the truth unless it suits his purpose, there are various ways in which he can avoid the religious obligation of an oath, in which he is materially assisted by the law. The law, for security's sake, demands that every witness shall be sworn in the manner which is binding on his conscience. The Highlander is only bound by the oath which he takes holding up his right hand; the Irish Catholic when he kisses a Testament marked with a crucifix; the Welshman, when three fingers are placed upon the book at one time. That being the case, three ways are open by which the wit-

ness may escape the religious consequences of perjury. He may take the ordinary oath, which is not binding on his conscience, and if nothing is said, he is free to lie as much as he likes, so far as religious terrors are concerned. At the Assizes at Carlisle, a Highlander was sworn on the Testament, and gave certain evidence; afterwards he was sworn holding up his right hand, and refused to repeat the evidence already given, saying "Na, na. Ken ye not there is a hantle of difference betwixt blawing on a buke and domming one's ain saul?" An Irishwoman at Liverpool, under similar experiences, recently made a similar remark, quietly saying that she supposed that she might say what she pleased, so long as she was not sworn upon the blessed crucifix.

Another mode of evading the terror of the oath is to take it in appearance only. At one time a witness did not consider himself bound if he kissed his thumb instead of the book or remained silent when the oath was administered.* And I see no reason why an unconscientious person, anxious to escape the pressure of the oath, should not tell a lie if asked what oath was binding on his conscience, so that he might be sworn and still tell lies without subjecting himself to the religious penalties of perjury. And if a witness chooses to tell such a lie, the law protects the liar, for he cannot then be further asked if he considers any other form of oath more binding.†

But a witness may be sworn, and yet not feel the terrors of the oath. He must believe in a God whose judgments are retributive, at the least; he must believe, according to the theory of the oath, that he is calling down exceptional penalties upon his head if he utters a falsehood. Now the law, as generally administered, takes no step to ascertain whether the witness believes in the special punishment of perjury. Any witness above fourteen years of age is sworn, and no questions are asked on this most vital point. But clearly such religious terrors cannot influence the Atheist. The Testament which he kisses cannot restrain the man who

* *Tyler: Oaths, their Origin, Nature, and History*, p. 48.

† *Taylor II.*, 1125.

believes that the Gospel is a myth, or that strange product of the nineteenth century, the pure Theist, animated with a positive hostility to Christ. The general belief in divine retribution is not enough ; it is necessary that the witness should believe that falsehood is a venial offence, and that perjury is an unpardonable sin. Clearly the Court may delude itself with the idea that it is dealing with a witness who feels the constraining power of an oath.

But in cases in which the terror of the oath is felt, there are many ways in which its truth-compelling power is modified. The question naturally arises : Can perjury be forgiven, or is it indeed that sin against the Holy Ghost which can never be pardoned here or hereafter ? If it can be forgiven upon repentance or after confession to a priest, it is obvious that when the punishment has dwindled down from eternal woe to transient risk its terror will be much diminished, and its restraint over falsehood will be reduced to a minimum. This Butler shows with all the power of his matchless irony,

The Rabbins write, When any Jew
Did make to God or man a vow
Which afterwards he found untoward
And stubborn to be kept, or too hard,
Any three other Jews o' th' nation
Might free him from the obligation :
And have not two Saints power to use
A greater privilege than three Jews ?
The court of Conscience, which in man
Should be supreme and sovereign,
Is't fit should be subordinate
To ev'ry petty court i' th' state,
And have less power than the lesser
To deal with perjury at pleasure ?

* * * * *

Why should not Conscience have vacation
As well as other Courts o' th' nation ;
Have equal power to adjourn,
Appoint appearance and return ?

And indeed the law itself encourages a witness to look upon some kind of perjury as venial :—

However gross be a man's false-swearing to a matter of fact, still if that matter of fact be not material to the issue or cause in question (and who but a learned lawyer can determine its materiality ?) it is not perjury, "because," says Sir Edward Coke, "it concerneth not the point in suit, and therefore in effect is extrajudicial." . . . How easily would human nature extend the temporal immunity to the spiritual obligation ; and argue that because the English law cannot apply its penalties to that case, neither would the false swearing be visited by the Almighty.*

And if one kind of perjury is venial, it would be easy to suppose that God might forgive the other also.

On the other hand, if a man believes that having once perjured himself he will go to hell and suffer everlasting torments, on the principle of "Once forsworn and ever forlorn"; having thus made the worst of the next world, what is to prevent him from getting the most earthly profit he possibly can out of his certain damnation ? Now this is precisely the view of the matter which was taken by those engaged in securing witnesses in connection with Custom House oaths. "There were houses of resort where persons were always to be found ready at a moment's warning to take any oath required. The signal for the business for which they were needed was this inquiry 'Any damned soul here ?' "†

Even if the witness had a due sense of the awful nature of an oath, habitual swearing would soon bring the familiarity which breeds contempt. "The feeling of sanctity that probably once attached to an oath becomes deadened in the minds of those who are taking it every day, and an easy manner and a composed demeanour are acquired by persons constantly in the witness-box."‡

Of this we have a good illustration in the following instance :—Mr. Ballantine severely cross-examined a young man, whom the late Lord Hatherley regarded as a very

* Tyler, 50, 51.

† Tyler, p. 54.

‡ Ballantine, vol. II., 23.

ingenuous witness exposed to a cruel ordeal. As the witness was going out of the court he was heard to whisper to a friend, "Why, the old gent believed every word I swore!"—as if it was the best of jokes to find so gullible a judge.

There is little *a priori* probability that the unvarnished person will be constrained by the oath which he has avoided taking, or by the terrors which he has learned to mitigate or to dispel. But now let us follow the witness into a Court of Justice and see how far its atmosphere assists the terrors of the oath—how far the oath prevails, in actual practice, to elicit the true facts of the case under consideration.

In the first place, the solemn and impressive words of the oath ("The evidence you shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God") are reduced to a mere form, or rather degraded into a horrible mockery by being gabbled over in a most perfunctory manner by a Court official. This oath renders the witness liable to be punished if he tells a lie in any question which is relevant to the point at issue, but counts it no crime if he tells lies about anything else. As it takes a clever lawyer to tell what is relevant to the case, this is a trap to catch a careless liar; a strong temptation to the man whom interest prompts to speak falsely if he only dare.

The witness has to give his evidence before a judge, who in these days is honest and straightforward; not taking bribes from both sides, as once upon a time; not open to the censure of Pope:—

Meanwhile declining from the noon of day,
The sun obliquely shoots his burning ray,
The hungry judges soon the sentence sign,
And wretches hang that jury-men may dine;—

not open to the approbation expressed for the Duke of Argyll in 1752, "Anybody can get a man hanget that's guilty; but it's only Callumore can hang a man wha's no guilty ava."*

But honest gentleman though he be, the modern judge is only a man. He has his little weaknesses: fond of his

* *Jeaffreson: A Look about Lawyers*, II., 214.

jokes, if he thinks himself a wit ; anxious to air his rhetoric, if he is an orator ; liable to make up his mind a little too soon, and unconsciously to become a pleader rather than a judge. He presides over the Court to take care that the game of Law shall be played in honest accordance with the rules of the game ; but there is a good deal of horse-play tolerated, in which the judge does not disdain to take his part. In one word, by his manner the judge may do much towards rendering a witness incapable and evidence worthless.

Then the witness, pledged to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, is examined by a barrister, who will only let him tell as much as he has in his brief, or as much as he thinks it will be well to disclose. How great a difference there may be between telling the truth as far as the assertion goes, and telling the whole truth, may be seen from a case tried before Mr. Baron Parke, in which a woman was acquitted of the charge of murder on the ground of the small quantity of arsenic found. Dr. Taylor had given evidence to that effect, and Serjeant Ballantine did not ask a single question in cross-examination. The Judge, after he had summed up, expressed his surprise to Dr. Taylor at the small amount of arsenic found ; upon which the medical expert said that if he had been asked the question he should have proved that it indicated, under the circumstances detailed in evidence, that a very large quantity had been taken.*

In the olden time, at any rate, an unscrupulous prosecution knew how to manipulate witnesses, and the process was made easier by the fact that witnesses were not sworn on that side.

Is not the winding up witnesses,
And nicking, more than half the bus'ness ?
For witnesses, like watches, go
Just as they're set, too fast or slow ;
And, where in Conscience they're strait-laced,
'Tis ten to one that side is cast.

Hudibras, II., ii., 359-364.

* *Ballantine*, vol. I., p. 1C1.

The witness has reason to complain that when he is called by one side he is invariably treated as though he were a partisan of that side ; so that the simple, child-like honesty of a Winkle is covered with confusion and disgrace, while the impudence of a Sam Weller is crowned with immortal glory. On the other hand, the opposing barrister, in his cross-examination poses as the bitter enemy of the witness, seeking any advantage which can be gained for the cause which he represents, and not very scrupulous always how that end shall be attained. "Knowing how necessary it was" (such is the astounding statement of Mr. Jeaffreson), "to put the witness in a state of extreme agitation and confusion, before touching on the facts concerning which he had come to give evidence," Erskine so "confounded" the Manchester "bagman" that he could not tell his right hand from his left. On another occasion a witness had sworn that one sleeve was longer than another. "You will," says Erskine, slowly, having risen to cross-examine, "swear that one of the sleeves is—longer—than the other?" Witness: "I do swear it." Erskine (quickly, and with a flash of indignation): "Then, sir, I am to understand that you positively deny that one of the sleeves was shorter than the other?" Startled into self-contradiction by the suddenness and impetuosity of this thrust, the witness said, "I do deny it." Erskine (raising his voice, as the tumultuous laughter died away): "Thank you, sir ; I don't want to trouble you with another question." *

Such treatment scarcely tallies with the directions laid down by that great lawyer, Sir Edward Coke, with respect to examination by a commissioner, which will equally apply to a barrister, if the object be to ascertain the facts of the case. "Forasmuch as the witesse, by his oath, which is so sacred as he calleth Almighty God (who is truth itself, and cannot be deceived, and hath knowledge of the secrets of the heart), to witness that which he shall depose, it is the duty both of the commissioner and of the examiner, gravely, temperately, and leisurely, to take the deposition of the witesse, without any menace, disturbance,

* *Jeaffreson*, II., 254.

or interruption of them in hinderance of the truth, which are grievously to be punished." *

Now it is quite clear that the administration of an oath does much to aggravate the position of a witness—difficult, at the best. You swear a man, you command or persuade him to call down upon himself the most fearful penalties if he does not speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. You then allow him to be examined-in-chief by a man who is instructed not to elicit the whole truth; you then allow him to be cross-examined by a man who does all he can to prejudice his evidence, by asking some questions which throw doubts on his integrity, by puzzling him into self-contradictions, or by terrifying him into utter confusion. And if he is ever attaining that equable frame of mind which is alone consistent with the proper discharge of his duty, it is always possible to insult him, or to terrify him, or to confuse him with the reminder, "Now, sir, remember that you are on your oath." When Goldsmith said that he would tell the truth and shame the devil, Johnson replied, "I wish to shame the devil as much as you do; but I should choose to be out of the reach of his claws." The oath sharpens the claws of the—cross-examining barrister.

Enough has been said to show that the oath does not exercise the truth-compelling power which it is assumed that it possesses. We now proceed to ask whether the theory of the imprecatory oath is not itself the survival of a decaying superstition rather than the expression of an enlightened faith. Can it be believed that God will treat as a comparatively venial offence the worst of falsehoods, deliberately and artistically manufactured, uttered from the basest motives, and with the most terrible results, *if unaccompanied by an oath*; and will doom to present woe, to future exposure, or to endless torture, the poor wretch who, hindered by examination-in-chief, and bewildered by cross-examination, has failed to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, after having acquiesced in the hastily-muttered and scarcely-understood,

* *Institutes*, IV., 278; quoted by Tyler, p. 85.

“So help you God”? Who can believe that it is a venial offence to swear to a falsehood in one attitude, and the worst of crimes if we assume another posture? This superstition, of which numerous examples have been given, is condemned by Cicero :

Who is influenced by an imprecation of the gods and is not influenced by the voice of a good conscience? The same punishment, consequently, which is assigned by the immortals to the perjurer is also appointed for the liar. For those immortal powers are wont to have their anger and vengeance roused, not so much by the forms of the covenanted words of an oath as by the perfidy and malice of over-reaching and fraud.—(*Orat. pro Q. Rosc. Com.* 16.)

And if God does not Himself recognise any great difference between falsehood and perjury, and will not of Himself inflict such very different punishments, is it conceivable that He will allow men to dictate a new mode of governing the moral world? As Lord Sherbrooke so well says: A man “cannot seriously believe that God has devolved on him the power of fixing his own punishment, nor that he can

“Snatch from His Hand the balance and the rod,
Prejudge His justice, be the God of God.”

Do we believe—can we believe—that God will interpose, specially or miraculously, to answer a prayer framed on such an expectation? Judgment by ordeal is not resorted to, because not believed in, to-day. Let us see how such a faith will work when put in practice. “‘May God strike me dead now at this moment, and here where I stand, if I am not innocent,’ said a prisoner at the bar. As the speaker’s guilt had been clearly ascertained, every hearer was painfully moved by the abominable self-imprecation. A thrill of horror ran through the Court. Then the judge, Baron Alderson, said, in a cold matter-of-fact voice, ‘Prisoner at the bar: as Providence has not interposed in the behalf of society, the sentence of the Court is that you be transported for twenty years.’”*

* *Jeaffreson* II., 393.

Now this story is instructive in many ways. The miserable fellow presented the principle of the oath from a slightly different point of view, and immediately a thrill of horror ran through the Court. Had he been a witness, sworn in the usual slipshod way, and perjuring himself after a frequent custom, no horror would have been excited by the lie which doomed him to hell, and yet how much worse is endless torture than sudden death. On the other hand the cool conduct of the judge showed how little he believed in the principle underlying the awful bravado of the prisoner.

There are two ways of getting over the difficulty presented by the oath regarded as an imprecation. One is to maintain that the great majority of men do not regard the words "So help you God," as implying execration or imprecation. But if this means that the majority of Englishmen understand the oath in a different sense to that which the theory of the law implies, the sooner they are enlightened on that point the better.

But some say that the words, "So help you God," do not involve imprecation. Such is their assertion, but authorities seem to speak pretty clearly upon this point. "An oath," says Mr. Taylor, "is a religious asseveration by which a person renounces the mercy and imprecates the vengeance of heaven, if he do not speak the truth."*

Doubtless a similar significancy once attached to the outward attitude assumed during the oath. The act of kissing the New Testament, which we have already had described as "blowing upon a buke," was once no doubt generally understood to mean what is specially expressed in the oath formerly taken in the Commissary Court. Placing his right hand upon one of the Holy Evangelists, the witness pronounced these words after the judge, "I renounce all the blessings contained in this book if I do not tell the truth, and may all the curses therein contained be my portion if I do not tell the truth."†

The assertion that the words, "So help you God" mean no more than the recognition of the Divine presence is met by

* II., 1115.

† *Tyler*, p. 190.

the fact that while the Separatist refused to be sworn, he was quite willing to make the following affirmation :—

“I, A. B., do, in the presence of Almighty God, solemnly, sincerely, and truly affirm,” &c.*

Now if the oath had really only meant the recognition of God's presence, the Separatist would have been informed of that fact, and there would have been no ground for his conscientious scruples. But, so far from this being the case, the distinction between calling God to witness and calling God to punish in an especial way, is recognised in our law. By 22, George II., c. 30, it is enacted that the Moravian “who shall be required on any lawful occasion to take *an oath* shall, instead of the usual form, be permitted to make solemn affirmation.”†

In the same way Barclay, in his *Apology*, draws a distinctive doctrine, calling God to witness and taking an oath :—

The using of such forms of speaking is neither swearing nor so esteemed by our adversaries. For when, upon occasion, in matters of great moment, we have said, *We speak the truth in the fear of God and before Him, who is our witness and the searcher of our hearts*, adding such kind of serious attestation which we never refused in matters of consequence; nevertheless an oath hath *moreover* been required of us with the ceremony of putting our hands upon the book, the kissing of it, the lifting up of the hand or fingers together with this common form of imprecation, So help me God. ‡

When we are told that the oath is only a religious asseveration, and merely involves the addition to a moral incentive of a religious influence, we are very much reminded of the way which certain nurses have of saying how nice the physic is which they are about to administer, how painless the operation which they would fain perform. But when the physic is once taken, the operation once undergone, further attempt at deception would only add insult to injury. This innocent religious asseveration is an

* *Taylor*, II., p. 1125, note 5.

† *Tyler*, p. 11.

‡ *An Apology for the True Christian Divinity*, p. 523.

asseveration with imprecation, however it may answer some people's purpose to give a more general definition.

But, again, it is said, "You call it an imprecation. Well, what if it is? Do you believe in the principles of the Lord's Prayer? If so, when you pray, 'Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us,' is not that an imprecation?"

His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, writing in reply to Lord Sherbrooke's article in the *Nineteenth Century*, says:—

Lord Sherbrooke puts it thus: It is, if the words be carefully considered, the renouncing of God's mercy, the invocation of a curse, the assumption that we know better than Deity how He ought to treat us, that we have the right and the power to direct what the treatment should be. If these words be true of "So help me, God," are they not equally true of "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us"? By this rule of interpretation we are saying every morning and night, "If I do not forgive others, do not forgive me." Is this also a renouncing of God's mercy and an invocation of a curse—an assumption that we know how we ought to be treated, and a direction that so we shall be? Either this, also, is a presumptuous sin, or Lord Sherbrooke's interpretation will not stand. As the Lord's Prayer came from the Saviour of the World, I must believe that the interpretation must be an error, or its rebuke would fall on Him who taught us so to pray.*

My answer is, in the first place, that according to the Revised Version, Matthew reads: "And forgive us our debts as we also have forgiven our debtors," a petition which embodies the following precept of Christ: "Therefore, if thou . . . rememberest that thy brother hath ought against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." That is the spirit in which Christ would have us to pray; and it is always possible for us to fit ourselves for such a prayer by first forgiving our brother—never possible for us to pray in the spirit of Christ unless we have—ever possible for us to

* *Nineteenth Century*, Sep. 1882, pp. 475—6.

urge a new prayer: *Forgive us our debts, for now we have indeed forgiven.* Or it may be put in another way. When we are at our best we forgive one another—we who at our best are weak and feeble; and if this be so, how much more will God forgive us? This is what Luke makes Christ say, “*Forgive us our sins, for we also forgive every one that is indebted to us.*” How could we dare to ask for mercy on any other condition?

We do pray for mercy,
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render
The deeds of mercy.

But, supposing we take the prayer to mean, “*Forgive us our sins past, present, and to come, in the same proportion as, and only as long as we forgive our fellow creatures*”—that prayer would also have the sanction of Christ’s teaching; for, in the parable of the Unmerciful Servant, He illustrates the principle of conditional forgiveness on the part of God—forgiveness which will last as long as we show a similar forgiveness. And this would seem to be the main point which the parable was spoken to illustrate, “*So likewise shall my Heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye, from your hearts, forgive not every one his brother their trespasses.*” Now, to pray that this may be so, is to pray that God’s will, as revealed by Jesus Christ, may be done; that the inexorable law which rules the spiritual life shall have its way, and not be miraculously tampered with; it is to pledge ourselves to walk in accordance with the divine methods, and to be imitators of God as dear children, well knowing that we cannot be as perfect as God, if we are not also as merciful.* We cut ourselves off from the divine mercy only so long as we cut off our fellow creatures from the blessing of our forgiveness. Indeed, the unforgiving spirit in us brings a cloud between our vision and the heaven of God’s love, and renders the closest communion impossible. This is a very different thing from selecting our own punishment, an

* cf *Matt. v. 48, Luke vi. 36.*

artificial punishment, and praying God to inflict it if we deserve it and do not keep faith with Him. In the latter case we bring down on ourselves a punishment which would otherwise not be inflicted ; in the former case we ask that a law of the spiritual life may be carried out, which will be carried out whether we pray for its fulfilment or not.

Cardinal Manning says that the Lord's Prayer came from the Saviour of the world ; and implies that the oath and the Lord's Prayer must stand or fall together. Perhaps it may be permitted to recall the fact that the Saviour of the world has exhorted his disciples to "Swear not at all," but to take care that their communication be Yea, yea, Nay, nay, seeing that whatsoever is more than this cometh of the Evil One—i.e., The Devil. So that Christian England would not be stultifying itself if it gave up The Devil's Oath and retained the Saviour's Prayer.

There is obviously a difference of opinion as to whether the oath is to be understood as an oath of imprecation ; and if so, whether such a prayer will be answered by God. Which-ever view is taken, there are reasons which should induce us to desire its abolition. If you believe in it, why insist on its imposition ? Clearly, it cannot improve the evidence of the thoroughly honest ; it cannot overcome the dishonesty of the utterly corrupt, nor has it made the more or less untruthful man entirely reliable. As it has failed in the object for which it was imposed, why do you, who believe in its terrors, insist on dooming the utterly corrupt or the careless witness to suffer God's wrath, and to undergo the punishment of an eternal hell ? It would be bad enough to do this if the object contemplated were achieved, if a few were doomed to hell in order that the evidence of the many might be made reliable ; but to do this with no such corresponding advantage is to be guilty of the grossest cruelty. That may be said of all oaths which Sir Edward Coke says of oaths which have no warrant of law, that they are rather *tormenta* than *sacramenta*.

But if you do not believe in the underlying theory, if you do not believe that the superficial act—the mode of taking

the oath—determines the perjury or otherwise of the false evidence, why countenance an appeal to heaven in the principle of which you do not agree? You insist on the expression of a view of the Divine Providence which you believe to be false, in order that you may receive as truth the evidence which is given by one in whose right hand there is, in your opinion, a delusion at least, if not a lie.

If it be contended, in spite of all that has been said, that the oath does bring the truth out of the unvaracious man who happens to be superstitious, and that the end justifies the means, there is force in that argument. Only, unfortunately, precisely the same plea has been submitted for profane swearing, and by this reasoning all blasphemy is perfectly justifiable. Mark Twain tells us, in his *Idle Excursion*, that the old captain “was deeply and sincerely pious, and swore like a fishwoman. He considered swearing blameless, because sailors would not understand an order unilluminated by an oath.”

It is argued that the oath ought to be retained because it expresses the national belief in the existence and in the moral providence of God. But what, after all, is the value of such a confession, when any witness over fourteen years of age willing to take an oath is asked no question as to what he believes? What use is such a theological test, when a man may reject the oath without assigning his special reasons for doing so? He is not called upon to explain whether he believes in the God by whom the witness swears; whether he treats as credible the Gospel which the witness kisses; whether he simply objects to his veracity being put to that test, or protests against the self-impredication which the theory of the oath presupposes? Hopelessly imperfect, however, as the test is in one way, it is very efficient in another. It divides all witnesses into jurors and non-jurors. It throws on the non-juror the slur of imputed scepticism; and while inviting jurors to swear according to their conscience, and permitting non-jurors to make simple affirmation, renders it possible for judges, like Lord Ellenborough, and barristers like Erskine, to offer insults such as these: A member of the Society of Friends

whose dress did not indicate the sect to which he belonged, having claimed to be examined on affirmation, was rebuked by the judge for attempting to deceive the Court by appearing in the guise of a reasonable being. A religious enthusiast, carrying out the principle of the law that he should be sworn in the manner that was binding on his conscience, offered to swear holding up his hand, and gave as his reason that the angel in the Book of the Revelation standing on the sea, held up his hand. To which Erskine replied, "But that does not apply to your case; for, in the first place, you are not an angel, and, in the second place, you cannot tell how the angel would have sworn if he had been on dry ground, as you are." *

Such swearing may be superstitious, but the law has no right to demand it as a supreme safeguard of veracity at the risk of its being held up to such consummate mockery.

If the oath does express the theistic faith of the British Empire, the faith which it expresses is this: That the Highlander may swear falsely with impunity so long as he refrains from holding up his right hand; that the Catholic Irishman may do the same so long as he does not kiss a Testament marked with a crucifix; that the Welshman is safe so long as he does not put three fingers on the book. To insist on this expression of the national faith either proclaims us superstitious or threatens to drive those who are not superstitious into unbelief.

But certainly the retention of the judicial oath, under all the circumstances which have been detailed, is an expression of the British character. It illustrates most forcibly the charge brought against our nation, by Mr. Matthew Arnold, in his Liverpool Address, that we are sadly deficient in lucidity, *i.e.*, that we have no perception of the want of truth and validness in notions long current; no perception that they are no longer possible, that their time is finished, and that they can serve us no more.

It is contended that we cannot be sure of getting reliable evidence in a Court of Justice apart from the palpable interposition of religious motives. The religious sentiment

* *Jeaffreson*, II., 253.

may, however, be invoked, and yet may not produce exactly the result which is anticipated. In the Hindoo Law provision is made for pious falsehood, which is called "The Speech of the Gods," and it is allowable to give false evidence for the purpose of saving a life which would be forfeited to the rigour of the law.*

And, indeed, those who feel that—

Earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice—

may well suppose that the Heavenly Father will Himself condone perjury if committed in the exhibition of a God-like mercy. Lord Mansfield directed a jury to find a stolen bracelet of less value than forty shillings, in order that the thief might escape the capital sentence ; and when the prosecutor urged that the fashion of the bracelet cost twice the money, the judge turned towards the jury and said, with solemn gravity, "As we stand in need of God's mercy, gentlemen, let us not hang a man for fashion's sake."† That is to say, on the plea of mercy he directed them to commit perjury.

The fear of hell will not always prevent men from false swearing. We protest against the common notion that you may take an unprincipled liar and galvanise him with the terrors of hell, and convert him forthwith into a miracle of truthfulness. With unblushing effrontery, for the mere delight of speaking falsely, or for motives of obvious self-interest, the thoughtless idler and the purchased liar give their perjured evidence. Even when the fear is strong—as strong as though the heavens were opened and the throne of God stood revealed, as though earth yawned and the flames of hell shot up from below—still the terrors of the nearer tribunal will soon blot out the apocalyptic vision. A nervous witness, having been encouraged by the judge, felt that after that he could swear anything he liked, showing that the awe of an earthly tribunal had excluded all other thoughts.‡

There is also the torture of cross-examination to be taken into account. Grant that a man believes even that sudden

* *Tyler*, 233.

† *Jeaffreson*, II., 217.

‡ *Ballantine*, I., 234.

death will be the consequence of perjury ; there are states of mind in which sudden death would be preferable to sudden disgrace. Grant that a vague belief in some undefined consequences if we perjure ourselves is in the mind ; that is powerless beside the certainty of present discomfiture. Grant that hell yawns before the disconsolate man, yet on the brink of the abyss he is struggling with a taunting, gibing, intellectual power, till it seems to him that the torments of hell are to be preferred to the agony of that contest. But most probably he forgets the future doom he has called down on himself, in his present bitter straits.

Nor can the vivid sense of God's presence produce a thoroughly reliable witness. Let us consider for a moment what are the attributes of such a witness. He must have accuracy of observation, vividness and distinctness of memory, lucidity of expression, and perfect honesty of purpose. Now it is quite clear that no terror, inspired by an oath, can act retrospectively and correct an inaccurate observation into an accurate one. No one can suppose that the act of taking an oath can endue us with the power which an imaginative writer supposes we shall one day possess of outstripping the career of light, so as to arrive at a given point in time to see the precise picture of the past as if it were still present. If we had that power we might perhaps correct the imperfect observation of the past. Nor can we suppose that vivid and distinct memory can be given, in ordinary conditions of the body, of that which attracted little attention at the time, as some uneducated persons in their dreams are said to reproduce, with exactness, the music and the French conversation which they heard with their outward ear but never understood at the time. And certainly lucidity of expression is either a gift of nature or a slowly acquired art, and cannot be superinduced by the imposition of an oath, unless we believe that God infallibly inspires and saves from mistake the witness who has called in the divine aid by means of an oath. Above all, it may be affirmed with confidence that the presence of religious sentiment does not necessarily bring with it an atmosphere of absolute sincerity. Perfect sincerity is not the character-

istic even of the most private prayer. It is only what we are vividly conscious of that we can vividly imagine to be known to Omniscience. It is on this account that private prayer, or the ministerial explanation which the conscience makes in the House of the Soul is no truer than some other ministerial explanations. All this George Eliot shows in connection with her masterly analysis of the character of Bulstrode. Speaking of the Confessional, the Rev. A. McKennal says : " So long as there is a motive for concealment, so long shall we practise concealment. The priest is practised in the art of worming secrets out of his penitents. He has to learn the science of casuistry, to acquire the skill in cross-examination of a lawyer, and hence the insincerity of an act where there should be on the one side only the strictest truthfulness, and on the other, perfectly unsuspecting confidence." *

We must sometimes walk alone in utter unconsciousness of God's presence, however profoundly we feel Him near in the highest aspiration of spiritual communion, and nothing seems more obvious than this, that in the intellectual process of giving evidence, the awe-inspiring fact of God's presence cannot always be remembered through a long examination, through a severe cross-examination, and through a more or less protracted re-examination ; and that if it could, it would often produce a distracting, and therefore, in all probability, a distorting influence.

The oath being thus powerless in so many cases to accomplish its assigned task, what provision shall we make for the treatment of witnesses? We cannot, under the present system, prevent perjury, but if only due skill be used, it can be discovered. According to Serjeant Ballantine, " cross-examination is the only means by which perjury can be exposed." We may still use the same means to discover the falsehood of the witness ; and for this purpose it may be better not to excite the terror sometimes inspired by self-imprecation. The oath may frighten into imbecility an otherwise useful witness ; it may destroy good evidence : but, in relation to false evidence, it acts as a

* *Christ's Healing Touch, and other Sermons*, p. 52.

danger-signal. "Mind, you are on your oath," warns the witness that what he is about to say is important, and that if he contradicts himself upon this point, he will be detected and punished; and hence, if he is telling a lie, he will take care to make it a consistent one. On the other hand, if the cross-examination is carried on without any demonstration—no remark being made by counsel when critical points are raised—the witness is thrown off his guard; he exposes himself, or, if not, the falsehood mingled with the truth is easily eliminated.

A well-known and certain punishment inflicted by the law for all false evidence given in connection with the question at issue before the Court will produce a deterring effect. Sometimes, no doubt, it is the fear of legal consequences rather than of divine wrath which influences men now. It is not always easy to gauge the comparative force of motives; but doubtless there are cases in which men, like King David, fear to fall into the hands of men more than into the hands of God. One historical instance goes to prove this. "The Ministers of Honorius were heard to declare that if they had only invoked the name of the Deity, they would consult the public safety and trust their souls to the mercy of heaven; but they had sworn by the sacred head of the Emperor," and they would not expose themselves to the *temporal penalties* of sacrilege and rebellion.* And Tertullian complains that it was the only oath which the Romans of his time affected to reverence.

In conclusion, it may be remarked that there is only one real safeguard against untruth, and religion may help us to that all important end. We get a glimpse of the right method to be pursued in the following incident:

When a child, eight years old, was brought up as a witness, it was mentioned that she was competent to give evidence because she had been twice instructed by a clergyman as to the nature of an oath. But the judge (Mr. Justice Patteson) would not admit her evidence, observing that he must be satisfied that the child felt the binding obligation of an oath from the general course of her religious instruc-

* Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, Chap xxxi.

tion, and that the effect of the oath upon the conscience should arise *from religious feelings of a PERMANENT NATURE*, and not merely from instructions confined to the nature of an oath, recently communicated to her for the purposes of the trial.*

This principle is capable of a wider application. "Never," says Mr. Caird, in his famous Sermon on Religion in Common Life, "in the highest and the holiest sense, can one become a religious man until he has acquired those habits of daily self-denial, of resistance to temptation, of kindness, gentleness, humility, sympathy, active beneficence, which are to be acquired only in daily contact with mankind." Hence the only safeguard against falsehood which piety can provide is through the cultivation of a habit of veracity developed in practical life under the influence of religious motive and sentiment. By cultivating such a habit till it works with automatic precision, and not by galvanising ourselves into truthfulness by the sudden flash of divine revelation, can we hope to be really truthful. "How shall we be believed?" says Gregory Nazianzen. "By our word and by a life which makes our word worthy of credit." "It is not the oath which gives credit to the man, but the man to the oath."† It is not in jerks of horror-goaded utterance, not in awe-stricken words such as might be uttered on some mountain of transfiguration, but in the calm custom of unfailing and abiding sincerity, that the truth should be spoken by the followers of him who bade his disciples to swear not at all, but to let their communication be "Yea, yea ; Nay, nay"—who came into the world for this purpose, and was born to this end, that by every act and deed of an upright life, and in ever varied tones, now of loving gentleness, and anon of stern denunciation, he might bear witness to the Truth.

CHARLES CLEMENT COE.

* *Taylor on Evidence*, Vol. ii. 1119.

† *Æschylus*, quoted by Tyler, p. 238.

AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN.*

MRS. DE MORGAN has given her readers a very acceptable book. The memoir of Professor De Morgan has all the charm which ought to be found in the recollections of a life marked, not by moving incident, but by strong individual character. One can weary of remarkable events, never of remarkable force or ingenuity of mind.

Augustus De Morgan was born in 1806 in India; he was brought to England as a child of seven months old, and owed little to his Indian birth, of which he was, nevertheless, in a fashion proud in after years, except the infirmity in his sight, familiar to all who knew him, and a constant element, more or less, in the shaping of his career. His first good school was that of the Rev. J. Parsons, at Redland, Bristol; here he was well taught in classics, but his love for mathematics does not seem to have been specially stimulated by the school routine. In 1823 he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, subsequently came out as fourth Wrangler in the Tripos of 1826, and began to study seriously for the Bar. Already, however, two leading features of his character had shown themselves, and it soon became clear that they were destined to have absolute control over his future career. The first was his liking, and great natural gift, for mathematics; the second was that sturdy self-assertion of intellect and conscience which, not necessarily, yet so often leads men into unorthodox, unpopular, and self-sacrificing paths. Both of these influences

* *Memoir of Augustus De Morgan.* By his Wife, Sophia Elizabeth De Morgan. With Selections from his Letters. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1882.

were at work when, in 1827, young De Morgan, himself a Cambridge man, and with an orthodox training, threw himself cordially into the scheme and hopes of the newly-invented London University. In the following year he was elected to the Chair of Mathematics.

It is with the University College in London, for a few years at first called the London University, that De Morgan's life and work will always be connected in the public memory; and in spite of his own protest at the close of his career, and the unspent force which to the present time makes that protest effective, the hope may be expressed that a permanent and fitting way will yet be found to perpetuate the memory of his thirty-four years of faithful service to the College. The story of Professor De Morgan's connection with and severance from the College is largely the story of his life. His love for mathematics and natural aptitude as a teacher made the opening at University College acceptable to his wishes; but a yet stronger inducement to him to become a candidate for the Chair was his warm approval of the principle which was laid down as fundamental by the promoters of the new institution—namely, that the highest academical training should there be given without any reference in teachers or pupils to religious convictions. Mr. De Morgan had already made friendships that deepened and strengthened his own fairly reasoned-out persuasion that religion is a private affair for a man's own soul. Some too hasty expressions might escape him now and then in those early days, marking his dislike of the practice of those who wear their religion on their sleeves, and think it well to do so; but "it was easy to see that a deep religious feeling underlay the contempt for observance which his early training had caused, and that his consciousness of the care and fatherhood of the Almighty was a sacred thing belonging to himself alone, not to be profaned by contact with human forms or inventions" (page 20). We quote these words because they really give the key to the religious bearing of his whole life: utter sincerity and simplicity of feeling accompanying deep convictions, and a boundless trust in a Goodness and

Intelligence over all. Among the friendships contributing to what was thus already a steady bias of his own mind, none was stronger or more beautiful, quite apart from the important domestic relation it led to later on, than that which he formed with William Frend, a man much his senior, and of character tried as gold is tried. Not the least interesting portion of an interesting book is Mrs. De Morgan's too brief sketch of her father's life and principles. While as yet De Morgan was dreaming, we may suppose, of neither sweetheart nor wife, except under the mysterious symbols of the pursuit to which his heart was given, his friendship with Mr. Frend was confirming him in independence of character and in a noble readiness for self-sacrifice.

The long connection of Professor De Morgan with the London University and University College was, in its leading features, but not the prominent ones, a course of steady, laborious teaching, and the devotion of the best hours of a lifetime to the objects of the institution, and the welfare of his pupils. It is this that a host of pupils look back to with gratitude, and can but think of as making his name inseparable from the history of the College. But the prominent features of the long connection of De Morgan's name with the College, those that have been best known to the outside world, and that are now chiefly recalled by this volume, are not the continuous work, which could lend few striking materials for description, but the acts on his part from time to time of adhesion or of secession. They may be enumerated thus: In 1828 De Morgan was elected the first Professor of Mathematics; in 1831 he resigned his office on a question of principle and practice affecting the status of the professors, and consequently the true welfare of the institution; in 1836 he resumed the Chair; in 1853 he made a strong remonstrance in a matter touching, as he thought, the leading principle of the College; and in 1866 he finally resigned, again on a question of principle. Immediately on his first appointment as teacher of mathematics, Mr. De Morgan had joined in a protest, addressed to the governing body of the College, which shows his sense of the difficulties

he might have to encounter. The question as to the rights and tenure of office of the teachers as against the controlling power of the governing Council arose as a difficulty even before the work of the College began. It is of necessity a vital question. The same critical contention, under a modified form, is well known to have led, only a year or two ago, nearly to a disruption in one of the largest and most famous endowed hospitals of London. Under all sorts of modification the question is a perpetually recurring one. It was a vital matter to the newly-appointed professors, in 1828, to know whether they held their offices independently of any change of opinion, or of fresh views of expediency, on the part of the Council, or whether they were liable to dismissal. In 1831, the Council dismissed from his office a professor in the Medical School, at the same time stating "that nothing which has come to their knowledge with respect to his conduct has in any way tended to impeach either his general character or professional skill and knowledge"; and Professor De Morgan, in high disapproval of this arbitrary act, resigned.

In 1836, on the sudden and tragical death of his successor in the Chair, Mr. De Morgan stepped in to cover the emergency, and eventually resumed his post, deeming the recurrence of such action of the Council as took place in 1831 to be sufficiently guarded against for the future. And, in fact, the further difficulties he encountered had a different occasion, though they touched the same critical point of dispute. A legacy left to the College Library in 1853 was accompanied by a condition that the three professors named in the will as trustees for the choice of books should be members of the Church of England. The Professor of Mathematics was thus disqualified to perform an interesting duty by his being a Nonconformist; and here, accordingly, if the legacy were accepted under such a condition, was a religious distinction made between the professors in an institution which professed to know nothing about religious differences either in teachers or in pupils. Professor De Morgan, after a vigorous protest, let the matter pass. And looking back, and considering human

nature to be what it is, and the offer of books to have been saddled by the testator, and not by any act on the part of the College, with this provision which would not affect the character of the gift, one sees that the question of principle might well be allowed to pass, and even without the transaction deserving so harsh a name as a moral "shuffle."

Still, Professor De Morgan was justly sensitive on this double point, the strict observance of the fundamental principle of the College, and the preservation of the independence and full rights of every professor. The events of 1866 in connection with Mr. (now Dr.) Martineau's candidature for the Chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic in University College are probably well known to the readers of this Review. Mrs. De Morgan puts together in this volume three important documents, two of them not before published, which give every assistance needed for understanding the course taken by Professor De Morgan. The first of these documents is the letter addressed by Professor De Morgan to the Council of the College, conveying his resignation of his office, and his reasons for the step. The second is the statement of fifteen professors, addressed to the proprietors, containing the arguments on the side of those who defended the action of the Council. The third is a private letter from Professor De Morgan to his old friend, the Rev. William Heald, in which something more perhaps of the inner mind of the writer comes out, and otherwise, than in the letter to the Council. All three are interesting papers; two of them will be turned to eagerly by many who, sixteen years ago, felt warmly on the points under discussion. Perhaps at the time, too scanty justice was done to a presumably honest wish on all sides in the Council to appoint simply the best man, taking all things into account, to the post. The most eminent man among the candidates, the one of largest experience, and of widest thinking, was by consent Mr. Martineau. Whether his appointment would have been the best in the interests of the College remains the undecided question which Professor De Morgan thought the Council decided in the negative on

unworthy or mistaken grounds. His letter to the Council is in many respects a remarkable one. His fresh, pungent way of stating things, and his uncompromising mode of reasoning out a matter, are well illustrated in it.

There is in this letter, we may observe by the way, a literary nut to crack, not the only one which this volume offers to us. We submit it to the ingenuity of our readers. "The acceptance," Professor De Morgan says, "of the conditions of that legacy [Dr. Peene's in 1853] did not drive me from the College, because, after much deliberation, and not a little help from what I now see to be sophism, my love for the College and the life I led in it barred the way with *De minimis non curat lex*. But I ought to have seen that *minimum* is the first step from *nihil* to *totum*; and when St. Denys, with his head under his arm, had made that first step, I ought to have foreseen the second" (page 340). This allusion to St. Denys is very puzzling. We have looked at it "amosgepotically"; we have considered whether, after all, it might be "Ocular and Elizabethan"; and we can make very little of it. It is true, Mrs. De Morgan interprets in a footnote; but we submit that the interpretation obscures, not explains. Professor De Morgan, with his racy, original way of saying strong things, meant probably something very good.

This is a small matter. We may quote another passage from this letter of resignation, which shows at any rate something of the pressure of high feeling under which it was written:—

I proceed to show, he says, that (supposing me willing to remain) I am as worthy to be extruded as Mr. Martineau to be excluded.

I have for thirty years, and in my class-room, acted on the principle that positive theism may be made the basis of psychological explanation without violation of any law of the College. When in elucidating mathematical principles it is necessary to speak of our mental organisation as effect of a cause, I have always referred it to an intelligent and disposing Creator. The *nature of things*, the *eternal laws of thoughts*, and all the ways by which that Creator is put in the dark corner, have been treated

by my silence as philosophical absurdities not worthy to have their silly names intruded upon those who are to be trained to think. Were I to remain under the new system, I should hold it a sacred duty and—ah, poor human nature!—a malicious pleasure to extend and intensify all I have hitherto said on the subject.

Again, for more than thirty years I have been as strong a Unitarian as Mr. Martineau. If I have not raised my voice in this matter, it is because I have been deeply engaged in other things, because I do not care what unreflecting people think they think, and because I have found that the great bulk of reflecting men of all sects keep their Trinitarianism caged in a creed, and are, in every practical application of religion except pelting Unitarians, as truly Unitarian as Mr. Martineau himself. Were I to continue in this college, under even the ghost of a gag, I should soon be heard (without the walls) on a subject to which I have paid long and close attention. I should soon bring the question to issue whether the installed Professor is or is not a subject for such discussion as has arisen about the candidate for admission. . . .

Return to the old principle. If the College fall, it will fall with honour. No concession of narrow minds, philosophical or theological, will save it. The enemy will give one sneer more, the friend nine cheers less. Thing'embigot, who says that his son shall not enter the College if Mr. Martineau teach there, never meant to send his son in any case. The late Vicar of St. Pancras, then a lessee in Gower-street, found the noise of the playground disagreeable, and sent word that if the nuisance were not abated he should withdraw his patronage; he had been an inveterate opponent. He was left to subtract his negative quantity if he pleased. Let Thing'embigot learn the same rule of algebra.

On the other hand, the enemy of religious disqualification, if the present course be persisted in, must decide whether his son shall be educated under selection carried up to its logical extent in the professed fear of God, or exclusion nibbled at up to compulsion of circumstances in the concealed fear of man as to religion, and another *fear of God* as to philosophy. I should myself be puzzled to make a choice, for if there be a tincture of atheism in the second fear of God, there is a tincture of blasphemy in the first. Of the two different ways of putting man in the place of God, I think the world at large would prefer the first.

My best wishes remain with the College which I leave, but I wish to make myself clearly understood on the question which has been opened. I trust that by return to and future maintenance of the sound principle on which it was founded, in which there is more religion than in all exclusive systems put together, the College will rise into prosperity under the protection, not of the Infinite, not of the Absolute, not of the Unconditioned, not of the Nature of things, not of the chapter of accidents, but of God, the Creator and Father of all mankind (pp. 342 to 345).

These words may be supplemented by a sentence from a letter on the same subject to Sir John Herschell :—

I would not have objected to leaving the existence of God and His action on the minds of men an open question for the best qualified candidate to treat in his own way ; but the interference of the College as a college, and a settlement of that question *officially*, is a step in which it concerns me, with my way of thinking, to take a part. . . . I have told them [the Council] *totidem verbis* that they had acted from *fear of God* in philosophy and *fear of man* in religion (page 369).

We quote these passages with no purpose except to illustrate the mind and character of Professor De Morgan. In these events of 1866, which touched him so nearly, his whole bearing, as in all else in his life, was full of **simple dignity**, very straightforward, regardless of petty or selfish interests. We demur to the necessity he felt himself under to resign his office ; and we lament that he took the action of the Council too deeply to heart, and regarded himself as henceforth cut off from sympathy with the College in which he had laboured faithfully for a lifetime ; but all the more we must honour the vindication of a great principle which he deemed to be in peril, and the readiness with which he accepted painful things as a portion of that needed vindication. The controversy itself, and discussion of the controversy, can never be revived with any advantage or interest ; but Professor De Morgan's part in it was so singularly illustrative of the great side of his character, as also in a measure of some weaker, but not less amiable, features, that it possesses permanent interest for those who love or revere his memory.

Professor De Morgan's theological and religious position has sufficiently appeared in these remarks upon his connection with University College. His theology, and something more, may further be gathered from the passage of his Will with which Mrs. De Morgan fittingly closes the memoir:—"I commend my future with hope and confidence to Almighty God; to God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, whom I believe in my heart to be the Son of God, but whom I have not confessed with my lips, because in my time such confession has always been the way up in the world" (page 368).

He was a Unitarian, and not unwilling, as he declared, to bring his theology into public speech and profess it before the world, if any doubt should ever be cast upon his perfect freedom to do so. But what interests us more than this is a very fine spirit of openness to new impressions and to the haunting mystery of a world of which science does not reveal the secrets. Few men have ever possessed the scientific faculty more decisively, or have been more strictly bound both by temper and by destiny to the logical exercise of the wits; and few, at the same time, have escaped more completely from any narrow satisfaction with the things known, or have entertained more candidly the possibility of reaching some higher apprehension of realities. We are glad that Mrs. De Morgan has reproduced in this volume the just strictures which Professor De Morgan passed upon a principle laid down by no less an authority than Mr. Faraday. In his lecture on "Mental Training" before the Royal Institution, in 1854, Faraday had said: "The laws of nature, as we understand them, are the foundations of our knowledge of natural things. Before we proceed to consider any questions involving physical principles, we should *set out with clear ideas of the naturally possible and impossible.*" To this De Morgan objected:

We stared when we read this—set out in physical investigations with a clear idea of the naturally possible and impossible! We thought the world had struggled forward to the knowledge that a clear idea of this was the last acquisition of study and reflection combined with observation, not the possession of our

intellect at starting. We thought that mature minds were rather inclined to believe that a knowledge of the limits of possibility and impossibility was only the mirage which constantly recedes as we approach it. We remembered the Platonic idea, as clear as the crystalline orbs it led to, that the planetary motions *must* be circular, or compounded of circular motion, and that aught else was impossible. We remembered with how clear an idea of the impossibility of the earth's motion the first opponents of Galileo started these maxims into the dispute. We doubt if in any mediæval writer the principle on which they *acted* has been so broadly laid down as by our author in the phrases above quoted. The schoolmen did indeed make laws of nature the foundation of their knowledge, and clear ideas of possibility and impossibility helped them in the structure. But they rather *did* it than *professed* it.*

Accordingly, Mr. De Morgan's guarded feeling towards the unexplained phenomena of Spiritualism, for instance, is by no means justly expressed by the word credulity. Rather, his knowledge, competent in its own sphere, became baffled and conscious of its failure in another sphere, and led him to a wise suspense of judgment.

Professor De Morgan's zealous labours in aid of higher education in the country, and in some movements of social progress, are well known. These must be thought of apart from the work which he undertook more immediately in the line of his own pursuit. To the latter belong the share he took, during a long course of years, in the proceedings of the Astronomical Society, and his numerous writings of a purely scientific character. In the former, we may reckon his long and most useful series of publications for the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, from its foundation, in 1826, to its dissolution in 1844,—his active and disinterested efforts to make known to the country at large the benefits of a decimal system of coinage, and to urge its adoption upon the Government,—his strenuous protests against "cram" in education, and the stress he laid upon the right formation of habits as of more weight than any acquisition of knowledge:—"If we take care of the habits,

* *Athenæum*, March, 1855. *Memoir*, p. 192.

the acquirements will take care of themselves" (page 227) ; and lastly, some books of a more popular order, full of fresh ingenious ways of treating old themes, or of curious knowledge picked up through years of wide reading and patient research.

For something of the enormous amount of work achieved by Professor De Morgan, the world has, perhaps, to thank his dislike for the country and the sea. He writes to Mr. Frend in 1834 :—

No letters from you, from which I conclude that your thoughts are of trees, only interrupted by the slopping of the waves. which are always fiddling at the sand, till I long to give them a thump, and tell them to be easy. The prettiest thing about the sea is the straight horizon and the isochronism of the waves in deep water, but near the shore they do not keep time like my pendulum (page 80).

He was contented with his London routine, and to be incessantly at work, while still showing as clearly as any man a keen enjoyment of domestic life and of the society of congenial friends. The following letter, written nearly at the close of his life, possesses points of interest beyond the account he gives in it of his idea of hard work :—

My dear Heald,—I think I shall be able to keep up the institution of a summer letter, though I may not be so long as usual. It is the forty-fourth observance.

You think, one letter of yours says, that I am feeling the effects of hard work ; in fact, that I have been working too hard. Bid your mind of the idea. I have never been *hard* working but I have been very *continuously* at work. I have never *sought* relaxation. And why? Because it would have killed me. Amusement is real hard work to me. To relax is to forage about the books with no particular object, and not bound to go on with anything.

You remember that my amusement used to be Berkeley and the like. Quite true. I did with Trinity College Library what I afterwards did with my own—I foraged for relaxation. I used to shock you with my reading of Voltaire, who existed in that

library in about eighty quarto volumes. So you called me an atheist vagabond, fancying that Voltaire was an atheist: he was, in fact, theistic to bigotry, and anti-revolutionist to the same extent.

I read an enormous deal of fiction—all I could get hold of—so my amusement was not all philosophical. I have never worked hard—never got so far as a headache. If I felt tired, I left off (page 393).

Many bright recollections of friends are to be found in this memoir, and they form by no means its least charm. Especially attractive is the long friendship, and the well-sustained correspondence in evidence of it, between Professor De Morgan and Sir John Herschell. "Looking back," said Sir John Herschell, after Mr. De Morgan's death, "on our long friendship, I do not find a single point on which we failed to sympathise; and I recall many occasions on which his sound judgment and excellent feeling have sustained and encouraged me," (page 399).

The selection of Professor De Morgan's letters in this volume is enough to show with clearness the characteristics of the man; yet it is too brief. We could have wished for many more of these letters, so suggestive, often witty, always wise and kind, and abounding with delightful nonsense.

From the following letter to Mr. Frend, in 1834, we have already quoted one short passage:—

I was not surprised to find, on my return to town on Friday, that you had decamped, seeing that you take pleasure in the wilderness. Neither must you be astonished that I did not exceed by a single day my estimate of the time I could bear the viridity of extra-urban scenery. . . . While my health is recovering from the effects of the raw atmosphere I have been breathing, I write this in preference to more serious occupation. This is no joke, I assure you; whenever I return from the country I am knocked down for some days, and could be ill with very little contrivance or external instigation, which never happens if I stay in town. And yet I have been only two days regularly in the wilds. To give you some account of my progress, I went to stay with a clerical friend, who lives six miles from any town

or village, except the thing he calls his parish, and a lone house he calls his rectory. So, he having no vehicle except a four-legged apparatus called a pony, we slung my baggage across the beast, and crossed the country on foot, like a gipsy migration, talking mathematics over his head, to his very great edification. Indeed, he (the quadruped) looked as wise and profited as much as some of my preceding pupils have done. How people live in such lone houses I know not. Conceive me reduced to clip hedges to pass away the time till dinner, which I did with great *gout*, seeing that it is reducing trees to something like regularity, and diminishing the sum total of foliage. From thence I went to Oxford, where I was thrown upon my resources for a whole evening. The only incident worth notice was that, having strolled out and picked up some second-hand books at a book-stall, rather Cornelius Agrippa looking sort of things, a good-looking old gentleman (a stout Church and State man, I'll swear) was so astounded that he changed his table to increase his distance, and looked at me as if he expected to see me carried away by an Avatar of the evil principle. Thence got I to Bedford, where I stayed some days with Captain Smyth, heard all the town politics, saw a jail with two men in it, father and son, charged with cutting the tails off fifteen pigs, dined with a clericus, and did various other things, not forgetting seeing a play acted by little children. . . . Thence got I to Cambridge, inside a coach, with a lady whose history I wormed out of her, agreeably to a talent I have for doing those things when I like, which you will admit when I tell you that in a ride of twenty-five miles I ascertained that she had married, when very young, an officer of the first Light Dragoons, with him had gone to India, was stationed at Bangalore; where she travelled; how he died, she came home, and married the vicar of some place which I now forget, and, having stayed at some place, which I equally forget, was now moving, with furniture following in a waggon, and husband deposited outside the coach, to take possession of his living, first stopping to dine with a friend whose name I forget. I also ascertained which of all my cousins in India she had danced with in her day, which was instructive to know. These, and a great many other things, did I ascertain; so you may see that if I am not communicative myself, I know how to make other people so when they do not know what I am at (page 78).

A letter written in 1859 to Sir John Herschell treats in

half-a-dozen lines, and in characteristic fashion, of the idea of Cause.

Thanks for your pamphlet. I have not had time to do more than glance at it, but will say what I think when I have got through a heavy job of calculation—a job of life and death, as one may say—for it is all about premiums, and claims, and assurances, &c.

Maurice de Biran, who died in 1824, aged about sixty, was a *philosophe*, who speculated and died, even as a silkworm spins and dies. He will be a gaudy moth, I daresay. His cocoon was published by Victor Cousin in 1841, in four volumes. He was very much against Napoleon in 1814, which means, I suppose, that he had been his parasite theretofore. He was a public man of some kind. Probably his will was an impulse to better his condition, or butter his condition. He passes for an acute thinker in France; but I have never seen a line of his writing.

I believe that so much of cause as is not mere notion of precedent and consequent is derived from our own consciousness of power exercised at will. If we had been rational posts, incapable of motion, chewing the cud of what passed before our eyes, and if with a will incapable of action, I do not see how we should have had any real notion of cause. What the will is I have not the least idea, or whether it ought to be called the *shall* or not. Query, if it be really correct to call it the *will*, how is a person, whose will is undecided, said to be *shilly-shally*? Ought it not to be *willy-wally*? Kind regards to the circle (page 300).

Here is a pleasant note to the same old friend, under date 1863 :

MY DEAR BARONET,—There's change for your "Professor." Everybody attaches some ideas to a word derived from early associations. The first "learned Professor" I read of under that name was Olearius Schinderhausen, of Leyden, who departed with his cast-off suit biennially. I did not think I should live to match him; but as I never go out, and always work at home in a dressing-gown, I also have but one coat in two years.

Seventy-one, eh? Go on to eighty, and then apply to me for further directions, if I should be in a condition to give them. Addition of the same to a ratio of greater inequality diminishes it. So says Jemmy Wood; and the life of man confirms it. When

you were preparing $\sin^{-1}x$, I was learning numeration from my father on a zahlenbreitstein—a pebble, of diameter and flatness, picked up in the road. And I remember that when it was lost I refused all arithmetic till another was found, which, considering that no one had told me the etymology of *calculation*, showed a kind of natural philological acumen.—Yours very truly, A. De Morgan (page 320).

We may quote one more letter, or portion of a letter, addressed, in September, 1868, to Mr. John Stuart Mill, who was then residing at Avignon. After some pleasant talk and inquiry about the Avignon edition of *Gardiner's Logarithms*, and a reprint in 1770 of the same, Mr. De Morgan turns to another subject of more general interest.

A nice job you will have made for the courts. Some ladies have actually passed the revising barrister because there was no opposition. The R.B. was right; he is not bound to know that Jane Smith is a woman, nor could he raise the question. I have a cousin whose wife is *David*. When the poll clerk sees a female claimant I suppose he will be bound to say, "Madam, you cannot be the Jane Smith on the list, for the law says that voters are all men. I must wait until some man comes forward and declares he is the person described!" Then the poll clerk may, perhaps, be subject to an action. But if he should admit the claim, there may be a scrutiny demanded, and, perhaps, a petition against the return. The question will raise some logic. The world of concepts being divided into man and non-man, if man mean male person, and only man can vote, non-man equally excludes Jane and her pussy and her pianoforte. They all come under the contra-positive—all voters are men. All voters are men, *i.e.*, all non-men are non-voters. There is but one answer to Jane, the cat, and the pianoforte, *i.e.*, *non-man*. I hope you will push the point, and get rid of the bother; it infests the house. But, in justice, let no woman be placed on the register except on her *demand*. To be a voter is sometimes dangerous. A man ought to face the danger, but you have no right to enforce it on women. In principle you might as well enforce the militia on them. Many women think exemption from politics is one of their rights (page 383).

We recommend our readers to go to the book itself. It gives the picture of one who lived to benefit multitudes, and

injured none—a man, wise, tender, devout, yet with a singular independence of character and an uncompromising conscientiousness. The Memoir, written as it is with both feeling and judgment, will be welcome to all who knew Professor De Morgan, or that have had reason, as pupils, to be grateful for his skill as a teacher, and for his patient love of his work. It will also, we hope, gain the notice of the far wider circle of those who care for the more original and sturdy forms of human intelligence and conduct.

EDWARD S. HOWSE.

*DR. MARTINEAU'S AND MR. POLLOCK'S
SPINOZA.—II.**

III.—SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY.

IN reading Dr. Martineau's exquisite sketch of Spinoza's life and character there has been little call for any mental effort. We have easily followed our accomplished guide and tranquilly enjoyed the successive biographical pictures which careful research has made so truthful, and artistic skill so beautiful and life-like. But now a more arduous task lies before us. So far we have been for the most part pleased, but passive recipients of intellectual and æsthetic gratification. If we wish, however, not only to have an adequate idea of Spinoza's history, but also to mount to his philosophical point of view, and endeavour to see the problem of the universe somewhat as he saw it, and to appreciate in some degree the merits and defects of his proposed solution, then we must nerve our minds for strenuous exertion. A more competent expositor than Dr. Martineau we could not find, but in passing to the second part of his study of Spinoza we soon discover that it is no longer a facile and delightful excursion in the company of a highly cultured friend through picturesque scenes which the imagination can easily realise.

* *A Study of Spinoza.* By JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D., Principal of Manchester New College, London. With portrait of Spinoza. London: Macmillan and Co., 1882.

Spinoza ; his Life and Philosophy. By FREDERICK POLLOCK, Barrister-at-Law, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Honorary Doctor of Laws of the University of Edinburgh. With portrait of Spinoza. London: Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

Spinoza ; Four Essays, by Land, Kuno Fischer, J. Van Vloten, and Ernest Renan. Edited by Professor KNIGHT, St. Andrew's. Williams and Norgate, London and Edinburgh. 1882.

Rather is it now a hard climb up Alpine heights of philosophical thought under the guidance of a vigorous thinker who will choose for us the least toilsome route, and will help us over difficulties with the happy knack of a practised mountaineer, but who will, at the same time, soon let us know that it is vain for those to set out on this expedition who are not prepared to put forth mental energy in grasping and surmounting the ideas which will rise before them.

It may be as well to preface our account of the more salient features of Spinoza's philosophy by some remarks on the proper function of philosophy in general, and also on the relation of philosophy to ethics and to religion. The wonder which fills the soul of man as he contemplates the visible cosmos or looks into the mysterious depths of his own consciousness cannot but awaken some intellectual impulse to theorise concerning this spectacle of the outer and the inner world. Reflection on the facts of perception and self-consciousness sooner or later reveals the truth that the human mind cannot think of the ever changing appearance of nature without thinking, at the same time, of an abiding cause of their successive appearances, just as it cannot think of its own successive mental states without recognising a permanent self as the seed of its various affections and the cause of its various relations. The antithesis which thus presents itself to the reflective mind is expressed by several pairs of terms which indicate respectively different aspects of these contrasted ideas. It is spoken of as the relation between God and the Creation, the Real and the Phenomenal, the Infinite and the Finite, the Eternal and the Temporal, the One and the Many, and in Spinoza's phraseology it is the relation between Substance and its Modes. But thought cannot stop short with an analysis of man's perceptual experience, it has also to explain the facts of self-consciousness, or the relation of its own personality to the two terms of this fundamental antithesis. Is the Ego a part of the changing phenomena of the universe, or is it something more than a series of changing states, and akin rather to the abiding cause of the phenomenal world? To determine, then, the proper meaning and reciprocal relations of these three

terms, God, Nature, and Man, becomes the problem to which all minds in whom the philosophical instinct is strong cannot help addressing themselves : and the different philosophical systems are the different attempts which have been made to present a self-consistent and adequate solution. But it is also to be noted that man's relation to the cosmos and its cause is not merely that of a spectator and theoriser. Man is not only a thinking being, he is also a moral and religious being, and in each of these respects he feels himself to stand in specially intimate relations with the Infinite and the Eternal. All philosophical systems, then, so far as they achieve their proper object, must include not only a theory of our sensational and perceptive consciousness, *i.e.*, of the physical universe and its ground or cause, but also an explanation of the facts of our moral and religious consciousness. It is not the function of the philosopher to attempt to create or to destroy moral and religious ideas ; he has simply to reckon with them as actual factors of experience. As, however, it is impossible for any theory concerning God, Nature, and Man, to become influential without, at the same time, either invigorating or depressing ethical and religious ideas, philosophy necessarily assumes considerable practical as well as theoretical importance in respect both to conduct and devotion. It is true that the philosophy of a man, or of an epoch, takes its form from the character and culture of the philosopher and of the time ; but it is equally true that a philosophical system becomes in its turn an ideal force which reacts powerfully upon the intellectual, moral, and religious life to which it owes its birth and its vitality. The facts of experience in which philosophy endeavours to discover organic unity fall, as we have already noticed, into three distinct groups, namely, first, the orderly sequence of physical and psychological phenomena, which forms the subject of scientific research ; next, the ideas and emotions which have reference to the cause and meaning of the phenomenal universe ; and, finally, the personality of man with his consciousness of moral freedom, his sense of obligation, his trust and reverence, his conscious sympathy and

union with the Eternal. Each of these several phases of experience has its special attraction for particular persons, and for particular periods in the mental history of mankind; and if, in the case of any philosopher or any age, the attraction to one particular phase of experience is so strong as to throw the others quite into the background, it is almost inevitable that the philosopher who is under this influence will use, as a key to the explanation of the *Universum*, the theory which he has found to answer in that province of experience which especially engages his interest and attention. In such a case the theory has not been formed from a comprehensive and sympathetic study and appreciation of the whole field of human experience; it is a merely provincial explanation, which is forcibly imposed upon other regions of thought and feeling to which it has no real application. Take, for example, the absorbing modern interest in the study of the order of cosmical phenomena, which was in its vigorous youth in the time of Spinoza, and is now in the prime of its robust manhood. The only theory which this experience seems to require for its philosophic explanation is the recognition, as an ultimate law, that the sequential relations of phenomena are invariable, or, as it is sometimes, though incorrectly, expressed, that causality obtains without exception throughout the universe. The natural effect of the subordination of all other ideas to this dominant idea, is that the other two spheres to which experience introduces us are either ignored altogether as substantive realities, or else constrained to obey this law of mechanical sequence. We shall presently see how both the theology and the psychology of Spinoza are hampered and paralysed by the tyranny of ideas which have their proper application in the mathematical and physical sciences, whence they are derived, but which, when raised as they are by him from their provincial sphere to universal empire, must either produce spiritual desolation by violently extirpating the other principles of human nature which rise up in protest against this despotism, or else present the spectacle of a philosophy divided against itself, and harbouring antagonistic ideas which it strives in vain to place in amicable

relations. Spinoza, at times, has recourse to the method of abruptly stamping out those intractable factors of human nature which are hopelessly at variance with his fundamental principle, as when he tells us that it is folly to repent of sins, seeing that sorrow is so much lost power, and as for the past, it could not have been other than it was; but, as a rule, he, like all great philosophers, shows a wide and deep acquaintance with human nature in all its chief aspects, and his ingenuity is mainly employed, not in distorting the facts of consciousness in order to squeeze them within the limits of his theory, but in so ordering his exposition that most of the important factors of our moral and religious experience are duly represented there, and it is only when we carefully examine their mode of entrance that we see that on Spinoza's principles they have no right of admission, and are there, not because logic demanded or allowed their presence, but because they belonged to Spinoza's inmost nature, and could not be extruded or disowned. We have a similar example of this inability of theory to wholly silence the claims of the ethical and religious consciousness in the case of J. S. Mill, and in this instance, also, the philosopher endeavours to show that his ethical ideas and his religious faith are in perfect accordance with his philosophy. Both Spinoza and Mill manage to fashion a most winning image of self-sacrificing love out of egoistic materials; and while Mill, in the last of his posthumous essays, puts in a curious claim for immortality on behalf of a portion of that unsubstantial aggregate of sensations which, in his view, constitutes man, so too Spinoza, after repeatedly assuring his readers that man is but a parallel series of modes of extension and modes of thought with no permanent substantiality, yet finds, ere he reaches the end of the *Ethica*, a method of rescuing "the better part of us" from the fate of temporal things, and translating it to its home in God's eternity. It is clear, then, from the instances of Spinoza and Mill, that, though a philosophical theory may not explain the facts of the religious consciousness, or may even seem logically incompatible with these facts, it by no means follows that the philosopher himself is

necessarily poor in regard to ethical and religious experience. When, as in the above cases, the logical articulation of the philosophical theory is actually dislocated by the inward pressure of ethical ideals and religious aspirations, it seems to us more reasonable to suppose that the religious element in such natures is real and living, but that it is restrained by some tyrannous intellectual pre-possession which grew originally out of a partial view of human experience, but has now assumed such strength and rigidity that it no longer allows the religious life free expression and development.

In every philosophical system there is generally one idea which takes precedence of all others, and gives to the philosophy its characteristic expression; and it may help us to understand Spinoza's true position as a thinker, if we briefly compare his dominant idea with other ideas which prevail in recent British philosophy. We have mentioned together Spinoza and J. S. Mill; but we by no means wish to suggest that there is any affinity between the governing idea which controlled the thought and emotion of the English philosopher and the idea which exercised most potent influence over Spinoza's inner life. Of the three elements which make up human experience, Mill fixes upon the sensational consciousness as of primary interest, and his ruling idea is that, by the principle of invariability of sequence and the laws of association, he can explain the sense of personal identity and the idea of causal energy. When we turn from Mill's Idealism to Mr. Spencer's Transfigured Realism, we seem, at first sight, to be closely approaching Spinoza's point of view; but this apparent approach is to a great extent illusory. Spinoza and Spencer agree in recognising the validity of both terms of the antithesis of God and Nature, but the governing conception of our English thinker is that Nature, or the Phenomenal, is the only Knowable, and that of God, or the Unknowable, nothing save His bare existence can be intelligently predicated; so that with him, as with Epicurus and Lucretius, the study of physical and mental phenomena absorbs the interest, and the exposition of the laws of these phenomena forms the beginning and the end of his philosophy. He does not, like

Mill, ignore God as the eternal substance and cause of phenomena, but his God is divested of all human interest. As in Mill's idealism sensation is the central fact, and man's rational, ethical, and religious ideas the mere products of association, so in Herbert Spencer's realism Nature is the one engrossing object of all philosophical research, for Nature, in his view, absorbs Man and hides God. Far otherwise is it in the system of the grandest of modern Stoics—our Hebrew Spinoza. With him, as with the prophets of old, God is the Alpha and the Omega of his thought. The mystic idea of self-existent Substance, with its infinity of infinite attributes, is the starting-point of his philosophy, and the close and culmination of it is the ascent of the soul, by virtue of clear reasoning and pure love, into that transcendent sphere where time and its vain illusions are no more, and man becomes a sharer in God's eternal life. Nor even in this mortal life is Spinoza's God unknowable, for the signal merit of Spinozism is that it emphatically asserts that we can never really know phenomena unless at the same time we have a clear knowledge of God and His causation. If, then, we characterise Mr. Spencer's "System of Synthetic Philosophy" by the name "Agnosticism," we need some other term to express Spinoza's proposed solution of the great problem of philosophy. It may be called Pantheism; but it must be clearly borne in mind that Spinoza's God is no sum-total of the various modes of body and mind that together constitute the manifested cosmos, or, in Spinoza's language, the *Natura naturata*. God is the *Natura naturans*, in whom is neither divisibility nor time succession, and who is active in His entirety in all causation. The *Natura naturata* is God as seen through the delusive medium of the sensuous Imagination, the *Natura naturans* is God as apprehended by the clear intuition of the Reason.

Where, then, is the difference between Spinoza's Pantheism and Christian Theism, seeing that both recognise the constant presence and activity of God in nature and the soul, and both maintain that the true end of human existence is to escape from the servitude of earthly passion by the greater might of self-forgetful love, that so man may

enjoy that spiritual freedom which is another name for intimate communion with the Eternal? Notwithstanding the apparent resemblance, there can hardly be a doubt that there is a very real difference between the religious views of the Christian Theist and those of Spinoza, and assuredly that difference would be fundamental and vital were the Spinozism which is actually presented in its author's various writings transformed into Spinozism, as it ought to be if Spinoza's system were that faultlessly logical deduction from his first principles which it is sometimes supposed to be.

The opposition between the fundamental prepossessions which control Spinoza's theological doctrine and those which prevail in Christian Theism will be clearly seen in the course of the review of his philosophy to which we now proceed, and some light will also be cast, we think, on the interesting fact that, notwithstanding this opposition, his writings have so much real or apparent affinity with Christian ideas.

Dr. Martineau's elaborate exposition of Spinoza's philosophy includes a very full discussion of the Logical Theory, the Metaphysical System, and the Ethical Doctrine; there are also shorter chapters on the Political Doctrine, the Doctrine of Religion, and, finally, an account of Spinoza's views on the Biblical Theology. The Logical Theory comes first in order, for though Spinoza's logic to a certain extent implies his metaphysical doctrine, yet some account of the former is a necessary preparation for the study of the latter. For the thorough understanding of this difficult subject the reader must, of course, refer to Dr. Martineau's complete and accurate exposition, and he will find some additional help furnished by writers who are more in personal sympathy with Spinoza's doctrines, in Mr. Pollock's thoughtful volume, and also in Professor Land's brief, but most luminous account of Spinoza's views in the two lectures now fortunately made accessible to English readers in Professor Knight's very interesting collection of "*Spinoza Essays*." We shall attempt no more than to present those features of Spinoza's doctrine which seem to us most necessary for attaining an accurate

general idea of his philosophy, and especially of his ethical and theological position.

Let us begin, then, with Spinoza's view of Perception. He starts with the assumption that objects are other than our ideas of them, and thus postulates a world of external realities opposite to the mind. He does not, however, hold the ordinary view that, as external objects act upon our nerves, so our nerves in turn act upon the mind, and produce there sensations and ideas ; for we shall see, when we come to consider his metaphysical system, that it is a conspicuous doctrine with him that material and mental things, though ever existing in exact parallelism with each other, exert no reciprocal influence. Matter is only acted upon by matter, thought by thought. What, then, is the nature of the relation between the mind and its object ? On this subject Dr. Martineau writes as follows :—

The idea, though other than its object, *agrees with* the object, so as to report *what it is*—i.e., to take its *Essence* into our thought. The idea of an ellipse, *e.g.*, is different from the ellipse, having no area and foci ; yet presents in thought the characteristic properties which the figure possesses in fact. We are to assume, then, these two positions : that the idea is other than the thing, so that the same predicates cannot be affirmed of both ; and that yet they have a point of union in the essence of the thing, which is present objectively in the one and formally* in the other. In this conception of a single "essence," qualified only by objects which touch its seat but not its identity, Spinoza flings a bridge across from things to thought ; he takes for granted that they communicate, and sets up a doctrine of natural dualism (p. 108).

We are not sure that we fully understand what Dr. Martineau means when he says that in Spinoza's view things and thought "communicate" with each other, for when describing Spinoza's doctrine, that the body is merely an aggregate of movements and the mind an aggregate of ideas,

* In a long and valuable note on page 109, Dr. Martineau explains that in Spinoza's phraseology "formal" existence means existence without reference to the presence of a perceiving mind, while to have "objective" existence is to come before the mind's attention. The former is real, the latter ideal.

Dr. Martineau adds :—" And these two pluralities are kept apart by the fact that each idea, while itself in the sphere of thinking, has its object in the sphere of extension, between which there is no communication " (p. 215). But Spinoza holds that in every act of perception what the mind immediately perceives is the state of its own body as affected by the object perceived, and so it would seem that the relation between things and thought must be that of correspondence rather than of intercommunication. And if we refer back the modes of extension and the modes of thinking to their substantial unity in God, it appears that even then, though they must be regarded as aspects or activities of the same ultimate reality, they could not be said to exert any causal influence on each other. It occurs to us, however, that in these two passages, which seem to be at variance, Dr. Martineau may be consciously dealing with two distinct stages in the development of Spinoza's thought, in the first of which some of the mediæval Realism still clung to him, and enabled him to say that the same essence was at once in the thing and in the thought, whereas at a later period he had become a more thorough Nominalist, and could no longer regard essence as competent for this act of mediation. †

Mr. Pollock's remarks on the question of Perception are worth quoting, both as an indication of his own philosophical position and also as illustrative of his statement that Spinoza bids fair to become the favourite philosopher of men of science :—

We cannot but notice one extraordinary defect which is conspicuous in Spinoza's psychology. One of the first things we expect from a psychologist nowadays is a systematic account of the processes of perception and knowledge. But Spinoza does not appear to have any theory of perception at all. He assumes, as we all assume, that there is some kind of correspondence between sensations in consciousness and things in the external

† That this is the correct explanation is rendered probable by a passage on page 134, in which Dr. Martineau says, " In Spinoza's ' Short Treatise ' he uses the ' Animal Spirits ' (accepted from Descartes), as a middle term between Percipient and Perceived, just as the ' Essences ' of things mediated for him between the Real and Ideal of the Intellect."

world. But of the nature of that consciousness he has very little to say. . . . Not that his metaphysical principles are in themselves unable to furnish means of dealing with the problem ; on the contrary, they very much simplify it. The puzzle of sensation when considered in the usual way, is that there is a relation between the heterogeneous terms of consciousness and motion. Something happens in my optic nerves, physiology may or may not be able to say exactly what, and thereupon I see. Can my sensation of sight be said to resemble the thing seen, or the images on my two retinae, or the motions on the optic nerves, and if so, in what sense ? These questions are essentially insoluble on the common supposition that body and mind are distinct substances or orders in nature. If body and mind are really the same thing, the knot is cut, or rather vanishes. The problem of making a connection between the inner and the outer series of phenomena becomes a purely scientific one. It is no longer a metaphysical paradox, but the combination of two methods of observing the same facts, or facts belonging to the same order ; and the science of physiological psychology can justify itself on philosophical grounds, besides making good its claims by the practical test of results. But the people who cry *materialism* at everything they disagree with or cannot understand will, doubtless, cry out that this also is materialism. And they are very welcome to any good it can do them (p. 213).*

* In connection with this doctrine of Perception, Spinoza has occasioned his readers much perplexity by using the words "idea" and "object," now in one sense and now in another. Dr. Martineau will, no doubt, confer much advantage on future students of this philosopher by the successful pains he has taken to track home to its source this element of confusion. After reading *A Study of Spinoza* (pp. 131—139), "on the two meanings of 'object' and 'idea,'" the student will have no difficulty in threading his way through the entanglements produced by Spinoza's ambiguous use of these terms. While referring our readers to the above passage for a full exposition, we may briefly indicate the main features of the distinction. When describing the operations of the understanding, Spinoza uses these two terms in the usual way. But it is a characteristic doctrine of his that every material thing, as well as the human organism, has corresponding to it a concomitant idea or mode of thinking ; for all modes of extension are correlative to attendant modes of thought. Therefore, all things are animated, and, with regard even to a stone or a tree, Spinoza would say that "the superiority of our mind to theirs depends only on the superiority of its corporeal object." In accordance with this view, he maintains that the mind is the "idea" of the body, and the body the "object" of the mind, not meaning thereby that the mind is thinking of the body, and so making it its object in the ordinary sense, but simply that the affections of the body (i.e., the condition of the ultimate molecular

We may notice, by the way, that of all the feats of logical legerdemain few are more striking than that by which Spinoza managed to pass, *more geometrico*, from this doctrine, so dear to Mr. Pollock and his scientific friends, that body and mind are but two modes or aspects of the same reality, to the doctrine, in which Spinoza's Theistic admirers find such satisfaction, that though the body perishes at death, nevertheless "the better part of us" is eternal.

As we have many images and thoughts in the mind which do not correspond to any external reality, we need some criterion by which to distinguish between truth and error. It is only by the internal marks of an idea that we can, according to Spinoza, learn whether it is true or false. The internal marks by which a true idea is characterised are *clearness* and *distinctness*. Mr. Pollock is probably in the right when he says that Spinoza's test of truth is not substantially distinguishable from Mr. H. Spencer's ultimate postulate—namely, that every proposition is true of which the contradictory is inconceivable, though Spinoza's formula expresses the criterion in an affirmative form. As Spinoza habitually regards geometrical knowledge as the norm to which all other knowledge should approximate, it is probable that he fancied, from the readiness and success with which his criterion could be applied to mathematical matters, that it would be equally efficacious in separating truth and error in other spheres of knowledge likewise. It is a curious illustration of the difficulty of applying this test of truth in the metaphysical sphere that, as Mr. Pollock points out, some of the most current notions in philosophy and psychology which Spinoza makes the objects of his

elements of the nervous system or brain) exactly correspond to the psychical elements which compose the mind. It is evident, however, that we do not attend to these cerebral conditions of our consciousness, and therefore to say that the object of the mind when it is observing a tree or a person is not the outward form at all, but that special configuration of the cerebral elements which the presence of the external thing or person produces, is to introduce a fertile source of serious confusion. It is, as Dr. Martineau remarks, an analogous impropriety to that committed by Sir William Hamilton, "when he confuses the *Cause of a Sensation* with the *Object of a Perception*," only that, in accordance with Spinoza's theory, the cerebral state is not the cause, but the concomitant of the sensation.

most unsparing attacks are precisely those which have been most commonly maintained, on the ground that they are principles given by consciousness, as clear, ultimate, and self-evident.

We shall presently have to consider how far Spinoza's imposing deduction of the phenomenal universe from the one eternal Substance satisfies, both in its supreme idea and in its process of derivation, the logical conditions which his own criterion of truth imposes. But, first, it is necessary to have a clear conception of the relation which such terms as Substance, Cause, and Reason bear to each other in his doctrine. The clue to his usage, in regard to these words, is to be found in his notion that the relation of the *Natura naturans* to the *Natura naturata* is analogous to that of a geometrical figure to the various inferences which can be drawn from it. The consequence is that he uses the category of Substance and Attribute, and that of Cause and Effect interchangeably, and then finds that, after all, neither of them expresses what he really means. Hence it comes about that instead of Cause we sometimes find him speaking of Reason, for it seems quite inappropriate to say that the equality of the sides of a triangle is the cause of the equality of the angles, for we might just as well say, inversely, that it is the equality of the angles that causes the equality of the sides. To use Dr. Martineau's words :—

Where the given thing, instead of being physical or qualitative, is quantitative in its essence—*e.g.*, a geometrical figure—the language of causality becomes wholly inapplicable. You may, doubtless, make some one characteristic of the circle, taken as its essence and put into its definition, yield others by inference; but it is not their *cause*, inasmuch as you can invert the order and deduce it from any one of them that may be substituted in the prior place. Their *ratio essendi* is a reciprocal one by which they eternally coexist, and not a successive one, like the *ratio fiendi*, which, in causality determines the order of events. This second category the understanding applies only to phenomena, and the properties of "Substance"—of entity "*in se*"—are not phenomena, but eternal as itself (p. 116).

Compare with this the following [passage from Professor Land's lectures :—

To Spinoza God and the world are correlates, as much as the equality of the angles and that of the sides, as much as the circle and the relations of magnitudes connected with it. It is possible in geometry to deduce the second from the first; but the first may equally well be deduced from the second. The word "Cause" is not a fit one in this part of the system; if it is to be used, the world may with equal correctness be called the cause of God. If we let the word go, with the whole logical apparatus connected with it, and hold fast simply the mathematical analogy, the conception of Spinoza will appear in clear daylight (p. 22).

We have placed these two passages together because, if we mistake not, they reveal in a conspicuous way an interesting relation between these two eminent expositors of Spinoza. Both are heartily at one as to Spinoza's real meaning; but while the English thinker regards Spinoza's doctrine of the relation of God to the world as fundamentally erroneous, and considers that God is really related to the world as Cause to Effect, the Dutch thinker, on the other hand, appears to be in complete accord with the inner spirit of Spinoza's teaching, and the only correction he would make in it is that the word, as well as the idea, "Cause," shall be entirely dropped out of use in speaking of God's relation to the phenomenal universe, and shall be confined to its ordinary employment among men of science to express the humanly conceived relation of one finite mode of being to another. It is possible that we are mistaken in supposing that this is Dr. Land's own view, for our opinion is gathered rather from the general tone and colour of his lectures than from any definite statement of his; but, in any case, the position which we have assigned to him on this question is not without its prominent representatives, and we suggest to our readers that, by comparing together these two views, and asking themselves in which of these directions their own sympathies and convictions tend, they will have one of the best possible

crucial tests for deciding whether or not they themselves are genuine Spinozists.

One of the most important factors in Spinoza's logical theory is the doctrine of the three stages of human knowledge which answer respectively to Imagination, to Reasoning, and to Intuition. This mode of graduating the cognitive process appears not only in the *Ethica*, but also in a slightly different form, with a fourfold division, in the "Short Treatise concerning God and Man," which, as was before mentioned, was probably written before Spinoza removed from Amsterdam. It is, indeed, quite organic in Spinoza's thought, and forms the basis of his ethical as well as of his logical method. The ideas of Imagination are the crude sense affections which have not yet been subjected to careful comparison and reflection, and present such a commingling of truth and error that they are a constant source of illusion. Dr. Martineau, in his chapter on "The First Order of Ideas," unfolds with much subtlety Spinoza's views on this somewhat complex subject, and thus sums up his account of these ideas:—

They are a medley of subjective and objective influences. They carry no apprehension of causes. Their association together is accidental. And their order is uncertain, as our belief in contingency attests. They are, therefore, confused and inadequate ideas; involving, indeed, no illusion, if taken for what they are—viz., mixed and partial states, falling short of the essence of things; but fatally misleading when accepted as real knowledge (p. 145).

Three, however, of the delusive influences of Imagination need to be particularly mentioned; these are the formation of Class-names or Universals, the idea of Time, and the belief in our own Freedom, *i.e.*, in our ability to act in either of two alternative ways; but the consideration of the last of these had better be deferred till we treat of Spinoza's Ethical Doctrine. From his theory of the formation of Class-names and his treatment of them as among the sources of illusion, it is clear that Spinoza had, to a great extent, disengaged himself from mediæval Realism,

of which, however, we still find some traces in his doctrine of "Essences." As Mr. Pollock points out, Spinoza's view of the origin of "Universals" is another of the many instances in which he seems to have anticipated recent scientific theories, for there is a very close resemblance between his doctrine and that put forth recently by Mr. F. Galton in a paper on "Generic Images." According to this view, when a large number of similar objects have been successively presented to the mind, the images so overlap each other in the texture of the brain that the slight variations in different directions which distinguish individuals, tend to neutralise each other, and the result is a confused image which is not that of any individual in particular; and it is this vague impression which is described by the Class-name. Spinoza's doctrine is thus expressed by Dr. Martineau:—

Where concurrent or contiguous images are partially *similar* (as of a man, a woman, and a child), repetition, as it accumulates, will resolve the integral representations; saving the constant features by reiteration, while the inconstants die away by non-recurrence. The result is, a mutilated representation or compound of such common properties as affect us in all the instances: constituting the meaning of a "*Universal*," or Class-name. . . . Where the partial similarity is reduced to a minimum, and the images delivered have nothing in common except in their being images, all their features are crowded out; none having advantage by iteration over the rest, so as to escape the reciprocal blurring and erasure consequent on the limited capacity of the human brain. The result is such abstracts as are expressed by the "so-called transcendental terms," "Thing," "Being," "Somewhat." As a mere residuum of obliterated images these also are "confused" (p. 143).

If we bear in mind this account of Class-names and Abstract Ideas as due to the illusory play of the imagination, and so answering to no reality, we shall see that Spinoza's supreme idea, that of Substance, was regarded by him as at the furthest possible remove from being merely an abstract idea, for the characteristic of the idea of Substance with

him is its exceeding clearness, whereas abstract ideas are instances of extreme confusion.

Spinoza's doctrine of Time, as contrasted with Eternity, is a point of cardinal interest and importance in his system, and may be regarded as the chief achievement of his philosophical genius, for it is by the employment of this contrast that he, in the fifth book of the *Ethica*, manages to perform the logical feat which we before noticed, and so to save his theory of human nature from the materialistic consequences to which it seems inevitably to lead. It is at the point where he begins to speak of existence out of time that his modern evolutionist admirers, such as Mr. Pollock, are reluctantly compelled to part company with their master, and he ascends on to another plane of thought, where Transcendentalists, like Schleiermacher and Schelling, hasten to welcome him with open arms. "Time," says Spinoza, "is nothing but a mode of thinking." The ideas of Past, Present, and Future would have no place if we could see things in their necessary causal connection as the expression of Substance, for Substance and its perfect cosmical expression are but two aspects of the same thing, and from the stand-point of Spinoza's intuition, it would be as absurd to talk of a real time succession among events, as to say that the various properties of an equilateral triangle manifested themselves one after another, so that the equality of the sides was succeeded by the equality of the angles, and the equality of the angles by the fact that each angle is the third of two right-angles, &c. It is the delusive imagination which, by presenting things in isolation rather than on their necessary connection with the whole, causes us to see in events a time relationship. Here again we see that it is the mathematical analogy that furnishes the key to Spinoza's meaning. Mathematical relations are independent of time, therefore to the eye of the philosopher all the relations which are necessarily implied in the idea of Substance, or God, must be out of time also. As Dr. Martineau notices, Spinoza's view of Time and Eternity might seem to anticipate Kant's "Transcendental Æsthetic" doctrine. "But," he continues, "Spinoza does not mean that the

time-order in which sensory material disposes itself is only the *a priori* 'form' of our perceptive faculty, and therefore not predicable of things as they are irrespective of perception. Spinoza did not resolve the externality, coexistence, and succession of objects into the constitution of the subject; but, on the contrary, assumed, as we have seen, the presence in thought of the essence which was real in the thing. He does not, therefore, teach the ideality of time in the Kantian sense" (p. 144). Here again the doctrine of the "essence which is at once in the thought and in the thing," to which we before referred, presents itself, and we are once more in perplexity as to Spinoza's real meaning. Dr. Martineau, can, no doubt, quote texts from Spinoza which quite justify his reading of Spinoza's doctrine, but still we cannot help thinking that the general drift of Spinoza's latest thinking was away from this doctrine of "essences," and was becoming more idealistic, and therefore Kantian, in its character. We express this opinion, however, with much diffidence, for it is a hazardous step to stray away from such a guide as Dr. Martineau, when we reach these sublimer heights of speculation. At any rate, there was this important difference between the Kantian and the Spinozistic doctrine, that according to the former it is the necessary character of our mental constitution that compels us to impose time and space relations on phenomena and disqualifies us in our present existence for realising in thought that "eternal" state, which lies "beyond the veil of space and time;" whereas in Spinoza's doctrine this disability is only the work of the delusive imagination, and he who attains to true philosophical intuition can in this present life step over the threshold of heaven, gaze with untroubled eye upon the Absolute, and enjoy the divine privilege of beholding the panorama of the cosmos under the form of eternity. On this subject Mr. Pollock writes:—"Spinoza teaches that the eternity of which the mind is conscious in the act of rational knowledge is wholly out of relation to time. Also, it is distinctly stated to be a kind of existence. Here then we have existence out of time, and a knowledge or perception of it in consciousness. Now it is, at least, a

serious question whether existence out of time is conceivable" (p. 299). We agree with Mr. Pollock that it is not "conceivable" in the sense of "imaginable," but we are by no means sure that it is not both "thinkable" and "believable."

In the foregoing remarks, we have partially anticipated the two other stages of knowledge—i.e., Reasoning and Intuition. In *Ratio* we rise by means of acts of comparison to "common notions," by which Spinoza appears to mean ideas of the separate common properties of all things; and hence this stage seems to be, on the whole, identical with our present idea of Induction, or the ascertainment of the laws of nature. There is this great difference, however, that Spinoza would not have considered that *Ratio* achieves its proper task till it succeeds in showing how the laws it discovers flow deductively from the attributes of Substance; and this is precisely the step that science seems unable to take. Hence, as we shall see, there is a fatal lacuna in Spinoza's attempted deduction of the world from God's attributes of Extension and Thought.

Though so much hinges on the Intuitive stage of knowledge in Spinoza's system, it does not seem that he attached to the word Intuition a very definite and uniform idea. He tells us that in Intuition the mind sees at a glance and not by a process, and in this view we should be disposed to regard it as a kind of Inspiration, independent of the previous exercise of rational thought. But then, again, we are told this third kind of apprehension advances by logical deduction from the idea of the real essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate idea of the essence of things. It would seem, then, that it is the power which the practised intellect is supposed to attain of immediately apprehending the true character of a thing or an event by instantly associating it with the combination of causes which necessitate its existence. Once again the mathematical analogy will, perhaps, help us, for the practised mathematician sees at a glance the various properties of a figure before him, though he had first to learn them by a process of reasoning. Here, then, we see Spinoza's idea of

the relation between *Ratio* and *Scientia Intuitiva*. As from the standpoint of Intuition there is no such thing as time relations among objective phenomena, so subjectively the perfect philosopher as he attains to the higher intellectual vision should not need to go through a reasoning process ; for past, present, and future should lie before his intuition as an open book. This will also, perhaps, serve to explain why Spinoza says that the mind enters into this highest stage of knowledge only in so far as the mind itself is eternal ; for the mind passes into the eternal condition when it is no longer deluded by time and the shows of time, and therefore it is no longer enslaved by the passions which have their ground in these vain imaginations, and if it could attain ideal perfection in this state, it would intuitively see God in everything as its ground and cause ; it would have no need for reasoning, but would anticipate in this life the Pauline idea of heaven, " where we shall know even as we are known." How far we are at present off from this happy consummation may be inferred from Spinoza's confession that the matters which he himself understands in the intuitive way are very few.

In what has been said respecting the Logical Theory, the chief features of Spinoza's Metaphysical System have been incidentally described, so that we need not dwell very long on this portion of our subject. As an introduction to what we have to say on this head, we cannot do better than quote from Dr. Martineau the following passage :—

Spinoza's theory of the world was not born in a day ; and in its growth was far from building itself up in the order ultimately given to its exposition. Were we to tell its story chronologically, we should begin with the two parallel data which he accepted from Descartes—"Extension and Thinking"—the bases respectively of matter and mind. Reduced afterwards to a second tier in his pyramid by the superposition of a crowning apex, these were at first his supreme categories. On their resources he relied for detecting the laws of the universe ; thence it was that he started his doctrine of physics, psychology, and ethics. They were the working factors of his speculation, though not its titular head. He thus wrought out, in the first instance, a dualistic philosophy ; and then, by a prefatory stroke of

thought or of assumption, converted it into a monism. In his early Short Treatise, the higher term (there called "God") into which he resolves the two heads of deduction is reached by processes of *reasoning*, borrowed, for the most part, from Descartes. In his Ethics the show of inference is dispensed with, and the unit of Being is made also the initial point in thought, and provided for at the outset in a *Definition*. That he thus treats as self-evident what before had needed demonstration implies a new phase in his philosophy; and to appreciate that philosophy as a whole we must look at it in its final form" (p. 167).

There is some doubt as to the nature of the tenure on which Spinoza holds his conviction of the existence of that "*res singularis*" to which he gives the names of "God," "Substance," and "*Causa sui*" (*i.e.*, the Self-existent One). He evidently does not mean by these terms to describe the aggregate of physical and mental modes of existence, but just the reverse of this—namely, the Eternal, the timeless Being, who is one and indivisible. Does, then, the certainty that this Being exists belong to that highest stage of knowledge which Spinoza calls Intuitive? If the idea that such a Being exists be a true idea, it ought, according to his own criterion of truth, to present itself to the mind in such complete clearness that to doubt it would be impossible. Probably this is the ground that Spinoza would take if he were cross-questioned, for he says elsewhere that, though he can form no mental picture of God, he, nevertheless, has a perfectly clear idea of God. If he had said further, "And the invariable concomitant of this clear idea is the certain conviction that the clear idea corresponds to an objective reality," his statement would have been intelligible and satisfactory. But, unfortunately, he is still under mediæval influences, and though he has omitted from the Ethics the psychological argument of Descartes, he still manages to slip in under cover of his first Definition ("By *Causa sui* I understand that whose essence involves existence") the old ontological argument, and lays himself open to the retort that, if by "essence" he means an idea in the thought, the fact that we cannot think of Substance without thinking of existence is no more a guarantee of the existence of Substance than the fact that we cannot think

of fire without thinking of heat is a guarantee of the reality of either fire or heat.* The ontological argument appears to have some cogency in the case of Space; but even Space cannot, in Kant's judgment, make good its claim to real existence. If, then, we drop this scholastic survival "essence," which is a source of confusion rather than of conviction, we are led to the conclusion that Spinoza intuitively perceived the existence of Substance—*i.e.*, that by a mental necessity he could not contemplate the plurality of phenomena without apprehending, at the same time, the real existence of the One who is manifested in the Many. Admitting, then, the validity of this position, that the mind cannot but recognise the existence of Substance or God, the next question is, Is this intuitive idea of Substance such that we are obliged to infer that it must have an infinity of Attributes, two of which, Extension and Thought, are accessible to us. Spinoza himself allows that our knowledge of Extension and Thought is derived from experience, and so at this initial point the theory loses its claim to a purely deductive character, and the connection between Substance and its assumed attributes is in no sense a logical one.

The attempted unification of mind and matter by attaching both as attributes to Substance, is an arbitrary speculative assumption, into which Spinoza was led by a supposed analogy with the deduction of geometrical properties from Definitions. He forgot, however, that in the case of the geometrical definition, the imagination constructs the figure, and thus gives a positive content to the notion, to which there is nothing analogous in the Definition of Substance. It is the more needful to insist on this point because Spinoza's error here weakens, if it does not wholly destroy, the fundamental idea of his system, that tyrannous prepossession of his, which, as we pointed out at the opening of this paper, must ever keep Spinozism and Christianity apart, namely, the idea of Necessity, or, as Kuno Fischer calls it, Causality.† Our idea

* Vide *A Study of Spinoza* (p. 164).

† Trendelenburg argues (in opposition to Kuno Fischer) that the ground-thought of Spinoza's system is the parallelism of the two attributes, and the

of necessary or invariable connection is derived entirely from our experience of the phenomenal world, and there is no warrant whatever for transferring it to the relation between the Eternal and the world of phenomena. The order of the cosmos has its ground and explanation in God; but this affords no justification for any assertion as to what God *must* do, or *must* not do. With the idea of the Eternal there wells up in the soul the emotions of infinite trust and reverence and love (and there is good reason to believe that such emotions overflowed the heart and mind of Spinoza); we see God in and through nature, but the laws of nature impose no laws on Him. The very moment the human intellect begins to dogmatise about the limitations of God (and Theists are not at all free from such dogmatism), there is a silent protest rises out of the inmost core of every man's being, and a deep persuasion that on this matter silence is wiser than speech.

We will not stay to discuss the question whether Spinoza regarded the two Attributes as really existing as such in God, or regarded the duality as being merely relative to our perception; but we feel no doubt that Dr. Martineau is right in his conclusion "that no præ-Kantian reader could have put the latter construction on Spinoza's language."

To take up once more the thread of Spinoza's pretended deduction of the universe from God: the question now arises how, if we leap over the great hiatus which separates God from His alleged attributes, and suppose we have reached pure Extension and pure Thought, we are to deduce from these conditions the finite modes of Extension and Thought which constitute the actual physical and mental cosmos.

circumstances that they never interact, and he thinks the special feature of the system is that by this ground-idea it overthrows both Materialism and Teleology at one blow, the former by the principle that matter cannot influence mind, the latter by the principle that mind cannot influence matter. With all respect for Trendelenburg's very high authority, we cannot help thinking that he is mistaken here, and that what he calls the ground-thought, is subsidiary and accidental compared with that idea of Causality to which Kuno Fischer assigns the dominant position.

"If we ask," writes Dr. Martineau, "why Modes should arise at all, and introduce defect within the perfect existence of the Absolute,—whether, as Schelling says, 'the Absolute is ennuyé with its perfection'?"—Spinoza answers with a constant phrase:—It is 'by the necessity of the divine nature.' That is, the divine nature cannot help it, comprising in its essence an immanent causality, rendering explicit its own implicit contents" (p. 194). The ablest of Spinoza's correspondents, the Freiherr von Tschirnhaus, writes to him as follows:—

I should like you to indicate to me how, on your theory, the variety of things can be shown to follow necessarily from the concept of extension, since you remember the opinion of Descartes, that this variety could be deduced from extension in no other way than by supposing that the effect arises from the production of motion by God.

And a little further on he continues:—

The reason why I particularly desire to know this is, that in mathematics I have always observed that from anything considered in itself, that is from the definition of anything, we cannot deduce more than *one property*, and that, if we wish to know other properties, it is necessary that we should refer the thing defined to other things. From the definition of the circumference of a circle, we learn its uniform self-similarity, possessed by no other curve, but we have to add radii, intersecting chords, etc., before we can establish other properties; and this seems to be opposed to the 16th Prop. of Book I. of the *Ethica*, in which you assume, as known, that from the given definition of anything whatever *several* properties are deduced. Which seems to me to be impossible, unless we refer the thing defined to other things; and so I cannot see how, from some attribute of God considered in itself, *e.g.*, infinite extension, the variety of bodies is able to arise" (Letter LXXI. of Bruder's Edition).

This letter is worth careful study, for here, as Dr. Martineau truly remarks, Tschirnhaus "hits Achilles' heel" (p. 121). The mere definition of infinite extension could not of itself enable us to deduce even the ideal space relations which bodies would have to observe if they really existed, for you must add to your definition or intuition of

infinite space, the definition or intuition of limited space before you can take a single step in logical deduction. And even supposing it were possible to deduce from pure extension the whole body of geometrical relations, we should still be as far off as ever from the actual cosmos, for we should only have the ideal space relations which a real universe would conform to, but as to the real universe itself, it could never come at all within the grip of our ideal deduction. To quote Dr. Martineau's concise and characteristic expression :—"Spinoza's account of causation mistakes logical cogency for dynamic necessity, or what amounts to the same, assumes, that, in virtue of parallelism, the one is the exponent of the other, and that in the dialectic of thought we may read the genesis of things" (p. 195).

We need not dwell on Spinoza's doctrine of immediate and mediate Eternal Modes, nor on his scholastic use of the word "Essence," by which he strives in vain to mediate between the infinite attributes of God and finite bodies and minds. His views on these matters are luminously expounded by Dr. Martineau (pp. 179—212); but Spinoza's ingenious devices to give a plausible appearance to his assumed deduction only serve, when critically examined, to confirm the conclusion that we know the Infinite by Intuition and the Finite by Perception and Self-consciousness, and that every attempt to pass from the former to the latter, by a logical process, is a signal failure. Here, then, again, at another most critical point, the chain of deduction snaps asunder, and Spinoza's system is as incapable of passing logically from God to the Finite, as our recent empirical philosophies are of making the inverse passage from the Finite to God.*

Spinoza, indeed, indirectly confesses that he cannot find, in his idea of God, the cause of a finite thing, for he says :—"No single thing, *i.e.*, having a finite and determinable existence, can exist, and be determined to act, unless determined thereto by some other cause, also having a finite and

* See an eloquent passage on this feature in Spinoza's philosophy in Mr. J. F. Smith's fine article on the "Ethics of Spinoza," in the *Theological Review* for October, 1870, p. 553.

determinate existence; which again cannot exist and act unless determined thereto by some other finite and determinate cause, etc., *in infinitum*."* But along with this account of Causation, which corresponds to the current scientific use of the term, Spinoza also recognises a quite different kind of causation,† for in other passages of his writings he identifies causality with necessary sequence from the attributes of God. This setting up of two causalities, the blending, that is, in the same system of philosophy of the theory which refers every change immediately to the action of God, with the opposite theory which finds the cause of each change in the preceding finite existence, is a serious source of confusion. As we have before seen, Dr. Land thinks that Spinoza's view will become clear as daylight if we drop the word "cause" in the first of the above senses, and hold fast to the mathematical analogy, according to which the world is as much the cause of God, as God is of the world. We are not sure that Spinoza himself would have been quite willing to buy clearness at this cost. It seems to us that he never fully realised all that is logically involved in this mathematical analogy, and did not see that causality in the first of the above uses could just as well be read backwards as forwards. The word "cause" in this sense is too vitally and organically bound up with his system to admit of being cut away as a disfiguring excrescence; and we strongly suspect that Spinoza would have sought to justify his two-fold use of the term by saying that in the first sense it denotes causality as viewed from the "intuitive" point of view, into which time-relations do not enter; and as, therefore, all the successive stages of causation which science interposes between God and the finite effect may be compressed into one act, God may be said to be the immediate cause of the finite events; whereas "cause" in the second sense indicates the aspect of the causal relation as seen in the second or reasoning stage of knowledge, when time-relations are still present to the thought, and therefore the causality presents itself as broken up into an infinitude of finite causations. Spinoza might

* Vide *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 204.

† Vide *Op. cit.*, p. 207.

thus argue that causation, though really homogeneous, must of necessity appear heterogeneous when contemplated now under the form of time, now under the form of eternity. Of course, in any case, he is exposed to the fatal question, How is it possible to deduce from the idea of God that His causality should differentiate itself into the finite modes which constitute the cosmos?

Let us now turn to Spinoza's doctrine concerning Man. Though Spinoza represents man as a compound of two parallel series of modes, which always correspond but never interact, he is not really able to preserve this parallelism intact. In treating of man as a percipient being, the thinking part of man is necessarily made so dependent on the extended part as to appear to bear the relation to it of a copy to the original, and, on the other hand, we shall see, when we come to consider his view of man's final destiny, the thinking element is at last so raised above the bodily that it secures for itself an eternal existence in which the body appears to have no share. The Mind is, as we have already seen, the Idea of the Body. This idea, which constitutes the mind, may have an idea of itself, so that now the mind, besides knowing, knows that it knows, and so self-consciousness arises.

This further knowledge (says Dr. Martineau) is a new fact, of which also an idea is formed, and so on till the first self-reflection includes an infinity. We are not, indeed, aware of having this infinite series of *discreet* cognitions; for the invariable occurrence with every idea, of the *same knowledge of it* amounts to a *fusion* of all the reflexes into one, viz., self-consciousness of the whole as *one mind*—a comprehensive *continuum* of thinking. "This knowledge of the mind," it is added, "is united with the mind, as the mind is united with the body." The doctrine wrapped up in these difficult propositions means simply—Given, manifold sensible affections; consciousness of them involves self-consciousness, and self-consciousness, self-identity: and so numerical data melt into individuality (p. 215).

It appears, then, that according to Spinoza the human mind is composed of the ideas of the manifold parts that make up the body, that is to say the mind is just as complex

as the body is. There is then no proper Self or Ego, but merely an aggregate of modes of thinking attended by modes of extension. We get no satisfactory account of the consciousness of personal unity and identity, for Spinoza says "the knowledge of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body," but the body and the mind are two independent and heterogeneous phenomena, unsusceptible of fusion, with nothing in common except *being phenomena*. "To such conditions," continues Dr. Martineau, "it is hopeless to look for the continuity and self-identity of personal existence" (p. 120). At this point it seems to us that Spinozism, as a logical system, utterly stultifies itself; for, how is it conceivable that a creature who is in every sense merely phenomenal, in whom there is no real substantiality at all, should be able to arrive at a knowledge of God, and from such *a priori* knowledge deduce that phenomenal universe of which he is himself a fraction? Not only are we unable to understand how such an aggregate of finite modes of extension and thought could attain to such sublime knowledge, but we cannot even understand how it could attain to knowledge at all. The being who knows phenomena shows, in the very act of knowing them, that he is something more than a phenomenon. As the late Professor Green writes, "Nature, with all that belongs to it, is a process of change; change on a uniform method, no doubt, but change still. But neither can any process of change yield a consciousness of itself, which in order to be a consciousness of the change must be equally present to all stages of the change; nor can any consciousness of change, since the whole of it must be present at once, be itself a process of change."*

Most surprising is it, that a thinker who had once grasped the distinction between that which is in time and that which is out of time, or in other words between what is phenomenal and what is substantial, should not have seen that there is that in man which differences him from nature, enables him to know nature, and to know also the Eternal, because man partakes of the nature of the Eternal!

* *Mind*, January, 1882, p. 14.

We cannot bring ourselves to believe that we have after all penetrated to the inmost meaning of the deep-thinking Spinoza, when we say he regarded man as merely phenomenal.

We will presently return to this matter; let us first, however, turn to Spinoza's Ethical Doctrine which forms a most interesting chapter in Dr. Martineau's volume, but at which our space only allows us to glance. As Spinoza maintains that God's acts flow from the necessity of His nature, and man is only a mode of this necessary manifestation, the possibility of human Free-will is at the outset excluded. That we think we are free is one of the delusions of the imagination. Freedom means action determined solely from within; hence God is perfectly free, and man becomes free in proportion as his conduct is determined by the inner impulse of love to God. Seeing that we are only modes of thinking and modes of extension there seems no provision in our nature for Action. Spinoza explains action by the law of "*Conatus*," by which he means that each thing endeavours, as far as it can, to persist in its own existence. "The human mind—understanding and imagination too—consciously shares in this universal endeavour; which as limited to it is *Voluntas*; as belonging to it and the body together is *Appetitus*, constituting the essence of the total man himself, and possibly operating unconsciously; when consciously it becomes *Cupiditas*."*

As there are three stages of Knowledge, so are there three corresponding stages of Feeling. Spinoza displays great ingenuity and insight in his analysis of the various springs of human action, and Dr. Martineau's full exposition of Spinoza's doctrine of the Passions and the Emotions presents much attraction and instruction to readers who may not be interested in Spinoza's metaphysics. The feelings connected with the Imaginative stage of knowledge are the Passions which take their rise from outward causes. So long as we are under their sway we live in bondage. But the *conatus* within us, *i.e.*, the impulse to maintain and increase our own being, prompts us to strive against these passions which

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 236.

lessen and impair our power, and with the growth of Rational and Intuitive knowledge, corresponding affections arise and free us at length from the servitude of passions. We cease to act selfishly, for we learn that individual power and being is augmented and enriched by union, that is, by merging private interests in the public good. "The mind is no longer kindled from without or disposed of by feeling which is not insight. Incandescent Rationality becomes *Fortitudo*, with its two divisions of High Spirit and Nobleness, and incandescent Intuition becomes *Intellectual Love of God*." *

We have now reached that final stage in Spinoza's thinking where his philosophy begins to possess great attraction for religious and mystical minds, and we will devote our remaining space to a very brief consideration of this important but difficult aspect of Spinozism. We before hinted that if Spinoza really regarded man as a mere phenomenal mode of God's manifestation of Himself in the cosmos, then the exalted tone in which he describes the consciousness of intellectual love towards God, his language about "the better part of us," and his evident assurance that this portion of us exists on a higher plane of being than does the perishing body, all become to us utterly inexplicable. Dr. Martineau is assuredly right in maintaining, with Trendelenburg, that in the fifth book of the *Ethica*, where Spinoza explains how the mind secures for itself freedom from servitude to the body, the determining place is assigned to the mind. The mind, indeed, is represented as having gained an ideal of human excellence, and as controlling the bodily activities with a view to the realisation of that ideal. It seems probable, therefore, that Spinoza when writing this concluding part of the *Ethics* no longer felt assured of the truth of his doctrine of the parallelism of body and mind. It is to be noted, too, that he sometimes represents the conflict in human nature between the ideal and the earthly, as a struggle between the eternal in the essence of man and the phenomenal in his existence. Now these considerations, when taken in conjunction with his new doctrine concerning "the better part of us," appear to

* Op. Cit., 268.

us to indicate that Spinoza, in writing in such earnest and glowing terms about the intellectual love of God, felt and practically held that his own mind had a substantive existence, and was attaining, through devotion to truth, a spiritual communion with God which was of too intimate a nature to be severed by death. It is hardly likely, we think, that Spinoza would have introduced into his system such a glaring incongruity as the doctrine of a better and a worse part in human nature, and would have resigned the one part to the fate of the phenomenal and translated the other to the realm of eternal reality, had it not been for the quiet expansion of an internal spiritual experience, which was gradually acquiring strength enough to dislocate to some extent the compact framework of his intellectual system and so find for itself a real but, as yet, inadequate expression. It has been sometimes suggested that Spinoza introduced into his system the features in question to escape, as far as possible, the *odium theologicum*. It is, no doubt, true that Spinoza loved peace, and was naturally cautious, but it is also evident that the love of truth was his characteristic passion, and if anything could awaken in him detestation and scorn, it was hypocrisy. So far from the fifth book of the *Ethics* bearing marks of effort on Spinoza's part to give his doctrines a more Theistic look than his inmost soul could justify, it seems to us that the book carries on its face clear traces of the exercise of ingenuity and effort to make his philosophical system express, if possible, without the entire sacrifice of its logical coherency, that spiritual faith, that consciousness of union and communion with God, which he cherished in the secret depths of his soul. When we think of the purity, serenity, and moral beauty of Spinoza's life, the victory he had evidently won, not only over the more earthly passions, but even over ambition, "that last infirmity of noble minds," we are constrained to believe that there must have been some adequate spiritual force to have produced this remarkable effect, and what could that force have been, if it were not the growing supremacy in his soul of that divinest and mightiest of all passions—the love of God?

It is true he calls it an "intellectual" love, and he would probably have admitted the accuracy of Dr. Martineau's suggestion,* that by that term he simply means to distinguish the *philosophical* habit of mind from the *scientific*; but we must remember that, in Spinoza's view, the wise man's philosophy and theology were one, and the word "intellectual" with him wore none of that cold, unemotional aspect which it suggests to us. To use Dr. Martineau's most felicitous epithet, Spinoza's intuitive ideas were all "*incandescent*." Truth and love presented themselves to his mind as simply the obverse and the reverse of the same spiritual fact; and it is this essential unity of idea and emotion which he seeks to express by blending the two together as noun and adjective in the combination "*amor intellectualis*." As we have previously intimated, the metaphysical theory, which Spinoza had been forced to form as the necessary logical outcome of Descartes's mechanical physiology and psychology, rendered it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for him to describe and analyse his religious consciousness in appropriate terms, and compelled him to modes of expression which seem most inadequate, cold, and even repulsive to those who are happily freed from such enthralling preconceptions, and so can more correctly and adequately state and explain their spiritual experience. The essence of religion is, of course, always the same; it is only when this essence has passed through varying intellectual mediums that it assumes its various theological forms. The mental medium through which Spinoza's religious feelings sought to find intellectual expression was singularly unfavourable. The idea of God as the only substantive reality; of the *necessity* of His nature; of man as a phenomenal mode of God's necessary manifestation; all these governing intellectual ideas obstinately refused to adapt themselves to any true and sufficient theological conception. Nor can it be doubted that, under such circumstances, the intellectual medium, if it fails to afford expression to the religious consciousness, exercises a positively depressing and deadening influence on that consciousness. The inner fire

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 275

and flame of faith and devotion must, in the long run, either be stifled and destroyed by this obstructive intellectualism (for religion needs expression as much as fire needs air), or the expansive power of religious fervour must burst or burn the obstructive theory, and liberate the spirit from its mental suffocation. That Spinoza's religious life should have suffered sadly from this tyranny of dogma was inevitable, but we are more inclined than we think Dr. Martineau to be, to conjecture that when Spinoza wrote the fifth book of the *Ethica* his religious consciousness was beginning to heave off the incubus which oppressed it, and that the doctrine of "the better part of us" and of "eternal life" are indications of this process; nor is it, we think, very unlikely that if Spinoza had lived much longer he would have recovered that belief in a Self and in Freewill of which his scientific studies had deprived him. The following passage, from Dr. Martineau's work, descriptive of Spinoza's position when he wrote the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (which was probably after the *Ethics* took its final shape) appears to us to confirm our impression that Spinoza was attaining to a truer view of the relation of the soul to God:—"God (he assures us) communicates of his essence direct (*i.e.*, without prophetic medium) to our mind—in greatest perfection of all did this happen to the mind of Christ, who apprehended the saving will of God without word or vision, but immediately, mind with mind, in unique spiritual communion."* This quotation shows, we think, that Spinoza had entered on a track of reflection which must have ultimately led him to the understanding of the profound truth, which is at once presented and misrepresented in the orthodox dogma of the two natures in Christ, a truth of which he evidently did not see the full significance when, two years before his death, he wrote that noteworthy letter to Henry Oldenburg,† in which he says:—"To show you openly my opinion, I say that it is not absolutely necessary to salvation to know Christ after the flesh; but it is altogether otherwise

* Op. Cit. 371. But read Dr. Martineau's explanation of Spinoza's real meaning here.

† Letter XXI. of Bruder's edition.

if we speak of the Son of God, that is the eternal wisdom of God which is manifested in all things, and chiefly in the human soul, and most of all in Jesus Christ. Without this wisdom no one can come to the state of happiness, for it is this alone which teaches what is true and what is false, good and evil. *As to what certain churches add that God took human nature, I expressly declare that I do not know what they say, and, to speak frankly, I confess that they seem to me to speak a language as absurd as if one were to say that a circle had taken the nature of a triangle.*" That in our spiritual life, God and man, the Eternal and the Temporal, the Finite and the Infinite, meet and learn each other's secrets, this Spinoza (though he evidently felt it) could not intellectually realise, for it contradicted the fundamental dogma of his philosophy, namely, that man is only a *mode* of Substance, and not himself a substantial individuality. The following passage from Kuno Fischer's "History of Modern Philosophy"* seems to us to state Spinoza's position in reference to this matter very correctly:—

The idea of personal Individuality solves the riddle of Spinozism. This equation (Gleichung) between Substance and Individuality Spinoza himself could not complete, for it contradicts the distinctly settled ideas of his system; but he could not help having an inkling of it, *and expressing it, as it were, against the will of those ideas*, for it is the secret of his philosophy. If we express the *amor Dei* in a mathematical formula, what else does it signify than the equation between Substance and Individuality, between the Divine and the human essence? That the Substance should become a limited thing, or that God should become man, appeared to the understanding of Spinoza just as impossible as the Quadrature of the Circle. . . . But Spinoza has himself, in the *amor Dei intellectualis*, squared the circle, for here is the equation between God and man at least indicated, if not fully carried out.

Every reader of this paper should give himself the advantage of reading Dr. Martineau's powerfully-reasoned chapters on Spinoza's "Intellectual Love of God" and "Religion," in which a less sanguine view is taken of

* Vol. I., p. 593.

Spinoza's theological position than that which we have been trying to express. Dr. Martineau's main contention is that "the intellectual love of God is no affection directed upon a *conscious and responding mind*; but the desire and delight of understanding things as determined by the necessity of nature,—the enthusiasm for truth,—the self-adaptation to the order of the world" (p. 274).

There is much to be urged in favour of this view; but our impression is that many passages in Spinoza's writings, especially in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, show that it does not give an exhaustive account of the contents of Spinoza's religious consciousness.

It is an interesting question whether Spinoza regarded God as self-conscious. Dr. Martineau inclines to the negative; we must confess that it seems to us that Dr. Busolt has made out a pretty strong case for the affirmative, though we quite agree with the latter thinker that Spinoza's words go too far, and probably further than his real meaning, when he says "that if we choose to assign to God such predicates as intellect and will, these terms will be as wide of their proper meaning as the term '*dog*' when applied to Sirius, instead of to the barking quadruped."* Spinoza tells us (*Ethics*, B. II., Prop. 3) "there is given in God an idea as well of His own essence as of all the things which necessarily follow from His essence." This idea of Himself as *Natura naturans* is, we think, clearly over and above the sum-total of ideas which are in Him in so far as he includes all the minds in *Natura naturata*; for the *Natura naturans* is not the mere totality of finite spirits, but is rather that principle which holds them all together in a single unity, in a way analogous to that in which the human Ego gives unity to all its separate mental states. As in Spinoza's view, time-relations have no application to God, it was inevitable that he should assert that "intellect" and "will," such as we have, cannot be predicated of the Eternal. We do not think, however, that this is altogether incompatible with the Theistic attitude of mind. Saisset's "*Essai de la Philosophie Religieuse*"

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 333.

was translated into English as an antidote to Pantheism, and yet we read in that treatise:—"God's thought knows nothing of the conditions of an imperfect intelligence; nothing of limit or time or space or succession; consequently nothing of memory, or reasoning, or induction or any of those human intermediaries between an infinite truth and a finite thought. . . . *The difference is not of degree, but of nature and essence*; it is the difference between time and eternity, between the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute." It is hardly possible to put into words the relation which is felt to exist in our souls between the human and the Divine, for as we once heard Dr. Martineau (or was it his congenial friend Mr. Thom?) say, the relation of God to us is not like that of one human mind to another, for other minds seem outside of ours, but *God invades our very consciousness*. The feature in Spinoza's theology which is most out of accord with the facts of religious experiences is the doctrine that God, *quâ Natura naturans*, cannot love finite souls. Here we think he misinterpreted his own consciousness, and was misled by the determinist dogma; for as he says in the Short Treatise:—"If God loved men we should have to suppose that men possessed Free-will;" no very alarming supposition for us, perhaps, but a serious one for Spinoza, for it involved the overthrow of his entire system of thought.

We have neither time nor space to examine adequately Spinoza's views on that other important and kindred topic, the Future Destiny of the soul. We the less regret this however, as we would rather not attempt to condense Dr. Martineau's full and lucid statement. This section of his book is a marvellous piece of clear exposition and subtle criticism. We cannot see how Spinoza could have satisfactorily rebutted Dr. Martineau's conclusion that the eternity which is so repeatedly and emphatically claimed by Spinoza for "the better part of us" is not shown to be personal or individual immortality. Whenever Spinoza attempts to explain the relation of that part of us which persists after death to the perishing portion of the soul which shares

the fate of the body, he seems to be compelled by logical exigencies to so express himself that all that characterises the special individuality falls to the share of the bodily part, so that what remains appears to be impersonal and to merge, therefore, into the consciousness of God. Even if Theodore Camerer's able reasonings in favour of Spinoza's belief in the persistence of a conscious unity after death be regarded as conclusive, there is still no rational ground for believing that the future consciousness will feel its continuity with the present consciousness. Nay, we find on referring to Camerer's admirable account of Spinoza's views, that he admits that on Spinoza's theory the differences between individuals after death can be only a *quantitative* and not a *qualitative* difference, for qualitative differences lie wholly in the region of the imagination, and so drop off at death, and what remains can only be a quantitative difference, *i.e.*, a difference in the amount of adequate ideas, or of knowledge under the category of eternity. Spinoza, then, has failed to set forth and justify an intelligible and satisfactory doctrine of Immortality. Are we, therefore, to infer that he had not himself a living faith in the continuity of that personal communion with God which he enjoyed? By no means. He has not succeeded in explaining and justifying to the intellect that postulate of his spiritual consciousness, but still the postulate is as strong as ever, and to all our objections he would confidently reply:—“*At nihilominus sentimus experimurque nos æternos esse*,” meaning thereby something diametrically opposed to what materialists and secularists mean when they say that there is no proof of the future existence of the soul. We are inclined to think that Spinoza's mistake was in treating as a demonstration of the understanding a doctrine which he held on no intellectual tenure, but which rested on his intuitive consciousness of communion with the Eternal, and waxed or waned not in proportion to the conclusiveness or inconclusiveness of his reasonings, but in proportion to the richness or poverty of his religious experience. His religious consciousness assured Spinoza that the spirit which is pervaded and ani-

mated by love to God is on a plane of being which transcends the finite and the temporal, and that therefore in regard to this Eternal Life all arguments for or against the immortality of the soul based on phenomenal analogies could have no possible force or relevancy. As the soul is surrendered to the invitations of Divine Love and Divine Wisdom it becomes persuaded that "neither life nor death nor things present nor things to come can ever separate it from the love of God." How to co-ordinate this faith with a philosophical creed which provided no substantive existence for the soul and denied free-will and moral responsibility, was the problem which Spinoza's genius was called upon to solve. That under these circumstances he should have been unable so to interpret the *melior pars nostri* as to fully preclude all doubt about the continuity of personal consciousness after death is not to be wondered at. At the same time we cannot resist the conviction that he possessed a firm faith that this prophecy of eternal life, which the soul utters in its divinest moods, involves both a retention of personal identity and the preservation and perfecting of the soul's higher life; and it is to us most interesting and inspiring to note how in Spinoza's writings, as in those of J. S. Mill, this irrepressible instinct of the soul seeks expression under the least favourable conditions of an uncongenial and even antagonistic philosophy. When Spinoza wrote the propositions on Eternal Life in the fifth Book of the *Ethica* his mood was probably closely akin to that in which R. W. Emerson composed the following passage:—

Men ask concerning the immortality of the soul, the employments of heaven, the state of the sinner, and so forth. They even dream that Jesus has left replies to precisely these interrogatories. Never for a moment did that sublime spirit speak in their *patois*. To truth, justice, love, the attributes of the soul, the idea of immutableness is essentially associated. Jesus living in these moral sentiments, heedless of sensual fortunes, heeding only the manifestation of these, never made the separation of the idea of duration from the essence of these attributes, nor uttered a syllable concerning the duration of the soul. It was left to his disciples to sever duration from the moral elements, and

to teach the immortality of the soul as a doctrine, and maintain it by evidences. No inspired man ever asks this question, or condescends to these evidences. For the soul is true to itself, and the man in whom it is shed abroad cannot wander from the present, which is infinite, to a future which would be finite.*

This quotation may perhaps also serve as an illustration of what we suppose Spinoza to mean by the third stage of knowledge, or the vision of things *sub specie æternitatis*.

In conclusion, let us say that it is not at all improbable that a certain mystic, or it may be misty, element in our mind, together with the fascinating effect upon us of that fine spiritual countenance which fronts Dr. Martineau's title-page, may have caused us to read into Spinozism religious ideas and emotions which the author of that system would disclaim, so that the present paper is at the best most incomplete till it is accompanied by a careful perusal of Dr. Martineau's calm and well-matured judgment on these matters. Ueberweg said that a dissection and exposure of Spinoza's numerous paralogisms was urgently called for. This work Dr. Martineau has done with fairness and thoroughness, and while he has clearly indicated the great logical failures, he has at the same time given welcome recognition to all that was good and great in the man and his writings. As an imposing deductive system aiming to explain God and the cosmos Spinozism has received a fatal blow. The logical continuity of the vast structure is broken, and it falls apart into a heap of fragments. Nevertheless, the ruins are magnificent, and from them many a subsequent thinker has carried off most precious material to incorporate in his own philosophy. Nor are they without attraction for other minds. Mr. Pollock has told us what interest they have for students of science; robust spirits of the Goethe type seek in them a soothing calm from life's fitful fever; and they are favourite haunts also with pensive and theosophic souls who feel with Renan that there they are not far from God. Spinoza was about the last man of whom it could justly be said that he is nothing if not logical. Few readers, we

* Essay on the *Over-soul*.

think, will reach the close of Dr. Martineau's masterly treatise without seeing that there are many passages of exceeding depth and suggestiveness in Spinoza's writings, and their admiration for the great Jewish thinker will be blended with a feeling of warm gratitude towards the highly-gifted expositor and critic who has so effectually aided them to form a just estimate of the worth of Spinozism.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

THE ORIGIN OF THE NAME "JEHOVAH."

I AM indebted to Professor Sayce for his criticisms in the last number of *The Modern Review*. When, however, he says that my arguments do not seem to him *convincing*, he would appear to have overlooked the fact that I was suggesting an hypothesis, and that I was not attempting to prove and demonstrate. Convincing proof and demonstration may be possible hereafter; but the time for these has not yet come. This being observed, I fail to see that anything said by Professor Sayce detracts from the probability of my hypothesis.

The disappearance from *Dyaus* of the dental, when the word passed over into Hebrew, seems to me to present no insurmountable, or even considerable, difficulty. *Dyahu* and *Dyahweh* would have been, as Professor Sayce knows very well, repugnant to Hebrew analogy and usage; and any other mode of adaptation would probably have involved greater distortion of the word than the mere dropping of the *d*. If such dropping could occur in Latin, a language related to Sanscrit, the fact of Hebrew being an alien language would seem to render a similar disappearance of the *d* sound even more probable.

My critic further objects that "Semitic theology was intensely solar," and that "Jahveh, like other Baalim, was originally a solar deity," while "*Dyaus* was the sky-god." Of the assertion that Jahveh was originally a solar deity no proof whatever is offered. Semitic theology, however, may have been in general intensely solar, though Jehovah was originally "the sky-god," or, to use the Scriptural phrase, "the God of heaven." According to my hypothesis Jehovah was *not* originally a Semitic deity. To this view (notwithstanding what is said in his last paragraph) Professor Sayce assents; and he questions, indeed, whether *Yahu* "admits at all of a Semitic derivation." It must be

remembered, too, that, in relation to the origin and significance of the name "Jehovah," the remarkable expression *Jehovah Tsebaoth*, "the LORD of hosts," cannot be disregarded. This expression, so unaccountable and incongruous, if ordinary explanations of the name are accepted, gains, as I showed, a new significance when Jehovah is regarded as the God of the sky, "the God of heaven."

The evidence which I adduced tending to show that commercial relations existed between India and Babylonia, is in favour of my hypothesis, even if we cannot determine when these relations commenced. Professor Sayce himself adds a piece of evidence on my behalf—the "mention of *Sindhu*, or Indian muslin, in an old Babylonian list of clothes."* As to the particular Indian language from which *tukkiyyim* "peacocks" (1 Kings x. 22) was derived, we need not, just now, much trouble ourselves. The bird, with its name, may have been transferred from one part of India to another. At any rate, the word, taken with other indications, tends to show that in the days of Solomon there was a traffic between the Israelites and India, either directly or indirectly. But this, though of some importance, is, for our present inquiry, subordinate.

With respect to a period so distant and obscure as that with which we are now concerned, the contention can scarcely be allowed that if, in consequence of commercial intercourse, *Dyaus* was introduced into Chaldea, the name must have been borrowed by the Babylonian traders rather than the Abrahamidæ. Surely, if commercial relations existed, persons not traders might pass from the one country to the other.

Professor Sayce, I observe, overlooks the important statements of Jos. xxiv. 2, 14, 15, that in Chaldea the family of Abraham served originally "other gods," and also the well-known Jewish tradition that religious persecution preceded their departure; a tradition which accords with the view that the cultus of Jehovah was new and strange to the Babylonians. We need not wonder, therefore, if the name has not been found on mythological tablets giving the names of gods worshipped by the neighbours of the Babylonians.

The suggestion that Jehovah was originally a Hittite deity will scarcely, I am afraid, commend itself to Old Testament students

* According to a statement recently made by M. Oppert, monuments which have been discovered by M. de Sarcy indicate the existence of maritime commerce between Egypt and Babylonia at a very remote antiquity. The voyage to India from Babylonia would have been far shorter.

generally. Jehovah, Israel's own God, and Israel, Jehovah's singularly favoured people, stand in too strongly marked contrast to the Hittites and other contiguous nations, with their false deities and abominations, their Baalim and Asheroth (Deut. xx. 17, 18; Judges iii. 5—7). The theory that Jehovah's character was exalted and spiritualised by the prophets will furnish no sufficient explanation, if Jehovah, bearing the same name, was, and always had been, a well-known deity of the Hittites. On the Hamathite names *Joram* and *Yahu-bidi* I do not know that I need add anything to what I have previously said. With regard to Uriah, his close relation to Israel may easily furnish an explanation of his name.*

Evidently, however, Professor Sayce has not very much confidence, either in his Hittite theory or in adopting, as an alternative, the derivation of the name from *hava*, as used in Job xxxvii 6, "For to the snow he saith, Fall on (*heve*) the earth." But to derive the meaning of the name from this passage standing, as it does, alone, would be in any case precarious. And it is rendered still more so by other peculiarities in the diction of Job with which the verb in the passage cited probably stands in relation. "He who causes (rain or lightning) to fall upon (the earth)" might not be amiss taken as an etymological explanation of the name, if adequate evidence were adduced. But such evidence, so far as I know, is wanting. At some future time I may possibly have an opportunity for inquiring into the Biblical evidence of diverse explanations or etymologies of the name. But to do so now might complicate the question at present under consideration.

If a thorough exploration were made of Mugheir and other sites on the lower Euphrates, together with the island of Bahrein in the Persian Gulf, we should probably gain new evidence as to ancient commercial relations between India and Babylonia. Possibly, we might also discover distinct traces of the introduction of religious ideas from the East, and of the events which resulted in the exodus from Chaldea of the ancestors of the Israelites.

THOMAS TYLER.

* A writer in the *Jewish World* (December 2), referring to Prof. Sayce's contribution in the last number of the *Modern Review*, observes, "The second syllable in each of these names (*Joram*, *Uriah*) is clearly Hebrew; and this would suggest—if the designation in each case is not of Jewish origin—an identity in the dialects of the Hebrews and the Hittites, and an identity in compounded personal names, something more than remarkable."

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

MR. CREIGHTON'S HISTORY OF THE PAPACY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION.*

THE title of this book suggests a comparison with the well-known history of Professor von Ranke. Its difference of plan, however, is at once indicated by the fact that Mr. Creighton's first two volumes represent some forty pages of the older work. This does not, of course, mean that their successors will be written on the same relative scale, but the character of the present instalment is very significant of the completeness with which Mr. Creighton has conceived his design. Professor von Ranke judges history from the present, from the point of view of intelligent contemporaries, and contents himself with a few generalisations about the past, generalisations valuable, and often penetrating so far as they go, but not pretending to independent research. Mr. Creighton on the other hand is convinced that the history of the reformation can only be approached by a patient and prolonged study of its antecedents. "We speak loosely of the Reformation as though it were a definite event; we ought rather to regard the fall of the papal autocracy as the result of a number of political causes, which had slowly gathered strength" (Vol. I., p. 29). He begins, therefore, with a sketch of the rise of the papacy, and dwells upon the successive epochs in its history, the power it drew from the decay of the Roman Empire, and from the spread of Christianity among the German invaders, its revival in the eleventh century, and the claims arrogated for it by Gregory the Seventh. He traces the prominence given to the religious centre by the enthusiasm of the Crusades, the political strength added by the interminable conflict with the German emperors, and, not least, the immense increase of influence derived from the foundation of the mendicant orders, directly connected with the Papacy and free from all intermediate control. By these steps the head of western Christendom attained, under Innocent the Third, "its highest level of power and respect. The change which he wrought in the attitude of the Papacy may be

* *A History of the Papacy during the period of the Reformation.* By M. CREIGHTON, M.A., late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Two Vols. Longmans, 1882.

judged from the fact that, whereas his predecessors had contented themselves with the title of Vicar of Peter, Innocent assumed the name of Vicar of Christ. Europe was to form a great Theocracy under the direction of the Pope" (Vol. I., p. 21).

The theocratic idea, however, as Mr. Creighton shows, was rapidly lost from the very conditions under which it seemed nearest to realisation. "The Papacy," it is truly observed, "was only obeying a natural instinct of self-preservation in aiming at a temporal sovereignty which would secure it against temporal mishaps" (p. 22); but none the less did it suffer as a spiritual power. The growth of the States of the Church proved a serious injury to its moral prestige abroad as well as at home. "Instead of being the upholders of civil liberty, the Popes ranked with the princes of Europe, and had no sympathy with the cause of the people" (p. 24). The catastrophe of the empire under Frederick the Second tempted the Pope to assume that international position which was involved in the imperial name; it was on this rock that he stumbled, and Boniface the Eighth, the pontiff who pushed his official claims to the furthest extreme, was also the last Pope who enjoyed a genuine authority as the centre of Christian politics. With him ends the history of the medieval Papacy. His successor retires to Avignon, and becomes the servant of the King of France.

The history of this exile forms the second half of Mr. Creighton's introduction. Drawing nearer to the epoch which, in the author's view, constitutes the potential origin of the reformation, the narrative becomes gradually more detailed, and we would specially direct attention to the excellent account here of the opposition to the Papacy, based on theoretical principles, which began to form itself in the fourteenth century. This tendency, which became prominent in the French resistance to Boniface the Eighth, is reflected in the political philosophy of Dante. Brought into the sphere of practice by the alliance of the great publicists, Marsiglio of Padua and William of Ockham, with the Emperor Lewis the Bavarian, it had far wider consequences than might be suspected from their immediate failure under the feeble and inconsistent management of Lewis. The resistance to the supremacy of the Pope was not necessarily in favour of that of the Emperor. It adapted itself to the growing sense of nationality among the peoples of Europe, and became in this way the lever which was used with marked effect by Wycliffe and Hus. It is certain that neither of these advocates of reform could have won the position they attained, had they not been able to take advantage of the political opinions that were already germinating in men's minds, and Mr. Creighton has done well to lay a decided stress upon their earliest manifestation in the beginning of the fourteenth century. We may notice incidentally that he has repeated an old mistake with reference to this subject in naming, among those who "asserted the independent existence of the temporal and the spiritual power, since both alike came from God, and each has its own sphere of action," the well-known Aegidius Colonna, tutor to Philip the Fair (Vol. I., p. 81). It is undoubtedly true that the manuscripts authorise the attribution to

him of the treatise *De Potestate Regia et Pontificali*, published in the second volume of Goldast's "Monarchia;" but M. Charles Jourdain's discovery of Colonna's book *De Ecclesiastica Potestate* has proved him to have been a supporter of the directly opposite party. Besides this, an early French translation of the work in dispute (also printed, though not identified, by Goldast), expressly ascribes it to Raoul de Preales, or Praelles, a councillor of King Charles the Fifth of France (see Sigmund Riezler, *die literarischen Widersacher der Päpste zur Zeit Ludwig des Baiers*, pp. 189 ff.). The confusion can only have arisen through the similarity of the two titles.

We have dwelt at perhaps excessive length upon Mr. Creighton's introduction because he has been, as it seems to us, peculiarly successful in a field which offers a good test of an historian's power. It is the work not only of a clear-sighted and widely-read historical student, but also of one who has been trained by teaching to select and arrange his facts. Nothing can be more unlike the work of a compiler. Through this outline of the development and decay of the Papacy, we are prepared for the decisive event from which Mr. Creighton dates "the period of the Reformation," the Great Schism of 1878. The Pope had returned from Avignon to Rome; his Italian successor was naturally little pleasing to a college of Cardinals of which two-thirds were French: in opposition to Urban the Sixth they selected their own Pope, Clement the Seventh. This is the situation which the author fixes as the determining event in the career of the Papacy. The medieval conception of the supreme Pontiff had long been gradually fading away; it vanished before the spectacle of a double succession of Popes, each claiming an unique dignity as Vicegerent of Christ. From this epoch the reformation of the church "in head and members" became a practical possibility if not a practical necessity. It would be impossible, within our present limits, to follow the history of the Papacy, through its devious wanderings amid rival popes and rival policies, through the councils of Pisa and Constance, to its renewed vitality in an altered sphere, under Martin the Fifth and his successors. It must suffice to direct attention to a few of the many points of interest afforded by the work before us.

The record of the Schism is at best a dreary one, but it has some circumstances not uninviting to the historian. The two lines of Popes happened to present a series of bold contrasts of temperament and aim, the single particular of agreement being their uniform lack of religious principle, and Mr. Creighton has skilfully drawn these characteristic, however unpleasant, portraits. See, for instance, those of Urban the Sixth (Vol. I., pp. 80, 92 f.) and Clement the Seventh (pp. 65, 127 f.), or of Benedict the Thirteenth and Gregory the Twelfth (pp. 197 ff.). There is everywhere manifest a desire to estimate fairly the most opposite qualities, nowhere a symptom of that indolent spirit which classes the whole set together as false and unworthy representatives of the Church. Such, indeed, they might appear if tried by the standard of other times; but Mr. Creighton is right to insist upon the injustice (to take a typical case) done to John the Twenty-third, probably the best-

abused of all the Popes, by the sudden revival of this standard when he came to be arraigned by the Council of Constance. Here Mr. Creighton even errs on the side of lenity. "It is difficult," he says (Vol. I., pp. 299 f.), "not to see that John XXIII. had hard measure dealt to him in the exceptional obloquy which has been his lot. Elected to the Papacy in return for his signal services in the Council of Pisa, he was ignominiously deposed by the Council which claimed to be a continuation of that of Pisa. Here, as elsewhere, the revolution swallowed up its own child, and John's character has met with the fate which always befalls those whom every one is interested to malign and no one is interested to defend." Yet even this favourable judge, after acknowledging John's decision and political sagacity as Legate in the Romagna, is forced to confess that at Constance he "had neither learning nor moral character to enable him to hold his own in the face of the Council. He had nothing but intrigue, which he managed so ill as to make it impossible for any one to hold by him through respect for the Papal dignity." In other words, his management of the Pisan Council had constituted for him a claim upon the Church, or at least upon the Cardinals, which could only be satisfied by the gift of the Papacy, an office for which he was obviously and notoriously unfit. "He was nothing more nor less than an Italian military adventurer." It is surprising, after such a verdict, that Mr. Creighton should lay a stress upon the fact that "Cosimo dei Medici, who was not likely to befriend an utterly worthless man, retained both affection and respect" for him (Vol. I., p. 301), and "incline to think that the opinion of Florence was less prejudiced" than that of Constance (Vol. I., p. 448). The "opinion of Florence" may be read in the superb tomb in the Baptistery, where the deposed Pope lies attended by the figures of Faith, Hope, and Charity. Surely Mr. Creighton would not have us believe that this represents a "less prejudiced" view of his character.

The Councils of Constance and Basle form the principal subjects of the second and third books of the present history. A certain tediousness is perhaps inherent in the records of Councils, and if the English reader misses here the life and colour which Dean Milman imparted to the corresponding portions of his "History of Latin Christianity," he may at least console himself by the superior accuracy and more complete knowledge of the newer work, which does not, as Milman did, begin the Council of Constance a year too late, and correct itself by silently omitting a year of its sessions. Mr. Creighton's virtue is his steady refusal to enhance the popular interest of his book by magnifying or distorting facts; his temptation is to underestimate them. We think, for instance, that in his struggle against the least suspicion of partisanship, he has unfairly reduced the significance of the activity of the English nation at Constance, which not only formed the moderating element in the Council, but also by its union with the Germans, constituted the majority by which whatever work was accomplished, was made possible. Mr. Creighton almost ignores the influence of Bishop Hallam, and says that his death "gave a colourable pretext for" the English "change of front, though it was in

no way connected with it" (Vol. I., p. 893). Yet certainly the immediate sequence of the two events has a more natural explanation in the disorder into which the party was thrown by the death of its leader, than in the "conjecture" (Mr. Creighton admits that it is nothing more) about "orders from home." Again, in regard to Wycliffe, it will doubtless offend many people to read that his teaching "produced no deep impression in England;" he "set in motion no great movement and left no lasting impression of his definite opinions" (Vol. I., pp. 306 f.); although we are convinced that, with the qualifications which Mr. Creighton adds, namely, that "he did much to awaken controversy," and exercised a considerable religious influence by his translation of the Bible, the criticism is entirely just. The historical importance of Wycliffe lies in Bohemia, in the preaching of John Hus. Mr. Creighton gives a clear and discriminating account of the rise and fortunes of the Bohemian reformer; the tragedy of his death he relates with a pathos that owes nothing to rhetoric, and arises naturally from the absence of affectation, and from the human earnestness of its telling. He allows full weight to the political considerations which assisted his temporary success. Hus was encouraged as a political tool, and abandoned when his co-operation became dangerous. But this does not touch the traditional view of his personal career; for he was unconscious of anything beyond what appeared to him his straightforward duty. "There was," as Mr. Creighton finely says, "a childlike simplicity about his character, and an ignorance of the world which some writers of modern times have mistaken for vanity" (Vol. I., p. 885).

On the vexed question of the Emperor's good faith in reference to Hus's safe conduct, Mr. Creighton is unsatisfactory. He says in a note that he has not "regarded this matter as one of great importance. . . . I have no doubt that Hus was deceived, but I cannot attach excessive blame to any one" (Vol. I., p. 447). In fact, he has not thought it worth while to make up his mind on the subject, for if Hus was deceived, it necessarily involves the severest censure against Sigismund, and so becomes a matter "of great importance" to the historian. For ourselves, we are persuaded that neither party was so ignorant of the meaning of a safe-conduct as to suppose that it could exempt Hus from the decision of the Council. The arguments are too extensive to admit of discussion here, but we cannot but feel that Mr. Creighton, in reproducing, though without its conventional heat of language, the stereotyped view of Sigismund's perfidy, has not exercised that independent judgment for which he is usually conspicuous; certainly he has not carried out his expressed intention of not attaching "excessive blame to any one" (see Vol. I., pp. 881, 888 ff.). He has, in fact, confounded the two questions, of the efficacy of the safe-conduct before and during trial, and after condemnation, which are totally distinct. In other respects, Mr. Creighton's estimate of Sigismund's character and career deserves the highest praise (see particularly Vol. I., pp. 250 f., Vol. II., pp. 162 f.).

The fourth book, which concludes the present instalment of Mr. Creighton's history, is entitled "The Papal Restoration." The central

figure in it is, of course, Aeneas Sylvius, Pope Pius the Second, to whom the author has devoted an exceptionally careful, thorough, and illuminating study, and with whom his second volume ends. The revival of learning forms an important part of this book. To many readers the fourth chapter (Vol. II., pp. 329-344) will be the most interesting in the work. They will contrast its freshness and vigour with the barren recital with which they are familiar, for instance, in Signor Villari's introduction to his life of Machiavelli. Mr. Creighton's view of the attitude taken up towards the movement by Nicolas the Fifth is penetrating and just. "It was not," he says, "exactly a Christian ideal that Nicolas V. set before himself. But the more religious aspirations of the time ran in the direction of ecclesiastical reform; and after the proceedings at Basle it was not judicious for a Pope to interfere with that matter at the present. Nicolas V. saw that reform was needed; but reform was too dangerous. If the Papacy could not venture on reform, the next best thing was to identify itself with art and learning. To the demand of Germany for reformation Nicolas V. answered by offering culture. His policy was so far wise that it enabled the Papacy to exist for sixty years before the antagonism broke out into open rebellion" (Vol. II., p. 327). We may here advert to the peculiar excellence which belongs to Mr. Creighton's treatment of artistic matters from the extent of his personal observation. He brings his traveller's experience to bear upon the buildings and monuments of Rome, Siena, Naples, Pisa, Florence, Basle, Constance; and though his descriptions are not always remarkable, they never fail to impress the reader with their truthfulness and perception. They are another evidence of the unwearied energy which Mr. Creighton has thrown into every detail of his subject. It is this painstaking and accuracy which will give his work at once a position of acknowledged authority.

In a first edition one must expect contradictions, and there are a few here. In Vol. I., p. 350, for example, it is said of Sigismund that "the unguarded words that he spoke lost him his Bohemian kingdom for ever:" in Vol. II., p. 155, we find "his restoration to Bohemia . . . accomplished." Again in a recapitulation (Vol. I. p. 420) a fact is insisted upon, which in the narrative itself is only mentioned incidentally in a foot-note (p. 894). But these are slight blemishes. The style of the work, though wanting in balance and dignity, is throughout direct and lucid; it has the ease and also the carelessness of a practised writer, but the grammatical slips that we have detected are very rare (e.g. Vol. I., pp. 16, 36; Vol. II., pp. 94, 343). Mr. Creighton's looseness in giving references is a fault that may lead to confusion with those who are not expert in the sources of medieval history. It would be difficult to count up the various forms he gives to Dietrich of Niem's history of the Schism, or, for that matter, to Professor Voigt's Life of Aeneas Sylvius. In the appendix to the second volume the perplexity is increased by a crop of misprints: we read twice of Pez's *Scriptores Rerum Austriacarum* (pp. 517, 522), and the Vienna *Monumenta Conciliorum* appears in at least three different spellings (pp. 505, 514, 516). In the same way though Mr. Creighton is scrupulous in his attempt to preserve the native names of

places, his irregularities are frequent. We read of Koeln and Coeln, Erfurt and Erfurth. Perhaps it is too late in the day to protest against the general principle: but for any one but a German to speak of Aix-la-Chapelle as *Aachen* is (*pace* Mr. Freeman) indefensible on any ground; it is to substitute one foreign name for another, the native word being, of course, *Aken*. And what shall be said of such an orthographical monster as *Grüningen* (Vol. I., p. 408) ?

R. L. P.

MR. LESLIE STEPHEN'S SCIENCE OF ETHICS.*

MR. STEPHEN'S statement in his Preface that he is a member of the school of thought to which Hume, Bentham, the Mills, G. H. Lewes, and Mr. Herbert Spencer belong, and that his object is to lay down an ethical doctrine in harmony with the doctrine of evolution, will suggest to the reader a correct general idea of the character of the work before us. We further read in the Preface that the author "does not believe that there is a single original thought in this book from beginning to end;" but we think that when the reader has reached the close of the volume, he will not be prepared to endorse Mr. Stephen's too modest estimate of his achievement. It is true that he has mastered and assimilated much of the thought and speculation of the above school of writers, but it is also evident that his book is far more than a mere restatement of earlier views, for not only are these views so combined as to illustrate each other, and, therefore, to form a more self-consistent and luminous body of doctrine, but it also seems to us that the treatise embodies some fundamental conceptions, which, if not wholly novel, have certainly never been so clearly enounced and so systematically applied in any previous empirical treatise on ethics.

We will presently mention the more important of these original traits, but we may first sum up the impressions which the reading has made on us by saying that though we think that Mr. Stephen has not given an adequate account and *rationale* of the facts of our moral consciousness, and that, indeed, by his method no adequate exposition of ethical truth is possible, nevertheless he has said much that is of the highest interest to students of every school, and has certainly done far less violence to the facts of our moral nature than many of his predecessors in the same line of thought have done. In reading him we are not often painfully startled as we are in reading Hobbes and Bentham, and even Bain, by some conspicuous misrepresentation of our ethical feelings, which tempts us to exclaim indignantly, Why, this writer is not expounding actual human nature, he is inventing a nature to meet the exigencies of his psychological theory! Mr. Stephen, for instance, does not represent morality as refined selfishness, and self-sacrifice as a temporary

* *The Science of Ethics*. By LESLIE STEPHEN. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1882.

inattention to self in order that self may get the daintiest gratification after all. On the contrary, he tells us that no act done for the sake of self can be properly called moral ; that self-sacrifice really exists, and is no less a duty because it often involves a real deduction from the agent's own happiness. Whether our author's psychological and anti-metaphysical first principles are logically compatible with the moral sentiments which he recognises and seeks to justify, is another question (to which we should not be inclined to give an affirmative answer), but, at all events it is an advantage to feel that the author of the *Science of Ethics* has a moral consciousness not essentially different from that of his readers, and that as a rule he does not much pervert the facts in order to triumphantly explain them.

In saying that he seeks to place his doctrine in harmony with the doctrine of Evolution, Mr. Stephen intimates that, however much he may have been in earlier years captivated by the doctrine of Bentham and the Mills, he does not now base his ethical views, as they did, on an analysis of the individual consciousness and attempt to show how, out of the elementary factors thus reached, all our ethical ideas and sentiments may be explained. With Mr. Herbert Spencer he considers that the study of actual human nature with a view to the ascertainment of its laws can only be prosecuted successfully when the individual is regarded as a part of a larger organism—namely, society ; and especially is this the case with our ethical consciousness, for, according to Mr. Spencer and Mr. Stephen, morality proper does not arise till man begins to act from those sympathetic emotions which prompt to disinterested beneficence.

In regard to this new treatment of the subject of Ethics, it can hardly be doubted that the theory of Evolution and the doctrine of Heredity will in the future considerably influence all branches of mental science, and the first step towards learning what amount of modification our views should rightly undergo in virtue of these new ideas, is to study carefully the accounts of human nature now being presented by such able thinkers as Mr. Spencer and Mr. Stephen, whose minds are fully saturated with this new conception, and who are, therefore, most likely to apply it to the fullest possible extent. It is only to be expected that such enthusiastic advocates should be somewhat one-sided, should press their favourite idea too far, and should regard it as the universal solvent for all that is solvable in science and philosophy rather than as one important principle, which must be aided and qualified by other principles equally necessary for the explanation of mental and physical facts. In one aspect man may be regarded as a part of the phenomenal universe, and on this aspect of humanity the doctrine of evolution will probably throw much valuable light ; but in another aspect man is raised above nature, and is akin rather to the abiding cause of nature than to the everchanging current of natural phenomena. This is the view of the late Professor Green, of Oxford, in the profound papers which recently appeared in the pages of *Mind*, on the question, Can there be a Natural Science of Man ? Admitting the importance of the Evolution Theory in regard to the history of natural phenomena, and, therefore, to the history

of man in so far as he is conditioned by the laws of the phenomenal universe, Mr. Green nevertheless feels himself necessitated by the study of the faculty of Cognition to give a decidedly negative reply to the above question. The abiding mind which knows the relations of successive phenomena cannot, he maintains, be itself a phenomenon; the intelligence which is competent to learn nature's laws must itself be intrinsically above nature. And if this conclusion is inevitable as a result of the study of man's knowing faculty, it is no less inevitable, we think, when we consider our moral consciousness, and feel that we possess a self-determining will, which enables us to make our election between motives which are felt to be of different moral rank, and which justifies our self-condemnation for past sinfulness because it testifies that our conduct might have been better than it really was.

In the languages and ideas of all nations the phenomenal and the metaphysical or ontological are inextricably bound up together, and we are surprised that such an evolutionist as Mr. Stephen should not have taken as *primâ facie* evidence of the validity and importance of both ideas the fact that evolution has not had the slightest tendency to eliminate either member of this universal antithesis. It is the great defect of his interesting volume that he studiously ignores all metaphysical considerations, and notwithstanding Professor Green's most weighty protest, imagines that he can give an adequate account of human nature while leaving all such considerations aside. How futile is such a pretension is evident from the fact that the very assumption of an objective universe on which the theory of evolution reposes, and also the belief in the existence of other people, are metaphysical assumptions; and were our author to steer as clear of all metaphysics as he professes to do, he would have no ground for asserting that the supposed events in nature and society are anything more than successive phases in his own sensations and ideas. He cannot do without metaphysics if he would, for every sentence in his book implies the acceptance of some metaphysical beliefs. What, however, he means when he says that he eschews metaphysics is that he will not contemplate the possibility that man's will is an original cause, or that there is any unique and undecomposable element in our moral consciousness, or any ultimate criterion of right and wrong. It is these particular metaphysical ideas that Mr. Stephen would fain dispense with, for these ideas would interfere with his main object, which is to show how, by simply assuming a community of creatures with certain capacities for pain and pleasure, and with a certain power of anticipating the future and of sympathising with each other, all the moral phenomena which we now observe in individuals and in society are seen to be explicable and inevitable consequences.

What has just been said will serve to explain two peculiarities in Mr. Stephen's mode of exposition—on the one hand, the comparative meagreness of his psychological analysis of the moral consciousness, and, on the other hand, the fact that the psychological portion of the discussion is abruptly cut into two halves by the sudden intrusion of a quantity of sociological matter. One would think that the first thing

to be done in expounding a Science of Ethics would be to give an accurate description of what is distinctively ethical in our nature as contrasted with what is sentient, intellectual or æsthetic; but in Mr. Stephen's book we do not get an account of the specially moral ideas and emotions, such as the consciousness of obligation, the felt difference between prudential and moral action, the sentiment of remorse, &c., till we are far past the middle of the book. The reason of this is that the moral factors of human nature are not in his view elementary, and, therefore, before he gives an account of them, he wishes to show how they have been produced. He, therefore, deals first with the psychology of motives in general. In this opening section of the volume we meet with the first indication of originality of treatment, if, indeed, it is not rather a conscious reproduction of Spinoza's view of mental causation. While Mr. Stephen believes that all conduct is determined by pleasure or pain, he denies that the anticipated pleasure or pain is the immediate cause of the act of choice. The anticipation of pleasure or pain is itself a pleasure or pain, and, in his view, it is only in so far as the anticipated pleasure or pain produces an actual pleasure or pain that it exercises any motive force over the conduct. Just as in physics it is said that a force cannot act where it is not, so, says Mr. Stephen, a future pleasure cannot immediately influence us, for only one force sets us in action, namely, present pleasure or pain. This is a curious psychological question; but we hardly think that introspection will justify the doctrine that we are never conscious of a motive to act in the absence of a pleasurable or painful feeling. As feelings, according to Mr. Stephen, are the only causes of action, it follows that it is, strictly speaking, incorrect to speak of the conflict of reason with passion. Passion can be resisted only by passion. Reason is simply the faculty by which future consequences are brought before the mind, and as the anticipation of these consequences is attended with more or less pleasure or pain, it follows that in so far as a man is reasonable he is under the influence of motives which would not otherwise be operative. The immediate appetite is held in check by a number of motives to which only the reasoning being is accessible. It is evident, however, that the anticipation of future consequences often operates as a motive without creating any strong present emotion. Mr. Stephen explains this on the ground that "we feel by signs as well as reason by signs. The sight of a red flag may deter me from crossing a rifle range without calling up to my imagination all the effects of a bullet traversing my body. If the motive which prompts me to run the risk be strong, it may be necessary to convert a greater volume of latent into active emotion. We steer our course by an apparently insignificant rudder, and only call out forces sufficient to overcome the actual resistance." Man, as an isolated being, is thus determined to action by his primitive appetite and instincts, and by his reason or calculation of consequences; but it cannot be said of such a being that he has any ideal of conduct, and the word "ought" has no meaning as applied to him.

To explain how man becomes moral, Mr. Stephen now leaves for the present the psychological investigation, and turns to the sociological. In

several thoughtful chapters he aims to show that the moral law is imposed on each member of society by the needs of the social organisation. It is rather surprising that Mr. Stephen, while regarding the whole of our moral sentiments as the result of social evolution, appears to attach too little importance to the doctrine of heredity, for he assumes that the brains of infants in barbarous and civilised states do not greatly vary, and refers the main intellectual and moral differences of individuals almost entirely to the influences exerted upon them after birth by the social organism of which they form a part. Just as in the infra-human stage those organisms survive which are best fitted for all the conditions of life, so is it also in social evolution; but, as Mr. Stephen explains at great length, the unit of social evolution in a moderately-civilised state of the world is not the nation, but the race. As improvements and inventions are rapidly communicated from one civilised nation to another of the same race, war becomes a subordinate phenomenon, and the real struggle for existence is between races which are distinguished from each other by their social "tissue," that is, by the degree in which each race, by the collective experience and interchanging sympathies of its members, has organised in its language, its laws, its usages and moral ideas the principles of character which are most conducive to self-preservation. In all races, however, there is a fundamental agreement as to the more elementary moral virtues, which are indispensable to social welfare. Mr. Stephen explains that the moral law, which in the course of evolution becomes a corporate sentiment, has two branches, the prudential and the moral, and the formation of moral sentiment in favour of the cardinal virtues—courage, temperance, truth, justice, and benevolence—is expounded with much detail. One of the most interesting features of Mr. Stephen's treatise is the emphasis with which he insists on the doctrine that true morality must be internal, that is to say, that it is not enough that the outward act should accord with the moral rule, it is also necessary that the agent should do it without any extrinsic motive. "The moral law has," he says, "to be expressed in the form '*be this*,' not in the form '*do this*.' It prescribes character primarily, not conduct."

The result, then, of Mr. Stephen's sociological discussion is that he considers that he has now accounted for the presence of distinctively ethical ideas and sentiments in human nature. His conclusion is that the feeling of moral obligation is not innate or intuitive in the individual mind, but has an objective origin, being produced by the pressure which the corporate sentiment of society imposes upon its members; and that in like manner the recognition of the relative moral worth of our springs of action is empirically reached by the relative importance of these different principles to the preservation and enrichment of the social fabric.

Accordingly, our author's exposition of ethical science now returns to the line of psychological investigation, and attempts to analyse and explain man's specially moral feelings; and here he inquires, first, if man is wholly a selfish being, whose apparently disinterested actions have all

an ulterior reference to his own happiness. Mr. Stephen's position in reference to this question is emphatically altruistic, so that here, too, as in other points, he is far more fully in accord with the ordinary sentiments of mankind than many Utilitarian moralists are. He holds, it is true, that all action is caused by the pleasurable or painful feelings of the agent, but what he insists on is that the pleasure often springs from the idea of another's happiness, and the pain from the idea of another's misery. It is through the principle of Sympathy that the representation of another's pleasure or pain operates as a motive to truly altruistic action. Mr. Stephen's account of Sympathy is very suggestive, and he shows that, notwithstanding some very perplexing apparent exceptions, in which a pleasure seems to be felt in another's pain, sympathy is a natural and fundamental fact. Mere sympathy, however, is not necessarily altruistic, for the pain which we receive from contemplating the miseries of others may prompt us to divert our attention from their suffering rather than to take measures for its relief. Mr. Stephen, however, endeavours to show that in proportion as man becomes more reasonable he virtually makes a common stock of pains and pleasures with the whole society to which he belongs, and the desire to augment the pleasure and to lessen the pain of others become as ultimate a motive as his desire for his own happiness.

In order (says Mr. Stephen) that a being provided with social instincts should act reasonably, it is necessary, not that he should take that course of conduct which gives the greatest chances of happiness for himself, but that which gives the greatest chance of happiness to the organisation of which he forms a constituent part. . . . So soon as I become sympathetic, even in the slightest degree, and thereby accessible to the social instincts, the mere prudential maxim ceases to give the true law of motive, and, therefore, of conduct in all the cases in which the sympathies or the derivative instincts are called into action (p. 258).

This passage suggests several difficult questions, to which, it seems to us, Mr. Stephen is unable to give any satisfactory reply. His attempts to answer them occupy the last quarter of the volume, and they reveal, we think, the fatal defects of his theory as an adequate account of man's moral consciousness.

The first question suggested is, Why is conduct which results from the pleasure or pain of the social instincts more meritorious than conduct which is opposed to that instinct? Because, replies our author, conduct at variance with the social instinct is antagonistic to the preservation and welfare of society, and the individual's merit is just in the proportion in which his intrinsic love of doing good leads him to do what the average man will only do when influenced by some extrinsic motive. Does the merit then consist in a man's being so constituted that the balance of pleasurable feeling that leads to beneficial action is greater than the pleasure which anticipated self-gratification produces? Surely, if conduct is thus simply the resultant of emotional impulses, it may indeed be æsthetically attractive or repulsive, but meritorious it can never be. The

idea of merit involves of necessity the metaphysical principle, which Mr. Stephen in vain tries to ignore, that the personal will in moral action is no mere resultant of motives, but is a self-determining power, which, in virtue of its freedom of choice, can direct attention to either the social or the selfish motive, and by persistent siding with one or the other can raise that motive to a predominant intensity. The idea of merit implies then that man possesses Free-will. Mr. Stephen rejects Free-will, and mainly on the ground that we habitually and safely predict conduct if we have a knowledge of character. The Libertarian, however, does not call this in question. In so far as a man's character is already formed, we may confidently predict that he will act in accordance with this formed character, and this power of prediction extends accordingly over nearly the whole of the conduct. It is only at the margin where the personal character is growing or being formed, that is, only in cases where the man is accessible to real temptation, that it becomes intrinsically impossible to forecast how he will decide between competing springs of action. The moral character of man, and of the social organism generally, changes only gradually and slowly, and, therefore, the fact that there is always a margin of uncertainty where complete foresight is impossible, does not prevent statistical inferences from being approximately true, or render man and society wholly inaccessible to scientific research. It is this union of a great and permanent body of formed character and habit, with a living margin of moral growth or decay, which, without annulling that freedom of moral choice which is indispensable to morality, furnishes the needful conditions for a reasonable prevision of human conduct, and for the scientific study of the motor forces in society. The same anti-metaphysical prepossession which vitiates Mr. Stephen's account of merit, vitiates also his exposition of remorse. Remorse is, in his view, the hatred which we feel for our unsocial behaviour, and this hatred is simply the reflection in us, through sympathy, of the hatred with which our neighbours would regard our conduct. It seems clear to us that remorse is felt to be an original sentiment of our nature, and no mere reflection of public opinion, and that it most surely involves, and is based upon, the conviction that the moral choice of ours, which occasions remorse, might have been other than it really was. Further, what is the feeling of obligation? Mr. Stephen tells us it arises from the fact that man is part of a social organism, and that the idea of the line of conduct which is most conducive to society's maintenance and health having been evolved by experience in the whole organism, is reflected in the individual consciousness, and constitutes the sense of duty. But why should such reflected sentiments assume an obligatory character if they have no other authority than the pleasurable or painful experiences of society? And if such be the essence of the idea of obligation, how comes it that the conscience often imposes upon men a line of conduct far higher than that which society claims or expects?

As compared with Utilitarianism the great significance of Mr. Stephen's teaching lies in his doctrine that conduct does not neces-

sarily or always proceed from a calculation of the pleasurable consequences to the agent, but simply from the circumstance that the idea or feeling which leads to the action is, at the moment, more pleasurable or less painful than the other ideas or feelings which are present; and the main object of his book is to prove that as civilisation advances the ideas which prompt action conducive to the public good tend to become the most pleasurable and, therefore, the most influential upon conduct. It cannot be said that he has demonstrated this, for, indeed, to do this he would need to refute all the arguments of the Pessimists; but even allowing that though his reasoning is defective his conclusion is sound, and that in the case of the perfectly moralised man the pleasurable becomes identical with the beneficent, and the painful with the pernicious, Mr. Stephen still provides no answer to the practical question, Why am I, in whom the idea of action for the good of society is not so pleasurable as the idea of gratifying my passion or self-love, bound to obey the social rather than the selfish motive? He can only reply that if I really feel myself morally bound so to act, it must be because resistance to the social instinct is painful, or the yielding to it is pleasant. But resistance to the passion that wars against the social instinct is likewise painful, and yielding to it is pleasant; why, then, do I not feel also bound to gratify the egoistic passion? We find, then, in Mr. Stephen's presentation of ethical science no satisfactory account of the psychological fact that when the social affections and the personal appetites come into collision, an obligation is felt to act in accordance with the former. His ingenious manipulation of the ideas of pleasure and pain does not succeed in yielding the entirely different idea of moral obligation. We might adduce other instances of the inability of Mr. Stephen's theory to account for the clear deliverances of our ethical consciousness; but these that we have cited are a fair sample of the difficulties which his book suggests. Valuable and interesting, then, as Mr. Stephen's treatise is in many respects, as an attempt to explain the genesis and development of moral ideas and sentiments in gregarious creatures who, individually, have no distinctively ethical faculty, it must be regarded as a failure. A true Science of Ethics must, we think, recognise at the outset that in ethical experiences there is a unique element, which, though it is constantly blended with other elements in human nature, is yet essentially undecomposable.

The historical unfolding of the conception of duty is a study of the highest interest, but just as the Darwinian theory does not supersede the necessity of regarding the cosmos as the manifestation of creative thought, so in the history of man the moral ideal must be recognised as an internal formative principle ever seeking to manifest itself in humanity. The successive phases of its evolution are conditioned by the progress of experience, but so far from being the product of experience it ever shows itself in advance of man's actual life, and with an authority whose rightfulness is never really gainsaid, it is ever claiming to realise itself more perfectly in human hearts and lives.

C. B. U.

MR. GUTHRIE ON MR. SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.

IN a substantial volume of nearly 500 pages,* Mr. Guthrie continues the elaborate and acute criticism of Mr. Spencer's philosophical system which he commenced in his former treatise on that author's "Formula of Evolution." Mr. Guthrie's position is not that of antagonism to the scientific doctrine of evolution, but he sees great blanks in the present deductive treatment, which cause him to regard Mr. Spencer's presumed fulness of exposition as merely illusory. "In so far," he says, "as Mr. Spencer's work is viewed as an attempt to show the *a priori* reasonableness of evolution by gradual development already established in various departments of science by *a posteriori* methods, it may be held to have accomplished its object; but in so far as it claims to have put together a framework of thought commensurate with all the sequences of the cosmos, it must be considered a disjointed structure from which as yet several connecting parts are missing" (*Pref.* p. v.).

Of course it is one thing to contend that the evolution of cosmical phenomena proceeds by imperceptible gradations, and not by sudden leaps, and it is quite another thing to attempt to prove that each of the successive phases in this evolutionary process is the *necessary consequence* of the condition immediately preceding it. Towards achieving the first of these aims, Mr. Spencer has done signal service; and the grand generalisations into which he has gathered up the results of the special sciences, and so enabled the mind to grasp the successive chapters in the history of the phenomenal world, well entitle him to gratitude and admiration. But his ambition soars far above this useful achievement. He aspires to impart to us such a knowledge of the ultimate constitution of the universe, that no events in the sublime procession of cosmical phenomena need surprise us, seeing that in the light of his exposition it must be evident to the reason that each antecedent appearance on the phenomenal stage necessitates and explains the particular appearance which follows it. Mr. Guthrie does not maintain, as we should be inclined to do, that this pretension to give a deductive explanation of the universe is intrinsically incapable of realisation; he simply limits himself to inquiring whether Mr. Spencer has succeeded in giving an intelligible and consistent account of the necessary evolution of the universe from certain assumed primitive data.

In telling us in the above passage that "several connecting parts are wanting in Mr. Spencer's explanation of the sequences of the cosmos," Mr. Guthrie might have added that the defective links in the explanation occur at all those hinge-points which really test the truth and adequacy of a deductive account of the universe; for, as Mr. Guthrie's detailed criticism clearly proves, Mr. Spencer's evolution theory fails to account for the passage from inorganic matter to organic bodies, it fails also to show how organism gives rise to consciousness, and we might add, though Mr.

* *On Mr. Spencer's Unification of Knowledge*, by MALCOLM GUTHRIE, author of *On Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution*. London: Trübner and Co. 1882.

Guthrie does not discuss this, it fails to show how a merely sentient being necessarily passes into a rational and moral being possessed of a power of free choice between higher and lower springs of conduct.

Mr. Guthrie's criticism of Mr. Spencer's position is the more interesting because it proceeds from one who is fully imbued with the modern idea of evolution, and who, having no metaphysical prejudice against Mr. Spencer's method, has studied it at first sympathetically in the attitude of a disciple, and only later and under logical compulsion in the attitude of a hostile critic.

One of the most important chapters of the book is that in which Mr. Guthrie submits to searching examination Mr. Spencer's explanation of the cause of organic evolution by means of equilibration and polarity, and the following words in which he sums up the results of his criticism are not, we think, much more severe than the case warrants. After justly complaining of Mr. Spencer's habit of gradually altering the recognised meaning of terms, Mr. Guthrie continues :—

In the case before us, polarity, which we can thoroughly understand as applied to the crystallisation of inorganic substances, is so overloaded with properties and powers, and is so expanded for the purpose of explaining all chemical and physiological arrangements, that it ends in meaning nothing at all. Fresh requirements, fresh properties needed—call them polarities, and let them equilibrate. We want growth and accretion—we want modification of molecules—we want fresh aggregates produced out of these modified molecules—call them polarities and let them equilibrate. Anything, everything is polarity—anything, everything, is equilibration. Make these terms vague and all-embracing, and you can deduce whatever you will. Put into them all that you want to get out of them, and the deduction, though obscure, will be sufficient" (p. 435).

Dr. Bain's and Mr. Spencer's attempt to explain the relation between mind and matter by the "double aspect" theory, *i.e.*, the Spinozistic doctrine that the ultimate substance has the two attributes, thought and extension, is also ably discussed in Mr. Guthrie's volume, and Mr. Spencer's inconsistent utterances on this subject are clearly pointed out. Sometimes Mr. Spencer writes as if he believed, with Spinoza, that matter and mind are parallel streams of phenomena which exert no causal action on each other, and must each be fully explained within its own sphere, so that all the muscular movements of organised beings are to be referred entirely to transmitted molar and molecular material movements, which would proceed unchanged if the creature had no consciousness at all; at other times, especially when treating of human psychology, he slips into the ordinary view, and admits that sensations, thoughts, and emotions are determining causes of muscular expression and movement, and that, therefore, these mental states must be admitted into the series of convertible forces; and so the doctrine which prevails in the biological treatise that material changes must always be referred to material causes is tacitly surrendered. Mr. Guthrie also takes Mr. Spencer to task for failing to give any explanation of the appearance of consciousness in a world where previously only lifeless matter was present; but we suppose Mr. Spencer would seek to escape from this difficulty by maintaining with Haeckel

that the elements of sentiency attend all the molecular movements of the inorganic world.

Nearly a third of Mr. Guthrie's book is occupied with the discussion of Mr. Spencer's view of the relation which ultimate scientific ideas bear to the Unknowable. In writing his earlier treatise, Mr. Guthrie proceeded on the assumption that definite conceptions are to be attached to the words Matter, Motion, and Force; but Mr. Spencer replies to his criticism by asserting that to attach to these words any definite meaning involves alternative impossibilities of thought. Mr. Guthrie rightly answers that it is evidently the aim of Mr. Spencer, in his account of the Knowable, to give a clear and self-consistent view of the universe and its evolution, and therefore, though Matter, Motion, and Force be only symbols of the Unknowable, they must, if the unification of knowledge is to be achieved, be symbols which definitely and coherently express all cosmical phenomena. Mr. Guthrie accordingly very properly objects to Mr. Spencer that he first professes to give an intelligible explanation of the cosmos, and then, when his explanations are shown to lack clearness and consistency, takes refuge in the Unknowable, and declares that he never intended his symbols to have a definite meaning. Well may Mr. Guthrie say "the question really is whether Mr. Spencer shall be kept to definite meanings when he speaks of the inter-relations of factors, or shall be allowed sometimes to use them in their definite meanings (which are all that can come into our calculations), and sometimes run away from them behind the scenes, letting them come out again in definite shapes when they have to do concrete work" (p. 180).

In conclusion, though we cannot always follow Mr. Guthrie's reasonings, and are not sure that we agree with his view of the proper relation between philosophy and science, we think that, as a criticism of Mr. Spencer's doctrine, the book contains many sound and important reflections, which well deserve the thoughtful consideration of all students of the theory of evolution.

C. B. U.

CANON COOK ON THE REVISED VERSION OF THE FIRST THREE GOSPELS.

THE work of Canon Cook * on the subject of the Revised Version of the First Three Gospels was undertaken, he informs his readers, for a very special reason. Having wholly, or in part, prepared the commentaries on the three Gospels—for the *Speaker's Commentary*—he had naturally a great interest in comparing the work of the Revisers on those Gospels with that which had thus been done under his own care, or by his own hand. He was amazed and grieved, he tells us, at the amount of change introduced by the Revisers, and felt himself "bound in honour to examine those [altered] passages separately and in detail." The result is this considerable volume, occupied, it will be

* *The Revised Version of the First Three Gospels considered in its Bearings upon the Records of our Lord's Words, and of Incidents in His Life.* By F. C. COOK, M.A., &c., &c., Editor of the *Speaker's Commentary*. 8vo, 1882, pp. 250.

perceived, only with the discussion of the changes introduced by the Revisers in the Greek text of the first three Gospels.

The work, having this origin, may be described as an able, as it is also a vigorous, and, in some respects, a successful, attack upon the results of the revision, as these are shown in the preference given to many new readings of the Greek, and the rejection of corresponding readings of the *Textus Receptus*, the reputed basis of the English Authorised Version. Canon Cook enters into much detail in all the passages of any importance in which these alterations of the text have been made. By some of them he is greatly offended; and it seems too evident that his indignation arises at times from motives which are not purely critical. This is the case, for example, when (p. 24) he observes in reference to Matt. i. 7, 8, 10, that it is to him "perfectly astounding that any critic should throw the responsibility for so positive a misstatement on St. Matthew." This is said in connection with the margin on these verses, in which it is intimated that the "Greek" has the names Asaph and Amos instead of Asa and Amon. Here, it will be observed, it is only a marginal note that is in question, and not a "change" in the text, as Canon Cook terms it. And he means us to understand that the writer of the Gospel could not, as an Evangelist, have made such a mistake, and that, therefore, the variant should not have been recorded. But even if this be conceded to the Evangelist, it might be interesting and right to put in the margin the *fact* that such a variant is found in some most ancient documents. The reason suggested, as above cited, for suppressing this fact, is clearly neither sound nor conclusive. For anything that appears, and for anything that is known of the writer termed St. Matthew, he *might* have made such a mistake, and therefore, it was quite reasonable on the part of the revisers to take notice that these variations occur. It would certainly, however, have been better if they had not said, without qualification, that the "Greek" reads Asaph and Amos. If this were wholly true, these forms of the names ought to have stood in the English version, which professes to represent the Greek. The Revisers ought doubtless to have said only that *some* ancient documents so read; and this is strictly correct, whether the Evangelist so wrote or not.

Another example to the same effect may be found at p. 20. Here, in reference to a particular point, Canon Cook observes: "It would indeed be a grievous evil were the representatives of Socinianism entitled to plead, in support of their doctrines, the text of Scripture as it stands in the Revisers' edition." Such expressions indicate an *animus* which at least is not judicial, whatever else it may be, and reveal to us the fact that the author's earnestness and zeal are very much pre-engaged on the side of the old readings. He is, we may plainly see, unwilling to let them go, simply, it would appear, because they fit in so well with the system of theological doctrines to which he is attached. *

* The charge of favouring "Socinian" renderings has been vehemently thrown at the Revised Version by the *Quarterly Reviewer* (Jan. 1882). In a very remarkable case this charge has been shown to recoil upon the reviewer's

This is one of the features of this book which, with all due respect for the eminent and learned author, it is proper to point out, and against which a reader should be on his guard. Another is, that, although the author speaks so frequently and so strongly against the critical principles and their results maintained by Messrs. Westcott and Hort in their recent edition of the Greek text, he yet takes no sufficient account of the processes by which those editors have been led to see in certain of the oldest manuscripts the true representatives (or the nearest which are now accessible to us) of the original words of the New Testament books. The manuscripts referred to are, indeed, few in number, and sometimes they even differ from each other in their evidence. Still, they are in fact the oldest existing documents of their kind, and they must have been copied from documents still older than themselves. Hence, where they are fairly supported by ancient evidence of other kinds—versions and ecclesiastical writers—they are entitled to be received in preference to the far greater numbers of other and later manuscripts, the agreement of which with one another, it may be reasonably shown, is largely the result of the well-known tendency of copyists to correct supposed errors, and smooth down rough places, and assimilate passage to passage in the process of transcription. We do not think that the arguments and evidences adduced by the two eminent critics to whom the author is so vehemently opposed, are considered in this volume with the fulness and detail which entitle him to reject their conclusions with so unqualified a disapproval.

Further, it must be noticed that in condemning the readings adopted, or recorded in their margin, by the Revisers, because they so often coincide with the new text of Westcott and Hort, and in ascribing to those editors, as he appears to do, an altogether preponderating influence in the decisions of the Revisers, he, in common with the *Quarterly Reviewer*, is clearly going beyond the limits which the proprieties of the case and the evidence in his possession should have imposed upon him. The Revisers' readings are in general accord not only with the text of Westcott and Hort, but equally so with the older texts of the greatest critical editors of recent times—Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles. These latter again were the predecessors of Westcott and Hort in attributing a preponderating value to the same small body of ancient witnesses whose testimony has been mainly followed by Westcott and Hort, and by the majority of

own head—in other words, to be applicable to the rendering which he defends, and not to the marginal note in the Revised Version against which he brings it. The note referred to occurs in Rom. ix. 5, where the Revisers have very properly acknowledged the fact that this verse has been punctuated and understood so as to yield a very different sense from that commonly attributed to it. Their record of this fact has provoked the bitterest wrath of the reviewer, who stigmatises their marginal note as "the Socinian gloss." Now it happens that Socinus, and the *Fratres Poloni* with him, accepted the punctuation and rendering of the verse, which the *Quarterly Reviewer* himself accepts! They held Christ to be God in such a sense that the doxology might be applied to him. The "Socinian gloss" is thus the received and orthodox rendering, not the marginal annotation of the Revisers. This has been pointed out with ample fulness of detail by Professor Ezra Abbot, in his article on Rom. ix. 5 in the newly-published (*American Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis* for 1881, pp. 141—2.

the Revisers. The coincidence may therefore be said to be one that arose from the nature of the case. Similar principles of criticism, fairly carried out, without any bias in favour of established readings, necessarily led not only Westcott and Hort, and the Revision body of which they were members, but also the most eminent critical authorities who preceded them, to the results which are so largely identical. This was clearly what was to be anticipated; and we imagine that these results will in most instances, though not in all, bear even a larger amount of hostile criticism than they have yet received.

Still we are far from wishing to convey the idea that we think the Revisers always right in the changes they have made. We think that Canon Cook, as well as the *Quarterly Reviewer*, has produced cases in which changes in the Greek text have, to say the least, been unnecessarily made. For example, the preference of the aorist ἀφῆκαμεν to the present in the Lord's Prayer is a case of this kind. Not only is the resulting sense unsuitable to the prayer, but, critically speaking, the evidence for the new reading is shown by Canon Cook to be insufficient. And there are various other cases of the same kind.

We cannot enter into many details, and must conclude with one further remark. Canon Cook objects greatly to the marginal notes to the Revised Version. They are insufficient, he observes, to show the amount of evidence for or against in the several instances to which they are appended. But then they are evidently not intended for such a purpose. The space at the command of the Revisers was quite insufficient for it. Their value is that they awaken attention and put readers on their guard, and will, no doubt in many a case, lead to further inquiry in the proper quarters. The same remark applies to various renderings and to differences noted in the punctuation. The interests of truth required that these variations, or possible variations, should be acknowledged. The Revision Company was not infallible, and happily it did not do its work as if it had professed, or even assumed, to be so. In cases of doubt, where these seemed important enough (and often, it must be admitted, where they were not so), notice of the doubt is given; and in this, surely, the public will think that the Revisers simply did their duty with honesty, as they were bound to do it. Canon Cook, following the bad example of the *Quarterly Reviewer*, writes as if he thought that the Revisers had sometimes appended a marginal note for the purpose of perplexing a reader or of throwing suspicion upon a text (see pp. 281—2) where nothing of the kind was required. In this, it is hardly necessary to say, he is not justified by what appears in their work; and the character of the Company, it may be added, is perfectly proof against such an imputation.

The reader who is interested in these questions may here be recommended to a work of much smaller size than that which has called forth the foregoing remarks—we allude to the pamphlet published by Two Members of the Revision Company* in reply to the articles of the *Quarterly Reviewer*. The reader of those articles and of Canon Cook's

* *The Revisers and the Greek Text of the New Testament*. By Two Members of the New Testament Company. London: Macmillan. 1882. 8vo.

volume will not do justice either to himself or the Revisers if he does carefully consider what is said on their side of the question in that Reply. Though of small extent, we are greatly mistaken if it does not, even for the general reader, put many things in a light very different from that in which the two adverse critics have represented them, and go far towards showing that the Revision, unpopular as many of its alterations may be, whether in the original text or in the English translation, has at least a good deal to say in its own vindication.

G. V. S.

DR. DAVIDSON ON THE NEW TESTAMENT DOCTRINE OF LAST THINGS.*

DR. DAVIDSON'S little volume on Eschatology, or, as he Englishes it on the title-page, "The Doctrine of Last Things," is, like all that has recently come from the pen of this writer, careful, critical, and judicious. It treats of Christ's Second Advent, the Resurrection, the Intermediate State, the Last Judgment, the Resurrection State, Rewards and Punishments, in several chapters, bearing the above headings, and containing a discriminating review and comparison of the various opinions held on these subjects by different New Testament writers, the whole concluding with a summary of results and a statement of the author's own view regarding these momentous topics. The full title of the book is "The Doctrine of Last Things contained in the New Testament compared with the Notions of the Jews and the Statements of Church Creeds."

The chief fault we have to find with the book is a want of care, not indeed in the method of research, but in the manner of expression. For example, on page 4 ff. we read, "Of the passages bearing on the subject [the Second Advent of Christ] some give His own words; others those of apostles, evangelists, and early Christians. To the former belong these statements;" here follow the words found in Matthew xxiv. 80—81, xxv. 81—88, xxvi. 64, Mark xiv. 62, Luke ix. 26. Hence the ordinary reader would infallibly infer that Dr. Davidson accepts all these passages as genuine utterances of Jesus. In the course of the chapter it comes out that this is by no means the case, but that in Dr. Davidson's view the disciples are "inaccurate reporters of the Master's words, because they misunderstood His meaning, and reproduced it in an altered shape." Would it not be more in accordance with Dr. Davidson's intention to have said that some passages *profess* to give the words of Christ about His second coming, but that these are a distorted echo of His utterance rather than "a reproduction of His meaning in an altered shape"?

The same sort of inaccuracy in expression occurs again on page 45 in reference to the doctrine of the Resurrection. "In Isaiah, chapter xxvi. (written in the exile time), it occurs as a wish:—Ezekiel describes it in a vision," i.e., in that of the valley of dry bones. Yet, on page 48 we

* *The Doctrine of Last Things.* By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D.D. Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co.

read, "These writers do not intimate the doctrine of the Resurrection, but the restoration of the people to their former prosperity in the metaphorical language of a resuscitation of dead Israelites." We humbly submit, moreover, that "the metaphorical language of a resuscitation" is scarcely good English. The chapter on the Intermediate State is exceedingly interesting; the opinions of Jews and early Christians on Sheol, Hades, Paradise, Gehenna, &c., are treated with a vast amount of erudition and in a most discerning and instructive manner, and the same may be said of the chapters relating to the Last Judgment and the Resurrection State.

With regard to Dr. Davidson's own views on a future state, it may suffice to say they are in harmony with those of the majority of Theistical writers. He believes, in short, that the life to come will be a continuation of the life that now is, admitting of indefinite progress, although under altered conditions. He rejects the doctrine of purposeless and eternal torments, and inclines to the optimistic hope of universal perfectibility. In a note in his final chapter he incidentally remarks, "Scientific men generally hold Sir W. Thomson's doctrine of the dissipation of energy, and the consequent final dissolution of all systems in the universe. In these hypotheses man is little if at all considered; God himself is shoved away out of sight behind *Nature*." Is not this a little unkind to the authors of *The Unseen Universe*, who, so far as we remember, based their arguments for God and immortality upon this very doctrine of the dissipation of energy? And is there not a quaint bathos in the closing sentence of the book—"When materialists are prepared to write on the gates of death the words of the poet, 'Leave all hope behind, you who enter,' their state of mind is surely unfortunate"? In fairness to the materialist it should, moreover, be remembered that it is not only hope but fear, which he would bid us leave behind. Very different indeed was the meaning of the legend inscribed above the portal of Dante's Inferno.

E. M. G.

MR. DALE'S LECTURES ON THE EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS.

MR. DALE has given us a handsome volume of sermons on the Epistle to the Ephesians,* and we are grateful to him for it. The book is a good illustration of the position of the moderately liberal school of the Independents, alike in its strength and its weakness. These sermons are practical, and must have been well suited to Mr. Dale's own congregation. Sunday after Sunday his hearers would go home feeling that they had heard something which had done them good; we can believe they enjoyed the long course to its very end. And, no doubt, there are multitudes who will have the same feelings when they read the book; it will do them good. This is strength. But the weakness appears in a

* *The Epistle to the Ephesians: Its Doctrine and Ethics.* By R. W. DALE. M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1882.

fatal inability either to grasp and expound the mind of the real Paul, or to penetrate to that deeper spiritual region where such men as F. W. Robertson or J. H. Thom make us feel that all critical questions are matters of small importance. Mr. Dale continually refers to critical points, touches on questions of authorship and date, and, no doubt, made his hearers and will make many of his readers, feel that he has dealt with the subject in a masterly way, and often disposed in a couple of sentences of whole reams of sceptical cavillings. But he does *not* know Paul as we have learned to know him through the labours of Baur, Holsten, and especially Pffeiderer. We have only to compare Mr. Dale's book with Pffeiderer's *Paulinism*,* to see what a gain modern criticism may win for us, how close it may bring us to the very mind of the Apostle with its self-consistent development and natural relations to his age, how the giving up of doubtful epistles is merely giving up what is inconsistent with the real man, an inconsistency which we perceive only in proportion to the thoroughness with which we feel we learned to know the real Paul. We have no space to enter into details, but one point we cannot leave unnoticed. The Person in whom Paul wanted men to have faith was God, not Christ. Faith is a trust in God based upon a knowledge of His character and disposition towards us, upon a knowledge of His love, of which Christ was the revealer. Paul identifies the spirit of God and the spirit of Christ. He does not identify Christ and God. And he does not make faith consist in believing in Christ, or in anything about Christ, save so far as Christ's life and death and new life constituted the basis of facts which enabled him to know God in His true character as Father, and knowing Him to love Him who so loved us, and loving Him to turn to Him in humble, childlike trust.

H. S. S.

DR. VON HARTMANN ON "THE RELIGION OF THE SPIRIT."†

THOSE who are familiar with Dr. von Hartmann's previous publication, "The Religious Consciousness of Humanity in the Graduation of its Evolution," will not be surprised at the title of the present work (see *Modern Review*, July, 1882, p. 686). Each of the two books is a unity in itself, and can be read independently of the other; but, inasmuch as they stand to each other as, on the one hand, the historical, and, on the other, the systematic part of a philosophy of religion, they form an internally-connected whole, which our author designates as his third chief work.

As in the historical portion of the investigation, the form of treatment

* Published by Williams and Norgate in the *Theological Translation Fund Library*.

† *Die Religion des Geistes*. VON EDUARD VON HARTMANN. Berlin: Carl Duncker's Verlag. (C. Heymons.) 1882.

in this systematic part is throughout phenomenological. Beginning with an analysis of the religious consciousness, the examination, starting from this psychological basis, proceeds to the metaphysical postulates of the religious consciousness, which, in von Hartmann's opinion, are everywhere found to be the higher synthesis of the exclusive postulates of abstract monism and theism, and ends in setting forth the practical consequences of the religious consciousness. The result of this systematic research von Hartmann finds to be the same as that of the historical—namely, the religion of concrete monism.

The book is divided into three sections, embracing the psychology, metaphysics, and ethics of religion. Under the first head the religious function is considered: (α), as exclusively human; (β), as reciprocal—a divine and human function. Religious metaphysics is classified as the metaphysics of the religious object or theology, and the metaphysics of the religious subject, embracing religious anthropology on the one hand, and religious cosmology on the other. By the ethics of religion is understood the awakening, the development, and the fruits of grace, as the subjective process of salvation, and the history of the social ethical institutions, the æsthetic cult, prayer, sacrifice, &c., as its objective process.

Now, the religious function may exist as *idea*, as *feeling*, or as *will*. Religion is a psychical phenomenon in humanity, and all actual religious phenomena are also psychical functions of men. As *presentation* or *idea* religion is not only "morality touched with emotion," as Mr. Matthew Arnold defines it; nor is it mere "admiration," as the author of "Natural Religion" would have us believe. A function which refers back to the subject—that is, has the subject itself for its object, cannot be called religious, as is proved by the instances of theoretical consciousness, eudæmonistic egoism, and the purely moral conscience. It is true that philosophy, in twofold form, has sought to supplant religion. In the first place, philosophical rationalism did much to set aside the historical religions, and to put in their place *natural religion*, or the religion of reason, with its spiritless deism and triad of ideas—a personal God, personal immortality, and personal freedom of will. Then came the French encyclopædists, with their spiritless materialism, such as, more recently, we find in Strauss' "New Faith." Opposed to this we have the ascending development of philosophical monism from Spinoza, through Fichte to Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hegel. Thus we see that, without the idea of God, there can be no religion, for this is the starting-point of all religious function.

Since the time of Schleiermacher, the importance of the emotional aspect of religion has been so well understood and appreciated that we need not dwell upon it here, but can pass on to consider the religious function as *will*. Dr. von Hartmann well says: "The religious will is the *alpha* and *omega* of all religion; as unconscious will, its first cause, as conscious its final goal. Without the unconscious religious motive to raise one from dependence upon the world to freedom in God, without the unconscious longing after the Divine which is primarily satisfied

with even the relatively most unfitting objects for the building up of a religious relationship, the evolution of religion in man would have been impossible; even those who regard the goal of this intense longing as illusory must admit that. . . . Of religion before allthings it may be said: 'By their fruits ye shall know them;' first of all, action, or, psychologically considered, the will to act, is the fruit, which must serve as a criterion for the value of all religious functions."

It may be remembered that in his "*Phænomenology of the Moral Consciousness*," von Hartmann's position was that pessimism, in its widest range, is the indispensable postulate of the moral consciousness, and he now finds that the like holds of the religious consciousness. "The reality of suffering," we are told, "and thereby the reality of man and of the persons and things that work upon him, is the indispensable postulate of the religious consciousness, without which the latter can only attempt to maintain itself by self-contradictions."

As regards what is termed religious anthropology, man is in need of salvation, not only with reference to evil, but quite as much, nay, more, in respect of guilt. None can feel free from guilt, however much he may try to do so—that is an indisputable fact, both of the moral and of the religious consciousness. Now, the conception of guilt contains two ideas: that of wrong, and that of responsibility for the same. Then comes the question: What are the metaphysical conditions under which wrong, and the responsibility are possible? The answer would seem to be, that the individual who is neither determined nor otherwise from without, must determine himself in his actions and resolutions, and in such a way that this self-determination falls within the realm of divine knowledge and will; but, for this to be possible, that essence of the individual from which he determines himself must lie, not outside, but inside the Divine Being, and without loss of individual reality. That is to say, according to von Hartmann, the right mean between fatalism and indeterminism is a psychological determinism, and the right mean between abstract monism and theism is concrete monism, which takes account quite as much of the unity of all being in God as of the reality of the many beings toward each other. "As the willing and knowing of the individual must be real, partial functions of the absolute willing and knowing, in order to be truly within its sphere, so also must the constant groups of functions which constitute the reality of the individual have their subsistence in the absolute actuality of the Divine Being, and not in themselves, so as not to represent a Being outside the Divine Being, but rather to be momenta of the absolute idea and absolute will in each of their single actions."

Dr. von Hartmann expressly tells us that, in the present work, he has had nothing but scientific interests in view, and that nothing is further from him than the tendency to practical agitations. Be it so; but there is a wisdom which is hidden from the "wise and prudent," and which, we venture to think, will survive the spread and progress of culture, and even the philosophy of the unconscious.

H. M. BAYNES.

SIGNOR VADALA-PAPALE ON MORALS AND RIGHT IN LIFE.*

IN this volume the author of "Il Codice Civile Italiano e la Scienza" and "Darwinismo Naturale e Sociale" seeks to show that science cannot be studied apart from life. The subjects of which he treats are Man and Life, the Good, Human action—Ethics, Morals, and Right as bearing upon laws generally, upon science, and upon history, and finally, the cosmical, psychical, and social forces in action, and the Harmony of life.

Signor Papale's studies are based upon Comte's positivism and Spencer's biological researches in their application to sociology. He is convinced that the sociological principle is the only basis for a true theory of law. "Right must be studied in the cosmical order, in the social order as manifested in the individual, in the family, in society, in humanity, and as effected by the State. Thus considered, right is the vital principle of the organism named humanity, which is incarnate in all the most minute relations affecting the conditions of the existence and evolution of all organisms. In the spontaneous part of human actions life is controlled by the moral law, hence the need for a study of the *relations subsisting between the moral law and right generally*, which do not constitute a distinct branch in science, but which are nevertheless an integral part in the study of the science of right itself, in serving as a guide to the limits of a code."

We then have to ask the oft-repeated questions :—How far can a science of human nature exist? and—How far may laws of human nature be regarded as certain? Signor Papale knows the answers given to these questions by Vico and others in Italy, by Ahrens in Belgium, by Schäffle in Germany, by Comte, Brocher, and Fouillée in France, and by Mill, Spencer, and Buckle in England. But, though he gives us an excellent summary of the history of morals and right, he omits to mention the curious and instructive application of philosophy to history by Hegel, who pointed out the relation of cause and effect between the physical environment of a given community and its social and political advancement. The great theatre of human thought and action—the earth's surface, being parted into three great divisions, mountain, plain, and shore, we might expect to find what we know to be the case, namely, that primitive conditions of society characterised the first, that there is a progressive state of social institutions on the second, and that on the third, there are the phenomena of commerce, empire, and wealth. Thus the Asiatic development would, he tells us, represent the childhood of civilisation; the Greek, with its worship of sensuous beauty, might be called its youth; whilst the Roman, in cultivating politics and law, would be strictly analogous to its manhood. As regards the old age of civilisation, Hegel thinks it is exhibited in the Teutonic development, which cares little for the world of action, but much for the cosmos of thought.

* *Morale e Diritto nella Vita: Studi dell'avvocato, G. VADALA-PAPALE* Napoli: Comm. Gennaro de Angelis e figlio. 1881.

In defining morality and right, Signor Papale agrees with M. Brocher, who says that morality tends directly and by itself to realise the destiny of humanity, whereas right only tends to it *indirectly*. Morality lays down the maxims of all life, rules not only the secret thoughts, but also external conduct. Right, on the other hand, establishes the proper autonomy in society, and governs those acts of external life which are the conditions of existence and development generally.

Accepting Comte's theory of the three states, our author finds that, in this positivistic age, the greatest social reaction against the despotism of class and state is the Declaration of Man's Rights, the assertion of the national conscience, the proclamation of man's autonomy in the search after the best social means for fulfilling his destiny. The part played by morality and right in this struggle of society against despotism, of civilisation against barbarism, is, in the one case, that of fraternity, and, in the other, that of autonomy. "The *autonomy* of individuals, of different organisms, of nations, in universal *brotherhood*—that is the centre round which the whole social system eternally revolves. Thus the history of man is gradually unfolded without ever coming to a close."

Signor Vadalà-Papale is interesting throughout, but there is one thing that vitiates the whole of his work, namely, the assumption that the millennium can be brought about by the attainment of a *material* ideal, instead of by a lowly following of Him whose meat and drink it was to do the will of God.

H. M. BAYNES.

RECOLLECTIONS OF UNITARIANISM IN NEW ENGLAND.*

MR. ALLEN follows up his previous excellent volumes with a very practical group of discourses on "Our Liberal Movement in Theology." The "Our" means that of the American Unitarians; and as Mr. Allen has lived through the greater part of the period he sketches, and held close personal relations with the chief actors in "Our Liberal Movement," he is able to throw his lectures into a very bright and attractive form, bringing its heroes successively upon the stage in the living reality of their respective individualities. Mr. Allen divides the history of American Unitarianism into three periods, the time of its Growth, roughly beginning in 1815, and including its controversy with the Orthodox sects; the time of Criticism, or of internal controversy among the parties of its own body, commencing about 1836; and that of Construction, that is, of scientific criticism on the one hand, and of denominational organisation on the other, opening more or less exactly in 1860. Not only the span of time but the scope of persons and of thought covered by this history, renders the little book of much more than denominational interest. No writer, from whatever quarter, who should essay to narrate the history

* *Our Liberal Movement in Theology*, chiefly as shown in Recollections of the History of Unitarianism in New England, being a closing Course of Lectures given in the Harvard Divinity School. By Joseph Henry Allen. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1882.

of American literature or American thought, could pass over the men who are the subjects of Mr. Allen's vivid characterisations. Channing represents the first of his three periods, Theodore Parker the second; while John Quincy Adams, Edward Everett, Charles Sumner, with Emerson, Bryant, and Longfellow are rightly claimed along with the divines Norton, Noyes, the Wares, Putnam, Gannett, and Starr King, as twining their names with the remarkable denomination of which Mr. Allen tells the story. When we realise that these, with Bancroft, Lowell, and others very eminent, if not all technically Unitarians, one and all have received powerful and determining influences from Unitarian communion, we are almost inclined to say that a full history of American Unitarianism would embrace a history of American literature.

To us, by far the most interesting chapters in the book are the personal sketches of Channing and of Parker. Mr. Allen tries very hard to make the balance that weighs these two men hang even. He dwells with reverent affection on the gentle dignity and the religious optimism of Channing: we think his candour fails to save him from disparaging the heroic ministry of Parker. The vague, uneasy feeling about slavery which mingled with the valetudinarian habits of Dr. Channing, but failed for so many years to compel his conscience to plain speech and action in the matter, must ever painfully contrast with the keen and agonising sense of the great iniquity which shook Parker's mighty soul as a reed shaken in the wind. Channing was, perhaps, the most wonderful exponent of the dignity of human nature who has spoken in modern times; his character can best be indicated as seraphic. Parker was perhaps the noblest exponent of the pressure of God upon the human conscience since Augustine; he himself is best described by that epithet of all others most rarely true in the record of humanity:—a Great Man. His virtues were the virtues of greatness; his brief outbursts of passion were the noble sins of greatness. It is fair neither to him nor to Channing to place them side by side as *men*, whichever we may prefer as preacher or theologian.

And, indeed, the apologies which Mr. Allen makes for the friendliness of so many leading Unitarians to slavery, or their long-sustained neutrality in the struggle, seem to us unfortunate. It is quite true that good men often fail to pierce through the veils that decently drape iniquity; but if other men meanwhile, amid contumely and great personal peril, expose and denounce the sin—these men show themselves, so far at least, of the nobler mould. The reason Dr. Gannett and the rest did not perceive the wickedness of slavery was that they were not great enough, were not prophetic enough to do so. It is better quietly to thank God for the much good that was in them nevertheless, than to drag them out to-day for equal honours with Garrison, Parker, and Sumner, whose rightness, and whose righteousness, intervening history, and the conscience of the present, vindicate with so sharp a contrast.

We do not for a moment expect Mr. Allen to see with us in this; but, despite this blot, we would express our cordial interest in a book we would gladly have noticed at greater length.

R. A. A.

MR. IRELAND'S AND MR. CONWAY'S BOOKS ON EMERSON.

THE only readers who will have any fault to find with Mr. Ireland's book * will be those who bought it in the first edition, so soon to be superseded by the present one, which is an improvement upon it in every respect. It appears now with some important additions, and has its value also much enhanced by copies of three characteristic portraits of Emerson, at the ages of forty-four, fifty-five, and seventy years respectively. The volume, too, is now in every way satisfactory in its outward form. The well-executed biographical sketch which occupies a little more than a third part of the book, has been worked over again, and made somewhat fuller, and will be very acceptable, especially to those who have not got Mr. Ireland's "authorities" to consult—chief among them Mr. G. W. Cooke's *Life and Writings of Emerson*.† The portion which is in a special sense the author's own personal contribution to our knowledge of Emerson, is contained in some forty pages of recollections of his visits to England in 1838, 1847-8, and 1872-8, followed by thirty pages of letters chiefly addressed to his young English friend and disciple. The Recollections, which have been considerably extended, and the familiar letters, give, in a very pleasant way, some characteristics of the guest whom Mr. Ireland was fortunate enough to be one of the first to welcome to our shores. The two or three specimens of his letters to Carlyle are just enough to give us an inkling of the high intellectual pleasure which Prof. C. Norton, as editor of the complete correspondence between the two great men, is preparing for us.

The rest of the volume is made up of miscellaneous records, gathered from many different quarters, containing estimates of the character and teaching of the philosopher, anecdotes, and recollections which had been set down by friends and by the many admirers who went on their pleasant pilgrimage to the genial oracle of Concord. Amongst the most interesting of the additions to this part of the book are the fervent and eloquent tributes which were paid to Emerson's memory at a special meeting of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Of these addresses the gem is the one given by Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes—so delicately sympathetic, so happy in its touches of poetical fancy and kindly humour, so clear and certain in its insight. Amongst the writers who have been drawn upon for reminiscences of Emerson at home or on the platform, are Miss Bremer, M. D. Conway, G. W. Curtis, Bronson Alcott, G. J. Holyoake, Walt Whitman. Some pages are given from Mr. Frothingham's *Transcendentalism in New England* about Brook Farm, and from Mr. Curtis's lively sketch of some of the picturesque and amusing aspects of that famous social experiment. Then come passages from the sermon in which Emerson resigned his pulpit and gave up the Unitarian

* *Ralph Waldo Emerson: his Life, Genius, and Writings. A Biographical Sketch.* By ALEXANDER IRELAND. Second edition, largely augmented. Three Autotype Portraits. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. 1882.

† Reviewed in the *Modern Review*, April, 1882, p. 425.

ministry in 1832. And there are reports of three of his public speeches, including the one on Burns, of which Mr. Lowell said that "every word seemed to have just dropped from the clouds."

We have said enough to show how much there is that is interesting and serviceable in Mr. Ireland's book. It has a distinct place of its own amongst the contributions to the Emersonian literature, of which a useful list is given in its concluding pages, and which may be consulted by readers who want more reminiscences and opinions and estimates to assist them in their studies. For our own part, with Mr. Cooke's book, and Mr. Ireland's, on our shelves, together with the one which is the subject of our next notice, we are very well content now to wait for the full, authentic records, first in the Carlyle-Emerson letters, shortly to be published, and then in the final Memoir. We only wish that Messrs. Macmillan would make haste and give us the beautiful edition of Emerson's writings which they have promised, so that we might be spared the discomfort of poring over the small and crowded type of the only English edition which is at present to be had.

Mr. Moncure Conway's book* which we have referred to above as completing our trio of Emersonian volumes, is, in some respects, the most original and characteristic of the three, and, on the whole, will probably prove the most attractive. It has a somewhat wider range of interest in certain directions, associating with Emerson, as the central figure and pervading presence, many of the other dwellers in that charmed circle of high friendships and generous schemes and fruitful work which had its centre at Concord. Mr. Conway writes as one who was in the secrets of that choice society—if, indeed, it had any secrets which were not open ones to all who cared to know and feel the charm of that bright, hopeful, quietly-glowing life of high thought and plain living which is so attractive and so inspiring.

In the graceful and harmonious prelude to his book, the author tells us how, when he was on the eve of his mission as a Methodist preacher on circuit in Maryland, he met, in some chance number of a magazine, with a sentence of Emerson's which changed the whole course of his life. Presently he received, as he says, "his marching orders," in reply to the letter which he had ventured to send, posting it "with a feeling that it was addressed to some impersonal spirit, dwelling in a spiritual realm, harmoniously called Concord, whom it would never reach." There is a pleasant account of his introduction, in due course, to the man to whom he owed his deliverance from bonds, and who gave him the welcoming word, and the smile "which was the break of a new day." "Many years after I read that one in paradise was asked how he got there, and replied, "One day as Buddha passed by he smiled on me."

Here Mr. Conway is in his best and happiest mood, and prepares us to enjoy and not to criticise; and we may say that there is little in the book that is not in keeping with these meditations and reminiscences, dated

* *Emerson at Home and Abroad*. By MONCURE DANIEL CONWAY. London: Trübner. 1883.

"the Vigil of Emerson." It is only now and then that he seems to forget his master's rule of beautiful candour, and tolerance, and breadth of sympathy. In his impatience of anything which he deems narrow or retrograde, he is slow to admit that there is any progress or freedom in paths which lead in any other direction than that in which he has gone. He appears to believe that the Unitarians really thought that Emerson was insane because, like the Quakers, he did not hold to the ordinance of the Lord's Supper, and because he began to preach some mystical doctrines which were strange to current creeds of heterodoxy.

No doubt the Unitarians of that generation did meet with shocks and perplexities, and had presently to consider some things that had not been dreamt of in their philosophy. We suppose in Mr. Conway's own case his spiritual education took a little time ; and it is not every individual, still less every Church, that can get along as fast as he has done. But we should have thought that he knew enough of the lives and the faith of such men as Dr. Channing and Henry Ware, to have been able to assure himself that the Church in which they, and others like them, found a religious home, was not held together by a "Christianity made easy ; New England theology with none of its crosses, but all of its comforts, adapted by scholars to suit spiritual epicures ;" and we do not see either wit or wisdom in saying that "between the Universalists, who believed God too good to damn them, and the Unitarians, who believed they were too good to be damned, respectability was able to make itself quite comfortable." However, we know that it pleases Mr. Conway to say this sort of thing, and it does not hurt anybody in particular. We should hardly have noticed it had he not said, when he began to write, that the smile with which his friend had taken his last farewell of him should not be changed to a frown by any sentence in the book ; and we think the tributes of love and honour which Mr. Conway records as having been paid to Emerson's memory by so many of the leading men in the Unitarian churches, should have thrown a more kindly light on one or two pages of a more than half-forgotten controversy.

It is impossible in the course of a short notice to give any account of the various matters of strong personal interest which are to be found in Mr. Conway's book. There is a very pleasant chapter in which the life at Concord is pictured, and some of the dwellers or visitors there are sketched. Brook Farm is described, but not, apparently, from personal knowledge, G. W. Curtis and Nathaniel Hawthorne supplying most of the information. Hawthorne himself and his wife are the subjects of a very graceful and charming sketch ; and another chapter is devoted to the poet-naturalist, Thoreau. Accounts are given of Emerson's visits to England, which formed the subject of Mr. Ireland's Recollections ; but beside the matter which they have in common, the two writers have their own separate experiences to record.

There is a great deal that is very thoughtful and suggestive in all that the author says about the characteristics of Emerson's philosophy and his influence as a teacher and as an eminently beautiful type of high and noble intellectual and spiritual life. We can quote but one out of the

many sentences of true insight and appreciation which occur :—"An unspeakable awe-stricken reverence for virtue and wisdom ; a spirit ever kneeling before the universe as the transcendent temple of goodness and truth ; a horror at the thought of raising private interests before eternal principles and laws ; a faith not to be argued with, absolute, in personal righteousness as the condition of all worth, involving a sense of corruption in all qualities, however brilliant, which have not that foundation."

There is something very stirring and quickening in the picture of the calm-browed philosopher and man of letters going forth from the retirement of his peaceful home amongst the woods and orchards to take his part in the great anti-slavery battles. When slavery was approaching its death-struggle, it was with the old fervour and courage that he resumed his place among his anti-slavery comrades, and "not only at every critical point spoke the best and bravest word, but was as prompt to share any personal obloquy or danger as he had been in earlier years when he took Harriet Martineau to his house in the face of the mob."

Scattered through Mr. Conway's pages are many pleasant gleanings of anecdote, with reminiscences of intimate talk, scenes and incidents which he has done excellently well in rescuing from oblivion. We do not know exactly how many of the chapters have appeared before as articles in magazines and journals, or how much has been done in the way of supplying connecting links, or in giving harmony of tone and proportion to the whole. But the author has succeeded in making a very pleasant, readable book, with a unity and marked literary quality of its own. One thing we may now confidently say about Emerson, that the more we know of his character, from the merest accident of his outward life to the inmost heart of his being, the more noble, and admirable a type of manhood will he seem to be ; and we need not wait till the whole history of his life has been told to claim for him a place of high honour among the world's very best and truest men.

MR. CAINE'S RECOLLECTIONS OF DANTE ROSSETTI.*

MR. HALL CAINE'S memorial of a brief but intimate friendship with one of the few men of original genius among the poets and artists of our time has an interest which, on the whole, is a sad one. It gives only too faithful a picture of a fine sensitive nature that was not strong enough to bear the burden of a heavy life-sorrow, a mind grown morbid and self-tormenting, and a will fretting itself away against shadows. We do not mean that this is the prevailing impression that would be produced by the complete view of the poet's life which has yet to be given, and which we shall receive, it is to be hoped, from the hand which, of all others, is most entirely competent to the task—that of Mr. Theodore Watts. Mr. Caine's record is naturally the most vivid and interesting when he writes from his own personal knowledge of

* *Recollections of Dante Gabriel Rossetti.* By T. HALL CAINE. London : Elliot Stock. 1882.

his friend ; and this is confined to the last two years or less, when the fatal results were becoming ever more painfully evident of the resort to chloral as a deliverer from the torments of insomnia, from which he had suffered since the terribly sad death of his wife after two short years of happiness. It was not till too late, says Mr. Caine, that "he learned the sad truth . . . that the fumes of this dreadful drug would one day wither up his hopes and joys in life, deluding him with a short-lived surcease of pain, only to impose a terrible legacy of suffering from which there was to be no respite."

Before telling the story of the beginning and course of his own intimacy with Rossetti, Mr. Caine gives a slight general outline of the poet's life, with some characteristics of his boyhood and youth, and a glance at the circumstances and training which had the most influence on his career, with some mention of the comrades with whom he worked and dreamed. In writing of the things which did not come within his own ken, Mr. Caine wisely confines himself to a very few pages ; and the chief part of the introductory matter consists in careful analyses and criticisms of Rossetti's more important poems, and of the one picture, "Dante's Dream," by which his reputation as an artist will be most surely established. We commend Mr. Caine's critical account of the poems to those of our readers especially who remember Mr. Buchanan's notorious article on "The Fleshly School of Poetry," and who have a lingering feeling that there was any ground for the attempt to identify Rossetti with an odious school of writers, happily never naturalised in England, who have glorified the lowest life of sense and dragged every high and pure feeling into the mud. A dozen pages are devoted to the disagreeable subject of this attack, which inflicted a deep and irremediable wound on the poet, and the cruel injustice of which the critic acknowledged, with compunction, when it was too late to undo the mischief. We cannot attempt any critical estimate of Rossetti's poetry here. It would not in all respects, perhaps, coincide with the one which Mr. Caine has given. But we are bound, at least, to say that we agree with him in saying that there is not a line of which the motive is not perfectly pure ; and we quote with pleasure a stanza from Mr. Buchanan's dedication of one of his later books "To an old Enemy" :—

Pure as thy purpose, blameless as thy song,
Sweet as thy spirit, may this offering be ;
Forget the bitter blame that did thee wrong,
And take the gift from me !

Mr. Caine's acquaintance with Rossetti was confined at first to a correspondence which extended over two years. This was followed by one year of frequent personal intercourse, after which the two friends became housemates together for the short remainder of the poet's darkening life. The numerous extracts from the correspondence, and the reminiscences of conversation, are full of interest, both for the impressions they give of Rossetti's character, and for the various literary and artistic judgments they contain both on his own works and on the writers whom he and

his correspondent and friend discussed together in letters or in talk. We regret that we have no room for quotations from some of the many pages headed by the names of Chatterton, Coleridge, Keats, or Wordsworth.

The reader will learn from Mr. Caine many interesting particulars about the poet's works. He will have a curious feeling about the first volume of *Poems* when he knows that its chief contents were buried in the young wife's coffin, and years afterwards restored to light with much remorse and self-reproach. He will read of the friendly stratagem by which, after a long period of illness and gloom, Rossetti was cured of the delusion that he had finally lost the power of making poetry, and how, by a challenge of his ability to compass the simple, direct, and emphatic style of the ballad proper, he was presently led to write the stirring ballads, "The White Ship" and "The King's Tragedy." For these and other such matters, and for a variety of character sketches and personal recollections, sometimes amusing, often painful enough, and always interesting, we acknowledge our debt to Mr. Caine. He undertook a task which must have been in many ways a trying one; and for the way in which he has accomplished it he has well deserved the thanks of every admirer of Dante Rossetti's genius.

LAWS OF LIFE AFTER THE MIND OF CHRIST.*

THIS much wished-for and much-needed volume has reached us so late in the quarter that we can at present give it little more than a welcome. It is inscribed to the Rev. James Martineau and Dr. W. B. Carpenter, as "respectively representing the ministers and laymen at whose desire it has been published." It should carry some significance in any anticipatory estimate of its value, that such men as these desired its publication and desired it because they knew what was sure to be in it. There is in these active times of ours such a rush of thought, such a rapidity of conclusion, such a haste and yet positiveness of conviction, such a jump at results on partial data, and such a miscalculation of the bearing of these data on wider and larger questions, that it requires a very strong hand indeed to induce us to pause and re-weigh matters.

For this cannot be done by any one who is not fully abreast of the existing state of knowledge and criticism—and in full sympathy, too, with all that is real and sound in it—admitting freely and willingly any proved fact of what has sometimes been most vaguely termed "hostile and destructive" criticism of records, and yet refusing to allow it more influence in great truths than legitimately belongs to it.

In this state of things it is of great interest and moment to receive the distinct and distinctive utterances of a perfectly independent and very mature thinker like the author of these discourses, and find him standing at last—after all this shifting panorama—in the immovability of an old

* *Laws of Life after the Mind of Christ. Discourses* by JOHN HAMILTON THOM.

and unchanged conviction. We do not say that everybody may integrally accept that conviction, but every one capable of thinking must respect it, for all such must see that everything with this writer is pondered thoroughly out and proved, if not absolutely, to what is to his own mind at least, after test upon test, its true foundation. In the opening sentences of the volume we find the key to his thoughts of Christianity as "The Impersonation of the Love that is in God":—

It was taken for granted that Christianity must have a unique essence, whereas its distinction is in having an unique fulfilment. It was forgotten that its supreme characteristic, Catholicity—the intuitive recognition of its intrinsic beauty by every soul that is alive—its power, wherever it can show its presence, to kindle life in souls that before seemed dead—are inconsistent with unshared attributes, with the isolation of a nature separated from the fundamental aptitudes and sympathies of human kind. Nothing that is catholic can be peculiar, except in the degree in which it develops and harmonises common properties.

Christianity has its crowning distinction; but this does not consist in introducing new elements into the spiritual world; it consists in perfecting, above all, in impersonating what was already there. Christ came to make all things new; but renewal is not innovation or reversal; it is exactly the opposite. It is building upon the ancient foundations, it is growth from the original stock. Christianity is not the root of whatever is good in human nature, for that was in it from the beginning, its inspiration and its law; nor is it the flower, the promise of the complete outcome, for that also was before in saints and prophets and all good men's lives; it is the consummation, the full-rounded fruit, and that never was before, and except approximately, alas! never has been since. Christ introduced no new germ into the human constitution; man was made in God's image; he combined the elements in a symmetry, only foreshadowed as an ideal until he showed it in the actual, and quickened the real, ruling, nature that is in us into consciousness and tension by revealing in life the end for which we all are living. Christ came not to preach any new doctrine, but to make the Truth, the everlasting gospel of the life of God in the soul of man, known in its substance, in its concrete presentation (pp. 1, 2).

Now, though nothing could be more complete than this statement, of itself, it is not left alone. It is followed up in the remainder of this very striking and high-toned discourse. It is explained, amplified, buttressed, so to speak, by detailed illustration. For this is one of the characteristics of Mr. Thom's style—as it was of Dr. Chalmers's and Dr. Channing's—that blow upon blow is dealt in the argument, till the truth intended to be enforced is firmly welded, and line added to line and colour laid on colour, till the picture of the thought comes out as clear, yes, and as warm, as sunshine. The Discourse entitled "The Universality of Christianity" still further illustrates this main position, where the universality is shown not in the usual way of extent of reception and adaptation, but in its faculty of covering all the ground, developing all the powers and meeting all the wants of our entire nature, so that even now "we are no nearer to any exhaustion of the riches that are in Christ than we are to having scaled the heavens when we reach a mountain's top."

And the volume spreads out to the enforcement of great lessons of practical value, issuing forth from these foundation truths. Such headings as these—"Circumstance, the Unspiritual God," "No Supererogation in Spiritual Service," "Brotherhood towards the Unattractive and the

"Repellent," "Spiritual Counterparts to Temptation and Despondency," "Quiet from God," "From the Seen to the Unseen," indicate the reach of the subjects, besides many others apparently more directly practical, such as "Knowing and Doing," "The Judging Spirit," "The Morality of Temper," "Self-Denial," "Disquiet of Spirit." But the speciality of all these Discourses is the philosophic spirit in which all matters are treated. Not that they are philosophical Discourses. They are Discourses on the actual religious life, but they are all written in a philosophical spirit. The acute and penetrating discernment of motives, the searching insight into varieties of character and act, and into the subtle doubtings of the soul, interesting and impressive and instructive in themselves, are made still more so by the profound expositions of roots and causes by which they are enriched.

We do not ourselves know many—we might, perhaps, say any—natures, however high and pure, that this book would not have the power, if not of making higher and purer, yet certainly of fortifying, helping and holding up, in whatever heights they might have attained; though, no doubt, the old saying is true again here, that it is only those that have ears to hear that will be able to hear—these sounds as from the spheres.

It would be doing entire injustice to these Discourses to read them quickly through, one after another. They should be read as they were written, in stillness and quiet—deliberately and meditatively, each leaving its impress on the soul with no risk of erasure even by a worthy successor, or of being turned into *palimpsests*. Before our further notice can appear most of our readers will, no doubt, be in possession of the volume itself—we do not mean in the material form alone, but in mental possession of most of its contents. Happy shall we be if now or hereafter, by anything we may say, we shall be able to help them still more fully to realise the value and richness of the possession.

X.

SOME AMERICAN BOOKS.

FROM America come several volumes dealing with the subject of religion, both in its controversial and its devotional aspects, and deserving more adequate notice than we can give them here. There is, however, less in them to criticise and discuss than to read with sympathy and general agreement.

Perhaps this remark applies least exactly to Mr. S. J. STEWART'S *Gospel of Law: a Series of Discourses upon Fundamental Church Doctrines*. Mr. Stewart has a trenchant way of putting things from his radical point of view, which, at any rate, serves his purpose of forcing the reader to reconsider some things which he may too lightly have taken for granted. His principal object, he says, is "to apply the facts of science to inherited doctrines, and then to give a positive basis of belief and conduct in consistency with these facts;" and he considers that no essential argument in the volume "is based on anything that is not absolutely proved." We think he is rather over-confident here, and he is apt, like other people, to think things are absolutely proved when

they are proved to his own satisfaction. On the whole, however, he keeps to fairly certain ground, and it is some of his conclusions rather than his premises that we are occasionally inclined to question. He certainly has the art of arresting the attention and making his reader think, and he is thoroughly alive to the vital significance of the doctrines which he discusses.

The anonymous author of *Ecce Spiritus : a Statement of the Spiritual Principles of Jesus as the Law of Life*, has brought to the study of Christ and his doctrine a very thoughtful and devout spirit, and a sympathy without which it is impossible to know what is the true spiritual power and inner meaning of Christianity. Like all true Liberals, he welcomes all the light which science affords and heartily accords it its legitimate claims; and he writes for those who, like himself, are fully sensible of the extent to which the revelations of science have affected traditional dogmas and ways of thinking, but who cannot rest in negative results, and who "are not wholly without hope of a possible meeting ground between faith and fact." Such a hope will, we think, be strengthened by much that the author advances. The reader will not fail to admire the candour and earnestness which characterise the book. Perhaps the style would be more effective if it were more concise, and if there were more salient points to mark the course of the argument. But if our attention sometimes flags, we are ready to confess, on taking the book up again in a fresher and more sympathetic mood, that it was our impatience that was chiefly to blame.

Mr. GEORGE S. MERRIAM has considered some of the same questions in his essay entitled *The Way of Life*. It is a study of the character of Christ, the result of an inquiry as to what elements of Christianity are to be considered true and permanent, and what must be regarded as transitory, and, for us, no longer serviceable. The author has "looked upon Jesus as a man only, with no superhuman nature or miraculous powers, but having in himself the elements of character which give to life its value and its true significance." The revelation of what the life of a true son of God should be is treated as the essential revelation in Jesus. There are some extremely suggestive remarks in the Introduction on the way in which the portrait of the Christ has been "idealised by the love and veneration of eighteen centuries. Whatever trait of fidelity, heroism, sacrifice, tenderness, faith, has risen upon the vision of hearts schooled in experiences of love and anguish and triumph, has been attributed to the divine Christ, and has blended with the portrait handed on in glowing radiance from age to age." It is not our ideal of manhood or our faith in God that is at stake upon the results of historical criticism. And whether we omit from our conception of the character of Jesus some things which seem difficult to harmonise with the rest, or whether we allow the religious imagination to present in some respects an ideal image which we cannot historically verify; still the transcendent significance of that life remains, and it is revealed in "the multitude that no man can number who have been inspired, each in his degree, by a courage, a love, a faith, akin to that of Jesus." The main essay, which forms only a third part of

the book, is followed by what are called "Open Letters," in which are set forth some aspects of life as it might be if it were really penetrated by the Christian idea. They are written in a frank and hopeful spirit, and the style of the whole book is bright, clear, and unaffected. It is a little book of very modest pretensions, but it is one which both conservatives and radicals in religion may study with distinct advantage.

A Year of Miracle: a Poem in Four Sermons, by W. C. GANNETT forms a very dainty little volume. As may be guessed, each of the four seasons of the year forms the topic of a discourse, and thoughts appropriate to the Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter of the natural world are connected with the seasons of human life. The author glorifies in his poetical prose the beauties and wonders and gifts of Nature, partly for the mere delight of picturing them, but more for the sake of the divine meanings, which need no didactic applications, but are plain for all who have eyes to see and hearts to feel. Mr. Gannett has a keen and discerning eye for the symbols and lessons of the outward world, and he delights in showing how the teachings of science heighten, instead of destroying, the poetry of Nature, by giving fresh food for the imagination, and deepening the sense of awe and wonder and admiration. He has given us some choice specimens of this poetry in his very charming and original little book.

There must be many of our readers to whom the name of Henry Ware is dear, and who have not forgotten him as a teacher of pure Christian morality, both by his writings, and still more, perhaps, by the record of his good life. They will turn with interest and expectation to the volume of sermons which has been published as a memorial of the ministry of his son, JOHN F. L. WARE, under the title, taken from the sermon with which it opens, *Wrestling and Waiting*. The friends who have made the selection have added a few grateful words of affectionate remembrance of what their pastor was "in home and camp, church and school." The sermons seldom touch upon any burning questions of controversy, and they pass over unnoticed points which might provoke criticism. They treat of the inner life of the soul, and the life of practical duty and devotion. They are characterised by plain and faithful speech, with that quiet trust in God, and belief in the unseen divine life, which helps us by sympathy and insight to realise the things of which it tells. Perhaps the most characteristic sermons are those on such subjects as "Seasons of Quiet," "Gentle Influences," "Silent Building." The only controversial sermon—and the polemical tone is almost absent from it—is the one entitled "None but Christ." It is a plain and unpretending utterance of the Unitarianism which is practically unaffected by the disturbing influences of what is called negative criticism and radicalism in theology, and which, if it does not contribute much towards a solution of the more difficult problems of modern religious thought, offers a place of quiet and of religious communion, and of fellowship with the spirit of Christ, where some of the purest and most deeply religious souls have found rest and have gained courage and strength for their life's work.

The volumes which we have thus briefly and imperfectly characterised

are published at Boston, by Mr. G. H. Ellis, and have come to us with the additional imprint of Messrs. Trübner and Co., London; as also have the following, which we have received from Messrs. Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., of Boston.

The Lord's Prayer: Seven Homilies, by WASHINGTON GLADDEN, was suggested by Mr. Ruskin's question, whether a definition of the Gospel "acceptable to the entire body of the Church of Christ, might not be arrived at by explaining, in their completeness and life, the terms of the Lord's Prayer—the first words taught to children all over the Christian world." It is by no means the first time that the attempt has been made to connect an exposition of the essentials of the Christian life with the clauses of the Lord's Prayer. Probably it is never done without putting more into them than actually belongs to them in their directness and simplicity. As an instance of this we might cite Mr. Gladden's exposition of the clause about our daily bread, which is said to teach five distinct lessons. 1—Our dependence on Him to whom we pray. 2—It is daily bread, *i.e.*, only plain and simple food, no luxuries. 3—It is our daily bread, or, it may be, sufficient for the day, not a superfluity. 4—It is *our* daily bread—ours only when we have earned it, not when we have got it by extortion, speculation, or dishonesty. 5—The petition is "give us," and it has regard to the necessities of all humanity. On all these points the author has admirable lessons to teach, only we can hardly agree with him that in this instance, and in some others, he has "not strained one word beyond its obvious and natural sense." Not that we find any fault with him for doing so in view of the excellent practical religious teaching, which forms the substance of his homilies.

On the Threshold, by THEODORE T. MUNGER, is a specimen, and a good one, of the numerous class of books written for the benefit of young men "beginning life." It is full of good sense and practical wisdom, and appreciation of all the healthy interests and the keen and hearty enjoyments of a vigorous life. There are excellent chapters on Health, Books, Amusements, Manners, Friends and Companions; and the author throughout has been mindful of his promise to his readers: "If they find some pages that are strenuous in their suggestions, they will find none that are keyed to impossible standards of conduct, or filled with moralisings that are remote from the everyday business of life." The author addresses himself to the youth of his own country especially. But young people on this side the Atlantic would find little or nothing in his book which does not suit their own case.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF RELIGION.*

HERR HAPPEL has written a very excellent *brochure* on Christianity in its relation to the comparative history of religions, which we have read with great interest. In a pamphlet of just ninety pages he

* *Das Christenthum und die heutige vergleichende Religionsgeschichte*. Von JULIUS HAPPEL. Prediger der Reformirten Gemeinde zu Bützow. Leipzig: Otto Schulze. 1882.

explodes the old arbitrary division of religions into one true and many false, and shows how such a view is totally incompatible with scientific or impartial investigation. In his introduction he recognises that the ancients had a presentiment, though only a presentiment, of the true nature of the problem of comparative theology. He remarks how the early Church fathers acknowledged in the best forms of pagan faith a kind of "natural Christianity," how they long endeavoured to explain affinities, now on the hypothesis of plagiarism, now on that of an original revelation, and now on that of a later special extra-Judaic or extra-Christian revelation, and how the correct solution of the problem could not be attained so long as all religions were tried by that of the Jews, as an absolute standard of truth. In his first chapter he vindicates the proposition that the comparative history of religion cannot fail to result in a more comprehensive and juster comprehension of Christianity itself. In Chapter II. he insists that Christianity can only be properly understood as the outcome of national life, and dwells on the contributions made by Herder to this conception of the subject.

Yet he allows that this consideration does not exhaust the question of the origin of Christianity, but that the latter presupposes the creative genius of an individual mind; while, at the same time, the immense amount of preparation which the course of history had brought about for the reception of the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth must never be lost sight of. Not only, however, in relation to the past but equally to the future development of Christianity is the comparative study of religions of paramount importance. Nor must we neglect in this consideration even the most elementary and rudest forms of faith. Only from the standpoint of historical development can the wide consensus of so many nations in favour of Christianity appear in its full significance, and only when the previous contributions of mankind at large towards the solution of the religious problem are acknowledged can the services of Christ be appraised at their true worth.

In all religions an outward investiture and an inner essence are to be distinguished, and this no less in Christianity than the rest. Like all other forms of faith Christianity has had a perfectly normal and natural growth. Like all others, too, it has a special genius of its own, which is not to be discovered solely by a study of the New Testament Scriptures, but equally from a comparison of the life of Christian with that of non-Christian races. It is by this means that the individuality of its founder will become manifest, and we shall thus obtain a criterion by which to separate the essential from the accidental in historical forms of Christianity. The above are the main theses worked out by the writer in detail, with abundant illustration from eminent authors, and with a vast array of learning and research, of which the results appear compressed into a small compass. The writer concludes as follows:—"The comparative history of religions as it is destined henceforth to be studied will be able most thoroughly and comprehensively to bring to light the real excellence of Christianity, because it is best able to take from it its pretended advantages, to strip it of its plumes and trappings, to show up its angularities

and points, to pull down the walls that bar the prospect, and set the observer on mountain heights, whence he can survey the whole domain of the religious life of mankind. There it will appear that the excellence of Christianity consists not in monstrosities, in supernatural doctrines, in mysteries inconceivable by human reason, as incarnation, inspiration, or so-called miraculous narratives, as the removing of mountains, &c., but in what is simplest, most natural, most human of all, but, nevertheless, is commonly the last to occur to men's minds; something which is found, indeed, in other religions, but nowhere else so set in the centre as it is in Christianity, so made the core and pivot of religious faith and life. Just in the fact that the Christian religion, in its essence, in its fundamental elements (love to God and man), when once recognised, is so simple, so obvious, so easy even for a child to understand, resides its true grandeur and the unique service it renders to the life of humanity."

E. M. G.

PROFESSOR LESLEY ON MAN'S ORIGIN AND DESTINY.*

THE present volume is the second edition of a work published twelve years ago, with the addition of six new lectures containing the author's "vision of the World and the wonders that shall be." Doubtless this has long haunted his brain; and it is interesting to know what a man of position in the scientific world, speaking from the standpoint of the physical sciences, has to say on so fascinating a subject.

Our author commences by reminding us that the physical destiny of our race on this earth will depend, first on the astronomical future of our globe, and that this, in turn, depends upon the sun and its spots, with which famines are associated as effect to cause. Hence in the future famines will be at least foreseen. But arguing from meteorological considerations, he asserts that there is no fear that the early or latter rains should fail the husbandman. The observations made a century or two centuries hence will teach men "how to engross their habitations on wholesome places, how to purify the atmosphere of cities from noxious vapours, how to foretell storms and to prevent shipwrecks." By the use of the telegraph and the telephone "the best choice of methods and means at the least possible outlay of the capitalised wealth of the world will be made" and "Christianity will be unified." Geographical maps which now lie, when they lie, "with the extraordinary force of all dramatic action, as compared with verbal statement," will, in the future, be more accurately drawn—to these will be added underground contour maps, and charts of the sea bottom; while the comparison of one century's maps with those of successive centuries will give an authentic history of the earth's changes.

* *Man's Origin and Destiny, sketched from the Platform of the Physical Sciences.* By J. P. LESLEY, Professor of Geology in the University of Pennsylvania, &c., &c. Second Edition, enlarged. London: Trübner and Co. 1881.

By the aid of the Chemistry of the future the waste of raw material will be eliminated from human industry. With iron and coal, and the machines which can be made by their aid, "the destiny of man is made safe." In Geology the Diamond Drill is destined to inaugurate the future study of the, as yet untouched, profounder depths of the under world. In Natural History the catalogue of living and extinct creatures will be completed, and the fullest information will be acquired concerning them. Man will more and more assert his lordship over the lower world, but instead of turning the luxuriance of Nature into a wilderness will change the desert itself into a watered garden. Man will be freed from medical as from all other kinds of superstition. "Air, water, food, sleep, work, pleasure, and cleanliness, are destined to resume the pharmacopoeia of the future." Hence a gain of quantity, not of quality. The race will not be stronger than the best individuals of the race are now, but there will be more strong and capable individuals.

Under the head of the social destiny of the race the writer utters a very definite political prophecy, and discerns that "the first great event of the future will be the taking of Constantinople." A wise government established there is to absorb Austria and Greece, European Russia, Asia Minor, Syria, Arabia, and Northern Africa, and hold in check Italy, France, and Spain. This wise government will be just and benevolent. The whole human race—except the privileged owners of real estate, and the lawyers, politicians, and soldiers their retainers—the whole human race entertain the profound conviction implanted by Nature and cultivated by the experience of life, that ownership is based on creation and confirmed by use alone. The destiny of man is to prove this conviction true, and to illustrate the truth of it in the future. In manufactures the skill of man has exhausted itself. With respect to finance, it seems likely that every separate interest of society will have its weight in determining legislative enactments, and that a just balance of all interests will be represented by a frequently modified, but generally consistent, system of internal taxes and foreign imports. However highly educated people may become, the hope of the future will always depend upon a band of honest experts whom the people can trust and to whom they can delegate the power to tax. But there will always be two classes of financiers, and between them the Protectionist practice will occupy the happy mean. To the question, Will war ever cease? our author replies that nations will put away their standing armies when there are no more kings and nobles, but only artizans and tradesmen, scholars and physicians and artists left in the land, with here and there a thief, a sot, or an imbecile, who will be cared for, each in a proper way.

The government of the future will (perhaps) be a republican hierarchy: the two main principles of which are: 1. No man has a right to express an opinion who does not know the subject. 2. Popular suffrage must be localised within the limits of personal acquaintance.

It is idle to ask if the practical will ever supplant the imaginative—"as well ask if the genius of creation is exhausted; as well ask if the heart of the world is destined to chronic ossification or fatty degeneration.

In the future, however, the higher education must ever remain the privilege of a portion of the population. There will be for *all* sufficient good, but no more, and to secure this, education must be compulsory—women must be educated on a full equality with men, and the sexes must be educated together. In the future, philanthropy will be the “science of Hygiene respecting Roguery in Society.” When beggars pretend they are starving they must be made to starve in reality, and so become enlightened on some points which only starving beggars can understand. By organised charity the philanthropic victories of the future will be won.

The future of Religion is not to be found in the Millennium which the sectarian spirit pictures as the triumph of its particular tenets. Education will make men more conscientious and more merciful, and they will consequently form a higher conception of God. This will cause “a direct gravitation towards the religion of Jesus, or to that element which is common to Confutzeeism, Mahometanism, and Christianity. . . . No creed can stand the fire of modern and future science; no rewards in heaven, or punishments in hell, will be either desired or anticipated. When all men have learned to act on the fundamental principle: Be God's child and man's brother, Christ will have, indeed, come the second time to rule and bless the world.”

Such is a brief abstract of the newer portion—the prophetic part—of Prof. Lesley's work. Possibly enough has been said to indicate the drift of the book. Clearly the modern prophet, like the more ancient one, is affected by his nationality, mingles unproved theories with established principles, is general rather than particular, although, as we have seen, he is clear on one detail, inasmuch as the commencement of his Millennium is to be coincident with the capture of Constantinople. Perhaps the writer has gone a little beyond the title of the book, and discussed more problems than can be “sketched from the platform of the physical sciences;” but it is certain that ere all his hopes are achieved, we shall have to follow the advice of the President of the British Association, and learn to labour and to wait.

C. C. C.

MR. ADAMS' DEFENCE OF THE ZOOPHILISTS. *

THE little book which has for its defiant title *The Coward Science*, is professedly an answer, on behalf of the Victoria-street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection, to the attack made upon it by Professor Owen in his recent publication called *Experimental Physiology*; but it is, in fact, a general defence of the position of the Zoophilists, and a restatement, in language adapted to the understanding of ordinary lay readers, of the principal arguments against the practice of vivisection.

Mr. Adams makes a lively defence of himself and his employers, and

* *The Coward Science. Our Answer to Professor Owen.* By CHARLES ADAMS, “Paid Secretary” to the Victoria-street Society. London: Hatchards. 1882.

retaliates vigorously on his opponents, and his readers, even if not convinced by his arguments, cannot fail to carry away a clearer idea of the real questions at issue. The earlier portion of the book is devoted to a defence against the purely personal attacks of Professor Owen, and the author has no difficulty in making some good points against him. But what makes the book of real value to all who are interested in the question is the remarkably clear and powerful refutation of the claims made by Professor Owen and his friends for the vivisectional discoveries of Hunter, Harvey, and Lister. So far as the discussion has at present gone, Mr. Adams appears to have decidedly the best of it; and unless some clear and straightforward reply to his arguments with regard to these claims be speedily produced by the other side, it is not too much to say that the large majority of readers will be of opinion that the vivisectionists have been worsted on their own chosen ground.

Notwithstanding our sense of the effectiveness of Mr. Adams' vigorous attack it is impossible not to regret that a question so serious and so important as that of vivisection cannot be discussed in a calmer way than is the practice at present. It is not too much to say that one calm and really fair statement of the arguments on either side will bring us nearer to a conclusion of the question than years of sharp partisan practice.

HENRY BOWYEAR.

SOME OTHER BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

WE can only say a few words of appreciation of two admirable addresses given at Manchester New College, London. The first is an *Address to the Theological Students, delivered at the close of the Session 1881—2*, by Rev. H. W. CROSSKEY, LL.D. (Manchester: Johnson and Rawson). Its subject is the relation between the work of the student and the Christian minister; and the importance is shown of a wide and liberal intellectual culture, including a knowledge of the methods and theories of modern science, as an essential part of the preparation for the ministry. The other address, entitled *Religion and Liberty* (Williams and Norgate), was given at the opening of the present college session by Professor JAMES DRUMMOND. It is an earnest plea for mental freedom in the study of theology and of all questions relating to religion, as a necessary condition of religious vitality and of the development of the spiritual life. Dr. Drummond takes a hopeful view of the present aspects of religious controversy; and he thinks that two important spiritual gains can already be discovered. "In the first place men are being thrown back upon the inner resources and primary essentials of religion; in other words, they are more genuinely religious. . . . And secondly, as a consequence of this, there is an increasing unity of spirit."

The Doctrine of the Cross, by Rev. E. P. SCRYMGOUR (G. Bell and Son), is an exposition of the doctrine of the community of sorrow and of

sacrifice. "In the act of sacrifice love is supported and informed by the light of Divine communion; and to bear that light in love is to enter into the sacrifice of Christ." The author keeps close to the realities of spiritual insight and experience; and his doctrine has very few points of contact indeed with the popular notions of the "scheme of salvation."

Reasonable Religion, by the Rev. D. P. FAURE, comes from Cape Town, where the author is minister of the Free Protestant Church. The volume contains nine thoughtful discourses on "Our Belief in God," and "Our Hope in Immortality." Mr. Faure's doctrine is practically the Theism of Theodore Parker, modified by some more recent ways of thinking and speaking on matters of religion. If we rightly understand his position, we wonder how he can think that the doctrine that there is nothing but "Nature self-originated and self-acting," differs only in name from his own Theism. In the same connection, however, he speaks of the self-styled atheist as acknowledging the existence of "Intelligence and Design," and if this is granted, of course the atheistic position is surrendered.

Nathan der Weise, edited with English Notes by Dr. BUCHHEIM, is the sixth volume of the German classics published at the Clarendon Press. The editor's name is a guarantee of careful and scholarly work, with a practical knowledge of the amount and kind of assistance which will be of most service to the student. Dr. Buchheim does not lose the opportunity of showing his appreciation not only of the literary quality of Lessing's great work, but of its noble lessons of charity and breadth of sympathy in religion; and the information he gives of the controversies which led to its production is very much to the point.

The following books, amongst others, must be reserved for future notice:—*The Life and Times of St. Anselm*, by Martin Rule, M.A. (Kegan Paul); *Life of Sir W. Rowan Hamilton*, by R. Perceval Graves, M.A. (Dublin: Hodges); *George Ripley*, by O. B. Frothingham (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co.); *The Legend of Thomas Didymus*, by J. Freeman Clarke (Boston: Lee and Shepard); *R. W. Emerson, an Estimate of his Character and Genius*, by A. Bronson Alcott (Boston: A. Williams); *Pearls of the Faith, or Islam's Rosary*, by Edwin Arnold, M.A. (Trübner); *The Gospel of the Secular Life*, by the Hon. W. H. Fremantle (Cassell); *The Evolution of Christianity* (Williams and Norgate).

THE MODERN REVIEW.

APRIL, 1883.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN FRANCE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "MODERN REVIEW."

THE earnest and cultivated minds which England counts in such great numbers are always justly interested in what passes on this side the Channel. Now, the Catholic, or, to use the language of the day, the Clerical, question, is so mixed up here with political or social questions that your Protestant majority itself can scarcely remain indifferent to it. Certain recent conversations have made me feel convinced that your countrymen are but ill-informed on this subject, and that—by an error which is the more excusable that it very generally prevails amongst ourselves—you judge of the ideas and tendencies of the French clergy from publications such as the *Univers*, the *Pélerin*, and the *Semaines Religieuses* of our different dioceses, or by political discourses, such as those of Messrs. Lucien Brun, Chesnelong, Ernoul, &c. Nevertheless, there is an evolution going on at present in our ecclesiastical world, the consequences of which only wait for favourable circumstances to reveal themselves completely. Those who are afraid of them are redoubling their efforts to block up the way ; but they will not in the long run succeed.

Now, in order to be understood, it is necessary to go a little further back. When, after the revolutionary storm, Napoleon the First negotiated with the Holy See for the restoration of the Gallican Church, his principal object, if not his only one, was to place the clergy at his own disposal, and to make them an instrument of domination. The method was simple. He had but to secure to the bishops of his choice absolute power over their priests; and, in keeping a hold on the former, he would have the latter under his control. Since then the bishops have done their utmost to escape in their own persons the pressure of government, and, on the other hand, have caused the full weight of despotism to fall upon the inferior clergy. Circumstances proved only too favourable, at the end of the Revolution, to the fulfilment of this part, at least, of Napoleon's detestable plan. The impossibility there then was of giving any practical validity to the greater part of the provisions of the secular law of the Church, made a *tabula rasa* of them in the eyes of the Vatican and the Tuileries alike. Hence this abnormal condition, in which the good pleasure of the bishops takes the place of all that is laid down by canonical laws.

This state of things has obtained for eighty years, and, far from seeming disposed to modify it, their Lordships have acquired such a taste for absolutism that they do not admit even the possibility of a different ecclesiastical *régime*. If two or three bishops have given signs of a desire to establish the observance of the law, they have shown themselves wanting in energy and perseverance, and their colleagues have, during their lifetime, combined to oppose to them that inertia which is the great weapon of their displeasure, and, immediately after their death, to undo the little they had accomplished. Such has been the fate of the attempts of Bishops Sibour, Darboy,* and De la Tour

* Mgr. Darboy procured the re-establishment, by Imperial decree, of the Chapter of Ste. Geneviève. *The stalls were open to competition.* He promised to regard the holders of them as irremovable, and counted upon finding amongst them, in course of time, curés for the principal churches in

D'Auvergne to restore ecclesiastical *tribunals* and *examinations*.

Rights count for nothing, the caprice of the superior is everything ; nought by merit, all by favour ; such is the state of the French clergy nearly a century after a revolution which was an inspiration of liberty to all around.

Thus, the law requires a competition for presentation to livings, and this competition ought to be held before examiners *elected every year by the clergy of the diocese assembled in synod*. These examiners alone are qualified to decide, not only upon the learning, but upon the antecedents, the fitness, the personal character of the candidates. From a list presented by them the bishop is to make his selection. If such a method were put in practice we might boldly affirm that *an immense majority of the priests who occupy the great livings of France would occupy them no more*. In Paris alone, out of sixty curés *not ten would hold their positions*.

Paris, and bishops for the provincial sees. *This institution might have brought about a revival of ecclesiastical studies* ; so one of the first acts of Mgr. Guibert, on his arrival in Paris as Archbishop, was to put down the examinations, and, in violation of all justice, to disperse among the very lowest clerical positions the chaplains of Ste. Geneviève, whom his predecessor had inducted. Equally fruitless, ever since 1801, has been every spasmodic attempt to restore the status of the French clergy. Mgr. Darboy, himself, however, was on the side of right, in so far as it did not interfere with his own caprices. Witness the interdict which he launched against the Abbé Roy, whom he wished to deprive of the cure of Neuilly. He was fortunately irremovable ; he appealed to Rome, and successfully ; but the Archbishop, who was all powerful under the Empire, obtained from the *Conseil d'Etat* a decision opposed to that of the Roman Curia. He appointed an administrator of the parish, and, thanks to the general debasement wrought by the then Government in Paris, as in the rest of France, not a single protest was raised in favour of the victim. The affair only terminated under the ultramontane Guibert, whose spirit of opposition to the acts of the Gallican Darboy was laid, as by a spell, the moment there was any question of keeping the priests in their degradation, even in contempt of appeals to Rome. In the end a resignation was extorted from the unfortunate Abbé Roy, on condition of his nomination as an Honorary Canon of Paris ; this being an implicit acknowledgment of his unblemished character, and of the injustice of the persecution he had undergone. It was easier to accede to his demand for this form of compensation than simply to confess to an abuse of power, and to make amends for it.

But neither in Paris nor in any other part of France would our mitred despots find it to their advantage to have synodical examiners. The synods are not even held; or if there is some empty shadow of them to be found, these are assemblies which have no liberty, and the fear of episcopal anger absolutely prevents the assembled priests from expressing an opinion on any subject which may possibly clash with that of their lord and master.

According to law, each curé ought to be irremovable. But the Concordat only established one curé, properly so called, for each canton; it is he alone who is irremovable. All the others, called *desservants* or *succursals*, are revocable *ad nutum*, and our bishops deprive them of their cures exactly as they give them, that is to say, when they please and how they please. One bishop makes a principle of leaving his priests in place as long as possible, not making a change without a serious motive for doing so—so much the better for them. But, on his death, another comes with the idea that frequent changes are desirable. Then unfortunate clergymen are to be met with on every road, each followed by his old servant, and a cart laden with his humble furniture. As to the reasons for change, they are very various, but it is frequently a wish expressed by some influential personage, more often feminine than masculine. The bishop, it must be allowed, does not always yield at once to such a request; and we know how the Bishop of —, when strongly urged by M. de X. to change his curé, staked the event on a game at billiards, and only sacrificed the unfortunate clergyman after a magnificent series of cannons made by M. de X. on the billiard-table in the bishop's palace. Doubtless, all our diocesan satraps would not proceed in the matter of change with such an easy grace; but all are agreed, not only in profiting by the unfortunate circumstances which have so limited the number of our irremovable livings, but also in opposing, as much as possible, any increase of the number. Hence it was that M. Jules Simon, when he was Minister of Public Worship, having proposed to them an extension of irremovability,* received from several of them letters in

* January 6th, 1873.

which anger betrayed itself in abusive language ; and he met, on all hands, with such resistance that he thought right to postpone to better times the execution of his plan. The curés of the Cantons, now the only ones who are irremovable, generally give very little trouble to the episcopal autocracy. In the first place they have, as a rule, been well tried before being elected. A character deemed capable of ever taking advantage of irremovability to defy the caprice of a superior is always an insuperable obstacle to nomination. Next, there is no scruple about intimidation in case of need. I know an archbishop who made one of his cantonal curés sit down at a desk in his house, and declared to him that he should not go out till he had signed his resignation. Once more, in some dioceses, Nevers for example, the bishops have simplified things still further, and do not nominate a single irremovable curé without making him previously deposit at the bishop's palace his resignation, signed beforehand.

According to law, every curé is to be free to choose his *vicaires*.* Provided that, with their help, he succeeds in satisfying the requirements of religious teaching, the administration of the sacraments, and the celebration of offices, the bishop has no right to interfere, save only to ratify the appointments, and to confer the necessary powers. It is needless to enlarge upon the wisdom of this provision, which alone permits the curé to employ every man according to his particular aptitude ; not wasting, for instance, on routine parish business the time and strength of a priest who has all the qualifications for preaching or catechising, while he is obliged to assign the work of teaching to men as destitute of eloquence as of knowledge, judgment, and tact. The French bishops entirely disregard these considerations, and only see, in curacies as in livings, posts to distribute according to their pleasure. The vicaires are thus entirely in the hands of the bishop ; and curés, even irremovable ones, must perforce add to all their motives for

* It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that the *vicaire* corresponds to the English curate, the *curé* being the incumbent.

complaisance the fear of losing one vicaire, or having another forced upon them.

According to law, the chapters of cathedrals ought to be recruited, to the extent of at least one-half, *by election*, and to form the council of the bishop. Two offices at least, those of *Penitentiary* and of *Theologal*, demand eminent attainments—the one in morals, the other in dogmatics and Scripture; and if the law does not strictly prescribe that they are to be conferred by competition, as is the case in Italy, and perhaps elsewhere, there ought at least to be an obligation to confer them only upon priests whose knowledge bears some proportion to their functions. So far is this from being observed, that our bishops distribute their canonries always according to their pleasure; part to their nephews, or members of their household, thus relieving themselves of the necessity of making any other provision for them; part to priests out of employ, whom they know no longer how to dispose of. And although they may have preserved in their mandates the formula, “Having conferred with our venerable brethren the canons,” &c.—a reminder of what they ought to do—the truth is, that they never consult them at all. In the same way the distinctive titles of Penitentiary and Theologal are preserved; but the poor old men who hold them, in most of our dioceses, if not in all, would find considerable difficulty in discharging the duties of their offices—for example, in giving a lecture on the Scriptures once a week, as a theologal ought, to the clergy of the episcopal city.

According to law, no priest ought to be punished by the bishop without having been judged by a special tribunal called *Officialité*. There the accusation and the defence are to be heard, and, if he be found guilty, the unfortunate man is to have the right of appeal from the diocesan officiality to the metropolitan officiality, and from that to the Pope. Now, nothing of the kind takes place. Officialities only exist on paper, and sacerdotal dignity is at the mercy of a cabal, or even of an anonymous denunciation. I wish I could believe that no one of our bishops has indicted

punishment without being convinced of the culpability of the sufferer. But, knowing the world of intrigue which moves and twines around our diocesan satraps, as around all despots, knowing what jealousies, what grudges, what retaliations a priest may be the object of, one trembles to think of this so-called justice, which, without serious inquiry, without pleadings, often under the control of prejudices, which, though unconsciously held, are none the less real, claims the right to deprive a man at one blow of both bread and honour. There are, in the streets of Paris alone, eighteen hundred* unfortunate men who were once priests, and who, thus ejected, have become cab-drivers, omnibus-conductors, street-sweepers, &c., the forms prescribed by law having been disregarded in the case of every one of them. Many of them, I grant, are indifferent characters; but how many of them have only become so under the influence of misery and despair!

There is a recent fact, the truth of which I can guarantee, and by which one can judge of many others. The Archbishop of S. had interdicted, on a charge relating to morals, a curé of his diocese. This man had taken refuge in Switzerland. At the end of some months the one who had denounced him died; but, urged by remorse, he had first declared that his denunciation had been slanderous. The Archbishop sent immediately for the unhappy priest to tell him that his innocence was established. But he replied to the messenger, "It is too late. I am to be married within a week," and so in fact he was. Considering what the ideas are of the greater part of our Catholics, many of those who heard of this marriage probably only saw in it a proof that the Archbishop was right, and that the priest was really a man of defective morals.

But terrible as such results may be, after all they only affect individuals. Much greater is the general evil which has been produced by the feverish desire for omnipotence, the rage for absolutism, of the French bishops of the nine-

* The number of priests exercising their functions in Paris is only about 1,100.

teenth century. This evil is seen in the almost universal lowering of mind and character in the inferior clergy, a lowering lamentable at all times, more lamentable than ever in an age of scientific progress and of social transformation.

With respect to character, the French priest is generally destitute of energy, dignity, and independence; ambition, or the simple desire for peace, too often gives him cringing ways. What else could be expected? Having but just left the seminary, where he has been taught to consider the wishes of his superiors more than the inspirations of his own conscience, he perceives that his position depends absolutely on the good pleasure of an autocrat, and he accustoms himself to put in the first rank of his habitual motives the fear of displeasing, or the desire to please some one, near or far, who might possibly interest this autocrat on his behalf. From his female parishioners to monseigneur's valet, the unfortunate man is obliged to keep on good terms with every one; and the great art he has to cultivate is the art of doing nothing and saying nothing that can compromise him. What boots it that he may dispense light, consolation, alms! That may serve for Heaven; but meanwhile he must be on good terms at court.

If he is on bad terms at court he will fare badly in the distribution of benefices or curacies. The eye of the master will never mark him for nomination to a deanery or an archpriesthood. Too happy if, limiting his ambition to living and dying in the midst of a little flock to which he has given his heart, he does not see himself condemned by the episcopal pleasure to break suddenly the bonds which attach him there, and go elsewhere to form other ties, which will be broken in their turn by another caprice of authority. In the estimation even of the religious world, accustomed to judge of the value of the priest by the functions and titles which the bishop has been pleased to confer upon him, he will be consigned for ever to the most inferior class of the clergy.

If on good terms at court, the most enviable positions are within his reach. Honours, irremovability itself, will come in time. He will mount to those heights from which Government, which never chooses but from the high places, may choose him for the episcopate; and public opinion may esteem him full of merit, when all his art will only have been to take care that the interests of religion shall not prevent him occupying himself first and chiefly with his own private interests.

It would be superfluous to repeat what a gain to dignity of character would accrue from the strict observance of the law. But above all, it is in regard to learning that the substitution of arbitrary will for law has produced the most deplorable effects. By dint of dwelling upon their own influence over the clergy, our bishops seem to have lost all thought of *the influence of the clergy upon society*; and, ever since the Concordat, they not only have not sought for priests of superior intellectual culture, but they seem to have always dreaded them. A Vicar-General of Cardinal Caverot, the present Archbishop of Lyons, once summed up their system in the midst of an ecclesiastical assembly in this speech, the authenticity of which I guarantee, "We want pliant backbones, not thinking heads." And the Cardinal himself has said many a time, "Learned men! what would you have me do with them?"

It is not everywhere, perhaps, that they would venture to speak so bluntly; but everywhere they think the same, or something very like it. And so it has come to pass that, in a century whose magnificent scientific progress will be its most imperishable title to glory, the highest ecclesiastical positions are held by men who are absolute strangers to this movement. A curé of a parish of thirty thousand souls, lately, at a dinner table, in the presence of several of the most learned laymen, addressed to another priest the question whether it was true that science had made serious progress since the beginning of the century. This same curé confesses, moreover, to any one who cares to hear it, that

he never opens any other book than his breviary. Another, a curé of Paris this time, read some time ago, in a paper, that the suppression of the Senate, reducing the French Republic to a single Assembly, would bring us back to a *Convention*. He did not understand what was meant, and asked one of his curates what this agreement was which was going to result from the suppression of the Senate. Even you English, for whose ignorance of the history of the French Revolution there would be some excuse, might feel insulted if I were to explain the confusion by which this poor man betrayed the extent of his ignorance.

The bishops, who have only exchanged the black robe for the violet after having been themselves, as simple priests, the products of the *régime* under which we groan, are often not much stronger; and it is difficult to believe what absolute nobodies a great number of them are. One of them, of the greatest note, said lately, in talking of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "I know that there are difficulties about the authenticity of this Epistle, but if it was not St. Paul's, one does not see whose it could have been, and so St. Paul must be the author." Nor is even this the masterpiece of its kind. I could introduce to you a well-known personage who, not long ago, became—by the grace of the *grand monde*—first bishop, and then archbishop, and who, I may safely say, does not even know that there ever was any question as to the authenticity of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is true that in his case "*savoir*" is in inverse proportion to "*savoir-faire*."

But let us confine ourselves to those who are simply priests. The majority of them live and die amongst us in absolute ignorance of the system of the universe. I do not even believe that they are quite convinced of the rotation of the earth round the sun; and, if they had but the courage to do so, they would doubtless proclaim, like Mgr. Bertheaud of Tulle, the impropriety of such an idea in connection with the globe which was the scene of the Incarnation.

Their minds are no more open to prehistoric archæology

than to astronomy. This science, which ought to make a deeper impression among the clergy than anywhere else, has come into existence, has been developed, and has arrived at the astonishing results with which every one is acquainted nowadays, without the priests seeming to be aware of it. If any of them have spoken or written on the subject, it has been generally to deny the evidence, and to declaim against the error and subversion of the faith. Whereas the fact is that the new truths have only overthrown false ideas which had been unfortunately mixed up with matters of faith. No doubt the Abbé Bourgeois, and one or two others, form very honourable exceptions; but that has been enough to place them under suspicion, and their brethren and superiors alike have simply shown themselves indifferent or hostile to their learned works.

Even the branches of knowledge which are purely ecclesiastical are not cultivated among us. The teaching of them in the theological schools is shamefully poor, and the greater number of the priests, when they have once come out from the schools, seeing no further advantage in such studies, give them up entirely. I do not think I exaggerate when I say that at least half of the French priests have never read the whole Bible once through. As to the parts that they are obliged to be acquainted with, such as the first chapter of Genesis, they understand very little about it; and any one who should press them a little in the matter of exegesis would soon commit them to a thousand absurdities. As to history, they are ignorant of that of their own Church, for it is not knowing it to have learnt, well or ill, at the seminary, the order of the Popes, and of the œcumenical councils, and a few names such as those of Photius or of Luther. Not having an idea of the evolution of this great body in the past, they do not even suspect that it is capable of further development. How can we be astonished that they misunderstand the possibilities of change which are the conditions of its activity and its life? that, under pretext of defending the Church, they cling desperately to the *status quo*, and that, in laying themselves out to preserve it,

they are in reality only working to stop its providential movement? Criticism, that wonderful tool of the pioneers of truth, that weapon which has been brought to such perfection in the nineteenth century, and which a multitude of elevated minds around them are daily handling with such skill, does not exist for them. This is only too evident from the manner in which they judge contemporary events as well as the deeds of the past. They are still in, or rather they return to (for in the last century their predecessors left it), that infantine state of intelligence in which the need of feeling the action of God in mundane affairs only engenders, in individuals as in peoples, a thirst for the marvellous. So they cling to the legends of the middle ages, and to those which in our day they have themselves produced or have allowed to grow under their eyes.

Who has not remarked, for example, the manner in which the legend of Lourdes was formed? The visions of Bernardette have had thousands of witnesses. But if all these have seen the young girl in a trance, she is the only one who has seen the apparition. Granted even perfect good faith in the child, does it require a high degree of critical acumen to recognise that, if the apparition had a subjective reality, it did not exist objectively; and consequently that we were in the presence of a phenomenon well known, if not fully explained, under the name of hallucination, and devoid of all supernatural character?

A clergy such as the observance of the law, and its immediate result in the encouragement of study, would soon give us, would have discovered this, and the whole affair would have been put a stop to at the outset. The ignorant and uncritical clergy, which episcopal despotism has given us, has believed in the miracle and preached it. Hence, among believers, the streams of pilgrimages, the infatuation of the imagination, and every kind of so-called miracle; while the unbelievers of substantial and intelligent piety are divided between sarcasm and indignation.

The same contrast between the state of the clerical mind and that which the progress of science and of critical

habits establishes in modern society may be seen again in a multitude of other points; and it is not only in the high regions of the learned world that sacerdotal ideas provoke mere shrugging of the shoulders. In the times in which we live,—times of progress, and, above all, of the diffusion of science,—the generality of intellects always catch the new lights, and their judgments soon come to reflect the judgments of those to whom the discoveries were owing. Hence the persuasion which prevails in every rank, from the highest to the lowest, that *the word of the priest and the truth of science are not in accord*. Wishing to keep a tight hold on the secondary clergy, the French episcopate, by its systematic opposition to all that would have made them participate in the grand intellectual progress of the nineteenth century, has succeeded in keeping them in a mental condition entirely out of harmony with the public mind.

This incompatibility is so evident, the press, the elections, all the means by which the public mind asserts itself, reveal it so unmistakably, that no one dreams of denying it. The artifice of some, the mistake of others, consists only in misstating the causes of it. The blame is laid on bad passions, on the natural repugnance of fallen humanity to Christianity,—as if these were not of all times and all countries, and as if there were not in the present hostility to the clergy something quite special to France and to the nineteenth century! But of all the evils of ignorance the greatest is not to know one's self; and our priests are far from believing themselves unequal to the requirements of their mission. Kept apart from their fellow-citizens, to begin with, by their garb as much as by their way of life, they hold themselves still more aloof by reason of the aversion of which they feel themselves to be the object. Thus they remain strangers to the most legitimate aspirations of modern society, no less than to the scientific truths of which it is in full possession.

They have scarcely any influence except over the minds of women and children. Women listen to them because

their own intellectual culture is, in France, so imperfect that they are less disquieted by the want of harmony between the scientific spirit and the ideas of sacerdotalism ; indeed they are hardly conscious of the discord ; while children are as yet at an age when instruction is not obliged to submit to the dictates of good sense. These children, however, as they grow up almost inevitably get beyond the reach of the priest's influence.

The catechisms in use are an indication of the intellectual calibre of the curés and vicaires appointed at the episcopal discretion. They can hardly teach anything of dogma or morals without mixing it up with errors of principle and false representations of fact, which they themselves accept as true.

In the Middle Ages there would have been no little danger both to faith and morals in declining to teach that there were only forty centuries between the Birth of Christ and the Creation ; that St. Denis as soon as he had been decapitated took up his head and walked off with the precious burden ; or that St. Remigius when he was in the act of consecrating Clovis saw a dove descend from heaven just at the right moment bringing him the oil he required. In those days men's minds were so far from being troubled by any difficulties in believing these stories, that they accepted them with avidity. Their trust in the priest was in no degree weakened by them, and faith being undisturbed lost nothing of its salutary influence on the conscience.

It is not so to-day. The spread of light has caused the men of our time to lose the tolerance with which their fathers regarded error or fiction, and individual minds soon come to participate in this new state of the public mind. The child, to-day, instinctively feels, when he has but just received the first communion, that the story of St. Denis or of the *Sainte Ampoule*, belong to the region of fable. He learns that no date can be assigned to the Creation, but that it assuredly goes back a long way beyond four thousand years before the birth of Christ. Warned by this that the teaching of his catechisers is far from being always in con-

formity with the truth, he rejects that teaching in the lump, and does this the more easily from the fact that the warning comes to him just when the awakening of his passions is beginning to make him the more impatient of restraint. So faith is lost not without detriment to morals.

Our bishops bewail this, as if the primary cause of the state of things were not their own aversion to the observance of law, and of everything which would have kept the minds of their priests at a higher level.

The course of events however must be beginning to give them warning ; and I deeply regret that I cannot read the impression made on them by the fact that they have had so much difficulty in selecting from among the secular clergy professors qualified to take the place of the Jesuits who have been ejected from the colleges ; or that, in founding chairs of theology and canonical law in the Catholic Institute of Paris, they were reduced to appointing Italians.

It is not that cultivated minds are altogether wanting in our ranks. They are always to be found, whatever happens. But learned priests give offence by their independence of character. From the very fact of their intellectual culture they generally have different ideas from those of the ignorant multitude ; and our bishops are ready to take the ideas of this multitude as a criterion of the good disposition of their subordinates. The contemners of the law see, in every priest of culture and originality, a judge whose voice it is above all things necessary to stifle.

It may be easily imagined that under these conditions the enlightened minority of the French clergy appears to be smaller than it really is ; and our bishops themselves cannot know to what an extent it condemns their despotism and bewails its consequences. There are priests who are fairly well informed, but whose independence of character and clearness of judgment are not on a par with their intelligence and culture, and these get no more than a glimpse of the causes of the general feeling of dissatisfaction, and do not venture to look the truth in the face. A greater number see it clearly enough but, influenced partly by ambition,

partly by fear, assume an attitude of dissimulation. As for those who speak and write as they think, to keep them systematically in the lowest posts is all that is necessary to deprive their voice of that authority which the simplicity of the public attributes exclusively to dignitaries in high position. The Abbé Raynoard reduced, in 1878, to the last extremity of misery by the Bishop of Marseilles, the Abbé Olive relegated to one of the humblest cures of Béziers, the anonymous author of the pamphlet entitled *Pourquoi le Clergé Français est Ultramontain*, struck off from the roll of the clergy of Paris—these, and many others besides, know something about it.

This system of repression, however, is rousing the attention of those very men over whom its terrorism is chiefly exerted, and I believe that it can in effect only hasten the hour of deliverance. It is a very remarkable fact, and one which I, for my part, observe with inexpressible satisfaction, that the idea of the necessity of a return to law is making its way more widely and more rapidly among the young clergy than among the older ones. The priests of the present day who have passed their two-score years have, as a rule, arrived slowly and painfully, by the way of solitary study and observation, at the conclusion that the primary cause of the evils that weigh down the Church of France is to be found in the abuses of the episcopal power. But the habits of respect and submission which are inherent in the sacerdotal mind make these conclusions repugnant to them; and it is only by dint of its superabundance that the evidence has forced its way to their reason. The younger priests go faster and farther. I have been struck by the confident terms in which they express themselves, when they feel that they may speak openly, on those questions concerning which their elders, when they were of their own age, had not taken up a decided position, or about which they were still hesitating.

Theory then, with us, is rapidly advancing to that point of maturity at which no human power can prevent an idea from translating itself into fact.

Under these circumstances, the conflict of the blind hatred of Christianity with that hybrid product of ignorance and political passion that goes by the name of the clerical spirit need not alarm us beyond measure. We go neither with the devotees of Atheism nor with those who claim to be the defenders of the Church against their attacks. The conflicts in which they have engaged constitute, in our eyes, an inevitable crisis from which the former will not come out triumphant, but in which the latter will certainly lose the position which they have taken up with such stubborn determination. French Catholicism, and, as a necessary consequence, France herself, cannot fail to be the gainers by this last result. A radical change in the situation is imminent; but we have a good hope that the present state of things will come to an end only to give place to one which is the object of the most ardent wishes of so many noble characters and enlightened minds.

In all the noise that is made about the Concordat, we cannot refrain from remarking that, of the two contracting powers, the will of one alone would suffice to save us. Now we are not without hope either on the side of Rome or on that of Paris.

At Rome sits a Pope who is much more concerned than his predecessors have been for the revival of ecclesiastical studies. He understands what the age requires; he knows that the Church is made for Society, not Society for the Church. He is aware that the movement of contemporary minds must be met by us with sympathy, with aid, above all things with counsel, never with opposition; and that to this generation, which is in travail with light, an enlightened priesthood is more necessary than ever. Nor does he lack energy for action when he has resolved what must be done; and we have already seen in the world of the Roman Monsignori with what a will of iron he can rouse from indolence, and break through routine. If then it were a question of compelling the episcopal power in France to return within the confines of law, of requiring the esta-

blishment in our dioceses of officialities and competitions, the observance of irremovability, the restoration of the chapters, and giving back to the French priest the dignity of a free man, Leo XIII. seems to us providentially qualified to bring all this to a happy issue ; and we would fain see in the fortunate predispositions of his mind and character a sign that the glory of having accomplished this will be the crown of his Pontificate. But placed as he is at a distance from us, and compelled to divide his attention between so many diverse objects, is he really acquainted with the state of French Catholicism ? Can he appreciate the disastrous consequences of the despotism of our bishops ? Is he aware how much is due to them of the loss of sacerdotal influence, and the aversion of which the priest has become the object ? Does he even suspect what our aspirations are ? And what voice is there to carry the expression of them to his ears ?

The Pope, unhappily, only knows the state of the Church of France from our bishops ; and, independently of the fact that they can only report what they themselves see, they would take good care not to provoke any decisions which would be unfavourable to their absolutism. We have a Nuntio amongst us ; but he hardly sees anything except through the eyes of the bishops. Of the priests whose character qualifies them for conveying some salutary warning, not one is in a position to do this. Of those whose position would ensure them a hearing not one has it in him to say the right word. Leo XIII., it is said, reads the Catholic journals ; but what can he learn from their reports of what is going on, in which half the truth is always left in the shade, or from that polemic without loyalty which inspires, above everything, the anxious desire to humour our oppressors ? He listens to politicians who are noted for their attachment to Catholicism ; but that attachment, in their case, takes no other form than attachment to the *status quo*, and their eyes are closed more obstinately still than those of our bishops to every symptom which is a precursor of necessary changes.

What way remains to us of making ourselves heard? Isolated instances of speech or of writing have only resulted, thus far, in marking out their authors for episcopal vengeance, while at the same time they have been disregarded in the silence and supineness caused by the victims they see around them, bearing witness to a thought that has no echo. And if an attempt were made to get up a petition, out of a thousand priests whose real thought is exactly expressed in all I have written, there would not be found ten who would consent to *sign* it. Moreover, the collector of the signatures would be denounced and struck by the episcopal thunderbolts long before he had obtained half even of the number required.

There remains the French Government. I am convinced that in this quarter our ideas, our aspirations, are much better known than they are on the side of Rome. And this is quite intelligible, when it is remembered that we all run much less risk in confiding them to a deputy or a minister than to a fellow priest or one of our superiors. Hence the greater part of our politicians are not ignorant of the extent to which the intelligent and cultivated party of the clergy groan under the crushing power of force and numbers, with what earnest desire they appeal for a return to the open air and the light, and with what hopes they would greet a restoration of law. Twenty times has it been explained to them how easy the actual text of the Concordat would make it for the State to intervene in this direction. Having in its own hands the selection of the bishops, the Government might take them only from among the priests who were resolved to put an end to the *régime* of arbitrary will. Having the power of confirming or rejecting the vicars-general, the curés, the canons, it could make their appointment dependent on the observance of the conditions of their nomination laid down in the Canonical law.

M. Flourens, who has long been the Director of Public Worship,* understands these questions very well. M.

* Under the Gambetta Ministry, M. Flourens was replaced by M. Castagnary; but it was only for a very short interval.

Corentin-Guyho and some other deputies are in the same position. But hitherto routine has always prevailed. While the grounds of complaint against the episcopate and the general spirit of the clergy have been recognised, the bishops have been only chosen from among the higher clergy of each diocese, nominated either by the bishops for the time being, or by the Nuntio acting under their direction.

All this results in the systematic exclusion from the episcopate of every priest who is qualified to take the law for his rule, to revive ecclesiastical studies, and put the spirit of the clergy in harmony with the progress of enlightenment and the most legitimate aspirations of modern society.

This course of action is so opposed to the true interests of Catholicism, our unpopularity is so certain to be continued and aggravated by it, that there are some who see in it the evidence of a treacherous design which our enemies would keep steadily in view, and on their return to power, would put remorselessly into execution. I even know one of our Ministers of public worship, who, on one occasion, after having listened very patiently to an exposition, such as I have now been giving, of the evils of the present mode of nomination to the episcopate—the conclusion being that a reform in the matter was necessary—is said to have replied, “Yes, but if we leave it alone, it will come to an end all the more speedily.” Without denying that, in the freemasonry to which almost all those belong to whose lot it falls, by virtue of the Concordat, to select the bishops, there may exist a definite plan of campaign against the Church; and fully recognising that for the purpose of ruining the Church of France nothing could be more skilfully devised or more certain in its effects than the perpetuation of the *régime* which has weighed it down since 1801; I do not believe in the existence either of such baseness or especially of such subtlety, in those who for some years past have held our ministerial portfolios. No doubt the most far-seeing of our enemies could not fail to applaud the

nomination of every bishop whose programme was summed up in the maintenance of the reign of arbitrary will; and, if anything could make them despair, it would be to see men raised, at last, to the episcopate who were resolved, by a return to the observance of the law, and by a revival of studies, to give the signal for our regeneration. But our rulers have no such far-extending views, still less have they any which have so little thought of self connected with them.

In a political situation such as ours, in which ministries measure their existence by weeks rather than by years, power is beset by too many pre-occupations, and can reckon too little on the future, to be able to practise, with respect to the Church, a Machiavelism which must be a work of time. Whatever hostility is felt with regard to us, it spends itself in acts which make more or less noise in the world, and which take immediate effect, acts which are calculated to gratify a radical constituency without necessarily provoking a conflict with Rome. But as soon as ever, instead of the breaking up of unauthorised congregations, or the laicising of the schools, the question of episcopal nominations is raised, the case is quite altered.

Then we find ourselves confronted by a positive right belonging to the Holy See by virtue of the Concordat,—the right of confirming by canonical institution the choice made by the government. We know that Rome, under various circumstances, has pertinaciously availed itself of this right, in rejecting ecclesiastics who were perfectly worthy in themselves, but who had a reputation at the Vatican, more or less deserved, for Gallicanism; * and it is forgotten that on many another occasion Rome has thought fit to accept men who were open to reproach in much more

* This was the case with the Abbé Maret, dean of the faculty of theology at Paris. Nominated under the Empire to the bishopric of Vannes, he was persistently refused by Pius IX., his deafness being the pretext, but the real cause being his Gallicanism. In the end the Imperial government gave way. The nomination for Vannes was given to the Abbé Becel, who had the advantage over the Abbé Maret of having never given evidence of any learning, and who consequently had not run the risk of professing in

serious matters than a lack of ultramontane ardour; and there is always plenty of business on hand to make the fear of a conflict with the Vatican prevail over other considerations. Still more surely the men who are in the habit of meeting the Nuntio in fashionable *salons*, of dining in his company, and who are not without connection with some of the bishops or archbishops, will gladly seize the opportunity of forgetting the promises of war against clericalism which were made to electors, and the acts of hostility to which they had been forced by the radical Press, or the Left of the Chamber. Besides, what acquaintance have they with the ecclesiastical *personnel*? Beyond those who owe their position to them or to the ministers before them, with certain intriguers besides who keep the Director of Public Worship in a state of perpetual siege, do they even know where to look for the learning and culture of the age, for dignity of character and all those qualities which go to make a man who can be relied upon? Is there even any care to know? And in the absorbing life which we lead, is there any time to spare for such inquiries?

Under such circumstances, you must not be surprised if our rulers give little heed either to our aspirations or to the real wants of France, or if, when they do take any thought for them, they do not much care to face difficulties for the sake of making nominations, the happy effects of which would only appear when they themselves were no longer in power. Accordingly, the grand course of practical French administration, that is to say routine, invariably prevails. The Nuntio is consulted beforehand, the bishops listened to, and no appointment appears in the Official Journal till the consent of the Vatican is assured. So they go on con-

ecclesiastical history or theology any opinions which would be in opposition to those of Dom Guéranger or of M. Veuillot. The dean received as a scrap of consolation a bishopric *in partibus*. Leo XIII. even substituted for this an archbishopric, but still *in partibus*. From that time the custom has obtained of making no nomination without being assured beforehand of the consent of the Vatican; and in this the government of M. Grèvy follows no less faithfully than did those of Marshal MacMahon and M. Thiers, the last steps of the Empire.

sulting and listening; and, to avoid worry for the moment, the French Government continues in fact only to use its right of nomination for the benefit of a coterie, and the very same coterie to which it is in opposition, not always without good reason, in other departments.

What, then, is to be done?

In the first place those truths must be taken to heart which have been set forth in this letter, truths which are no discovery of mine, and which I am not the first to make known, and which are less strange to many of our politicians than is often supposed. It is not here then that the chief difficulty lies.

But the next thing is to will, and to will with something like consistency and perseverance. And here is the real difficulty, for it pre-supposes, amongst other conditions, either advent to power, or sufficient disinterestedness to undertake an immense work, without any prospect of bringing it to a conclusion, without even any assurance that others would carry it on, perhaps without having experienced anything but annoyances as the first results of the undertaking.

It is possible however that these annoyances would be much less serious than might have been expected.

No doubt if it were thought fit to make one or several appointments without consulting either Rome or the present episcopate; if the names of those who had been elected were to make their appearance all at once in the Official Journal, and it were known or guessed from their character and antecedents that they had been chosen to bring us back to the observance of law and to effect a revival of studies amongst us, two results would inevitably follow.

In the first place, the Pope, accustomed to other methods of procedure which, however, the Concordat gave him no absolute right to require, would find himself slighted; and he would naturally be prejudiced against the newly elected.

But this unfavourable predisposition would be a very small matter compared with the obstinate combination of hostilities which the latter would have to encounter.

There would be the hostility of the bishops enamoured of despotism, at the thought that the comparisons that must follow would seal the condemnation of their methods of administration; and that a priest who had been systematically kept under by them, was in the way of being able, by merely showing what he was in a competition, to succeed to the highest posts. There would be the hostility of the whole multitude of vicars-general, archpriests, deans, canons, who have been elected at the good pleasure of the bishop, and with them the crowd of lesser nonentities,—at the thought that, knowledge and culture becoming necessary for promotion, their hopes are blighted, and the generation elected by merit sets its light in contrast with their darkness.*

Then there is the hostility of all those who by counsel or intrigue, have had a hand in previous nominations, and who would cherish a hope of continuing to wield the same influence. The habits and customs of these personages would not allow them to give vent to their discontent in broad daylight, and to declare their true motives; but treacherous insinuations cost them so little, calumny is so customary a weapon with them, the mass of good pious people of vacant minds and fickle character so innocently become their habitual accomplices, that we could but expect

* It is hardly necessary to remark that we say this with certain reserves. Several of our bishops have sufficient intelligence, uprightness, and even disinterestedness, to prevent them from committing themselves to the feelings of hatred by which others are carried away, and to the manoeuvres to which they give rise. We are even convinced that there are some who would not be particularly displeased to see signs of a return to the law, to be tried, to begin with, in some other diocese than their own. They have not enterprise enough to put themselves at the head of the movement; but they already perceive that it must come, and they are willing enough to follow it. The same may be said of the vicars-general and other dignitaries of the diocese. There are plenty of nonentities amongst those who have been elected under the present régime; but they are not all nonentities; and although they are, as a rule, open to the reproach of a minimum of courtiership (varying, for that matter, with the character of the bishop) without which they would never have drawn the attention of the master to themselves, there are amongst them some minds upright enough and prudent enough not to have anything to do, even as more or less unconscious confederates, with the conspiracy that we anticipate.

that all the echoes of clericalism would vie with one another in their zeal to crush the newly elect under accusations of suspected doctrines or defective morals. The rumour which they themselves had set afloat will be listened to with hypocritical concern ; they will avail themselves of it to work upon the Pope, who is already sufficiently prejudiced ; and they will make him an unconscious accomplice in the subversion of law, under pretext of inducing him to oppose his apostolic firmness against the intrusion of unworthy persons into the episcopate.*

No doubt with energy and perseverance enough on the part of the Government, the conflict would always end in its favour, provided that the election had fallen upon ecclesiastics of high character. But it is much better policy to avoid the conflict ; and in a state of political instability like ours the most speedy solutions are always to be preferred.

What we have to do, therefore, is to make our wishes clearly understood at the Vatican. Whatever difficulties might be raised by the present fanatics of despotism, for however eager they might be to put a spoke in the wheel, Rome could not in the last resort be opposed to the exercise of a right which she herself enjoys and which she applies to her own case. As to the revival of studies,

* It is the custom of the French "clericals" to mislead the Pope with respect to many things about which he has no means of forming his own judgment. Although Leo XIII. appears to be less easy to prepossess than Pius IX. was, they have already succeeded, on more than one occasion, in inducing him to take a course very different, probably, from what he would have done if he had had more correct information of the real state of our affairs. Witness the history of the Decrees. There were some congregations, at least, which were ready to submit to them, and it was from Rome that the order came to persevere in resistance, obliging them to expose themselves to a dissolution by force rather than seek from the Government of the Republic an authorisation which they would have promptly to ask for, outside, as soon as ever they had crossed the frontier. The fact was that the discredit that would be cast on the Republic by the picking of locks served the purposes of the clericals ; and what they feared above all on the part of the Pope was that he might be giving counsels or instructions which would solve the situation in too peaceful a manner. To ensure a different kind of issue it was necessary that he should be deceived ; and measures were taken accordingly to deceive him.

Pius IX. was indifferent enough to it. But Leo XIII. is, as we have said, a man of a different stamp ; his pontificate has been called, from the first, the pontificate of the *savants* ; his encyclicals, his creations of Cardinals,* all his acts, show his regard for learning, his persuasion that it is a distinction to the clergy, and that it is more than ever required of them at the present day. If there ever has been in the history of the Church a favourable period for coming to an understanding with Rome as to the election of enlightened bishops who desire to see a learned clergy, and who are resolved to promote a more advanced teaching in the seminaries, it is the period of the present pontificate.

It would then be comparatively easy to agree with the Holy See on the question of principle. As to the question of the persons to be looked to in applying the principle, the Government would have, itself, to find out the right men to begin with. These would assist, later on, in discovering others. But I do not hesitate to say that in making the selection in the first instance it would be absolutely necessary to disregard the directions and counsels of the Vatican. Not that its intentions would be open to suspicion. But its sources of information are of necessity imperfect ; the members of the French clergy whom Leo XIII. would appreciate the most highly if he could know them, are, thanks to the present *régime*, inevitably unknown to him ; and those who act according to the routine of ignorance and self-will, will leave nothing undone to keep from him the knowledge of their existence ; or, if he succeeds in informing himself of it, care is taken that he shall have the most unfavourable opinion possible of their character and disposition.

The only existing difficulty, then, would be to get Rome to accept, by a preliminary agreement if required, the nominations in which the French Government should take the entire initiative. Need we suppose this difficulty to be a serious one ? Need we even suppose that it would exist at

* We are not speaking of the Cardinals created by Leo XIII. in France. He had no choice but to take what he could find amongst our archbishops.

all, if the initiative were at once enlightened and prudent, as well as decided ; above all if in the case of too strong an opposition being made in any individual instance, it were absolutely determined to substitute no one who did not furnish the same guarantees for the execution of the plan of reform, the principle of which had been definitively established ?

Simple as this plan may be in its conception, and necessary as it may seem that it should be put into execution, no doubt we are not yet within immediate reach of it. Placed as we are between republicans who are too determinately hostile, or too profoundly indifferent, to have much concern for a solution of the clerical question which would be as advantageous to the clergy as to the nation, and reactionaries who, some of them of set purpose, others through mere stupidity, do everything they can to keep the question in its acute stage, we do not yet see the signs of our deliverance. But it is impossible that the extreme parties should go on fighting indefinitely over our body.

Meanwhile, ideas are making their way among us, and they will penetrate still farther, in spite of everything ; and if, in our ranks, more than one man of high character and qualifications—slighted and made almost useless by his effacement—perishes in the attempt without having seen any change effected in the *régime* under which he has suffered so much, others will arise who will be found ready, the moment any pains are taken to ascertain the mere fact of their existence.

These then are the things which, without any fear of playing the part of a false prophet, you may tell that great English public which bestows on religious questions the attention they deserve ; so that no surprise need be felt either at the humiliating position of the Catholic clergy in France, and their present unpopularity, or at the almost sudden revival, the rapid and complete transformation of the clergy that will be witnessed, the instant the French Government sees fit to give the signal.

A FRENCH CATHOLIC PRIEST.

THE BOOK OF DEUTERONOMY.

THE Law occupies a place in the history of the religion of Israel which has no precise parallel in the development of any other faith. It was in a peculiar sense the expression of the nationality of Israel, which was, in its turn, profoundly modified by it. It sprang out of the deep religious impulses of the higher minds of the race, looking back upon their past history as the scene of a divine preparation, and upon life in the land which "Yahveh had sworn to their fathers to give them" as the fulfilment of a divine plan, in the choice of Israel to be his people. This conception was at first feeble and obscure till it received vivid expression from the prophetic interpreters of the patriarchal histories; but it grew with the national growth, and was strengthened rather than impaired by the national disasters. However it might sin, however it might suffer, Israel was still the elect of God; there was no severing that tie which Yahveh himself had formed; to it his holiness was pledged, and in it lay the assurance that Israel must at length realise the high destiny thus designed by him. Hence the Law which served as the statute-book of this unique polity, acquired a character of its own. Round its observance gathered all the most earnest piety, the most devoted self-sacrifice. It was accepted as the sum of all

religion ; its words, its very letters, gained a sanctity which no other writings could claim ; and its interpretation legitimately demanded the surrender of a life.

It cannot, therefore, be a matter of indifference to inquire what was the origin of this Law. Its history is, in fact, an epitome of the history of Israel's religion. The elements of which it is composed belong to various dates, and are gathered up from many centuries. They represent successive stages of belief and practice ; and this succession, when the constituents of the series are laid out in order, corresponds to the advance of thought and faith indicated by other writings, whose chronological sequence is independently established. It has been the task of more than a hundred years since Astruc first opened the way to the investigation of the documents composing the book of Genesis,* to disentangle the complicated tissue, and exhibit the separate strands of narrative and legislation from which the Pentateuch has been woven. But it was early recognised that among these materials the book of Deuteronomy has a place of its own. Its style and contents set it apart from the books which precede it, while its connection with the history of Israel is so clear and marked, that it can be assigned with practical certainty to a given date. If this be the case, the book of Deuteronomy supplies a fixed point from which we may proceed to investigate the other constituents of the Law ; and its doctrines and usages become a standard of comparison by which we may test the religious life of earlier or later times. It thus provides in a peculiar manner the key to the criticism of the whole Pentateuch, and by this means also to the development which that great collection summarises and embodies. A series of papers designed to illustrate some of the results of recent inquiry into the Old Testament, may well, therefore, start with an exposition of the religious principles which this book contains, and an attempt to exhibit the general

* *Conjectures sur les Mémoires Originaux dont il parait que Moïse s'est servi pour composer le Livre de la Genèse.* Bruxelles, 1753.

method by which its place in Hebrew literature is determined.

I.

A few words must be said first about its form. It is at once distinguished from its predecessors by the fact that its chief substance is a long continuous address from Moses to Israel (v.—xxvi.). This address is delivered at the foot of the slopes of Pisgah, in the plains of Moab east of the Jordan, as the people await the order to cross the river and enter the promised land. It is preceded by a narrative, briefly recounting the events of the wanderings after the departure from Horeb (i.—iv. 40); and it is followed by certain earnest admonitions concerning the observance of the commandments previously enjoined (xxviii.—xxxi.), by two poems known as the Song and the Blessing of Moses (xxxii., xxxiii.), and by the pathetic narrative of the prophet's death (xxxiv.).

Now, the first question which suggests itself is whether the book, as we now have it, is the work of one author or not. Jewish tradition had no hesitation in assigning it all to Moses, with the exception of the last eight verses, which were attributed to Joshua. The evidence hereafter to be presented must deal with the general theory of its Mosaic origin; but it is still desirable to inquire whether the book is or is not a real unity. The ordinary reader feels so strongly impressed by its glowing faith and passionate devotion, that he does not analyse the data which the book itself provides. But a little examination shows that whereas the introductory chapters relate the disappearance of the entire generation of fighting-men who had left Egypt, during the wanderings, the middle part of the book declares that Moses is still addressing the very people who shared in the deliverance of the Red Sea, and witnessed the terrible glories of Horeb. The following passages set side by side

plainly reveal that the audience in i.—iv. is not the same as in v.—xxvi.

i. 35. Surely there shall not one of these men of this evil generation see that good land which I sware to give unto your fathers, save Caleb, the son of Jephunneh, &c.

ii. 14—16. And the space in which we came from Kadesh-Barnea, until we were come over the torrent Zered, was thirty and eight years: until all the generation of the men of war were wasted out from the midst of the camp, as Yahveh sware unto them. Moreover, the hand of Yahveh was against them, to discomfit them from the midst of the camp, until they were consumed. So it came to pass that when all the men of war were consumed and dead from among the people, &c.

v. 2, 3. Yahveh our God made a covenant with us in Horeb. Yahveh made not this covenant with our fathers, but with us, even us, who are all of us here alive this day (cp. xviii. 16, 17).

viii. 2—4. And thou shalt remember all the way which Yahveh thy God led thee these forty years in the wilderness to humble thee and to prove thee. . . . Thy raiment fell not off thee, neither did thy foot swell, these forty years.

xi. 2—7. Know ye this day; for I speak not with your children which have not known, and which have not seen [what he did unto Pharaoh in the Red Sea, in the wilderness, &c.], but your eyes have seen all the great acts of Yahveh which he did (cp. ix. 7, sqq., 22, 23, xxix. 2—5).

It can hardly be supposed that the clothes which never wore out lasted longer than the bodies which they protected. The writer of viii. 2—4 and xxix. 2—5 does not follow the same tradition of the wanderings as the author of ii. 14—16.

The collection of "testimonies, statutes, and judgments," therefore, in v.—xxvi., has received an addition in the shape of an historical introduction, i.—iv. 40, from another hand. But even these middle chapters seem to have grown out of a smaller nucleus. In v. it is related that after the delivery of the Ten Words, the terrified people entreat Moses through their elders that they may be spared the further sight of the darkness and the fire, and the sound of God's awful speech. They suggest that Moses should approach alone, and receive by himself the divine ordinances which he should afterwards report to them. The arrangement is approved, and Moses is instructed to enjoin the people to return to their tents, while

he stands upon the mount before Yahveh, who communicates to him the regulations to be observed by the people in the promised land. These commandments are announced in the following terms :—

* v. 31, vi. 1. But as for thee, stand thou here by me, and I will speak unto thee all the commandments and the statutes and the judgments which thou shalt teach them, that they may do them in the land which I give them to possess it. . . . Now these are the commandments, and the statutes, and the judgments which Yahveh your God commanded to teach you, that ye might do them in the land whither ye go to possess it.

Although announced, however, they are not really produced. Their appearance is delayed till xii., when they are introduced by a similar formula :—

xii. 1. These are the statutes and judgments which ye shall observe to do in the land which Yahveh God of thy fathers giveth thee to possess it.

From this point the legislative code flows on to the end of xxvi., and concludes with the solemn injunction :—

xxvi. 16. This day Yahveh thy God hath commanded thee to do these statutes and judgments; thou shalt therefore keep and do them with all thine heart and with all thy soul.

The intervening chapters, vi.—xi., contain, in reality, two prophetic sermons, loosely combined with the framework of the code. The first, vi. 4—viii., expounds the duty of the love of Yahveh, and has for its text the sublime words :—

vi. 4, 5. Yahveh our God, Yahveh is one: and thou shalt love Yahveh thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might.

The second, ix.—xi., consists of warnings against disobedience, with historical illustrations of past unfaithfulness. Each is introduced by the customary formula of prophetic address, "Hear, O Israel,"* and the two discourses serve as glorious types of the prophetic teaching in the period to which Deuteronomy belongs. These chapters almost more than any others contain the essential ideas of this marvellous book, some of them being reproduced again

* Cp. Amos iii. 1, iv. 1; Is. i. 10; Mic. i. 2, iii. 1, 9, vi. 1; Jer. ii. 4, v. 21, xiii. 15, &c.

in another great prophetic discourse, xxviii., xxx.*; while xxix. deals with similar conceptions, though in a slightly different style. Under what circumstances these varying materials were finally blended together into one whole, to which the poems in xxxii. and xxxiii. were appended, we cannot tell. It is clear, however, that the book is the product of a school of prophetic thought which profoundly modified the whole conception of Israel's history and religion. The entire collection of the records of the past was subsequently revised under its influence, considerable portions of the history of the conquest in the book of Joshua being retold with its inspiration, and the touch of the Deuteronomic writers can be detected again and again travelling along the ages all the way from the wanderings and the settlement in Canaan to the fall of Jerusalem and the captivity.

II.

The diversity of authorship, which Deuteronomy exhibits, need not, however, prevent us from regarding it as essentially one book, in our comparison of it with other portions of the Pentateuch. The differences of view to which we have drawn attention do not impair its general unity of thought and feeling; while the character of its language and the copious flow of its style mark it off in the strongest manner from the rest of the so-called Mosaic literature. It would be easy to produce dozens of words and phrases occurring again and again in this book alone, or found elsewhere in the Pentateuch only in one or two fragmentary passages evidently stamped in the same mint of speech.†

* This discourse, however, bears plain traces of the fall of the national polity, and the consequent exile, xxviii. 68 sqq., xxx. 1—5.

† The writer of the Commentary on Deuteronomy in Bishop Ellicott's *Old Testament Commentary for English Readers* (the Rev. C. H. Waller), admits that the style of Deuteronomy is unique, though he concedes that the style of Joshua bears some resemblance to it. But he attributes the "somewhat special mode of thought and expression" to the "early

But the evidence of language, though of immense weight, is of far less interest than the ideas of which it is the vehicle; and we pass, therefore, at once, to the consideration of the relation which the contents of Deuteronomy bear to the preceding books.

It must be remembered that when Deuteronomy and its few associated paragraphs are withdrawn, the remaining mass of Pentateuchal literature falls apart into two clearly marked groups of documents: one containing a collection of the tradition of the patriarchs and the wanderings with a short legislative code, *Ex. xxi.—xxiii. 19*, the other constituting that remarkable combination of universal history and sacred law to which Ewald gave the name of the Book of Origins, and which later scholars have preferred to designate the Priestly Codex.* The first of these has eminently a prophetic character; the second is as distinctly sacerdotal. The first deals with Israel as a people, having a political unity; the second represents it as a congregation having an ecclesiastical unity. What is the place of Deuteronomy in relation to these two works? That they each existed at one time independently, prior to their fusion in our Pentateuch, there seems no room to doubt; and in view of the differences of religious life which they present, it becomes a matter of some importance to ascertain their proper order and development. Can we discover any traces which will show us whether the Deuteronomic writers were acquainted with either or with both of these books? If we can do this, and if we can determine the religious significance of Deuteronomy as well as its historical date, we shall find a principle of judgment in our hands before which many of the remaining difficulties of

Egyptian education and varied experience of Moses"! The point is really here ignored. It is not so much the difference between Deuteronomy and the Psalms, Proverbs, Ezekiel, or Ezra, that is significant, as the difference between Deuteronomy and *other parts of the Pentateuch*. And it is odd to find the peculiarities of the book, which is regarded as the last work of Moses, ascribed to the foreign influences of his Egyptian education!

* See the *Modern Review* for January, 1883, p. 22.

the Pentateuch and the other national records will disappear.

Such an inquiry may proceed upon two lines. The relation of Deuteronomy to the Prophetic (or Jehovist) History-book, and the Priestly Codex, may be tested by its allusions to the ancient traditions also recited by them, or by a comparison of its laws with the Short Code of *Ex.* xxi.—xxiii. 19, on the one hand, and the elaborate arrangements of the Levitical legislation on the other. To gather up all these would be a tedious process: but a few samples must be presented.

The main outlines of the story of Israel from the descent of their patriarch-ancestor into Egypt are all familiar to the Deuteronomic writers. But it is to be observed that while they follow the general course of events narrated alike in the Jehovist History-book and the Priestly Codex, they nowhere cite any of the details peculiar to the sacerdotal version; they appear acquainted only with the prophetic narrative.

Thus in *Num.* xiii. it can be shown without difficulty that two inconsistent stories have been blended together into one composite account. The people have marched from Horeb into the wilderness of Paran, in order to enter Canaan from the South. Thence Moses sends twelve men to explore the country, and their mission is related in two different forms easily distinguishable from one another. The story from the Prophetic History-book takes them up by the arid district on the South known as the Negebh into the hill country round Hebron. There, in the neighbouring ravine of Eshcol, they cut down a huge cluster of grapes, with some pomegranates and figs, and carry back the fruit to the camp as a specimen of the fertility of the country. The other story, belonging to the Priestly Codex, is by no means content with so short an investigation, and sends the spies through the entire length of the land as far as the pass between Hermon and Lebanon in the extreme North, allowing six weeks for the journey, and attributing to the

spies on their return an evil report of the land. The principal passages are subjoined.

PROPHETIC HISTORY BOOK.

Num. xiii. 17—20. And [Moses] said unto them, "Get you up this way by the Negebh, and go into the hill country, and see the land what it is. . . . And be ye of good courage, and bring of the fruit of the land." Now the time was the time of the first ripe grapes. (22-24) And they went up by the Negebh, and came to Hebron . . . and they came unto the torrent of Eshcol, and cut down from thence a branch with one cluster of grapes, and they bare it between two upon a staff, and they brought of the pomegranates and the figs . . . (26, 27). And they went and came to Moses and showed [him] the fruit of the land, and they told him and said, "We came unto the land whither thou sentest us, and surely it floweth with milk and honey, and this is the fruit of it."

PRIESTLY CODEX.

Num. xiii. 17a. And Moses sent them to spy out the land of Canaan.

21. So they went up and spied the land from the wilderness of Zin unto Rehob as men come to Hamath.

25. And they returned from spying of the land after forty days.

32. And they brought up an evil report of the land which they had spied unto the children of Israel.

Now these narratives are plainly inconsistent with each other. With which of them does Deuteronomy agree? With that of the Prophetic History-book.

Deut. i. 22—25. And ye came near us every one of you, and said, We will send men before us, and they shall search us out the land, and bring us word again by what way we must go up, and into what cities we shall come. And the saying pleased me well, and I took twelve men of you, one of a tribe; and they turned and went up into the hill country, and came unto the torrent Eshcol, and searched it out. And they took of the fruit of the land in their hands, and brought it down unto us, and brought us word again, and said, It is a good land which Yahveh our God doth give us.*

A similar test case occurs in the compound story of the rebellion of the Levite Korah with Dathan and Abiram of

* It is noteworthy that the Deuteronomic writer represents the suggestion to explore the land as proceeding from the people. This is a further point of disagreement with the story in the Priestly Codex, which ascribes the mission of the twelve spies to a divine command, "And Yahveh spake unto Moses saying, Send thou men" (*Num.* xiii. 1, 2). Mr. Waller (*O. T.*

the tribe of Reuben, in *Num.* xvi. A little criticism shows that the original story in the Prophetic History-book dealt only with the revolt of the Reubenite leaders against the secular supremacy of Moses. Their resistance is punished by an earthquake, which engulfs them with their families and tents. With this has been combined a second story of the protest of Korah and his Levites against the restrictions confining the priesthood to the house of Aaron, and their destruction by fire at the entrance of the sanctuary; this belongs to the cycle of narratives and laws in the Priestly Codex. The Deuteronomist, however, cites only the first episode, and in adverting to the fate of Dathan and Abiram omits Korah altogether:—

Deut. xi. 6. And what he did unto Dathan and Abiram, the sons of Eliab, son of Reuben; how the earth opened her mouth, and swallowed them up, and their households and their tents and all the substance that was in their possession in the midst of all Israel.

The conclusion to which these and similar instances point is clear. The Deuteronomic writers adopted the traditions embodied in the Prophetic History-book, though they occasionally reproduced them freely; they were unacquainted with the stories of the Priestly Codex.

Turning to the relations of the Deuteronomic laws to the Short Code in *Ex.* xxi.-xxiii. 19, and to the elaborate minuteness of the Levitical Legislation, we meet with the same phenomenon. A large portion of the Short Code reappears in Deuteronomy, though old laws are sometimes altered to suit new principles. Regulations on idolatry, slavery, manslaughter, manstealing, retribution for injuries, seduction, witchcraft, the treatment of widows, orphans, and strangers, and a number of other civil and criminal concerns, are common to both. From among the ordinances of religion, the following illustrations must suffice.

The law books of Israel were naturally occupied with the

Commentary) on the above passage from Deuteronomy, writes, "We learn here that the proposal in the first instance came from the people. Moses would naturally refer it to Jehovah, and, when approved, the scheme was carried out." But this method of accommodation can only overcome the other difficulties by ignoring them.

institutions of worship: and for those who were emerging out of polytheism and idolatry the first prohibition obviously related to the worship of any other God but Yahveh. This was strictly forbidden by the First Code (*Ex. xxii. 20*), under pain of that doom of "devotion," the *cherem* or sacred ban, which forfeited life. The same prohibition is renewed by the Deuteronomic law with an iteration which shows how great was the temptation (*e.g., Deut. xiii.*). But the primitive law, allied with the Short Code, *Ex. xx. 24*, did not limit the ritual approach to Yahveh to any particular place: it expressly permitted altars to be raised, and sacrifice to be offered, *wherever the worshipper pleased*. On the other hand, the Deuteronomic legislation was no less emphatically directed against a system by which every man did that which was right in his own eyes (*Deut. xii. 8*). It strenuously protested against the plurality of sanctuaries (for reasons which will be shortly expounded); and its first great law demanded the immediate abolition of every centre of worship except one (*Deut. xii. 2, sqq.*). Only the place which Yahveh should choose to put his name there, was to be maintained in unabated dignity, nay, with richer strength and interest: for thither should now be carried all sacrifice and tithe, the vow and the freewill offering, the first-born of the herd and the first-fruits of the field. The old festivities should be celebrated by the united household no more at the village altar, or in the little chapel of the family or the clan, but in the temple at Jerusalem, with every solemnity of an exclusively sacred spot, and all the splendour of the metropolitan ritual. What is, however, a novelty in Deuteronomy, is everywhere assumed in the Priestly Codex. The "Dwelling-place," with its court and altar, is expressly devised to represent the central sanctuary. It is set in the midst of the tribes, and thither all eyes turn and all feet travel to the mid-point of the camp without a question. The Levitical legislation is no longer concerned with the place where, but with the persons by whom, and the mode in which, the rites of sacrifice shall be performed.

With primitive Yahvism were soon associated certain

annual celebrations. The festival cycle of the First Code specified three yearly feasts. So did that of Deuteronomy, though it gave them all new names, and modified old usage to suit fresh needs.

SHORT CODE.

Ex. xxiii. 14. Three times thou shalt keep a feast unto me in the year.

15. Thou shalt keep the feast of unleavened bread :

16. And the feast of harvest . . . and the feast of ingathering. ' .

17. Three times a year shall all thy males see the face of the Lord Yahveh.

DEUTERONOMIC CODE.

Deut. xvi. 1. Observe the month Abib and keep the passover to Yahveh thy God.

10. And thou shalt keep the feast of weeks. . . .

13. Thou shalt keep the feast of booths seven days. . . .

16. Three times a year shall all thy males see the face of Yahveh thy God in the place which he shall choose.

But the Levitical Legislation is not content with these. Besides innumerable particulars for the observance of those already prescribed, it adds two more, the day of blowing the trumpets and the solemn day of atonement in the seventh month (*Lev. xxiii.* 16), when the high priest entered the innermost sanctuary, closed to him at all other times, to offer reparation for himself and his people before the sinless purity of the Only Holy. The ideas expressed in the rites of this great day are entirely foreign to the conceptions of the Deuteronomic writers. They have no place in their religious scheme ; they belong to a different period of thought which has devised new forms for its expression ; and their absence from the Deuteronomic Code can only be explained by the assumption that they were not as yet developed, or at least systematised in any public recognition.*

That the principles of the Levitical Legislation should be ignored by the Deuteronomic writers is less surprising when we recall the historic scheme within which their laws are cast. They are supposed to have been communicated to Moses on the mount, and to have been reserved by him for delivery to the people till they were ready to enter Canaan

* It is worthy of note that in the *O. T. Commentary*, Dr. Ginsburg's excellent illustrations and explanations all refer to the usages of the second Temple.

and establish themselves in their new homes. The Legislation of Deuteronomy is throughout designed for a settled, not a wandering people. It is rightly connected, therefore, not with Horeb and the wilderness, but with the promised land. On the other hand, the great mass of the Levitical Legislation is assigned to the Sinaitic desert. It is given bit by bit to Moses, or to Moses and Aaron together, and centres round the Levitical *Mishkān*, or "dwelling-place," of which Deuteronomy says not one word. It is not strange, therefore, that their accounts of objects which they both recognise in common should be widely different. Thus, for instance, among the most sacred relics of the ancient cultus of Yahveh was the ark, which all tradition ascribed to the Mosaic age. The Deuteronomic version of its origin states that after the destruction of the golden calf, Moses was directed to hew two new tables of stone to replace those which he had broken in his first outburst of wrath on beholding the apostasy of his people, to construct an ark for their reception, and then to carry the tables up into the mount, that Yahveh might re-write the Ten Words upon them (*Deut.* x. 1, 2). Accordingly, when the ark was ready, he went up with the two fresh stones, which received the impression of the divine commands, and were deposited by him in the ark on his return to the camp (x. 3—5). The Levitical account, however, is totally different. The command to construct the ark is given during the first sojourn on the mountain, before the episode of the golden calf (*Exod.* xxv. 10, sqq.). Its fulfilment is delayed (in the present narrative) till Moses has reascended the mountain, and brought back the second set of tables. The preparations for the sanctuary are then begun with an appeal to the entire people for free-will offerings; and the construction of the ark, in particular, is assigned to Bezaleel (*Ex.* xxxvii. 1, sqq.). The ceremony of depositing the tables within it is deferred till the entire "dwelling-place" is ready to shelter it. Not till the first day of the first month of the second year after the exodus is the dedication performed, and the

sanction of Yahveh obtained to the completed work (*Ex.* xl.). *

Once more, the Deuteronomic Code makes no distinction between the Priests and Levites (xviii. 9, 18, &c.), and expressly claims for the whole tribe of Levi the rights of the sacred order (xviii. 1). They have been specially separated for the sacerdotal function. They bear the ark of the covenant, they minister before Yahveh: they pronounce the blessing on the people in Yahveh's name; they share in the administration of justice. The Priestly Codex, on the other hand, draws the sharpest distinction between the two classes whom the Deuteronomic Legislation invariably unites. That service of the altar which Deuteronomy regards as a universal privilege of the entire tribe (xviii. 6, 7), is forbidden under pain of death to all but the consecrated family of Aaron (*Num.* iii. 5, sqq.; xviii. 1, sqq.). Only the priests may sacrifice, and enter the holy place: these alone could discharge the mystic ceremonies of the sacred rites which must be strictly withheld from all unhallowed hands. No contradiction could be more glaring: and it is at once plain which is the later law. The whole course of the history after the exile reveals the distinction in full force. Prior to the captivity no real trace of it can be found. A close hierarchic corporation does not spring suddenly into existence. It

* Mr. Waller (*O. T. Commentary*) is reduced to the most extraordinary shifts in dealing with *Deut.* x. 1—5. He dislocates the order of the instructions in ver. 1: "The command to make the ark was given in the former period of forty days (*Ex.* xxv. 10); the command to hew the two tables was given after Moses had seen the glory of God (*Ex.* xxxiii.) from the cleft in the rock," &c. But it is expressly said that both commands were given "at that time." Next, he supposes that there was a temporary ark made by Moses, which was afterwards replaced by Bezaleel's ark. Of this, it need not be said, the text says nothing; indeed, it expressly excludes it, for ver. 5 runs, "I turned myself and came down from the mount, and put the tables in the ark which I had made; and there they be, as Yahveh commanded me." Plainly, therefore, the tables remained in the ark prepared for their reception before Moses' ascent. Mr. Waller, however, here abandons his suggestion of the temporary ark, and interprets "I made" (which he declines to consider a past perfect) as "I caused to be made," referring to the ark which Bezaleel constructed under Moses' directions. In that case, what became of the tables during the long interval before Bezaleel's ark was ready?

grows by the gradual assertion of privilege, by the slow exclusion of the many from the rights claimed and guarded by the few. In this respect, therefore, as in others, the Priestly Legislation must be pronounced later than the Deuteronomic Code.

Broadly speaking, it may be said that the First Code is concerned primarily, from a religious point of view, with the divine object to whom worship is to be paid, but permits that worship to be offered anywhere : Deuteronomy, laying additional emphasis on the nature of that object, deals with the resulting question where that worship should be paid, and answers it by centralising it at the temple of Jerusalem ; while the Levitical Legislation is further occupied with the grades of the officers who should perform it, and the manner of the rites. The chronological series to which these belong cannot be doubtful. The most general and indefinite must be the first. The most scrupulous and minute must be the last. And so the conclusion emerges, as before, that the Deuteronomic Code holds a middle place between the First Legislation of Exodus and the Priestly Law.

III.

But what, after all, is the religious significance of the Deuteronomic law ? Why does it mark so great an era in the history of Israel's faith ? What is the difference implied between its theory confining the worship of Yahveh to one place, and that of the First Legislation which permitted it at many ? Does not the restriction involve retrogression rather than advance ? How can it be pleaded that the localisation of worship to the Temple alone marks a higher spirituality than its toleration at innumerable sanctuaries close to the homes of the people ? Could we only conceive an attempt to abolish every church, close every chapel, and shut every meeting-house and hall, throughout our land, for the purpose of securing fixity of doctrine in Westminster Abbey, or simplicity of ritual in St. Paul's, who would not instantly protest against so intolerable an interference with

the national liberties, who would not find in it the ruin instead of the exaltation of the national religious life?

And yet in Israel it was precisely the reverse. The only forms under which its ancient worship was carried on, were those of sacrifice and festival. Of that which is so expressively called among us "Common Prayer," there was then no trace. It had as yet no Scriptures to serve as the basis of public instruction, it had no hymns to utter the aspirations of multitudes in words which each one might feel to be his own. The offering, the vow, the tithe, were the only known manifestations of piety. The gathering of the family or the clan around the domestic altar, or in the village sanctuary at the nearest high-place, was the simple method of devotion. Why should all this be abolished? Did it not bring the people and their God into much nearer relations than if he could be approached at one place alone? Would it help a man to be religious that he must travel miles and days to discharge the most elementary of his religious duties? Of what avail was it to the farmer of Hebron to be told that he must go all the way to Jerusalem to pay his priestly dues, and kill his passover each spring? Why might he not slay the victim from his flock and from his herd in his own house (*Deut.* xvi. 2, 5, 6)? How could such burdens as these teach him a nobler truth, a deeper love?

These questions easily arise out of a comparison of the strictness of the Deuteronomic law with the looser provision of the First Code. But it is not hard to give an answer which may at least indicate how profound was the religious difference involved. When the Israelites entered Canaan, the bond which united the tribes was very far from strong. The settlement occupied many years; the conquest was not really complete for generations. The dispersion of the people over a large area separated them from the sanctuary round which they had gathered in the camp during the wanderings: and the religion which Moses had taught them was threatened with extinction unless it could be maintained independently. On every hill-top, near every hamlet, attached to every larger town, throughout the land,

they found and employed the places of Canaanite worship, or they reared their own altars for the cultus of Yahveh. Was it surprising that the homage thus offered should resemble that of the people with whom they mingled in common rites? Beside the altars of Yahveh stood the symbols of Baal and Ashera. The private house was protected by its domestic images (teraphim); the public temple enshrined its golden ephod or its young bull. Pious kings like Saul and David called their children impartially after Yahveh and Baal; nay, the name Baal was even applied to Yahveh himself; and when the names were interchangeable, it is clear that the characters of the two deities in popular estimation were not widely dissimilar, and the homage offered to them must have been much the same. Only gradually did the prophetic party, attaching themselves to the Mosaic tradition, raise their protest against this fusion of the severer purity of true Yahvism with the odious idolatries and the still more odious unchastities of the Canaanite cultus. In their early days the prophets naturally followed many of the popular customs. Before the priestly functions were restricted to any particular guild, Samuel, though of no Levitical descent, habitually conducted sacrifice at the high place near his own house. David, whose religious ardour and whose skill in song created the belief that he was the author of nearly half the Psalm-book, had his private house-idol. Solomon, who was unquestionably allied with the Mosaic party, used to frequent the great high-place at Gibeon without a word of prophetic protest—nay, with a special reward from Yahveh (1 *Kings* iii.)—and prophetic influence in the person of Ahijah was said to have supported the revolt of Ephraim and the Northern Tribes, which resulted in the establishment of fresh national sanctuaries for the new kingdom. The great conflict against the worship of “other gods” was begun in the ninth century by Elijah, who led the opposition to the cultus of the Tyrian Baal under Ahab and his successors: but they made no efforts to suppress the idolatrous worship of Yahveh. It was renewed by the prophets of the eighth century, who went a step further,

announced the spiritual character of Yahveh, and declared idols an utter abomination ; " fling away the images," they cried ; but they did not propose the abolition of the high places. They did not see that it was impossible to control the local sanctuaries ; impossible to root out the idolatries of centuries, and leave the empty shrines for purer homage ; impossible to allow the altars to stand while the rites that had been celebrated there were forbidden. Every city and village might still have its Baal ; every street corner might still be aflame with incense (*Jer.* xi. 13). There was but one way of reform. It was to permit no worship anywhere but at one place : to see that the place thus chosen was the centre of the national life ; to abolish every other sanctuary, to break up every religious establishment, to disperse all illegitimate priests, to destroy every idol, and to make the desolated shrines unclean for evermore.

Such a reform as this could only be begun and completed under the deepest religious conviction. To carry it out effectively required more than the force of the executive, it needed also the national sympathy. That this sympathy was very imperfect, there is abundance evidence. But that the conviction existed, at least in some minds, the book of Deuteronomy, which is its great literary monument, is the imperishable witness. Here for the first time in the series of prophetic writings do we meet with those explicit assertions of monotheism, which show that at length the prophetic thought has in the firmest way grasped the idea of the sole deity and spirituality of Yahveh. So the great theme is announced : " Hear, O Israel, Yahveh our God, Yahveh is one." The Baals might be many, with the Ashêras by their side : yet they had no being before this sublime unity. The images might yet remain, hidden by their possessors to save them in some future time of need, but these could not represent, still less could they *be*, the Only Holy. " Know that Yahveh, he is God, there is none else beside him ; " " Yahveh, he is God in heaven above, and upon the earth beneath, there is none else." Once only were his people made conscious of his presence amid clouds and gloom : but the fire which

blazed in the darkness on the rocky heights of Horeb was only the incorporeal symbol of his invisible being ; the voice that pealed from the crags to the plain below came from no lips any more than the thunder-roll or the wind. These two truths set the seal to the long upward movement by which the conception of Yahveh had slowly been liberated from the ancient physical elements in which it originated, and the local conditions under which it was held. It is the glory of the Deuteronomic writers to have so stamped them upon the heart of their people, that they were never afterwards forgotten.

It was, however, along the line of Israel's history that these fundamental principles were worked out. They were not stated in the abstract as philosophical propositions, they were held only in the closest relation to the religious thought and life of the time. They were not, therefore, at first applied to the world at large ; they were only used to illustrate and ennoble the relations between the nation and its God. What were these relations ? Israel was but one of many peoples. It saw its superiors around it on every hand. It had created no empire : it had not carried its arms from land to land, nor by its fleets transplanted its civilisation beyond the sea. It had neither science nor letters like the learning by the Euphrates or the Nile. Least of all did it possess any superior holiness. Why then, should it alone have received the true knowledge of Yahveh ? It did not acquire this knowledge by its own search. It had not gone in quest of Yahveh till it found him. Rather had Yahveh singled out Israel. Why should the divine election have passed over the culture of Asia, the fertility of Egypt, the marvellous energy of Phenicia, and lighted on the shepherd tribes of Canaan, to train their descendants into a people for himself ? This was the problem which no human insight could solve. Thought was powerless to explain the secret. It could only carry it back into the recesses of the supreme will, and leave it there. Yet some expression of the mystery it must find. This act of choice, a choice so unexpected, and sustained with such tender faithfulness amid the bitterest disappointments, could

spring from nothing else but love. Love was the key to Yahveh's dealings with Israel.

Deut. vii. 6—8. Thou art an holy people unto Yahveh thy God. Yahveh thy God hath chosen thee to be a peculiar people unto himself, out of all the peoples that are on the face of the earth. Not because ye were more in number than any people did Yahveh set his love upon you and choose you, for ye were the fewest of all peoples; but because Yahveh loved you, and because he would keep the oath which he had sworn unto your fathers, hath Yahveh brought you out with a mighty hand, and redeemed you from the house of bondmen, from the hand of Pharaoh, King of Egypt.

And what, in return, must be the basis of Israel's relation to Yahveh? That, likewise, must be love; love not incompatible with a sacred fear, a holy awe, love passing into service, love acting through law, love pouring itself into obedience to the God who has deigned to ask for it by that first act of choice.

Deut. vi. 5. Thou shalt love Yahveh thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy might.

x. 12. And now, Israel, what doth Yahveh thy God require of thee, but to fear Yahveh thy God, to walk in all his ways, and to love him, and to serve Yahveh thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, to keep the commandments of Yahveh and his statutes, which I command thee this day for thy good.

It is characteristic throughout that the Deuteronomic writers, like all the prophets before them, have in their mind always a nation and not an individual. They regard Israel as a whole; the persons who compose it merge their separate existence in a corporate life; they are swayed by common purposes, impelled by common feelings, as members of a united organism. Deuteronomy is, therefore, a book not of personal but of national religion. At the same time it exhibits in the most striking manner the preparation for the transition from religion conceived as an outward bond, expressed in a public cultus, to religion expressed as an inward relation, expressed in spiritual sentiments. The Deuteronomic legislators were not prepared to abolish the established order of sacrificial worship. There was then no other known mode of testifying affection for the Lord of all. To be sure, Hosea had declared that Yahveh desired goodness more than sacrifice: Isaiah had denounced the

offerings of hands full of blood : Micah, or some later teacher, had enumerated justice, mercy, and the lowly walk with God, as the divine demands. But this apparent disparagement related only to the relative claims of the neglected moral law. The prophets had not really contemplated the cessation of all ritual. On the other hand, the favourite doctrine of the inviolability of the sanctuary against foreign attack, and the place occupied by Zion in the forecasts of the future, implied that the temple service of Yahveh held a high place in their conception of religion. Now the distinguishing idea of Yahveh was his holiness, an attribute which kept him strictly apart from every other deity in a sublime isolation of unapproachable purity. Those whom he loved, therefore, whom he had chosen, must be holy, too; separate, like himself, from every defilement; and especially remote from the least approximation to the rites offered to other deities. Hence it is that the first great law of Deuteronomy is a law directed against every form of idolatry, and the abominations connected with the survival of the ancient Canaanite cultus. The local sanctuaries with their unhallowed orgies, their licensed harlotries, must be destroyed. Not only must the images be shattered, the stone pillars dedicated to Baal thrown down, the wooden tree trunks (emblems of his consort Ashêra) hewn in pieces; but the very altars themselves, which the first code had permitted, must be overthrown; the hill-tops must be no more the places of resort for the country round; the green tree must no longer shelter the shrine beneath its shade. This was demanded by the first duty of religious faithfulness. What could not be cleansed, must be destroyed.

The commonest usages of daily life were so intimately connected with religion, that they were instantly affected by any change in its practice. The householder who killed his sheep or his ox, perhaps on rare occasions of festivity, was wont to set aside some portion for sacrifice to Yahveh, it might be on the family altar, or at the nearest high place. This simple rite, where the head of the clan had perhaps himself officiated as family priest, must now be dis-

continued; unless, indeed, the temple at Jerusalem were within reasonable reach. Must those, then, who lived too far off to drive their animals to be slaughtered there, forego their meat? By no means, they might be killed and eaten within the domestic precincts, but no longer as sacrificial animals, only like the wild game of the hills, the hart or the gazelle: and as the food ceased to have a sacred character, those who partook of it need no longer be ceremonially clean (*Deut.* xii. 13-15). In the old days the tithe of corn and wine, the firstlings of the flock and the herd, were taken to the neighbouring sanctuary, and there consumed in festive meals by the priest and the household in joyous company. These happy gatherings were now broken up, or, at least, transferred elsewhere. The weary beasts could not be driven all the way to the temple 'mount; they must be sold; and with the proceeds in his hand the worshipper must repair to the one spot which the new law allowed, and there, with his children, his slaves, and the Levite from his village, join in the glad service of his God (*Deut.* xiv. 23-27, xii. 17 seq. 29). So, again, the ceremony of voluntary adoption of slavery could no longer invoke the sanction of religion. The servant who after six years of unpaid labour elected to remain a bondman with his master for life, had formerly been taken "to God," as the First Code had it (*Ex.* xxi. 6, A. V. "the judges"), that is, to the nearest sanctuary, and there had been solemnly fastened to the door-post by an awl pierced through his ear. The abolition of every house of God save the temple at Jerusalem, destroyed this custom; and henceforth the symbolic process was to be performed in purely secular fashion at the householder's own door (*Deut.* xv. 16, 17).

These are but samples of the mode in which the change of the law was designed to operate. It was an attempt to reform the cultus on the basis of the unity and holiness of God, his love for his people, and his people's love for him. In this reformation it was not proposed to dispense with the cultus altogether. No prophet could have ventured to do that. Religious growth could not proceed so rapidly. Many

things must happen before the principles of the higher Yahvism could be so detached from the public national expression of them, and set free to create new forms for themselves. The authors of the new code could not cut themselves adrift from the times in which they lived. They could only throw the whole force of their burning conviction, their intense and passionate faith, against the idolatries of the day. They cast their proposals into the current form of legislation, in the Mosaic name. They cast their opposition to foreign abominations recently introduced as well as to the ancient appropriations of their forefathers from their Canaanite neighbours, into the form of awful threats of destruction against the nations whom they were to expel, and the tempters who should seduce them from their allegiance to the God who had chosen them of his free grace. But the nations had been neither expelled nor destroyed, they had been gradually amalgamated with the conquerors : and though the ban was denounced against the idolaters, it was never really intended to lay whole cities waste, to massacre the guilty inhabitants and the innocent cattle indiscriminately and burn the desolate houses to the ground. These are only the pictorial mode in which the writers express their utter abhorrence of the practices which destroyed the sanctity of Israel, and insulted the majesty of Israel's Holy One. Strangely do these fierce sentiments read beside the repeated declarations of the divine compassion, the reiterated appeals to the heart of loyalty and trust, which give to these pages such a kindling glow. It is well that we can in part resolve the inconsistency which seems to discredit the value of a piety apparently marred by such bloodthirsty ferocity. The writers present their principles under the limitations of imaginary circumstances that were never real.

IV.

The Deuteronomic Code, then, was a programme of religious reform. But this protest against idolatry and unspiritual worship could have but little influence unless it

was carried into practical effect. Left in its rolls of skin, it could be known but to a few. If it was to become the instrument of national regeneration, it must in some way or other be made known to the nation. How was the Deuteronomic Code first published? Are there any traces that it was ever adopted as the basis of a great religious movement? There are: and the history of the reformation based upon it gives us the clue to its place in Israel's life and literature. This was the Reformation of King Josiah.

The story has been told so often that it need only be briefly retraced here. On the death of Hezekiah, early in the seventh century B.C., the young Prince Manasseh came to the throne in Jerusalem. He was but a boy at his accession; and as soon as he arrived at manhood he threw himself into the reactionary movement against the prophetic party, which had been so long dominant under the leadership of Isaiah during Hezekiah's reign. The worship at the high places flourished as before. The cultus of Baal and Ashêra was renewed with the greatest vigour: it was made the fashionable worship of the capital by a huge Ashêra symbol in the temple itself. Beside the precincts were houses of that most depraved class of temple-servants who took part in the unchaste rites. In the courts of the sanctuary rose two altars to the host of heaven. Hard by were the stables in which were kept the horses dedicated to the sun. Nor was this all. Manasseh revived the horrible practice of Ahaz and dedicated one of his sons to Molech by fire; while every kind of witchcraft, necromancy, and divination, flourished in defiance of the sole lordship of Yahveh. For half-a-century the temple at Jerusalem was thus made the centre of every imaginable rite hateful and impure in the eyes of the Mosaic party. What was practised in the city was not neglected in the country round; and every village and every height had its own special abomination. It was hardly to be supposed that the successors of Isaiah would tolerate this heathen revival without a protest. Undeterred by the power of the court, they threatened the most terrible penalties upon the guilty

nation, and predicted for Jerusalem a fate like that of Samaria (2 *Kings* xxi., 10-16). Some of them paid for their bold speech, perhaps for their overt resistance, by their lives. The conflict raged for a generation: each street of the city had its tale of slaughter: until at last, two years after the death of Manasseh, his son and successor Amon fell by a palace intrigue, and the boy Josiah was placed on the throne at eight years old. The youth of the new king must have seemed to each party to offer a splendid opportunity. Unhappily, it is no longer possible to trace the details of the struggle. By what means the Mosaic Yahvists gained the ascendancy cannot be told. But by the eighteenth year of Josiah's reign (B.C. 621) they were ready for action. The prophetic order had for some time been secure from attack. Jeremiah and Zephaniah had already been active during several years. The prophetess Huldah exercised such high influence that at a critical moment the leaders naturally resorted to her for advice. The time was now ripe for the announcement of their great design. At an interview between the high priest Hilkiah and Shaphan, the King's secretary, on some temple business, Hilkiah handed to the royal minister a book of Law (*Torah*, "teaching") which he had found, he said, in the house of Yahveh. Shaphan withdrew with the book and read it. He saw at once that its contents could not be kept secret: they must be made known to the King without delay. When he returned to the palace to report the discharge of his mission, he further communicated to Josiah the discovery which had been made, and proceeded to read the book aloud to him. The King was deeply moved, and immediately nominated a commission of five persons, including the high priest and the chief secretary, to learn what was the will of Yahveh. The deputation went at once to consult Huldah. In the name of Yahveh she gave her emphatic sanction to the book (2 *Kings* xxii. 8-20).

The King's course was now clear. The representative "elders" of the people were summoned; and, after further consultation, a vast assembly of every rank, alike from the

capital and from the country, was convened at the temple. There Josiah himself read to his subjects the words of the new-found book. Under the profound impression produced by this solemn act, unparalleled in their history, the King came forward on the platform and made a public promise to fulfil the duties it prescribed. Then it was the turn of the people, and they likewise took the same vow (2 *Kings* xxiii., 1-3).

What was this Law-book? It is described as a covenant-book, a title harmonising singularly well with the Deuteronomic Code, which begins with the covenant of Horeb and ends with the covenant of Moab (*Deut.* v. 2, xxix. 1). What were the acts which it enjoined? We shall perhaps best be able to infer their nature from the recital of what was done under its authority. The first step was to purge the temple of every vestige of idolatry. The Ashêra was removed and burned, and the remains were ground to powder, and strewn over common graves. The houses of her unchaste servants were laid low. The vessels dedicated to Baal, Ashêra, and the host of heaven, were carried out and burned, and their ashes were sent to the dishonoured sanctuary at Bethel. The horses of the sun were taken away, and the festive chariots were consumed in the general conflagration of the idolatrous objects. The altars which had stood on the roof of the temple since the days of Ahaz (all through the reign of Hezekiah and the ministry of Isaiah!) and those newly erected by Manasseh in the two courts below, for the worship of the host of heaven, were torn down, and their very dust cast into the waters of the Kidron at the foot of the temple mountain. The Topheth which had been the scene of the fiery sacrifice of first-born sons to Molech, was defiled for ever. When the temple and the city were cleansed, the same reforming zeal attacked the high places outside the walls. The venerable structures erected by Solomon on the Mount of Olives, consecrated by the memory of his greatness as well as by generations of pious offerings, with which no king, however devoted, had ventured to interfere, were overthrown. The stone pillars of Baal were

shattered, the wooden trunks of Ashêra were hewn in pieces, and dead men's bones were thrown upon their sites. Throughout the land the altars of incense to Baal, the sun and moon, the host of heaven, were destroyed. An immense effort was made to root out witchcraft, and the traditional rites that gathered round the private idols found in every house. To the extremest limit of the kingdom was the abolition of the high places pursued. The unlawful and idolatrous priests were deposed, and stripped of every privilege. The Levitical priests, whose local functions disappeared with the sanctuaries at which they had ministered, were brought to Jerusalem and connected with the lower grades of the temple service. It is said that the King's reforming zeal extended to the desolate Samaria, where severer measures were enforced, for not only were the high places pulled down, but their priests were slain. And by way of solemn ratification of the entire movement, it was completed by a grand celebration of the Passover, in accordance with the injunctions of the Covenant-book, such as had never been witnessed before in the annals of the past (2 *Kings* xxiii., 4-23).

The precise accordance of these details with the reforming laws of the Deuteronomic Code, and the recurrence of numerous phrases in the description of the whole proceedings which appear again and again in its pages, render it as certain as any literary conclusion can be within the limits of the Old Testament, that the book discovered in the temple contained the substance of the Deuteronomic legislation. By whom that legislation was compiled, whose was the genius which first gave expression to the great prophetic ideas which it contains, we shall never know. It could hardly have proceeded from Hilkipah and the priests of the temple, for the intended extension of their privileges to the country Levites who came up from the disestablished high places can scarcely have been acceptable to them, and was never, in fact, carried out, owing probably to their resistance. Some striking resemblances in the language of its exhortations to the writings of Jeremiah have led to the

suggestion that he was himself its author : but these external affinities cover differences of spiritual type far too wide to allow us to accept such hasty inferences. All that can be said is that it is in entire harmony with the type of prophetic teaching belonging to his age, and that the date of its composition cannot be far removed from the period of its discovery.*

V.

What, then, is the meaning of this book for us ? What place can it still hold in our religious thought ? We have nothing to do with the reform of a cultus that has long since passed away. In the conflict between the local sanctuaries and the temple, it may seem to us a matter of small moment how the issue goes. It is true ; but the issue is in reality much wider. The great doctrines of Deuteronomy, the unity and the spirituality of God, were not (as has been already said) conceived absolutely, or expressed in the language of philosophy ; they grew out of the circle of Israel's personal relations with its deity. They sprang from a conception of religion which was purely national : they combined with it a thought which was wholly personal ; Yahveh and his people—what he has done for them—how they may show their loyalty to him—these are its themes. Its survey of the world, its view of

* Mr. Waller (*O. T. Commentary* ; introduction to Deuteronomy, p. 2.) says : "The age of Jeremiah, or Ezekiel, or Ezra, has been suggested as the source of these precepts" [*Deut.* xii-xxv.]. Mr. Waller professes to pay "special attention to modern critical theories about later authorship ;" but his vague statement concerning the reference of the Deuteronomic Code to the age of Ezekiel or Ezra, is as wide of the facts as his other remark that "the earlier and later portions of the book are admitted to be the work of Moses."

No doubt the work presents itself in his name : that is to say, it is intended as an exposition of what were supposed to be his principles applied to the religious and social conditions of the writer's own time. The recognised methods of historical and legal composition perfectly justified this great dramatic impersonation ; and it is grossly unjust to stigmatise it by the opprobrious modern term of "literary forgery."

the religions of other nations, are strangely narrow according to our modern notions. If Yahveh has chosen Israel, he has not chosen any other people. But at the same time, as he is all-supreme, their acts, their faith, can only be what they are by his will : and when the nations around worship the sun and moon and stars, it is because Yahveh has assigned to them these objects for their gods, while he has reserved Israel for himself (iv. 19, 20).^{*} So there is no hint of any desire to interfere with these arrangements of Providential disposition. No missionary zeal burns for the conversion of the heathen. There is no passionate ardour for the vindication of the sole majesty of Yahveh through the whole earth, from end to end of heaven. Israel is still within its own borders, and has its own work to do in its own land. It is true : this book is, as has been said, a book of national religion, whose limitations are stamped on every page. But it is withal a book of personal religion, and so of universal religion. It deals with the facts of life and history with the confidence of one who sees them all radiant with the light of a divine purpose, marshalled in the order of a divine plan. It speaks to a nation which has a destiny to fulfil. But it can only conceive that nation as existing through the bond of its religion. This bond has not been self-created ; it was wrought by Yahveh. Yet though the people could not make it, they could destroy it ; and if by their unfaithfulness it falls to pieces, they will cease to be a people, and their name will disappear. In other words, religion is the real ground of all moral and social order. It folds everything else within itself, and gives to it its highest expression. But for this end the Deuteronomic writers are instinctively conscious that they must establish for religion a deeper basis than that of public

^{*} The authorised version hardly expresses the full significance of the passage: "lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and, when thou seest the sun and moon and stars, all the host of heaven, shouldest be carried away to worship them, and serve them, which Yahveh thy God hath assigned to all the nations under the whole heaven. But you hath Yahveh taken, and brought you forth out of the iron furnace, out of Egypt, to be unto him a people of inheritance, as ye are this day."

ritual: it must supply something more than legal rules or even moral ordinances. It must quicken reverence, it must inspire trust, it must awaken affection. This is what Deuteronomy for the first time fully expressed. Hosea had already perceived that in our religious life it is not so much we who find God, as God who finds us. Deuteronomy accepted this truth, and sought to show what forms the religious life thus quickened would assume among Yahveh's people. It discerned that that life must be a life of loyal obedience and of holy affection; and inasmuch as these are not outward acts but inward states, it took the first steps towards transferring the stress of religion from national observance to individual consciousness, and proposed as its ultimate ideal a community which should collectively realise a relationship of reverence and love to its heavenly Lord. These great sentiments could only be comprehended and expressed by the community when they had first been deeply felt by each single soul: and in enunciating its principles for the government of the traditional Israel, Deuteronomy was in fact, therefore, enunciating them for the whole human race in every age. It was reserved for the greatest of Israel's sons to discern this completely, and to proclaim its highest word as the first law no longer for Judah but for the world. "What commandment is the first of all?" Jesus answered, "The first is, Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one: and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." * And so the teaching of Deuteronomy leads direct to the supreme thought of Christ.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

* Mark xii. 28-30.

THE OVERSTRAIN IN EDUCATION.

ON entering the Dome Saloon of the New Capitoline Museum, at Rome, the visitor may see on his left-hand side the tombstone of one Q. Sulpicius Maximus. The subject of this monument was no hero of the camp or of the Senate, but a little fellow not twelve years old whose title to fame was the defeat of fifty-two competitors in the improvisation of Greek verses. Specimens of his pretty skill are graven on the marble. But the pathetic epitaph relates that death was the price of the over-stimulation of the boyish brain.

Such, so far as I know, outside China, was the first case of death from competitive examination. When will be the last?

No Englishman can fail to feel some pride in the extraordinary advance which the last quarter-of-a-century has seen in the education of the English people. The purpose of this article is to show that that advance has not been wholly in the right direction, and that it has not been without grave drawbacks. But he would indeed be a one-sided critic who should not confess that great and good things have been done. The average number of children in attendance at primary schools in Great Britain in 1857 was 626,696; in 1881 it was 3,273,501. In other words, the increase was five-fold, while the growth in population was but an addition of one-third. In 1857, one in thirty-five and a-half of the population was at a primary school; in 1881, one in nine. Whatever else this means, it means an enormous diffusion of the primary arts of civilisation—reading, writing, arithmetic; it means also a vast conversion of savagery into orderly decorum. At the same

time the spread of the higher education has proceeded at no less extraordinary a pace—at any rate among girls and women. “Fair girl graduates” are no longer a poet’s half-humorous dream, but sober fact. In every large town the new Girl’s High School vies with the old foundation of the Grammar School which has been usurped by boys. Young ladies may now know chemistry as well as talk botany, and we no longer marvel at her quaintness when we read that Lady Jane Grey loved Greek and Latin. Liverpool, Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield, Bristol, Nottingham, as well as Manchester, are the seats of large and flourishing colleges, staffed with talented professors and richly endowed by the public spirit or the private munificence of their citizens.

But there is a dark side to the picture. All those millions go to school; but are they all educated? What is the general tone and strain of our educational leaders? In what direction do they point the aspirations of teacher and taught? In nine speeches or articles out of ten the one string harped upon is industrial success. Our young are to learn because otherwise the foreign competitor will beat them. Moral apologues by the thousand fall on our ears, the end and aim of which is “success in life”; and success in life means solely and simply getting plenty of money. Education is preached by the great chorus of its preachers as a commodity of mercantile value; and so, after all, it is not education that is preached, but sheer technical training from first to last.

The first great apostle of the modern educational movement in this country was Mr. Robert Lowe. Lord Sherbrooke breathes now a serene atmosphere, and his cynicism may have risen to a higher level. But the Mr. Lowe of the old days was a philosopher who had one safe measure for all men, and that was money. It is not yet five years since he wrote: “Once place a man’s ear within the ring of pounds, shillings, and pence, and his conduct can be counted on with the greatest nicety.”* Such was the avowed

* “Recent Attacks on Political Economy.” *Nineteenth Century* November, 1878, p. 864.

principle of the able man to whom, by an unhappy fate, was consigned the guidance of the movement at the moment when the British people were first aroused to the conviction that something big must be done in education. The famous Code of 1861 was the issue: and that Code set firm upon its pedestal the idol "payment by results." The simple social philosophy propounded by Mr. Lowe penetrated every wheel and screw of the new educational machinery. His desire was to govern the conduct of teachers, so he rattled pounds, shillings, and pence at their ears. His whole reliance was on their pecuniary avidity: to their sense of the noble character of their task and its pregnant issues he made no appeal whatever. For he himself has said that where the money-motive once comes in, men's "deviations from a line of conduct which can be foreseen and predicted, are so slight that they may practically be considered as non-existent."*

Nor was the public sentiment on the whole at all averse to the clever minister's expedient for getting good results from the educational institutions of the country. The children were to be educated that they might themselves earn the more money by-and-by, and so increase the wealth of the nation: what more fitting than that the nation should put its investment into the most direct form possible, and pay the teacher so many shillings down for every boy he could turn out that could write a commercial letter and add up a page of ledger? The state was buying clerks and traders; why not make the transaction between the state and the teacher who turned them out clear and simple, by promising him so many pounds a gross?

"Payment by results" is the very key of the whole commercial system of the modern world; and commerce is the breath of the British citizen. Nothing could be more natural than its application to the new trade in which he was embarking—the trade which in 1870 was taken over as a national concern. The consequence has been, as in all cases where money is freely introduced into the market, an im-

* *Ibid.*, p. 864.

mense stimulus to production. The article demanded is delivered in ample quantities in spite of a few "spoils" in the shape of enfeebled bodies or shattered brains. And merchants, manufacturers, and Her Majesty's Ministers congratulate one another all round.

But how has the system acted on the men and women who are the chief agents in working it out? No one who has at all acquainted himself with the actual work of our Elementary Schools can remain unimpressed by the large amount of conscientious, disinterested, and devoted work which many teachers carry on. Hundreds of them place before them as their foremost object, the welfare of the children entrusted to their care; and I desire at the outset to express my profound respect for the numerous men and women whom the bribery of no Code can decoy from that method which they deem alone consonant with the physical, mental, and moral welfare of their scholars. But the bribes dangled before the eyes of the forty thousand Certificated Teachers of Great Britain * are constant and alluring; and they are bribes offered to a class of persons worse paid, relatively to the services required of them, than any other whatsoever.† The livelihood of the teacher depends directly or indirectly on the percentage of children he can push through the ordeal of examination, and the number of subjects he can crowd into their brains. It is true that it is a common thing for Boards or Managers themselves to take the risk of this from year to year, and to pay the teacher a stipend not nominally based on his examination successes. But indirectly, save in the case of exceptionally wise authorities, the working is the same. If the grant earned falls, the stipend will be reduced, or the teacher will receive his dismissal.

Under the stimulus of this system of "payment by

* In 1881, England and Wales, 33,562; Scotland, 5,544. *Report of Com. of Council on Education*, p. xlv.

† "In 1870, the average salary was £95 for males, and £57 for females; now it has risen to £121 for males, and £72 for females." *Presidential Address of Mr. R. Sykes at the annual conference of the National Union of Elementary Teachers*, 1882.

results," the average teacher has, for the past twenty years, been pressing his scholars for more and more remunerative response to his instruction. The motive appealed to by Mr. Lowe has been successfully brought into full and constant play, till in the minds of many it has outdone all others. Exceptionally able and ambitious teachers have driven their schools even harder than their neighbours, and have obtained results from which golden grants have flowed in, which have delighted managers and perhaps a little astonished "my lords." "My lords" have responded by screwing up the conditions of grants to a higher and higher pitch; and so the stimulus to the average teacher has grown more and more goading from Code to Code.

It is then, in the interests of both scholars and teachers, a question for urgent inquiry whether this process has or has not resulted in an excessive nervous strain upon the teacher. I say in the interest of scholar as well as of teacher, because there is no profession in which nervous strain must be so ruinous to the quality of the work done as that of the pedagogue. The overtaxed barrister may lay up for himself paralysis or lunacy; yet while he is still able to stick to his work, the strain on his nerves will only make his cross-examinations a little sharper, and his references to his "learned friend" a trifle more acid. The overtaxed preacher may, if he is an earnest one, preach morbid sermons with a false strain of sentiment running through them; yet his hearers will for the most part be proof against his appeals, and rather raise their eyebrows in surprise at his exaggerated expressions than set to work to shape their lives according to his views. But the overtaxed school-teacher becomes thereby hopelessly incapable of that just balance of firmness and kindness, that happy admixture of patience, energy, and cheerfulness, which is of more importance to the conduct of his school than any certificate or the praise of any inspector. Hence the question how the nervous systems of the teaching fraternity are affected by the pressure of successive Codes is a question of unsurpassed moment in estimating our national education.

Such an inquiry is indeed beset with difficulty. Official statistics are impossible to obtain. The Committee of Council on Education duly report the number of teachers with whom they deal, and the figure of the grants they earn ; but they have no column to show the prevalence of depression of physique or the percentage of lives sacrificed in the fierceness of the competition. I have, however, made it my business to acquaint myself, by correspondence or conversation, with the experience of a large number of head-teachers on this and other points. I have selected some of these on the ground of facility of personal access to them, others because I was specially recommended to them on account of their width or length of experience, others quite casually and without any previous knowledge whatever, picking the names of their schools out of the official list of Elementary Schools aided by Parliamentary grants. Of those of whose views I have thus had the opportunity of informing myself, more than seventy per cent. believe that they themselves or members of their staff have suffered in health from the pressure of the Code requirements, and many add striking testimony concerning other members of the profession, of whose breakdown they have had personal knowledge. Some of the statements which have reached me deserve a more special reference. The head-master of a brilliantly successful British school in Liverpool writes to me that, though he is enthusiastically fond of his work, he is, at thirty-nine, prematurely grey, and has undergone a surgical operation for a disease brought on by over-work. He suffers greatly from indigestion, especially just before inspection ; and he adds that the master of a neighbouring school died of disease of the heart, at the age of forty-two, brought on, in the words of his physician, "by the worries and anxieties of school-work." "Only those," says the head-master of one of the largest Board schools in the East of London, "who know the anxiety of the teacher for a few weeks before the inspection can fully enter into the strain upon the mind, the excessive nervousness and even sometimes irritability caused by the desire to do well on

inspection day." The teacher of a Church school in a thriving Midland town tells me, "I have often been taken for fifty and am not yet forty years old; two years ago I had to exercise the greatest care, or the doctor said the mind would collapse." The late head-master of the excellent Lower Moseley-street Schools, Manchester, mentions two teachers of his acquaintance, both of whom were paralysed, and says that they always attributed their breakdown to the harassing and unyielding conditions of the Code regulations, combined perhaps with the constant inhalation of a vitiated air. "My medical adviser," says a Bristol teacher, "has distinctly warned me of the result of this pressure, going so far as to assert that, if not stopped, I should materially shorten my days." A teacher formerly very eminent in his own town, now at rest in the well-earned haven of a country rectory, looking back on the days of struggle with the Code, writes to me in a very careful communication, "With all the care I could exercise by the use of the usual means for preserving one's health—and my constitution, I believe, was an exceptionally strong one—I suffered from frequent attacks of biliousness, and twice, at the critical time of the inspection, my health quite gave way, owing to nothing but the constant mental and bodily strain, in an impure atmosphere, notwithstanding everything was done that could be done in the way of efficient ventilation. Two promising young men, assistant masters, who had been pupil teachers, died of consumption, according to my belief, from too close application, and I reckoned on one or more pupil-teachers being away from their duty from sickness in other parts of the year beside the usual holidays." A country head-master complains that his health is undermined by the strain involved in conducting a class consisting of Standards IV., V., VI., and VII. all together. "I have," says he, "four divisions in the class all doing different work at the same time in arithmetic, and three in dictation. I must dictate to Standard IV, read a tale twice over to Standard V., and superintend a theme or letter for Standards

VI. and VII." Such a school, it will be said, is miserably under-staffed. It is true ; but it is staffed in perfect accordance with Government requirements. A friend of my own, whose school stands foremost in its town for the business aptitude of the boys it turns out year by year—where, indeed, a regular list is kept of applications for scholars from employers—has been at the pains to place in my hands a statement which derives great weight from his long and wide experience. In the course of a review of the effects of the system on the physique of teachers, he says, "the nervous power of the digestive organs fails first generally. Head affections prevail. Paralysis, apoplexy, dementia supervene. Were it possible to get at the vital statistics of the great body of certificated teachers during the last twenty-five years, a sad history would be revealed. I judge of the mass from my actual knowledge of seven teachers whom I knew best during my college-life. Of the seven, only two survive"—my friend is, I suppose, five-and-forty years of age—"and these have had, since passing their fortieth year, very severe and protracted illnesses. Their lives are no longer such as a careful insurance office would accept at ordinary rates. Nor can an opinion on this point be founded safely on the cases of teachers now at work in schools. It is notorious that those who can escape from the profession, do so. Nothing is more painful than to find teachers occupying good situations, so far as salary is concerned, bent on getting away from the work if they can."

Probably the record among the mistresses would prove a still sadder one than that of the masters ; though I am inclined to think that it would be modified by the fact that the females are knocked out of the race at an earlier stage in their career than the males. A few days since a successful mistress told me of one after another of her successive pupil-teachers who had found their way to the asylum or otherwise utterly collapsed. She herself suffers acutely from chronic nerve-strain, and describes how at night, not sleeping, but awake, she will enter into some explanation to her pupil-teacher, to find after many minutes that there is no

pupil-teacher there, and that it is the walls of her chamber, not those of the schoolroom, that surround her. An accomplished head-mistress, in Suffolk, tells how the working up for examination is "the old man" on the teacher's back. "After the honest work of nine months," says she, "and the overstrain of the three in which the examination falls, I often feel as if I had been put upon the rack—bruised and sore in body as well as in mind. About five years ago I had a complete break-down, when I became very deaf, and my memory seemed suddenly to have forsaken me. A long rest restored the hearing, but the memory has never regained its old power. . . . I assure you that, in the quarter before the examination, I hold *all* my scholars individually in mind. A's spelling must be improved; B's arithmetic is weak; C is not perfect with her repetition, and so on. When I go to bed, there is still the same array of children to torment me in my sleep. Add, that I go to bed at twelve and rise at six to correct exercises, &c., and you may judge that the Code is a heavy burden."

The mortality among school-teachers, according to the *Schoolmaster*, amounts to 2 per cent. per annum, as against $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. among police and sailors. Of the recent students of a large normal college more than one in fifty has died each year, while the normal average mortality among persons between twenty-two and thirty-four years of age is less than one in a hundred.

But in 1881 there were in England and Wales 33,639 pupil teachers assisting the 33,562 certificated teachers. Perhaps these young people show a better bill of health, and we may turn to them for encouragement. I fear not. The pressure on these young lads and undeveloped girls is, if possible, more severe than that on the chiefs themselves. The five best hours of each of five days in the week are given by them to the labour of teaching, probably even more arduous to them, considering their inexperience and inefficiency, than to their overseers. It is to be hoped that Mr. Mundella's new clause limiting their hours of teaching-service to twenty-five per week may be so interpreted as to free them from the heartless drudgery of playing police

over the "kept-in" out of school-hours day after day. But, even so, hard indeed is the life of these children, who, it must be remembered, may be bound at fourteen and practically even at thirteen years of age; and Diocesan or Board requirements of the most burdensome character are too often added to those of the Department itself. A London master says that his pupil-teachers have no recreation whatever, except, perhaps, half-an-hour after tea. "On Saturdays," he explains, "lectures on Diocesan work have to be attended and Diocesan studies entered into; drawing, science, &c., have to be done on this day. I hear everywhere the complaints of pupil-teachers and of those who have been pupil-teachers: their life is one of continual drudgery." The master of a very large Board School in the Midlands says, "I am engaged to take the classes in the pupil-teacher central scheme. These pupil-teachers attend two nights a week, from 6.30 to 8.30, and one night from 6.30 to 9 p.m. If, besides this, they attend any science-class or instruction in French or other language—as they must to get a good start at the Training College—and work up to it, I do not see where the time for recreation is to come from. As a matter of fact, the pupil-teachers who work hardest in school teaching, and who are, therefore, often the best teachers *restore the balance by neglect of systematic study.*" This is the London Board's pupil-teacher's Saturday, according to a twenty-five years' head-master: "A pupil-teacher leaves home at 8.30, attends lectures from 9 to 12.30, then has four hours' hard study to prepare his lessons for the various tutors for Monday, when he again goes to the Centre from 6 to 8.30 p.m. If we break down, whose fault is it, but that of the powers that be—the Taskmasters?" "I fear," says Miss Müller, of the London School Board, "there is very little doubt that the majority of school-mistresses and all pupil-teachers live in a state of ceaseless mental worry, which is injurious to health and perfectly incompatible with that happy and calm temper that every one has a right to enjoy whose life is well-ordered and properly balanced."*

* Report of the National Union of Elementary Teachers, 1882. P. lxxxiii.

But it will be said that the pupil-teacher's is a selected life which can well bear extra strain, since the medical certificate required at the outset sufficiently guards against his liability to injury under the stress of his duties. But facts seem to show that the medical certificate is worse than waste paper, or else that even the sound and strong are broken by the weight of the burden imposed. The testimony to the miserable physique induced by the pupil-teacher's life is melancholy to the last degree. Their very stature seems to be affected. "Almost always short of stature and pale-faced," says Mr. George Smith, "with the anxious, wearied look occasionally that young people ought never to wear." "Of rather diminutive stature and delicate health," says a quondam teacher, now a clergyman. "They grow or rather half-grow narrow-chested," says another, "flabby-muscled, round shouldered, thin; their faces carry a careworn, dreary expression." A lady teacher testifies, "They are very generally pale and delicate in appearance, with a droop in the shoulders and an anxious careworn expression in their faces while in repose. Their brain power can never be properly developed while they work to the extreme of their strength during the day." Another mistress: "In many cases their growth appears much stunted." "A tall pupil teacher is almost a phenomenon in my experience," says an East-end mistress. "The body is sacrificed to the brain," writes a teacher from Kentish Town, "and both suffer in consequence." A lady now removed to the superintendence of a well-known endowed middle-class school observes that "the *moral* strain in endeavouring to govern a class of 20, 30, or 40 children is excessively bad for growing youths and girls." Such testimonies as these might easily be multiplied without limit. Very striking is the remark of the head-mistress of one of the training colleges: "We have done a hard term's work, but these girls all look in better condition than when we received them from their pupil-teacher life."

Grave enough assuredly are these facts regarded solely in reference to the condition of an honourable and indispen-

able profession ; but contemplated from the point of view of our four million scholars,* they acquire a portentous significance. If, as I am persuaded, 50 per cent. of our whole teaching staff are overstrained by their labours or their anxieties, how fatal a flaw must this prove in their influence on the boys and girls submitted to their charge. Negatively, the listlessness and weariness of the teacher must inevitably rob the lessons he superintends of life and interest ; positively, the nervous irritability to which so many teachers pathetically confess, must fill the child's mind with vexation or fear in place of the sunny temper in which alone juvenile study can be healthfully or profitably pursued. But the stress of the demands made upon the childish brain itself renders the school-life to multitudes one long, painful, and pernicious strain, quite independently of the depressing lassitude or the hasty temper of the overwrought masters, mistresses, and pupil-teachers.

To begin with, many schools call upon their scholars for an appalling amount of home-work. Two-and-a-half hours each evening is no uncommon thing. Boys hardly out of the infant school will sit with flushed and throbbing brow over book and slate till ten and even eleven at night. "The continuous occupation of the child-life," writes a very able and earnest teacher, "robs it of due recreation, and tends to destroy all *faculty*, although it may increase *capacity*." But more predominant now than excessive home-lessons is excessive over-time in school. Every school is compelled to exhibit a time-table, and that time-table must be approved by Her Majesty's Inspector. But the table is often little better than a fraud : the anxious teacher expands the five or five-and-a-half hours per diem which it exhibits to six or seven, or more. The quick children may escape these extra hours ; the dull and the delicate are prisoners without reprieve. They must be worked up to "passing" point, and this is the only way to do it. Schools are quoted which

* There were in 1881 on the English and Welsh registers 4,045,862 children. The average attendance for the whole of Great Britain was 3,848,011.

even hold three sessions in the day and another on the Saturday. How does all this affect the health of the scholars themselves?

The most common symptom of its injurious consequence is the talking of lessons in sleep, to which a chorus of inspectors, teachers, and parents bear united witness. "Dozens of instances," says Mr. Quayle, of Liverpool, headmaster of St. Thomas' and St. Matthew's, "of complaints from parents concerning their children's loss of appetite, talking in sleep, languor, nervous state, indifference to childish sports, &c. No robustness or energy." Mr. John Steedman, of Nottingham, says that in his former school, where much hard work was done continuously, and where the population was settled, the regular boys were very small. He has been struck with the rapid growth of many of them during the year or two *after leaving school*. "The children would be better," writes a mistress, "both in mind and body, if their school-life was happier; the strain of the Code prevents this." "The children's health is placed, unfortunately," writes a master, "in competition with the school-master's means of living." Anecdotes abound of parents visiting the school to remonstrate against the pressure put on their little ones, and vainly interceding for the remission of excessive lessons. "About a week ago," said a Lancashire mother the other day, "they began to cram my little one, and she not seven years old, for the examination. It was lessons morning, afternoon, and night, and you never saw her without her books. I don't understand all this learning, but at last I saw that they were killing her. So I went to the school and said that I could not let her work so hard. But they would not let her stop. They said she would do grandly. But I wanted to keep my child. So at last, with no end of difficulty, I got a medical certificate, and now I mean to keep her at home till the inspector's been and gone, I do." In Nottingham, not long since, the parents of a little girl, seeing her overdone and talking of lessons in her sleep, gave notice that they should keep her from school for a time. The teacher promptly called and

offered a present if the child attended regularly! A mistress in Yorkshire was called before a Committee of her Board a few weeks since for unmercifully beating a girl eight years old on the head, because she failed to work a problem in arithmetic (Standard III.). When the mother complained, the answer was that the child was clever enough and could do the sum if she chose. The parents pleaded that she was delicate, and that they would much rather she did not pass the examination till the next year if any severity had to be used. To which answered the teacher: "But I *want my money*, and I'll *make* her pass." That teacher put the whole system of "payment by results" in a nutshell.

We must not dismiss this branch of our inquiry without noting the effect of the requirements on *eyesight*—especially of the needle-work on the eyesight of girls. It is well known that alarm has arisen on this subject in Germany, and that Prince Bismarck taxes the minutely differentiated German printed character with much of the mischief. But like results accrue in England with no such type to bear the blame. A Birmingham mistress writes: "A very large proportion of my scholars suffer from diseases of the eye. Girls are frequently absent for weeks together attending the eye infirmaries. One pupil-teacher became temporarily blind while attempting to complete the needle-work for an examination." Another mistress, in whose school failing eyesight is very common, says, "the sewing (required under the New Code) is something terrible." "Sight," says a third mistress, "is a rapidly increasing failing among the scholars." A few years ago, H. M. Inspector, in a midland town, having conscientiously appraised the needlework of the elder infants grouped before him, turned to the mistress and asked, "Now can you show me any *pinafors by the three-year olds!*" "No, indeed, sir," said she, taking the question for a solemn joke. "Oh, but I assure you *I get them in other schools*," rejoined the official incarnation of the educational ideal of English statesmanship.

In her address to the Elementary Teachers' Union, at Sheffield, on "Over-Pressure in Schools," Miss Müller said:

“To any one watching the progress of a school, be it boys’, girls’, or infants’, which attains annual good ‘results,’ the signs of over-pressure will be visible, though not to the passing visitor, who exclaims in astonishment at the rows of class-rooms abnormally clean, and the rows of children abnormally quiet. A superficial glance at any large institution discovers only appearances, and not realities. But let any one follow the course of such a school during a year or two with quiet and constant visits, and he will see little signs that have large meanings. There are certain evidences which are unmistakable. The visitor will ask himself, ‘Do the children look happy?’ Alas, never! ‘Do the teachers look happy?’ Still less.”* Mr. Sykes, the able President of the Teachers’ Union, speaks with authority, at any rate on the views of teachers. “To a dull child,” says he, “our present system of cram and mechanical drill must make the schoolroom appear as a place of cruel mental torture. . . . Babies, of four or five years of age, are subjected to [the mania for competitive examination]; and children of seven years of age earn grants upon their ability to satisfy the inspector, after passing through the ordeal of individual examination. The pale faces, lack-lustre eyes, aching brains of the little children, and the repeated complaints of brain-fever, loss of eye-sight, and bodily depression and weakness, plainly evince the cruelty as well as the senselessness of the system.”† As to the “babies of four or five years of age,” an ingenuous inspector laments, in his report, that “a very useful year of school-life is frequently lost because the attendance officer can ask no questions about a child under five.”‡ I have a curly-locked, bright-eyed baby of just that age; I am glad he is not “useful” in earning grants for anybody!

An infallible index to the *general* depression of the health of the children in our Elementary Schools is to be found in the *exceptional* and permanent break-down, and even deaths from over-pressure, testified to from so many quarters.

* Report of the N.U.E.T., 1882, p. lxxviii.

† *Ibid.*, pp. xxix., xxviii.

‡ Report of the C. C. E., 1881—2, p. 418.

These cases are difficult to get at, owing to the natural reticence of those who know ; still more difficult to prove, because the *post hoc* is not necessarily the *propter hoc*. Still, it is impossible to doubt their frequent occurrence. "Two cases," writes one head-master, "are conspicuous in my mind." "Some two years ago," says a Liverpool master, "a very intelligent, but delicate boy entered the school, anxious to compete for one of the scholarships established by the Liverpool Council of Education. After being in the school less than six months he died, the immediate cause of death being rheumatism of the heart ; but during the delirium of the last few days, he moaned sadly about his school-work." "My medical adviser," a teacher writes to me from Bristol, "asserts that brain-fever is frequently the result of home-pressure, and that the number of such cases has been on the increase for some years." A lady in the service of the Board at Birmingham, writes : "To maintain a percentage in upper classes meeting Code requirements, I have had to raise a good number from Standard II. to Standard IV. The parents of one child whom I had put forward objected strongly, on the ground that 'last year but one,' said the mother, 'my other girl was served the same, and the very week after the examination she was taken ill and died.' Of course," adds the teacher, "I respected the mother's wishes, but I was not able to set aside the principle ; some other Standard II. child—the next best I could find—had to fill her place." A Bradford master writes to me : "I have heard of many instances in the town of permanent break-down or death resulting from the strain of school-work. A few years ago a girl committed suicide owing to depression of spirits caused by her inability to do the home-work prescribed at school." Mr. Girling, at a recent meeting of the executive of the National Union of Elementary Teachers, referred to the case of a child who had then just died of brain-fever, whose continual cry in his last delirium was, "I can't get it right ! I can't get it right !" At the last annual meeting of the Scotch Educational Institute, Dr. Farquharson said that lassitude, depres-

sion, and dyspepsia had frequently come under his observation among the common school children, and especially chorea, or St. Vitus's dance, and he added that the grimaces and eccentric movements of incipient chorea were sometimes chastised as pieces of impudent buffoonery. At the same congress, Dr. Robert Beveridge, Physician to the Aberdeen Royal Infirmary, gave statistics of the increase of deaths from diseases of the brain among children of school age in the eight large towns of Scotland in the decade 1872—81, when the Education Act was in force, as compared with 1859—68. Dr. Beveridge has been kind enough to assist me in reducing these statistics to exact tabular form. He compares first the percentage of deaths during school age by brain disease with deaths from all causes for the two periods, and then the percentage of deaths by brain disease with deaths from all causes except zymotics, which are, of course, very irregular. This is the result :— *

	Percentage of Deaths from Diseases of the Brain to Deaths from all Causes during School-age.		Percentage of Deaths from Diseases of the Brain to Deaths from all Causes, except Zymotic Diseases, during School age.	
	1859—1868.	1872—1881.	1859—1868.	1872—1881.
Aberdeen	7·5	9·2	11·3	12·7
Dundee	5	8·4	8·4	12·2
Edinburgh	6·6	7·7	10·27	13·4
Glasgow	5·5	7·3	8·4	9·9
The eight large towns of Scotland	5·8	7·7	9·05	10·95

Enough has, perhaps, now been said to establish the

* These figures, covering about a third of the population of Scotland, and comparing whole decades, are on a large enough scale to exclude casual sources of fallacy. Their significance will, perhaps, be more apparent when converted into the following form :—

	Increase of proportion of deaths from Brain Disease to deaths from all sources.		Increase of proportion of deaths from Brain Disease to deaths from all sources except zymotics.	
	Per cent.		Per cent.	
Aberdeen	22·67	...	12·39	...
Dundee	68	...	45·24	...
Edinburgh	16·67	...	30·48	...
Glasgow	32·73	...	17·86	...
The Eight large Towns of Scotland... ..	32·76	...	20·99	...

Dr. Beveridge has extracted his figures from the returns of the Registrar-

fact that there is among teachers and children in our Elementary Schools (1) a widespread depression of health, and (2) too high a percentage of complete physical or mental collapses. But it must not be supposed that this state of things is attributable *solely* to the high-pressure system which is so much to be deplored. The evil effects of bad methods of work are redoubled by bad sanitary arrangements.

The principal requirements of the Education Department, from a sanitary point of view, are that 80 cubic feet of internal space and eight square feet of internal area shall be allowed in every school-building for each unit of average attendance; and that managers shall not fail, after six months' notice, to remedy any such defect in the premises as seriously interferes with the efficiency of the school. Failure here may, under the New Code, incur the loss of half the whole grant earned. The Department further

General, the only source available. In these returns ages are arranged in four classes:—(1) Under 5 years; (2) 5 to 20; (3) 20 to 60; and (4) over 60 years. Hence Dr. Beveridge is compelled to take school age as 5—20 years without further sub-division. The large proportion of the Scotch town population going on to the High Schools and the Universities renders this prolonged schoolage less vitiating for our purpose than it would be for English lives; but undoubtedly the pressure in these advanced seminaries, which is notorious, constitutes an appreciable factor in our results. The *chief* disease of the brain or nervous system among persons between 5 and 20 is ophthalmitis, or inflammation of the brain proper. Death from convulsions, which would otherwise be a highly vitiating element, not depending on such causes as we are investigating, is almost entirely confined to infants under 5 years. Dr. Beveridge has kindly supplied me with these figures for the eight large towns of Scotland (1881), which will show the proportion in which different nervous disorders prove fatal at different ages:—

	Age: 0—5		5—20		20—60		60—		Total
Cephalitis	350	...	110	...	47	...	8	515
Apoplexy	86	...	34	...	280	...	296	696
Paralysis...	11	...	11	...	221	...	440	683
Insanity	0	...	0	...	10	...	6	16
Chorea	0	...	2	...	1	...	0	3
Epilepsy	9	...	11	...	44	...	14	78
Convulsions	453	...	31	...	12	...	2	498
Diseases of Brain in other forms or undefined	60	...	68	...	164	...	90	382
Total	969	...	267	...	779	...	856	2,871

requires generally to be satisfied that the premises are healthy, well lighted, warmed, drained, and ventilated.

Such provision proves in the working miserably inefficient for its ends. The close, stuffy atmosphere of nine school-rooms out of ten after an hour's occupation is truly horrible. Indeed, how could it possibly be otherwise? Eighty cubic feet per child, says the English Department: Professor Pettenkofer, of Munich, lends his high authority to a demand for 540 cubic feet per child. We put twenty-seven children into the class-room which he declares is only fit for four! In a hundred ways premises passed without a criticism by H. M. Inspectors are disqualified for the child's abiding place during one-fourth part of its existence. Light falling in the wrong direction, knife-board seats, seats so high that the poor little feet dangle, all these blemishes leave the grant untouched. Miss Löfving tells us how in the schools of the London Board, the child's left arm is placed on the desk above the copy-book or slate, the trunk twisted and bent to the left, the left side of the chest and abdomen pressing with full weight against the desk—a posture disastrous to growth, to respiration, to circulation, to digestion, and to spinal development. “When remonstrating,” says she, “against this barbarity, I got the astonishing answer, that this position was enjoined by *the Government Inspector*, ‘in order to prevent the children copying from each other.’” *

We have then to face the fact of terrible physical evil in our national system of education—a wholesale undermining of health which must tell with redoubled power in the second generation. Now, I believe the unexpressed feeling of many excellent people might be summed up thus: No doubt it is a very sad thing that some should be struck down and many maimed, but after all it is worth great sacrifices to become an educated nation; if the minority suffer, yet the majority have great gain; and we must not look only at the victims of the battle, but also at the splendid fruits of victory. It becomes necessary then to ask, *Are we becom-*

* *Lecture on Physical Education and its place in a Rational System of Education.* By CONCORDIA LÖFVING, p. 44.

ing an educated nation? What is the calibre of the education bestowed at so great a cost?

Teachers, at any rate, are almost unanimous that to two classes of children a good education—an education good *for them*—is by the present system absolutely denied. First, the clever children are defrauded of the proper fruits of their talent, for they are dragged back by the dullards and the dunces. The interested teacher has no interest in leading them forward apace: the disinterested teacher has no time to spare to them from the backward. Secondly, the dull children are forced in a manner that robs them of what little brain-power they begin with. They must be presented in a higher standard each successive year, and if possible by any pulling or pushing, they must be passed. To the average child, a good many authorities agree, the requirements of the Code are pretty fairly adjusted. Now by a trick of thought, it is common to assume that the average children are the majority, that non-average children are the exception. But in reality there are very few average children indeed; and if first we subtract those for whom the Code moves too slowly, and next those for whom it goes too fast, we shall have a very meagre class left to benefit by its measured scale of progress. The truth, however, would appear to be that its pitch is that of the *rather* clever children; so that on the one side the few *very* clever children suffer by its leniency, and on the other the combined mass of the average children and the slow suffer by its stringency.

It is the *driving*, then, which is the major evil in the educational working of the Code. A horse spurred up a steep hill will stop dead beat before it gains the top. "It is a common thing," writes a Birmingham teacher, "for children who have been driven through the lower standards, when reaching the fourth to fail utterly, and leave school with an utter distaste for study." "The fundamental work of the 'three R's' is not half as well done as it was twenty years ago," says another; "boys who begin bright get quite stupid by the time they are in Standard IV." Mr. Quayle says, "Children just scrape through an examina-

tion, and are then placed (per Code) in a higher standard, where the work is far beyond their comprehension. To ensure a pass, they are then forced, goaded, and crammed, till work is made hateful to them, and their intellect is dulled. This goes on year after year till they get exemption from attendance at school, when books are cast aside and the groundwork so laborously prepared, is seldom made use of." Mr. John Reynolds, headmaster of the splendid school at Flowery Field, near Manchester, and on the whole the warmest friend of the Codes Old and New I have met with among teachers, alleges that "where an attempt is made to get extraordinary percentages, dunces are worried into deeper stolidity." Mr. Francombe, of the Redcliffe Endowed Boys' School, at Bristol, allows me to quote his opinion that "the number of subjects now being taught in our schools greatly impairs the results in the 'three R's,' and that *but few boys leave our schools able to write well and spell correctly.*" A colleague in the same city corroborates: "Nothing is learnt really well, only a smattering of each subject being taught to each child, as the requirements are too many to be mastered in the time." Mr. Hodgson, of Kidderminster, complains that "there is not time to train children to think." This view is more strongly put by a lady now freed from the trammels and conducting with the highest success a school that knows neither Code nor Standard. She holds that the "payment by results" system "is admirably calculated to further mechanical cram and trickery and discourage all true educators with noble aims." "What will pass, not what will educate, is the incentive," says Mr. George Smith. Mr. Steedman has placed in my hands a most careful paper on the whole question. While not deeming the Code requirements as in themselves excessive, he holds that it is only suitable for children "not harassed by multifarious work or home-duties which occupy the mind with other subjects and hinder *that process of germination* which ought to ensue between positive study and study."

It is worth while to observe in what manner the system strikes at thoughtful teaching and induces "cram." A female teacher whom I have already quoted, after sighing over the process by which "the dunces are with pain untold brought to 'passing' pitch," says, "I once heard a Second Standard examined in geography. There were ten out of the thirty whose knowledge of Physical Geography might have put grown people to the blush, and the rest acquitted themselves not dishonourably. Yet, in the report, the teacher's only reward was, 'The answering in Standard II. should be more general.' How think you the teacher prepared her class for the next examination? By the *rule of grind*; so many through the mill: and the report this time gave her great praise." I have been furnished with a kindred illustration from another branch: "Mr. L——, head master of St. —— School, felt very dissatisfied with the results of his arithmetical teaching, although his school passed very creditable examinations. The whole work seemed to him too mechanical, and consequently little helpful in developing the intelligence of his scholars. He changed his methods. He taught next on first principles. He was delighted to see the ingenuity shown by the children in inventing processes. The answers certainly were not always correct, but that was owing to mechanical drill having given place to rational methods, which might be a little less reliable for answers, but which were more fruitful of thought-life. The well-known book of Sonnenschein and Nesbitt was his *vade mecum*. The examination came round at last. If the 'intelligence' of his school should be now tested he was sanguine. But intelligence could not be tested by a dumb card with one or two arithmetical puzzles on it. The 'results' of the examination were bad. The grant was poor. Next year Mr. L—— turned Sonnenschein out, and returned to the old and profitable plan, getting a good grant for his reward."

And if teachers speak thus hopelessly of their own work, what have Inspectors to say? Truly I believe some of them know but little of it; yet many clearly see its failings.

"Year after year," writes Mr. Brodie, "the same complaints are in every Inspector's report. The teaching is dry, bookish, technical, barren." Yet this same Inspector boldly defends the test by percentages of passes. "They attest," he declares, "when high, to at least much solid hard work, dogged labour, and persistent every-day drudgery." Alas ! they do. But doggedness and drudgery, these will make neither bright nor intelligent children. Mr. Barrington-Ward confides to "my lords" his experiences thus: "Too many elementary teachers, men and women alike, still fancy that it is sufficient to aim at mere mechanical excellence, to the exclusion of the development of those rational faculties which raise man to his noble rank above the brute creation. With some teachers whom I could name a parrot or a monkey would almost form as apt a pupil as his present charges." This is very impressive writing, though not quite grammatical; but Mr. Barrington-Ward should remember that for twenty years our teachers have been assiduously taught that if they diverge from mechanical teaching the average wage of forty shillings a week is likely to drop to thirty-five. Mr. Alderson, one of the best and kindest of Inspectors (though I grieve to find him going for increase of school hours), finds little benefit to true education from the multitude of "subjects," in addition to the "three R's," which throng the modern Codes. He finds in too many of the schools of busy Marylebone "Reading, which does not expand the mind; grammar, which does not leaven speech and writing; arithmetic, which does not form a habit of exact thinking; geography, which does not interest the imagination; literature, that does not improve the taste; physiology, that has no bearing on the simple laws of health; domestic economy, that does not contribute to the comfort of homes."

No, we are not yet becoming "an educated nation."

I shall be met with the rejoinder that I have failed to recognise the amendment in all this negative and positive evil likely to result from the introduction of Mr. Mundella's New Code. Teachers are almost unanimous in acknowledg-

ing the higher minded desire to do good which has actuated Mr. Mundella in the preparation of this now famous document, and the gracious courtesy and kindness with which, in bright contrast to some of his predecessors, he has striven to comprehend and to meet their views; an acknowledgment most thoroughly deserved. But unhappily teachers are almost equally unanimous in the apprehension that the New Code will prove very nearly as oppressive as any of its predecessors, if not even more so.*

That Code retains the principle, but modifies the method, of "payment by results." In Infant Schools the total possible grant is to be seventeen shillings per unit of average attendance. Of this, nine shillings is fixed and depends in no way on results. Two, four, or six shillings may be awarded as the "merit grant," of which more anon. Two shillings will depend on results in needlework and singing. In Boys' Schools, the highest possible (excluding grants on "special subjects") will be £1 0s. 10d. per unit of average attendance—viz., four shillings and sixpence fixed independently of results; one, two, or three shillings, merit grant; eight shillings and fourpence, depending on an exact percentage test; and five shillings, depending on a rough percentage test.† In Girls' Schools one shilling extra is possible, viz., the grant for needlework. In addition to these amounts, however, individual scholars may be presented for examination in one or in two "specific subjects," and for each individual pass under this head, the grant will be swelled by four shillings. The merit grant is an entirely new element in the Government allowance. It is undoubtedly conceived in the true interests of education, and

* Inspectors seem to expect that the New Code will either leave things pretty much as they are or increase the pressure all round. Mr. Collins, Inspector for the Peterborough district: "With regard to the New Code, generally, he might say that the examinations would, as far as possible, go on the same lines as in past years."—(*Schoolmaster*, Feb. 3, 1883.) Mr. Hitchens, Inspector for the Huddersfield district: "No doubt it gave them all more work."—(*Schoolmaster*, Feb. 17, 1883.)

† The "Instructions to Inspectors" suggests 75 per cent. in "class subjects" for "good," which is understood to earn the full grant, 50 per cent. for "fair," which will earn the half grant under this last head.

nothing can be more admirable than the description given by "my lords" of the "excellent" school entitled to the highest award under this head.* But the Inspector is still instructed to regard "the number of passes"—in other words the percentage—as an important element in the award of the merit grant; and quantity being so much easier to assess than quality, there is every reason to fear that this will form, in the majority of districts, the real foundation on which merit will be calculated, quality, and, still more, general organisation and tone, being more or less shadowy accessories in the inspector's mind. Indeed, though "the rage for percentages" which teacher after teacher has deplored, may be in some degree checked by the New Code, the temptation to the teacher to wring the utmost possible quantitative results out of the brains of the largest number possible of children will be as stringent under the New Code as the Old; nor will it make much difference in the stress of that temptation whether the teacher's pittance is to be directly measured by the results obtained or whether he is only working in the fear of managers whose pride and (in Voluntary Schools) whose pockets will be affected by the rise or the fall in grant. No child whose name has been on the register within the last twenty-two weeks, it must be remembered, may be withheld from examination without the express and individual sanction of the Inspector; every child must be presented in a standard higher than that in which he was presented the year before, unless the Inspector give express and individual permission to the contrary, and the First Standard must be taken at seven years old. The loud and unanimous appeal of the teachers all over the land is to be allowed to withhold from examination at least one child in ten on their own responsibility, and to be entrusted on their own responsibility with greater freedom of classification according to the ability—as distinguished from the age—of their pupils.

The concession of this dual demand would, no doubt, miti-

* "Instructions to Inspectors," Sec. 32.

gate the monstrous evils of the unhappy system that is in vogue; but I am persuaded that while the broad principle of "payment by results" continues in the ascendant, overpressure, rule of thumb, and the perversion of the true ends of education will prevail over the length and breadth of the land. Let teachers rather look to the New Ministerial Circular of Upper Canada, where, in the upper grades at least, a clean sweep is made of payment by result. Let them ask, with one of my own correspondents, "If the teachers in Germany and America can be trusted to do their work without being required to make all children pass a certain examination each year, why may not we?" As it is, our allies in the methods of education on all the face of the globe are, I have seen it stated, Austria and China only!

But it is not the method only, but the aim as well, that is in fault, not the practice alone, but the ideal too. Two supreme mistakes vitiate the whole organisation of English education, from the Elementary Schools, through the Grammar Schools and Girls' High Schools, to the Universities. The first mistake is the conception of intellectual training as the acquisition of information rather than the development of faculty. The second mistake is the conception of intellectual training as itself constituting education, whereas education is the co-ordinate and interdependent development of physical, intellectual, and moral faculty.

Of the first mistake this only need be said: it springs out of the trading spirit in which education is regarded, the trading spirit which was the inspiration of Mr. Lowe, and corroded all his work; yet even from the purely commercial point of view it is utterly fallacious. Not the boy stuffed with "crammed" facts (even if he did not disgorge them the moment schooling ends) makes the good clerk or the successful merchant, but the boy of thoughtful energy. Many a rich man of to-day never went to school at all after six years old. Well spoke a thriving Glasgow shoemaker a month or two ago: "Education Act a success? Why, before the Act my apprentices used to come to me unable to

read or write, but they'd rise to an idea like a trout to a fly. Now they all write well enough, but they've no brightness or intelligence."

But the second mistake is the fatal one—the conception of intellectual education as something which machinery may produce apart from the development of the other faculties of our humanity. I will not speak now of moral training. The Inspector is, indeed, instructed to satisfy himself "that all reasonable care is taken, in the ordinary management of the school, to bring up the children in the habits of punctuality, of good manners and language, of cleanliness and neatness, and also to impress upon the children the importance of cheerful obedience to duty, of consideration and respect for others, and of honour and truthfulness in word and act." * If the conditions of inspection and examination were not directly inimical to some of these requirements, a higher value might be set upon this paragraph than, as it is, is possible. It is perhaps useless here to express the grief and shame that arise from the reflection that the chaotic condition of religious opinion compels the unnatural divorce of religious from intellectual training in the common schools of the country—an arrangement which not only emaciates the intellectual education itself, but fosters the pernicious conception of religion as a thing apart from the daily concerns of life. And this is said with the full knowledge that no amendment is possible till the nation is baptized with a new faith, and the vivid sense of religious realities penetrates the national thought and life.

The failure of educationists in this country, however, to recognise the need of interpenetrating intellectual with physical education, must be discussed at greater length. Parliament and the Department have charged themselves with certain responsibilities in regard to the physical welfare of the child. However ineffectually they discharge it, they freely acknowledge the duty of guarding the scholar from overt physical injury. Negatively they hold them-

* Cited from the Code of 1881, in "Instructions to Inspectors," Sec. 82.*

selves responsible. They have failed to perceive that, if they undertake to educate, they have to take in charge positive physical development. It is not enough to say, "We will guard this child from bad air and bad smells." It would not be enough even to *do* it, as well as to say it. If you are going to educate, you must educate body as well as mind; indeed, you cannot truly do the one without the other. Speaking of the mass, not of the exceptional individual, it is certain that you cannot have sound minds, save by securing sound bodies as their instruments. If you try for the former, neglecting the latter, the mind will fail of true health; and every effort to develop it alone will react with fearful force upon the body. "Overstrain in Education" will not stop when adequate ventilation is secured and hours of mental toil are limited; it will go on till physical development is sought by positive agencies as careful and elaborate as those designed for the promotion of intellectual progress.

"The art of education" writes (of all men) Professor Bain, "assumes a certain average of physical health, and does not inquire into the means of keeping up or increasing that average." Alas! that is so in Great Britain; but so it ought not to be. True education is the harmonious development of all the powers towards the perfect man. It is not the traders only of the future that fill our schools, but the citizens and parents. Mr. Colt-Williams fears for our future army and navy if the present school curriculum is extended. But physical vigour is no less needful to the sound citizenship of the civilian; and in the light of our modern knowledge of heredity, terrible indeed is the responsibility resting on any legislators who strain the physique of the fathers and mothers that are to be.

Just as much, then, as it is the duty of the State to strive to develop a higher intelligence in the rising generation, is it incumbent upon it to take measures as an essential element in national education for the development of a higher healthiness. Having once laid its constraining hand upon our boys and girls, it must either make or mar, physically

no less than intellectually : and it is bound not to mar, but make.

If this grave natural obligation once be recognised, many hours of the present brain-labour will have to be swept away to make room for the physical culture which alone can secure sound results even in the intellectual sphere. The games of our little ones will be seen to be no less important than their lessons ; the play-ground will be as essential as the school-room. The "run out" at the end of every hour, while doors and windows are flung open to let the air sweep through, will be a part of the school discipline. Hygienic seats and desks will be universally required. And all this blessed reformation will be consummated by a complete, graduated, scientific course of gymnastic education—not the weekly drill based on the requirements of military evolution and superintended by a pompous sergeant dressed in a little brief authority, but the daily exercise of all the muscles of the body based on physiological laws.

The gratitude of all educational reformers, and all lovers of children, and all believers in the high functions of humanity, is due to Miss Löfving for her efforts to inspire English educators with a sense of the high sanctity of their calling and the miserable failure of their practice. Especially is it to be hoped that she may succeed in awakening interest in the gymnastic system elaborated by her celebrated countryman and predecessor, Ling. The London School Board has actually listened to her pleadings, and allowed her to exhibit the Swedish methods. But when she went so far as to ask for three half-hours in the week for the girls of London to practise the Ling gymnastics, "payment by results" forbade it ; and these children—many of them without any true physical exercise whatever—must content themselves with fulfilling Mr. Brodie's ideal, "solid hard work, dogged labour, and persistent every-day drudgery," to the end of the chapter.*

* It was my intention, when I undertook this article, not to confine the discussion to the "Overstrain" in Primary Schools, but to adduce evidence of its widespread existence in the middle and higher classes ; and I am

With all the splendid progress which has marked our century, with all the battles won against ignorance, and indebted to several head-mistresses and others connected with the education now offered in Girls' High Schools for furnishing me with the fruits of their experience and the expression of their views. But I have found it impossible, in the present paper, to go beyond the limits of the narrower subject treated in the text. The rapid spread, however, of Girls' High Schools throughout the country, superseding by their cheapness many excellent private seminaries, makes the nature of the education given in them and the attention accorded to physical considerations, a question of more than private interest and importance. The Girls' Public Day-School Company now possesses twenty-seven establishments in different parts of the country, with 4,800 pupils, and there are a growing number of schools modelled more or less on the pattern of these, under local committees of gentlemen and ladies. The Company aspires to set the tone of education for middle-class girls. It is a pleasure to be allowed to quote Miss Hastings, head mistress of the Wimbledon High School, to the effect that the Company are "most wise and thoughtful" in refraining from pressing the responsible teachers for educational results which the mistresses think excessive; but I fear they do not always exercise over mistresses who adopt other views and methods of education than Miss Hastings, such a supervision as shall check the excessive stimulus of which there is such frequent complaint. Miss Hastings declines to send in any of her pupils for outside examinations, such as the Oxford and Cambridge "Locals;" but in other schools, both within and outside the control of the Company, the utmost stress is laid upon these examinations as tests of work done, and a distinguished head-mistress, though not prepared to set her face against them, still writes to me that, in her opinion, the Council are misled at times in the direction of too strongly urging examinations by the success of schools which purchase their distinction at the heavy price of overwork. Under mistresses such as I have quoted, the health of the scholars is all that can be desired; but of those schools where the lady principals stimulate the ambition of their pupils, or fail to check the eagerness of those whose natural ambition is excessive, a very different story must be told. "During the examination week," writes an assistant teacher, "I have known of several girls going into hysterics, who are not usually at all wanting in self-control; and I have known of two fainting in the midst of an examination." "Girls are so anxious," says another lady of much experience in High Schools, though not, I believe, under the Company, "that they work themselves up to almost a frenzy of excitement from nervous dread of failure." Yet the Principal of one of the Company's schools writes to me:—"I have known cases in which excitable girls, instead of being rather checked, have been urged on by constant inquiries by their parents about marks, &c., first to get to the top of their respective forms, and then to pass various outside examinations, till their nervous systems have been completely overdone." And though this lady lays the chief blame on the parents, who urge their daughters on, yet, on the one hand, certainly many parents are constantly protesting against the school demands, and, on the other, it is the school system that is responsible for suggesting to parents

filth, and vice, in grasp of what is meant by the training of a human being, we have fallen behind the fellow-these mad and criminal ambitions. "Girls," says the same lady, "who are pressed on at the early age of the Junior Cambridge to take high honours often break down completely, and do no more. So also with the Senior. I hear grievous complaints from Newnham and Girton that the girls from certain schools have been so overworked before coming up that they can do nothing at Cambridge." An assistant teacher writes to me:—"In High Schools it depends entirely on the head mistress of each school whether there is overwork or not." She adds her opinion—after an experience in three High Schools—that "all marks, positions, prizes, &c., ought to be done away with, and the pupils should work for the sake of the good they get from the work. It is not the work, but the anxiety and strain that accompanies the work which does the harm. Girls sometimes get a mark-fever, never satisfied unless they get the highest mark. I see them rush for corrected papers with flushed faces and trembling hands, look at the end for the mark, and then stuff them into their desks. It is not the work they care about, but what they get for the work," which reminds me of a youth who afterwards took the Balliol, at Oxford, in an exceptionally brilliant examination. When I knew him he was the most wonderful prize-getter—no matter in what subject—I ever fell in with. His true culture was indicated by the fact that his college room was adorned with tawdry and vulgar coloured prints, and he always emphatically protested that he cared not at all for knowledge, nor for distinction, but only for the *money value of his winnings*. I will conclude this note by transcribing the major part of an admirable letter from the mistress of a non-Company High School in the North of England. She writes:—

"There are few subjects upon which I feel so strongly as that of physical education and development; especially as it seems to take such a very secondary place in many public girls' schools, and is frequently altogether neglected.

"1. I think one of the greatest evils is the local examinations for girls under eighteen years of age. They put a great strain upon them. The girls unconsciously get over-excited, and where the examination is constantly held before them as the goal to which they are tending, they think more of it than the work they are actually doing. Young children, especially, if they are not stupid and apathetic, become unnaturally excited. Work might possibly be arranged in a school so that the girls were unconscious of an approaching examination in it, but this is very difficult to accomplish with such as the Oxford and Cambridge Local Examinations. In my opinion it is better in Girls' High Schools to arrange for a systematic course of education suited to the ages, capacity, and to a certain extent local characteristics of the girls, and subject the school periodically to an inspection. This does away with prolonged strain and enables thorough work to be tested. The Oxford and Cambridge Local Examinations require a knowledge of a great many subjects, and young children should not be occupied with more than a very few at one time. For this last reason I consider them very injurious. Again, failure is often taken very much to heart, especially by the best, most thoughtful, intelli-

citizens of Pericles and the sophists with whom Socrates held dispute. They at least knew that the whole man gent and conscientious girls, and it is they who as a rule do not succeed well in examinations. The result is that they are disappointed; they lose confidence in themselves, and become indifferent. Their intelligence gets blunted, and all spirit for investigation and research is crushed out by the thought that there is no time for anything but that which is needed for the examination. I think the very feeling of having accomplished some thing intellectually adds to bodily vigour and energy, and then follows the desire for exercise. I have seen girls after thinking out some question, and finally arriving at a right conclusion, being seized with the desire to rush about and play. But this healthy feeling never comes to a girl who is crammed.

"2. No school should be without a spacious playground and a large, airy room for wet weather. The system of turning girls out for ten or even five minutes in the middle of the morning for an orderly march round a corridor or playground, is, in my opinion, altogether unnatural. So is supervision by a teacher during play, unless she plays with them at their request. A large number of girls together will generally play, and play well and heartily, if left to themselves for fifteen minutes, and not need supervision.

"3. A portion of every day should be given to systematic drill. For older girls of 17 and 18, gymnastics might be substituted for drill, or supplement it with advantage. A good school should have its gymnasium and, if possible, swimming bath.

"4. I think that, as a rule, far too much written work is expected from girls. The bent, cramped position over a desk, for a length of time, is bad for them, both at school and at home. It increases the duties of the teachers enormously, for all written work should be carefully looked over and corrected. Children would be brighter, and their knowledge would be more thorough, for more 'question and answer' in class; and the time thus spent in catechising would, although apparently taken from the lesson, be spent to the greater advantage of the pupils.

"5. If girls are kept on the mental stretch for nearly four hours in the morning, that is, for two hours at a time, with an interval of half-an-hour in the middle for drill and play, very little good work can be expected from them in addition. In many High Schools girls work, I may say, literally always. They come home at one o'clock, begin to work immediately after dinner, take no walk or exercise, or, if they are forced to go out, think all the way of their lessons. They work again all the evening until late at night, perhaps until 11 o'clock, and even then they do not rest, but think of a Euclid rider or some other mathematical problem the last thing, and leave it to solve itself during the night by unconscious cerebration. In the morning it has to be hastily written out, and the girl leaves home without having time left to eat her breakfast. This is not education; and a school which allows such a state of things to continue must have something very much amiss with its organisation. Hard, bright class-work, with a little carefully-set work to do at home on the day's lesson, is in my opinion the best economy, and I have found it answer.

"6. If teachers are conscientiously to prepare their lessons, and I main-

must be trained if the parts were to be sound. Those schools of Athens, which bred the highest type of intellect which has ever adorned the human race, were all gymnasia. The young men, whose university was the Academy or the Lyceum, equipped themselves with immortal philosophy and mathematics while they walked among the orange-trees and myrtles; and health meant with them what the word means in its old Anglo-Saxon strength, wholeness of all the faculties which make up humanity.

In her essay on "Hygeiolatry," Miss Cobbe owns to the gravest apprehension lest modern society should be invaded by a new principle in morals. The threatening principle she reduces to this formula: "That any practice which, in the opinion of experts, conduces to health or tends to the cure of disease, becomes, *ipso facto*, morally lawful and right.* Nor is it easy to escape the facts which Miss Cobbe marshals to prove her case. Rightly or wrongly, legislation for health is carried forward with a zeal which takes but scanty heed of constitutional principles and personal rights for which our forefathers spent treasure of means and life. Rightly or wrongly, not only the warehouse and the mill, but the home and the actual person are more and more subjected to inspection and control which neither we nor our fathers have hitherto been able to bear.

But the strange thing is that side by side with this phenomenon, contemporaneously with the appearance of the degrading and deadly doctrine which Miss Cobbe deplures, and of the good and true spirit of sanitary reform which is the brighter side of the medal, we have a growing recklessness about healthy living, which makes for the tain that the simplest lesson needs preparation, they must not be burdened with the drudgery of correcting endless exercises. A teacher in a High School should not have her time so filled up that she cannot correct all her exercise-books within school hours. This, however, is generally the case, owing probably to an inadequate staff. I do not believe a teacher in full work can at the same time take an examination herself satisfactorily. I have never known of a case of its being done without a breakdown sooner or later, or without some detriment to health."

* "The Peak in Darien," &c., p. 82.

serious deterioration of the stalwart English race. While health-committees of Town Councils are more vigilant than any previous generation has known them, barristers, solicitors, physicians, ministers of religion by the hundred are living at a pressure of which the lightest result is chronic dyspepsia and consequent enfeebled progeny, while among the graver consequents are heart disease, consumption, paralysis, insanity, early death. While food-reform and dress-reform are becoming the social gospel of thousands of educated ladies, I for one have frequently reckoned up the whole circle of my personal acquaintances in the vain attempt to find a single unbroken family of vigorous and healthy girls. While local and national legislators freely sanction, in the interests of health, regulations which empower sanitary officers to enter the private house and carry off the sick child against the protest of the parent, the school which the State endows reeks with foul air, and the school-keeper is bribed to goad the slow brain till it keeps pace with the quick. While physiology and domestic economy are earning heavy grants from the State purse, the simplest physiological laws are ignored, and the first principles of sanitary economy are defied by the agents of State education.

The anomaly springs from one fundamental cause. The criminal excess and the criminal defect in the care for health equally arise from a great lack in our social and religious philosophy. That lack is an *ethics of the body*.

The only true ethics of the body consists in its recognition as an instrument for responsible use—a recognition which can be generated only by a vivid religious sense of its direct derivation from the Supreme in trust for the furtherance of the noblest purposes of life. Such a recognition will, on the one hand, check the disposition to regard physical sanitation as the ultimate end of the existence of the individual or the race. It will, on the other hand, constrain each man by its moral force towards thoughtful and steady solicitude for his own health and that of the community of which he is a responsible unit. Under the guidance of such

a principle, we shall neither exalt the care of the body to be the final goal of our social aims, nor leave the body to shift for itself unconsidered and untended.

Guided by such an ethics, the citizen will perceive the avoidable over-taxing of his own physical powers and the indulgence of idle and selfish habits to be alike immoral. A voluntary spendthrift moral strain and a voluntary inactivity he will know to be equal sins; and he will no longer, while gravely telling his neighbour he does wrong to overwork, cherish a secret persuasion that his own overwork leans to the side of virtue. We shall all understand it to be our duty to maintain our physical constitutions at the highest level of efficiency we can, to the end that "our bodies may be the servants of our spirits, and both our bodies and our spirits be God's servants."

But if such is the obligation of the professional man in his own case, how far graver the obligation with regard to the young and tender minds and frames committed to his charge. Here are men not made, but men and women in the making. The delicate balance of physical, intellectual, and moral power can be sustained in the process of development only by the wisest and most constant care. The breach of moral trust involved in the reckless spoiling of the physical instrument of our own intellectual and spiritual life is aggravated ten-fold when we spoil the lungs or brains of those who are themselves defenceless against our rule. Moreover, to the healthy development of the child a bounding energy is needful which the adult can do without. The twelve months of over-strain or the few weeks of feverish solicitude and struggle go further towards over-balancing the poise of child-power than towards wrecking the harmonious order of a grown man's energies. Childhood is the time for *preparing* the physical instrument; in manhood, if it is simply kept in sound condition, it is enough.

But the gravity of the trust is again enormously increased when the State lays hold of the child with its all-compelling hand, and charges itself with his intellectual development. Compulsory education—however wise and necessary—is the

assumption, by the State, of the responsibility inherent in the parent. The English legislature constrains the child to certain intellectual training. It is bound by every consideration alike of justice and of mercy to see to it that the form of that intellectual training shall be consonant with the best and truest physical development. It is its urgent duty to recognise the rights and functions of the body. That State which seizes the children of the poor at an age when, for the rich man's little ones, life is still but the sunny alternation between the nursery and the garden, and administers, in the name of education, a system by which the physique of multitudes is enfeebled, and preparation is made for the deterioration of the race, commits surely an almost unforgivable sin. Whosoever shall cause one of these little ones to stumble, it were better for him if a great mill-stone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea.

The path of reform, however, lies open, and there is no serious difficulty in entering on it. Let educationalists clearly expound to themselves the ideal towards which they are labouring. Is that ideal a generation of children full of useful information—information for the most part to be utterly forgotten twelve months after emancipation from the mental drill of school,—or is it a generation of bright and happy, intelligent and loving boys and girls, full of the promise of that stalwart manhood and comely womanhood which make for the greatness and virtue of a nation? The latter ideal once selected, the better way will soon be found; and the English people of the dawning twentieth century will be a people realising that noble harmony of physical and moral faculty of which Browning tells:—

We need no longer say,

“*Spite* of this flesh to-day,

“ I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole.”

As a bird wings and sings,

Let us cry, “ All good things

“ Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul.”

RICHARD A. ARMSTRONG.

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CARLYLE AND
EMERSON.*

ON a day in August, fifty years ago this coming summer, Thomas Carlyle was sitting "stranded and helpless" in his home amongst the solitudes of Craigenputtock, to which he had returned after a few months' attempt to endure the near neighbourhood of his fellow-creatures in Edinburgh. The experiment had been foredoomed to failure; and he had shaken off the dust of his feet against the city which had been to him "the dullest and poorest and on the whole the paltriest of places," and the people, who were "the most entirely shallow, barren, unfruitful, and trivial set of persons" who had ever come across his bodily vision! Now he had been at home again some three months, brooding over his destiny, and waiting in a somewhat tragic attitude to know what his work was to be. He had just been writing in his journal: "I am left here the solitariest, stranded, most helpless creature that I have been for many years. Months of suffering and painful indolence I see before me; forin much I am *wrong*, and till it is righted, or on the way to being so, I cannot help myself." "On the whole it is good, it is absolutely needful for one to be humbled and prostrated, and thrown among the pots from time to time. Life is a school: we are *perverse* scholars to the last and require the rod. Above me, as I thought last night in going to sleep, is the mute *Immensity*; Eternity is behind and before. What are all the cares of this short little Platform of existence, that they should give thee pain?" †

* *The Correspondence of Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 1834-1872. In two volumes; with Portraits. London: Chatto and Windus. 1883.

† *Life of Carlyle*. By J. A. Froude. Vol. II., p. 353.

The next entry after the pages which contain these confessions and reflections, with much more in the same vein of mingled despondency and resolve, is in another handwriting, Mr. Froude says, and is merely a name—Ralph Waldo Emerson. The name stands there as the opening word of a beautiful chapter of friendship begun that summer day half a century ago, a friendship the intimate record of which is contained in the letters now given us at the wish of both the writers. It began under happy auspices. Carlyle, we may be sure, was not to be reckoned on at all times as likely to be the most cordial of hosts, nor was he quick at recognising a man's good qualities at first sight. But such a visitor as this young American, so eager and generous, bringing such sunshine of hope and enthusiasm with him, and coming so far to look on the prophet who, as yet, was without honour in his own country, could not be coldly received. "Of course," wrote Carlyle to his mother, "we could do no other than welcome him; the rather as he seemed to be one of the most lovable creatures in himself we had ever looked on. He stayed till next day with us, talked and heard talk to his heart's content, and left us all really sad to part with him." As for Emerson, he was enchanted with his visit. He had charmed Carlyle into his best mood, and in his best mood he was delightful. "I found him," he reported to his friend, Mr. Ireland, "one of the most simple and frank of men, and became acquainted with him at once. . . . He is, as you might guess from his papers, the most catholic of philosophers: he forgives and loves everybody, and wishes each to struggle on in his own place and arrive at his own ends. . . . He talks finely, seems to love the broad Scotch, and I loved him very much at once."* It promised well indeed for the friendship that was to date from that first meeting, that a walk over the hills with Emerson should have put his host in a frame of mind for forgiving and loving everybody; and in the long-continued correspondence which made that friendship ever

* *E. W. Emerson. A Biographical Sketch.* By ALEXANDER IRELAND. Second Edition, p. 148.

more intimate and more valued on both sides, we can see something of this same genial and softening influence which the gentler and more catholic spirit unconsciously exercised. We may see it in the absence of those strong antagonisms to which Carlyle was so easily provoked, and which might have been looked for in the utterances of two such different natures. We may see it in the sentences, half humorous, half apologetic, which often temper the severity of some harder saying. Carlyle's share in the correspondence, while it bears the clear, bold stamp of his individuality, is characteristic of what was most humane and magnanimous in him. He has to come out of the gloom and the shadows into the light of the cheerful day to talk to his friend, as they talked on their first never-to-be-forgotten ramble together over the hills and moors of Craigenputtock.

Speaking, long years afterwards, of the day when his unknown visitor "came from Dumfries in a rusty gig; came one day, and vanished the next,"—he said :—

"I did not then adequately recognise Emerson's genius; but my wife and I both thought him a beautiful transparent soul, and he was always a very pleasant object to us in the distance. Now and then a letter comes from him, and amid all the smoke and mist of this world it is always as a window flung open to the azure." "Emerson has gone a very different direction from any in which I can see my way to go; but words cannot tell how I prize the old friendship formed there on Craigenputtock Hill, or how deeply I have felt, in all that he has written, the same aspiring intelligence which shone about us when he came as a young man, and left us with a memory always cherished." *

"*Forgotten you?*" wrote Mrs. Carlyle, in a postscript to one of her husband's letters, "O, no indeed! If there were nothing else to remember you by, I should never forget the Visitor who, years ago in the Desert, descended on us, out of the clouds as it were, and made one day there look like enchantment for us, and left me weeping that it was only one day."

* *Thomas Carlyle.* By M. D. CONWAY. P. 41.

As for Emerson's recollections of that day, are they not written in the *English Traits*, known and read of all who have any care for either of these men? The sequel is contained in the long-expected volumes now in our hands. The whole series of letters has been set in order and beautifully printed, under the careful editorship of Professor C. E. Norton, the good friend of both the correspondents. A few, unfortunately, are missing at present, some of which, to judge from the references in other letters, must have been particularly interesting ones. We only hope that they will presently be forthcoming, and that they will not only be incorporated in a new edition, but also printed separately for the benefit of those who possess the present one.

It is possible that readers who are chiefly interested in finding some new, emphatic utterances of the characteristic doctrines of the two writers, in religion and philosophy, politics, or morals, may at first feel some disappointment that there is not a more frequent interchange of opinion on the subjects which were of the deepest moment to both of them. There were questions in the region both of thought and of action, on which Carlyle and Emerson could only have found themselves in essential disagreement. For the most part such questions are, as by tacit consent, avoided, or but lightly touched upon. There were times, especially the years of the civil war, when Emerson must have been most deeply pained by the irony and scorn which Carlyle was spending on some of the things which he himself was taking most deeply to heart. The *Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question*, and *The American Iliad in a Nutshell*, must have been difficult even for him to forgive. And all through those four harrowing years it must have been a sad reflection that his friend had not a word for him of sympathy or cheer. His unbounded faith and charity prevented any expression of reproach; and only now and then, as in one or two letters written when the slave-holders' rebellion and the slavery question generally could not but have been uppermost in the thoughts of every American, do some strong but calm and reasonable words of Emerson mark the difference of temper and moral

conviction between the two men. It was impossible for him, under any circumstances, to sacrifice his faith in Carlyle's magnanimity, and while sorely disappointed that he had, all along, thrown the influence of his name into the scale of slavery, and was blind to the real issues of the struggle in which it was to perish, he set this down to no perversity of judgment or disdain of human rights, but to simple want of opportunity of seeing and knowing for himself. Six months before the close of the war he wrote :—

I have in these last years lamented that you had not made the visit to America which in earlier years you projected or favored. It would have made it impossible that your name should be cited for one moment on the side of the enemies of mankind. Ten days' residence in this country would have made you the organ of the sanity of England and of Europe to us and to them, and have shown you the necessities and aspirations which struggle up in our Free States, which, as yet, have no organ to others, and are ill and unsteadily articulated here We want England and Europe to hold our people staunch to their best tendency. Are English of this day incapable of a great sentiment? Can they not leave cavilling at petty failures, and bad manners, and at the dunce part (always the largest part in human affairs), and leap to the suggestions and finger-pointings of the gods, which, above the understanding, feed the hopes and guide the wills of men?

There is more in the same vein of wise, practical, and far-seeing consideration of the great questions at issue, and in quitting the subject Emerson says :—

I shall always respect War hereafter. The cost of life, the dreary havoc of comfort and time, are overpaid by the Vistas it opens of Eternal Life, Eternal Law, reconstructing and uplifting Society—breaks up the old horizon and we see through the rifts a wider.

There are passages enough in the letters in which national affairs are discussed, and incidentally throughout the correspondence, which serve to illustrate the bearing of Emerson's idealism and philosophy of life on practical politics and every-day duties. But if there had been no such instances of his insight into the actual problems of the day which were pressing, some of them with terrible

urgency, for solution, it is strange, and yet not altogether strange, that Carlyle should not have more clearly seen into what working energy that "silent electricity" could be transmuted, which he recognised in Emerson's words. The fact is, Emerson at Concord was in much closer contact with his people, and was a more potent factor in the best life of his country, than was Carlyle in London, where he was able to live in disdainful isolation from the whole world of politics and human society around him; and there is less point than might seem at first sight in the remonstrance which Carlyle made to his friend after reading the volume of Essays, which he afterwards introduced by a characteristic Preface to English readers.

I have to object still (what you will call objecting against the Law of Nature) that we find you a speaker indeed, but as it were a *Soliloquizer* on the eternal mountain tops only, in vast solitudes where men and their affairs lie all hushed in a very dim remoteness; and only *the man* and the stars and the earth are visible,—whom, so fine a fellow seems he, we could perpetually punch into, and say, "Why won't you come and help us then? We have terrible need of one man like you down among us! It is cold and vacant up there; nothing paintable but rainbows and emotions; come down, and you shall do life pictures, passions, facts—which *transcend* all thought, and leave it stuttering and stammering!" To which he answers that he won't, can't, and doesn't want to (as the cockneys have it); and so I leave him, and say, "You Western Gymnosophist! Well we can afford one man for that too. But—!"

To this Emerson replied:—

Of what you say now and heretofore respecting the remoteness of my writing and thinking from real life, though I hear substantially the same criticism made by my countrymen, I do not know what it means. If I can at any time express the law and the ideal right, that should satisfy me without measuring the divergence from it of the last Act of Congress.

And so again, in another letter of an earlier date, he had said:—

You sometimes charge me with I know not what sky-blue, sky-void idealism. As far as it is a partiality, I fear I may be

more deeply infected than you think me. I have very joyful dreams which I cannot bring to paper, much less to any approach to practice, and I blame myself not at all for my reveries, but that they have not yet got possession of my house and barn.

No doubt a good deal of Carlyle's criticism applied fairly enough to the cruder forms of that "transcendentalism" which is such a curious and yet characteristic product of New England; and it was not unnatural that, coming fresh from the reading of *The Dial*, that interesting and instructive representative of both the strength and the weakness of the movement, he should write (in 1842)—

I love your *Dial*, and yet it is with a kind of shudder. You seem to me in danger of dividing yourselves from the Fact of this present Universe, in which alone, ugly as it is, can I find any anchorage, and soaring away after Ideas, Beliefs, Revelations, and such like,—into perilous altitudes, as I think; beyond the curve of perpetual frost, for one thing! I know not how to utter what impression you give me; take the above as some stamping of the fore-hoof. Surely I could wish you *returned* into your own poor nineteenth century, its follies and maladies, its blind or half-blind, but gigantic toilings, its laughter and its tears, and trying to evolve in some measure the hidden Godlike that lies in *it*; that seems to me the kind of feat for literary men. . . . Well, I do believe, for one thing, a man has no right to say to his own generation, turning quite away from it, "Be damned!" It is the whole Past and the whole Future, this same cotton-spinning, dollar-hunting, canting and shrieking, very wretched generation of ours.

Although, however, Carlyle was so impatient of the Transcendentalism, into the high and ever higher altitudes of which it was so easy, he said, to screw one's self, seeing nothing under one but "the everlasting snows of Himalayah, the Earth shrinking to a Planet, and the indigo firmament sowing itself with daylight stars;" and though he longed "to see some concrete Thing, some Event, Man's Life, American Forest, or piece of Creation, which this Emerson loves and wonders at, well *Emersonized*, depicted by Emerson, filled with the life of Emerson, and cast

from him then to live by itself"—he knew how to distinguish the living voice from the echoes. He would yield to none in his admiration and love of the high intellectual beauty and piercing spiritual insight, revealed in those writings, which, modest as they were in their pretensions, bore the unmistakable stamp of genius. He had his objections, generally reasonable enough, on the matter of mere literary form, though he soon learnt to accept it as the style of speech which best fitted the style of thought, and he recognised with delight the voice which seemed to him almost alone among the meaningless noises with which, to his ears, the world was full.

The first clear evidence he had that there was that voice of Prophecy in New England, was in the little volume entitled *Nature*, which Emerson sent him in 1836, speaking of it as the entering wedge, he hoped, of something more worthy and significant. In his acknowledgment of it he wrote:—

You say it is the first chapter of something greater. I call it rather the Foundation and Ground-plan on which you may build whatsoever of great and true has been given you to build. It is the true Apocalypse, this when the "Open Secret" becomes revealed to a man. I rejoice much in the glad serenity of soul with which you look out on this wondrous Dwelling-place of yours and mine,—with an ear for the *Ewigen Melodien*, which pipe in the winds around us, and utter themselves forth in all sounds and sights and things; *not* to be written down by gamut-machinery; but which all right writing is a kind of attempt to write down. You will see what the years will bring you. It is not one of your smallest qualities in my mind, that you *can* wait so quietly and let the years do their best. . . . In fine, I say, sit still at Concord, with such spirit as you are of; under the blessed skyey influences, with an open sense, with the great Book of Existence open round you: we shall see whether you too get not something blessed to read us from it.

Alas! "the blessed skyey influences" were not gracious just then to the perturbed spirit that, at the close of this same letter, cried out against "this accursed Lazar-house of

quacks and blockheads, and sin and misery (now near a head)."

A few months later he had been reading the oration, *The American Scholar*, and he is full of admiration.

God be thanked for it! I could have *wept* to read that speech; the clear, high melody of it went tingling through my heart; I said to my wife, "There, woman!" She read; and returned, and charges me to return for answer, "that there had been nothing met with like it since Schiller went silent." My brave Emerson! And all this has been lying silent, quite tranquil in him, these seven years, and the "vociferous platitude" dinning his ears on all sides, and he quietly answering no word; and a whole world of Thought has silently built itself in these calm depths, and, the day being come, says quite softly, as if it were a common thing, "Yes, I *am* here too."

After a further interval of four years came the *Essays* which Carlyle had the satisfaction of introducing to English readers in a preface to the London reprint. To his friend he wrote:—

My blessing on you, good Ralph Waldo! I read the Book all yesterday; my wife scarcely yet done with telling me her news. It has rebuked me, aroused and comforted me. Objections of all kinds I might make, how many objections to superficiality and detail, to a dialect of thought and speech as yet imperfect enough, a hundredfold too narrow for the Infinitude it strives to speak: but what were all that? It is an Infinitude, the real vision and belief of one, seen face to face: a "voice of the heart of Nature" is here once more. . . . You are a new era, my man, in your new huge country: God give you strength, and speaking and silent faculty, to do such work as seems possible now for you!

Carlyle had, up to the last, a gentle rebuke to administer to the writer for taking so little heed of "the frightful quantities of *friction* and perverse *impediment* there everywhere are," "the reflections on which in my own poor life," he says, in writing to welcome one of the latest of Emerson's volumes, the *Society and Solitude*—"made me now and then very sad as I read you." But he recognised with delight all the old beauty and strength.

A calm insight, piercing to the very centre ; a beautiful sympathy, a beautiful *epic* humour ; a soul peaceably irrefragable in this loud-jangling world, of which it sees the ugliness, but *notices* only the huge new *opulences* (still so anarchic) ; knows the electric telegraph, with all its vulgar botherations and impertinences, accurately for what it is, and ditto ditto the oldest eternal theologies of men." And then the " style," the treatment and expression,—yes, it is inimitable, best—Emersonian throughout. Such brevity, simplicity, softness, homely grace ; with such a penetrating meaning, *soft* enough, but irresistible, going down to the depths and up to the heights, as *silent electricity goes*.

Even in the Poems, which Emerson had sent with some humorous apology—" Poor man, you need not open them. I know all you can say,"—he could hear " some tone of the Eternal Melodies sounding, afar off, ever and anon." " But indeed," he said, " you are very perverse ; and through this perplexed and *undiaphanous* element you do not fall on me like radiant summer rainbows, like floods of sunlight, but with thin piercing radiances which affect me like the light of the *stars*." To much of Emerson's poetry this saying is no doubt applicable. At the same time, the summer rainbows and sunshine are not altogether wanting.

If we turn now to Emerson's letters to see what he had to say of the books, from the first *Essays* and *Sartor* down to *Frederick the Great*, which he regarded with such intense admiration, we find less that calls for notice. The first delightful discovery of the advent of a new original genius had an earlier date than the beginning of the correspondence. The admiring allegiance which had been so eagerly offered and graciously accepted was, in a manner, taken for granted, while its limitations and good-humoured reserves were rather tacitly understood than openly insisted upon.

You are dispensing (he wrote of *Sartor*) that which is rarest, namely, the simplest truths—truths which lie next to consciousness, and which only the Platos and Goethes perceive. I look for the hour with impatience when the vehicle will be worthy of the spirit, when the word will be as simple, and so as resistless,

as the thought,—and, in short, when your words will be one with things.

Like other wise men, he presently learnt to accept as a matter of course the Carlylese dialect, which at first had seemed to him an eccentricity to be discarded when it had served its purpose.

Emerson was soon able to assure the disappointed and desponding author of the growing appreciation of his unfortunate book, in America.

The lovers of Teufelsdröck here are sufficiently enthusiastic. I am an icicle to them. They think England must be blind and deaf if the Professor makes no more impression on them than yet appears. I, with the most affectionate wishes for Thomas Carlyle's fame, am mainly bent on securing the medicinal virtues of his book for my young neighbours.

Before long he had the satisfaction of sending the author a copy of *Sartor*, printed at Boston, and published there as a *Book*, two years before it got beyond the pages of *Fraser's Magazine* in England, "poor Fraser" shrieking at the idea of a new edition, an idea "frightful to him, or rather ludicrous, unimaginable." In no small measure, Carlyle owed these, his first assured successes, to the zeal of his devoted admirer, who had turned business-man and literary agent, book-distributor, and general champion on his behalf. "Good news," exclaims Carlyle, "good new friends; nothing that is not good comes to me across these waters. As if the 'Golden West,' seen by Poets, were no longer a mere optical phenomenon, but growing a reality, and coining itself into solid blessings."

These solid blessings in the form of pounds sterling, now fifty, now a hundred at a time, form the topic of a good many of Emerson's letters, with details of publisher's accounts, arrangements for reprinting, and for circumventing unauthorised adventurers in the same field—all reported in the most business-like way. In the natural course of things, however, the sun of popular favour dried up, after a time, this source of revenue, by making it worth while to speculate in cheap unauthorised editions; and the mutual congratula-

tions on the author's great and assured literary successes are qualified by anathemas against the "pirates and thieves," such as the New York "scoundrel who fancies that because there is no gallows it is permitted to steal."

By way of supplement to the friendly criticisms which the two authors pass on one another's books, we meet with a good many characteristic illustrations of the differences in their methods of composition. And as Carlyle has the most to say in the way of criticism and description of his friend's completed work, so he has the most to say of his own while it is in the workshop. He wears himself out with irritation, anger, and despondency over his task. Labouring over the completion of the *French Revolution*, a toil so terribly aggravated by the calamity that befell the second volume (of which he tells the story in a letter dated May, 1835), he says:—

One sole thought, that Book! that weary Book! occupies me continually: wreck and confusion of all kinds go tumbling and falling around me, within me; but to wreck and growth, to confusion and order, to the world at large, I turn a deaf ear; and have life only for this one thing,—which also in general I feel to be one of the pitifulest that ever man went about possessed with.

Of the "Cromwell":—

I am day and night, these long months and years, very miserable about it—nigh broken-hearted often. Such a scandalous accumulation of Human Stupidity in every form never lay before on such a subject. No history of it *can* be written to this wretched, fleering, sneering, canting, twaddling, God-forgetting generation.

As for "Frederick," Carlyle's heart even misgave him sometimes about his hero.

Frederick himself is a pretty little man to me, veracious, courageous, invincible in his small sphere; but he does not rise into the empyrean regions, or kindle my heart round him at all.

And the task of writing his history was done with groans and wrath.

I bore and dig toilsomely through the unutterablest mass of

dead rubbish, which is not even English, which is German and inhuman; and hardly from ten tons of learned inanity is there to be riddled one old rusty nail.

And when the work was finished,

It is a bad book (he wrote); poor, misshapen, feeble, *nearly* worthless (thanks to *past* generations and to me); and my one excuse is, *I* could not make it better, all the world having played such a game with it.

All this burning and consuming literary passion,—due partly, may we say, to a sublime egotism, and partly to the absorption of a great artist in his work,—is curiously contrasted with Emerson's quiet, methodical and leisurely ways. He sits in his sunny home at Concord, writing lectures and addresses in endless series, and has always his journal near at hand to catch a passing thought and keep it for future use. Happy with his books and his thoughts, with wife and children and a few chosen friends, he yet cannot shut himself up or live the life of a recluse; and he is ready for any call, whether it is to lecture to a village Lyceum, or to face a howling mob of pro-slavery roughs.

As usual (he writes, one summer), at this season of the year, I, incorrigible spouting Yankee, am writing an oration to deliver to the boys in one of our little country colleges nine days hence. You will say I do not deserve the aid of any Muse. O but if you knew how natural it is to me to run to these places! Besides, I always am lured on by the hope of saying something which shall stick by the good boys.

Out of the piles of manuscript which accumulated under his hand, books were to be made by a process of sorting, extracting, sifting, re-arranging and re-touching. Sitting down to prepare a volume of Essays, "I am here at work," he says, "to spin some single cord out of my thousand and one strands of every color and texture that lie ravelled around me in old snarls."

The contrasts in the processes by which the finished works of Carlyle and of Emerson respectively were wrought, correspond exactly to the contrasts in their literary style. It

is unnecessary to say which was most likely to result in a work with artistic unity of effect, and harmonious proportion. It is enough that each man has written himself into his books; and if the one gives us his best thoughts by carefully selecting them and deftly arranging them in a choice mosaic, while the other passes everything through the furnace, and has no fruit of his labour till after long and painful years, it is not, after all, by the canons of literary criticism that a prophet's word is to be tried.

All through the correspondence, as a kind of "refrain," comes the invitation, the wish, the hope, that Carlyle and his wife would go over to America to visit their friends at Concord, if not to settle there altogether; and triumphal lecturing tours through the States are planned. The visit seemed sometimes on the point of coming to pass; and Emerson sent a careful calculation of the probable expenses and profits, and all sorts of practical information. It began and ended in talking and planning; and we only mention it here because it is so frequently referred to in the letters, and also, more especially, for the sake of giving Emerson's fine, magnanimous words, with which, on behalf of himself and his fellow-countrymen, he buried the remembrance of all past bitterness of political antagonisms. As late as 1870 he was once more hoping for that long-promised visit; and in putting in his plea, he declared that he could still guarantee Carlyle a cordial reception.

Every reading person in America holds you in exceptional regard, and will rejoice in your arrival. They have forgotten your scarlet sins before or during the war. I have long ceased to apologise for or explain your savage sayings about American or other republics or publics. and am willing that anointed men bearing with them authentic charters shall be laws to themselves, as Plato willed. Genius is but a large infusion of Deity, and so brings a prerogative all its own. It has a right and duty to affront and amaze men by carrying out its perceptions defiantly, knowing well that time and fate will verify and explain what time and fate have through them said. We must not suggest to Michael Angelo, or Machiavel, or Rabelais, or Voltaire, or John Brown of Osawatomie (a great man), or

Carlyle, how they shall suppress their paradoxes, and check their huge gait to keep accurate step with the procession on the street side-walk. They are privileged persons, and may have their own swing for me.

In fine, Emerson had long learnt to separate in his mind the true genius of Carlyle, and the qualities for which he had always loved and revered him, from the alloy of Carlylese prejudices, animosities, and wilful extravagances which would pain or surprise him when he took them too seriously, but which he was able to regard with a half-humorous vexation, and gentle tolerance, that ended in both forgiving and forgetting. So, in the letter dated January, 1872, the last in the correspondence, he wrote :—

I know well all your perversities, and give them a wide berth. They seriously annoy a great many worthy readers, nations of readers sometimes ; but I heap them all as style, and read them as I read Rabelais' gigantic humors, which astonish in order to force attention, and by and by are seen to be the rhetoric of a highly virtuous gentleman who *swears*.

He had just received the last instalment of the library edition of Carlyle's works, and had been sending his congratulations to the author.

And now my stately collection is perfect. Perfect too is your Victory. But I clatter my chains with joy, as I did forty years ago, at your earliest gifts. Happy man you should be, to whom the heaven has allowed such masterly completion. You shall wear your crown at the Pan-Saxon games with no equal or approaching competitor in sight,—well earned by genius and exhaustive labor, and with nations for your pupils and praisers. I count it my eminent happiness to have been so nearly your contemporary and your friend,—permitted to detect by its rare light the new star almost before the Easterners had seen it, and to have found no disappointment, but joyful confirmation rather, in coming close to its orb. Rest, rest, now for a time, I pray you, and be thankful.

Carlyle might well be grateful for one who could never look at him and his work with any eyes but those of affectionate admiration. Long before, he had declared to him,

"It remains true, what I have often told you, that properly there is no voice in this world which is completely human to me, which fully understands all I say, and with clear sympathy and sense answers me, but your voice only." And again, "You were like an angel to me, and absorbed in the beautifulest manner all thunder-clouds into the depths of your immeasurable æther." In spite too of every difference of opinion, and the absolute contrasts of temperament and aim and views of life, Carlyle felt as strongly as his friend did that there was under all a deeper ground of unity, a fundamental agreement which we shall not attempt to define here, but which the whole tone and tenor of their intercourse help us to appreciate. "Deep as is my dissent," says Carlyle, "from your Gymnosophist view of Heaven and Earth, I find an agreement that swallows up all conceivable dissents." And, in writing after one of the longer intervals in the correspondence,—

Nay, I have not at any time forgotten you, be that justice done the unfortunate: and though I see well enough what a great deep cleft divides us, in our ways of practically looking at this world,—I see also (as probably you do yourself) where the rock-strata, miles deep, unite again; and the two poor souls are at one. Poor devils!—Nay if there were no point of agreement at all, and I were more intolerant of "ways of thinking" than I even am, yet has not the man Emerson, from old years, been a Human Friend to me? Can I ever forget, or think otherwise than lovingly of the man Emerson?

In Emerson's letters we meet with many pleasant pictures of his household, his occupations, his neighbours and friends, his occasional bits of travel. In an early one he sets down the amount of his modest income which makes him a rich man, staying at home or going abroad at his own instance, and having food, warmth, leisure, books, and friends.

My wife Lidian is an incarnation of Christianity,—I call her Asia,—and keeps my philosophy from Antinomianism; my mother, whitest, mildest, most conservative of ladies, whose only exception to her universal preference for old things is her son; my boy, a

piece of love and sunshine, well worth my watching from morning to night ;—these, and three domestic women, who cook and sew and run for us, make all my household.

A little later he tells of a recent new-comer,

—a blessed babe, named Ellen, about three weeks old—a little fair soft lump of contented humanity, incessantly sleeping, and with an air of incurious security that says she has come to stay, has come to be loved, which has nothing mean, and quite piques me.

We get many such glimpses of the singularly bright, harmonious, and altogether sweet and wholesome life of the poet-philosopher at Concord ; from which there always comes, in these letters, some breath of hope and cheer to soften the despondency and enliven the self-made solitude of the prematurely worn and life-weary man who wrote, when he was but forty-three,—

I am older in years than you ; but in humour I am older by centuries. What a hope is in that ever-young heart, cheerful, healthful as the morning ! and as for me, you have no conception what a crabbed, sulky piece of sorrow and dyspepsia I am grown ; and growing, if I do not draw bridle.

The one finds everything beautiful and gracious about him and life “ absurdly sweet,” and we have before us always the picture described by Carlyle of “ the genial smiling, energetic face, full of sunny strength, intelligence, integrity, good humour.” The other contrives, as he confesses, “ to take the very ugliest view now and then of the beautifullest things ; ” and to take the very gloomiest view of his own life, and the destiny of his fellows, and the whole visible order of things ; though he also will not deny that “ the Earth withal is verdant, sun-beshone ; and the Son of Adam has his place on it, and his tasks and recompenses in it, to the close.”

There are several deeply pathetic letters, written when Emerson lost, first his brother Edward, in 1834, then, within two years, Charles, who was still nearer and dearer to him as a member, at the time, of his own household, and the intimate

companion of all his thoughts and pursuits ; and, then, bitterest loss of all, just in the bright promise of his early boyhood, the son, Waldo, whose memory is enshrined in that exquisite *Threnody*, in which the poet has indeed caught some of the sweet and solemn tones of the "Everlasting Melodies."

Of his brother Charles he wrote as " a man of a beautiful genius, born to speak well, and whose conversation for these last years has treated every grave question of humanity, and has been my daily bread." Carlyle had no conventional phrases of consolation to offer, but wrote in deep sympathy,

I do not tell you not to mourn ; I mourn with you, and could wish all mourners the spirit you have in this sorrow. Oh, I know it well ! Often enough in this noisy Inanity of a vision where *we* still linger, I say to myself, Perhaps thy Buried Ones are not far from thee, are with thee ; they are in Eternity, which is a Now and HERE ! And yet Nature will have her right ; Memory will feel desecrated if she could forget. Many times in the crowded din of the Living, some sight, some feature of a face, will recall to you the Loved Face ; and in these turmoiling streets you see the little silent churchyard, the green grave that lies there so silent,—inexpressibly *wae*. Oh, perhaps we *shall* all meet YONDER, and the tears be wiped from all eyes ! One thing is no Perhaps : surely we *shall* all meet, *if* it be the will of the Maker of us. If it be not His will,—then is it not better so ? Silence,—since in these days we have no speech ! Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, in any day.

When Emerson wrote of his heart-breaking grief in the death of his little boy, Carlyle was in an especially gentle and solemn mood, for his wife had just lost her mother, and his message of sympathy with his friend's great sorrow was written from a house which also had been " rendered vacant and sacred by Death." After saying what he could to comfort and cheer the mourners in the darkened home at Concord, he wrote of himself and his thoughts, in the following fine pathetic strain :—

I lead a strange life ; full of sadness, of solemnity, not without a kind of blessedness. I say it is right and fitting that one be left entirely alone now and then,—alone with one's own griefs and sins

with the mysterious ancient Earth round one, the everlasting Heaven over one, and what one can make of these. . . . It is many years since I have stood so in close contact face to face with the reality of Earth, with its haggard ugliness, its divine beauty, its depths of Death and of Life. Yesterday, one of the stillest Sundays, I sat long by the side of the swift river Nith ; sauntered among woods all vocal only with rooks and pairing birds. The hills are often white with snow-powder, black brief spring-tempests rush fiercely down from them, and then again the sky looks forth with a pale pure brightness—like Eternity from behind Time. The *Sky*, when one thinks of it, is *always blue*, pure changeless azure ; rains and tempests are only for the little dwellings where men abide.

Twenty-five years later a more tragic sorrow had befallen him. The letter he wrote after his wife's death is like one of the tenderest pages of those "Reminiscences" which were in many ways so sad to read. We must quote a few sentences from it, before leaving these more serious passages of the correspondence.

By the calamity of April last, I lost my little all in this world ; and have no soul left who can make any corner of this world into a *home* for me any more. Bright, heroic, tender, true and noble was that lost treasure of my heart, who faithfully accompanied me in all the rocky ways and climbings ; and I am for ever poor without her. She was snatched from me in a moment, —as by a death from the gods. Very beautiful her death was ; radiantly beautiful (to those who understand it) had all her life been : *quid plura* ? I should be among the dullest and stupidest, if I were not among the saddest of all men.

The reader will naturally look, in Carlyle's part of the correspondence, for some of those rapid sketches of character, and vivid bits of portraiture which he could dash off with such a sure artist's touch, enabling us to see some notable people, if not just as they were, at least just as they appeared to one of the keenest of observers. There is Tennyson, "one of the finest-looking men in the world. A great shock of rough dusty-dark hair ; bright-lavishing hazel eyes ; massive aquiline face, most massive yet most delicate ;" his voice "musical metallic, fit for loud laughter

and piercing wail, and all that may lie between." "His way is through Chaos and the Bottomless and Pathless ; not handy for making out many miles upon." There is "Old Rogers with his pale head, white, bare, and cold as snow, [who] will work on you with those large blue eyes, cruel, sorrowful, and that sardonic shelf-chin : " Harriet Martineau, " a genuine little Poetess, buckramed, swathed like a mummy in Socinian and Political-Economy formulas, and yet verily alive in the inside of that ! " John Stirling, who is often mentioned,—Carlyle loves him better than anybody he has met with " since a certain sky-messenger alighted at Craigenputtock, and vanished in the blue again : " Daniel Webster, with " the tanned complexion, that amorphous, crag-like face ; the dull black eyes under their precipice of brows, like dull anthracite furnaces, needing only to be *blown* ; the mastiff-mouth accurately closed " : John Ruskin " copiously and desperately pouring [fierce lightning bolts] into the black world of Anarchy all around him " with a " divine rage against iniquity, falsity, and baseness."

A striking and very interesting figure appears on the scene in the person of Bronson Alcott, long conspicuous in the Concord circle, and happily still left, a worthy representative of that group of eager souls bent on living up to a new poetic and philosophic ideal of existence. He came over to England with an introduction from Emerson, who had said of him before, " he is a majestic soul, with whom conversation is possible. He is capable of truth, and gives me the same glad astonishment that he should exist which the world does." Carlyle describes him as a " genial, innocent, simple-hearted man, of much natural intelligence and goodness, with an air of rusticity, veracity and dignity withal, which in many ways appeals to one." " The good Alcott ; with his long, lean face and figure, with his gray worn temples and mild radiant eyes ; all bent upon saving the world by a return to acorns and the Golden Age ; he comes before one like a venerable Don Quixote, whom nobody can even laugh at without loving ! "

We must resist the temptation to quote at length some further passages in which both Emerson and Carlyle record their impressions of Alcott, the latter ending by an energetic discourse expressive of his feelings with regard to all sect-founders. And we must be satisfied with merely mentioning the names of Southey, Landor, Thackeray, Blackie, Froude, Monckton Milnes, Clough, Margaret Fuller, and Delia Bacon, of Shakespearian fame. Bulwer-Lytton, is incidentally alluded to as "one of the wretchedest Phantasms," and *à propos* of Prescott, who was being "infinitely *lionized* by a mob of gentlemen," it is remarked that, "the Johnny-cake is good, the twopence-worth of currants in it too are good; but if you offer it as a bit of baked Ambrosia, *Ach Gott!*" One other specimen of Carlyle's satirical humour in this line, we cannot help giving for our readers' amusement. Emerson had innocently asked him "What sort of a person is Heraud?" a writer who, it would seem, was thought a good deal of by certain admirers at Boston. We wonder whether the report obtained was communicated to them. Leigh Hunt, it appears, had described him as "wavering in the most astonishing manner between being Something and Nothing," and John Mill had said, "I forgive him freely for interpreting the Universe, now when I find he cannot pronounce the *h's!*" As for Carlyle's own opinion, he says:

To me he is chiefly remarkable as being still—with his entirely enormous vanity and very small stock of faculty—out of Bedlam. He picked up a notion or two from Coleridge many years ago; and has ever since been rattling them in his head, like peas in an empty bladder, and calling on the world "List the Music of the Spheres." He escapes *assassination*, as I calculate, chiefly by being the cheerfulest, best-natured little creature extant.—You cannot kill him, he laughs so softly, even when he is like killing you.

Among the many passages which we had marked in further illustration of the quality of the book, there are divers brief sentences which would be not unworthy of a place in a

florilegium from either author. We must be contented with quoting the following, from Emerson :—

Men live on the brink of mysteries and harmonies into which yet they never enter, and with their hand on the door-latch they die outside.

I always seem to suffer some loss of faith on entering cities. They are great conspiracies; the parties are all maskers, who have taken mutual oaths of silence not to betray each other's secret, and each to keep the other's madness in countenance. You can scarce drive any craft here that does not seem a subornation of the treason.

When I go out of doors in the summer night, and see how high the stars are, I am persuaded that there is time enough, here or somewhere, for all that I must do; and the good world manifests very little impatience.

What have we to do with old age? Our existence looks to me more than ever initial. We have come to see the ground and look up materials and tools. The men who have any positive quality are a flying advance party for reconnoitring.

Our readers may now have some idea of the various charm of these letters. There are many points we have not touched on; but in the selections we have made, and the few comments with which we have accompanied them, we hope we have at least succeeded in suggesting in what a peculiarly interesting way the correspondence enlarges our knowledge of the genius and personal characteristics of the writers. The names of Carlyle and Emerson have been associated from the first; and though the contrasts, both of character, of opinion and feeling, and of literary style, are so strongly marked that these strike us perhaps more than the resemblances do; the intimate and familiar utterances of friendship which we have been permitted to overhear, help to reveal the deeper unity in which, like the "rock-strata, miles deep, united again, their souls were at one." No one, we think, can read these volumes and not feel that he knows both men more intimately than he knew them before. In Emerson's large and gentle tolerance of

his friend's perversest moods, and in Carlyle's homage to the pure devotion to truth and pursuit of the ideal, which was at the heart of the "Transcendentalism" at which he sometimes scolded, we learn the secret of their mutual understanding; and we are enabled to correct for ourselves some of those shallow and fickle judgments which are founded only on superficial resemblances or differences, and which are liable to be reversed as easily and with as little reason as they were first pronounced. But whatever be the places ultimately assigned to Carlyle and to Emerson in the roll of the world's thinkers and workers, they will, in any event, always be thought of together henceforth as inseparably united in the bonds of a true and beautiful friendship.

THE EDITOR.

THE LAWBREAKER.

THERE are periods in the world's history, for the most part in the earlier stages of civilisation, when the Lawgiver is the great want of the age. The social tie is as yet weak, the half-developed instinct of justice in each individual is too feeble to control the anarchic passions. What is then needed is a man of superior insight and force of character, who will serve as a rallying-point for the better spirits of the nation and be a sort of embodied conscience; uttering what all dimly feel to be right, and giving it the sanction of authority; compelling the baser element to submit to the nobler, and thus evolving a sort of moral order out of the chaos of conflicting wills. The instinct of mankind has ever recognised such men as its greatest deliverers; they are the founders of States, the creators of social institutions, the restorers of paths to dwell in, and the epochs of their activity are counted the most noteworthy in a nation's existence.

But there are other periods, and our own age is one of them, which labour under another class of evils, and demand a different remedy—periods when right and wrong appear in less clearly-defined antagonism to each other, and the best energies of men are paralysed for want of direction, the moral sense being entangled in a maze of insoluble problems. At such times no clarion-call goes forth to summon the hosts of the faithful to battle with the enemy. There are indeed opposing armies, and bitter is the strife. The banners of Order and of Rebellion are displayed; but who are the combatants ranged under them? On the side of Order we have, it is true, the just, the temperate, the law-abiding, the conscientious; but also the timid, the

conventional, the self-interested, the pharisaical, the unmerciful. On the side of Rebellion there are the licentious, the unscrupulous, the violent, the self-indulgent, but also the generous, the enthusiastic, the self-sacrificing. In every fierce outbreak against the established order of things we are forced, however unwillingly, to acknowledge that the "heroes" are to be found on the side of revolt—amongst Nihilists, Communists, Carbonari; not amongst the aristocrats, the bourgeoisie, and the partisans of authority, in Church and State. Apart from those exceptional circumstances which develop heroism, it is far from being the case that the "virtuous" have a monopoly of the amiable and estimable qualities; in fact, it is a common observation that the finest natures are most apt to "go wrong."

Another perplexing feature of the age is that the efforts of the best and even the most enlightened of the community are frequently rendered void or worse by some inexplicable force that, as it were, deflects them from their aim. The mischiefs which afflict our society seem to proceed from the virtuous equally with the vicious. The hand indeed that comes into actual contact with the crime is that of vice, but we have not to look far to see behind it some pitiless virtue urging it on, like an inexorable fate. In whichever direction we look we find a waste of moral force. This is pre-eminently an age of high culture for the moral emotions. Never were the ideals of conduct so lofty and pure as at present. The very word "solidarity" forcing its way into our language testifies to a larger conception of humanity gaining ground among us, and the natural sympathies flow freely into the channels thus widened out for them. And yet we need but lift the thin veil of respectability that shrouds our homes, to see everywhere around us a seething mass of corruption and misery that sickens and appeals us.

Whose fault is it? Is it possible, we ask, that it is the good, pleasant people we know that are responsible for these things? Is it they that own the unwholesome workshops, grow rich on the labour of underpaid women and girls, hold the licences of haunts of vice, and pocket the

rents of noisome dens in which honest toil snatches its brief repose? It must be the people of character and reputation who uphold these evils, for the others would not have power to do so in the face of any strongly-expressed public opinion. Only law can shelter the worst of crimes. What then has become of those moral and religious principles which, judging from our literature, our pulpits, nay even our ordinary conversation, might be supposed to be built into the basis of our life?

It would be unfair to charge this age with any exceptional amount of hypocrisy; it is rather that the moral forces ranged on the side of order can find no vent, no adequate sphere of operation. They are checked, hemmed in on every side; duty is arrayed against duty, law against love. And then on the other side of these boundaries of law, the waste is still more appalling. What a torrent of passion sweeping along in its unchecked course, carrying everywhere destruction! Are not these the waters for which we are athirst—the “life of which our nerves are scant,” and can we have them but to blast, not to bless? For it is impossible not to recognise in the very excesses of the vicious, powers and activities essential to human nature which only take those channels because all others are blocked up from them by the operation of a false law.

Here we come to the root of the mischief. The thought of right, which is enshrined in the laws and embodied in the conventional rules of conduct, has been outgrown by the developing moral life, no less than by the growing needs of our complex social state, and has thus become untrue to facts—in other words, to Nature. The emotions cease to respond to it; a “right” that means disservice to man cannot awaken enthusiasm. It is evident that in such a state of things the rigid enforcement of the false law will work unspeakable mischief, whilst the anarchic passions, swelled by the streams of thwarted natural activity, will gather a frightful strength, and the excesses which they commit will cause such horror as to widen the breach between the law-abiding and the law-refusing classes. They will hate each

other with the more intensity (as is ever the case) because each has got hold of half the truth, which is mischievous until supplemented by its other half.

The most discouraging feature of the case is that it seems of no use to aim at strengthening the sense of duty, reinforcing the will with motives to just, benevolent deeds, since some fatal spell has fallen upon the whole range of human actions, turning their good into ill, and baffling the best efforts of the most conscientious men. What we are suffering from is not lack of force, but wasted force; it is therefore not to increase the amount that is wanted, but to give it direction.

It is at such a crisis of human affairs that the Lawbreaker is called for—one guided by the unerring instinct of genius to choose the forbidden things, and refuse the permitted. Not *any* lawbreaker—for the law has been wrongly broken time out of mind, and no deliverance has come of it—but one in whom are fulfilled the conditions for doing it rightly, that is, who can break it *not for self*. In so doing he is at once a breaker and a fulfiller of the law, for in his breach of the letter he reveals the higher law of the spirit. By this action of his the conscience is emancipated, force locked up in useless restraint is set free, and becomes available for new tasks. There is a dynamic of the moral as of the physical world. Whilst the sense of duty is yoked to some useless and mischievous superstition, there is a waste of the force that is wanted for the reform of practical life. It is evident that when any difficult task has to be accomplished, any great resistance to be overcome, any exhausting sacrifices to be made, the first step towards the attainment of the object will be to find some needless restraint which can be shaken off, some false law which may be refused, some superstition to be laid aside under which the conscience has been kept in bondage. This being done, the force thus set free can be turned to the new task. It seems a simple case: here is something for man to do: very well; fulfil the condition, find something that he may leave off doing, and the power is there, ready for use.

Now if we apply this principle to what has actually taken place in history, we shall find it amply verified. This explains why the great moral reformers have ever been the breakers of false yokes, the destroyers of superstitions, and why, too, the deadly strife which they have waged against superstition has always been put *first*; not the preaching of a positive morality, which (from the individual purity of the men) we might have expected to be the thing uppermost in their minds.

Take, for instance, the greatest moral revolution ever wrought—that effected by the teaching of Jesus Christ. The world was full of the foulest iniquity—in every part there was oppression, cruelty, falsehood, and vices for which modern refinement has no name. In the enslaved and decaying society of Palestine Jesus witnessed, doubtless, every variety of the vices of tyrant and victim. And He held up to man an ideal of moral purity, before which the highest ethics of heathen moralist and sage look dim and tainted. But if we examine those records of His teaching which have been preserved, and which represent at least the impression produced by Him on His contemporaries, we find that His most burning zeal and indignation was turned not against the vices, but against the superstitions of the day. We utterly mistake the meaning of His words, if we dismiss the subject with the usual commonplaces about the hatefulness of hypocrisy, and conclude that because Jesus denounced the Pharisees and their devotion to ritual, this devotion must have been a pretence. He would never have been so indignant with a mere sham. He did not want a Carlyle to tell him that shams die of themselves. They have no vitality; a laugh will do for them,—no need of tears and blood. His holy anger, His indignant consuming wrath, had harder work and a nobler object. It was the heavy yoke, grievous to be borne, which He was wrestling to lift off men's shoulders; and that yoke was a false notion of duty *believed in*—not merely professed, or it would not have been a yoke at all.

It has struck us with wonder sometimes that, when there

were such glaring and hideous evils to be attacked, He should have come down with a weight of indignation on the good people who laid an over-stress upon Sabbath-keeping—a harmless fault, we might have supposed, if a fault at all. Now we see why He did it: He had work for man to do; He could not afford to let moral force be locked up in a useless and even cruel Sabbath-keeping and tithe-paying. Cruel—for whatever is not useful is cruel, or tends to become so. There was a superstition that the duty to God might involve doing what was harmful to one's neighbour, and that the very painfulness of this constituted the chief part of its virtue. Meanwhile, there were numberless social duties lying unfulfilled, services unperformed, because the sympathy and kindliness had been checked which would have prompted them. Here, then, was a double waste; here were two moral forces (forms, of course, of the one force) engaged in neutralising each other—duty enlisted against love by a hateful superstition. No wonder that He who loved man was indignant at this waste, and set about destroying the superstition under which man lay crushed. And so strong was it that His victory cost Him His life. He slew the false law, but only by nailing it to His own cross. Let His accusation be written up high, that all the world may know for what He died, and for what it owes Him its chief thanks. "We have a law, and by our law He ought to die." Yes, it was true. By *that* law He ought to die. The Lawbreaker—that was His highest glory.

The same dynamic order is still more evident in St. Paul, who carried out in a wider sphere the spirit of his Master's teaching. Placed as he was face to face with the most degrading forms of vice in Corinth, Ephesus, and Rome, a man of austere and even ascetic virtue amidst a society of shameless libertinism, should we not naturally expect his most intense antagonism, his most indignant denunciation to have been directed against Gentile profligacy? But no: when laying down the rules of Christian conduct, he simply, calmly points out the way in which men should go: "Speak the truth one to another"—"Bear ye one another's

burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ"—"Pray without ceasing"—"Be diligent in business," &c. There is no hortatory rhetoric, no heat, no violence, as if he were trying to create an impulse. He seems to take it for granted that the way being indicated, love, or *life* as he calls it, will take that direction. He has nothing to say to those who suggested living in Sin "that grace may abound," but the simple statement of the dynamics of the case: "How *can* we?" But observe the change when he contends with the Judaizers about circumcision; here he wrestles, he agonizes; here is the very heart of the combat; to fail here is to fail utterly. Here in the despised Jerusalem, not in Athens or in Rome, is to be decided the fate of the world, because here is the stronghold of that sense of duty behind which the "self" stood entrenched to fight its last battle. To this far-seeing eye the law, and not Cæsar, ruled the world. And how true was the insight—how justified by the result. He triumphed; the gospel of freedom was sent forth to the Gentile world un mutilated by Jewish restrictions. The conscience, emancipated by love, was trusted to write out its own commandments, and a morality arose in the centre of the most corrupt society the world has ever seen, as far surpassing the Jewish as life will ever surpass its counterfeit. Side by side with all the laws about property ever invented by the keenest-eyed justice, (perhaps the Mosaic will bear comparison with any), set that one naïve description of the lawless community: "And they that believed had all things in common, neither said any man that aught that he possessed was his own."

The same process was repeated at the Reformation under Luther. He attacked licence—not directly, but by giving freedom. Destruction preceded Reformation. The false law of asceticism had to be broken before the new morality could be evolved. Perhaps of all the services which Luther rendered to mankind, none more deserves its gratitude than his marriage with Catherine von Bora, in which both parties broke their monastic vows. The law which had governed him had compelled him to turn aside from the

serviceable thing, if it so happened that it was also a pleasant thing. But he who is inspired by an unselfish passion that makes even pain welcome or indifferent, has no need to turn away from pleasure. He has learnt the supreme art, to take pleasure rightly. The value of Luther's act lay in its being an open defiance of the law. Monastic vows of celibacy had been broken thousands of times in secret and selfishly with no result but evil. Luther did rightly what had often been done wrongly, and the effect was to roll an enormous weight off the conscience of mankind, and set free the paralysed and imprisoned forces to work out the moral regeneration of society. He broke the idol and emancipated the worshippers.

Turning from the history of the past to the features of the present age, the question meets us: Is there any such idol now which the reformer will have to break, any superstition which holds back man's hand from the service of his fellow, any law which is kept to the injury of others for the sake of a man's own goodness? For if not there is no hope. And surely never was there a time when the force was more needed than now to repair the moral waste. Wherever we turn our eyes—to the State, to the City, to Society, to the Church, to the Family, it seems that the old safeguards and bulwarks are crumbling down, and a gigantic selfishism is everywhere rampant. "The whole head is sick and the whole heart faint." Those who have tried with most patient skill to apply a remedy to any one of the symptoms of our diseased social body, have all come to the same conclusion. It is of no use dealing with isolated symptoms; driven from one part, the malady reappears in another; unless new life can be poured into the system, and a complete regeneration effected, decay must go on with an ever-accelerated speed. If we seek some test that shall register the low-water mark, as it were, of our moral life, let us look not at the sensational pages of some low-class novel, replete with crime and horror, but at the science which is the outcome of the wisdom and benevolence of some of our wisest and most benevolent men—our Political Economy. Here we shall see,

formulated as it never was before, that man must live for self; this is the first axiom of the science, the keystone of the edifice. What follows is a series of schemes, more or less cunningly contrived, for making a million or so of separate selves, with their conflicting interests and passions, work harmoniously together; these schemes based, moreover, on a notion of justice, which means giving to each individual self its rights. A hopeless problem—thank God! It might be stated thus: Given, a being whom God has not made possible, to find his place in this world of God's making, to ascertain his duties and his rights; or, Given, two straight lines enclosing a space, to find their direction and the space they enclose. Take a book like J. S. Mill's "Political Economy," for instance, particularly the chapters on "Popular Remedies for Low Wages." Who does not lay it down with the feeling—well, if this be a true statement of the case, it is hopeless to attempt any amelioration of the condition of the masses of our fellow-men? We shall go on, the upper classes growing richer, more splendid, more luxurious, more refined, more inhuman; the lower more wretched, more degraded, more brutal, until both are overwhelmed in some chaotic revolution.

But is it so hopeless? Is not the force we want really there, locked up in the maintenance of some false right, some superstition, the casting away of which will be life from the dead?

To answer this question we must first ask: How may we know the false right from the true—what are the characters of a superstition? Are we not in danger of shaking off a right restraint for a wrong one? How may we know that the law we break is not of eternal validity? We might answer this question from History by inquiring what have been the false duties which men have thrown off (human sacrifices, celibacy, &c.). Or, again, we may have light cast upon it by analogy if we observe of what sort is the "law" which the painter violates, what is the accuracy which he may, and must, sacrifice to obtain truth in his picture. From both these sources we shall obtain the

same characteristic marks by which we may know the false law.

First, then, we shall find that the law we must break will be one enforcing or prohibiting certain rigid *things*. The reason of this is evident. Nature ignores things. She knows only of processes. A law of things, of "commandments contained in ordinances," as the Pauline expression is, must become false in course of time, for that in which the life of man was once expressed is true to this no longer, and is a mere dead encumbrance. James Martineau well says, "There is no system of duties which will stand as a permanent diagram of right." The right will be a thing growing, expanding in its demands to meet fresh needs as they arise, and will ever be in advance of our practice, and lead us on to new attainment. But not only will these fresh needs prescribe for us new duties; they will perpetually be superseding and rendering positively mischievous those actions which were once useful and even necessary. Thus a law that insists upon the performance of certain outward acts must inevitably come into conflict with the expanding life of man, and the breaking of that law will mark a necessary stage in his development.

Again, a false law may be known by its tendency to insist upon abstinence from pleasure or restraint of passion as a good in itself, thus marking the extreme point of departure from the order of Nature, which exhibits the perfect union of law and liberty.

The false law, indeed, is one which Nature refuses to let man obey, and this is its invariable mark. Its presence may be known by an unbridled licence on the one hand, and by a miserable and stunted life within the forms of law on the other. Nature lays one command upon all things, to *live*; and when men make laws for themselves that forbid or hinder life, she grandly ignores them, pouring a tide of passion into human hearts which must carry destruction and ruin around, if the channels of useful activity into which it should flow be choked up with artificial prohibition. Sooner or later these barriers must be swept away. With

what cobwebs does man strive to bind the giant forces that sway his life! So one exclaims when they have been snapt and rent: but until that deliverance comes, their strength is of cast iron. What can relax the grasp of Duty on man's soul? What pangs can wrench from him his virtue? Let the history of asceticism answer! For, let it be observed, it is not mere lawlessness that can break the force of law to bind the conscience; that wild licence is weakness not strength; only that which has borne the yoke is mighty enough to break it. For the law is not an arbitrary enactment, that it can be set aside at will. It is the embodiment of the moral life of man in the past; in it are stored up his acquired and inherited gains. Though life has departed from it, it is still the symbol of that which is dearer than all pleasure, holier than all use. This law can never relax its hold on the conscience until it be fulfilled; that is, broken not for self, and all the good that was in it taken up into the higher law, which stands revealed in the passing away of that which obscured it.

A false law in morals may be paralleled with an imperfect generalisation in Science. It makes outcasts, anomalies. Until some generalisation is made all facts are alike unclassified; they remain isolated, and apparently arbitrary. With the law comes a distinction. Some facts are taken in and accounted for; in them an order, a necessity, is discerned: others remain unexplained; they are anomalies, apparent exceptions. The next advance is made by a man who, with the instinct of genius, discovers in these anomalies the key to a larger generalisation in which they shall be included. In like manner every great moral reformer turns first to the "outcasts." He leaves the ninety and nine and goes after the one that was lost, and when he has found it carries it in his bosom, nearer to his heart than any of the others. For is not that wanderer the dearest? He, too, is a lawbreaker; in him there is that element of rightness, the following of passion. It was indeed a self-passion, and therefore led him astray; but when the true passion has been breathed into him he

will be capable of a higher goodness than that of mere abstaining and forbidding. "I have seen," writes James Hinton,* "Righteousness taking Pity to her bosom and going forth, repentant that she has been cruel, to meet those who cannot restrain their passions, and saying to them: 'You also are my children.' I have seen those whom Goodness had disowned called her children by Goodness becoming better, not by any change first in them." It is the necessity of embracing these passion-driven natures that makes new demands upon virtue, and raises it to a higher level. The "baptism with the Holy Ghost" succeeds to the baptism with water; the kindling breath of enthusiasm to the mere purification of the outward acts.

CAROLINE HADDON.

* To the letters and conversation of James Hinton, I am indebted for the greater part of the thoughts developed in this paper.

*DISCOURSES BY THE REV. JOHN HAMILTON
THOM.**

THE author of these Discourses has long been held in the highest esteem by a large circle in Liverpool, where he has spent the whole of his ministerial life, and by Unitarian Christians everywhere. More than forty years ago he publicly distinguished himself, together with his life-long friend Dr. Martineau, and the late Rev. Henry Giles, in the Liverpool Unitarian Controversy, taking up the challenge of thirteen Evangelical clergymen to discuss the points at issue between them; on which occasion, both in the published lectures and in the preliminary correspondence, it was generally admitted that the Unitarian champions most ably held their own. Among the orthodox we remember hearing that Mr. Thom was then familiarly styled "the Evangelical Unitarian."

To the outside public Mr. Thom is perhaps best known as one of the editors of the "Prospective" and "National" Reviews, and a contributor of important articles to periodical literature, as the biographer of the Rev. J. Blanco White, the author of an interesting volume of discourses on "St. Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians: an Attempt to convey their Spirit and Significance," and a smaller volume, called "Christ the Revealer;" and more recently as the editor of the "Letters, embracing the Life, of the late Rev. John James Tayler, B.A."

The volume now under our notice is the response to a requisition to the author, signed by many friends, that he would give to the world through the Press some of those

* *Laws of Life after the Mind of Christ.* Discourses by JOHN HAMILTON THOM. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1933.

utterances which only the failure of vocal power precluded him from continuing to give forth from the pulpit. It is appropriately inscribed to the Rev. Dr. Martineau and Dr. W. B. Carpenter "as respectively representing the ministers and laymen at whose desire it has been published." Not only those whose request is thus complied with, but all thoughtful and attentive readers, will feel grateful to the writer of these instructive and suggestive Discourses.

The volume is interesting and important from several points of view. Those who are in the habit of believing that Unitarian Christianity is necessarily cold, and powerless to move the heart and elevate the soul, who agree, perhaps, with Mr. Kegan Paul, in the *Nineteenth Century*, where he asserts that Unitarians "now confine themselves to mere Theism and correct morals, with intellectual gracefulness," cannot but be struck with its manifestation of intense faith in Christ as the revealer of a God actively present with the devout soul, and thus as still a living power, even with those who have learned from him to address their prayers solely to the Father. Those, again, who are prone to assert that the progressive sweep of scientific investigation, and especially the doctrine of evolution, has entirely changed the conditions of religious thought, may be struck with the fact, that a writer of the highest culture, fully alive to all the truths of science, and all the results of the freest critical inquiry, feels no difficulty in still believing that God is very nigh to the faithful soul, that religion is the great sustainer and sanctifier of life in joy and in sorrow, and that the immortal hope is inseparable from faith in God as the Father of our spirits.

Once more, those who maintain that there is no adequate reason to believe in anything higher than the idealised spirit of humanity, and yet lay stress on elevated and self-sacrificing principles of duty, may be struck with the continual evidence here given, of the intimate and necessary connection between religious faith and moral earnestness and elevation of character, and may be led to ask them-

selves whether the moral principles which they uphold could be long sustained, even if for a time enunciated, by men who lived as "having no hope and without God in the world." But there are many passages in this volume, the searching truth of which to human experience and consciousness will be acknowledged and responded to with interest and profit, quite independently of any philosophical or theological prepossessions in the mind of the reader.

The character of the first Discourse may be anticipated from its suggestive title, "Christianity the Impersonation of the Love that is in God." From the second Discourse, on "The Universality of Christianity," we extract the following passage as an indication of the style of thought:—

Now with God in Christ, we have the same method of instruction as with God in Nature. The greatest truths are rather communicated to spiritual apprehension, as seeds of future growths, through kindling faith, affection and thought, than expressly stated. Christ has given us no definition of what Christianity is, for how define in words what is embraced only in a life which has no limit but God? The works and life of Christ are in truth as illuminated facts, true to experience but anticipatory of progress, foreshowing our goal to make clear our destination and be a stimulus on the way—indications of things to come, not mere emblems and symbols as in the universe, but witnesses *in kind*. They serve to show us the Father through the only spiritual medium we know, the soul of a man. "The Son can do nothing of himself; but whatsoever he seeth the Father do, these things doeth the Son likewise." And a man worthy to be a Son of God is a more unanswerable declaration of heavenly life, of human immortality, than material or sensible evidences could possibly be—than a voice penetrating the cold ear of death—than Lazarus and the widow's son showing some of the reunions of heaven upon this side the grave, or attesting angels and a visible ascension to the skies. The only thought that has ever stood in the way of a universal faith in immortality, is the fear, derived from ourselves, that human nature is unworthy of an eternal union with God, and Christ has taken that fear away. In *him*, in the embodied Truth, in the Word made flesh—*there* is the lesson as soon as you can read it, the motive

as soon as you can appreciate it, the key of the spiritual mysteries as soon as you feel them to be mysteries, the heaven of reconciliation with God through love and the work of love, self-sacrifice, as soon as you hunger and thirst for its peace. (P. 22-3.)

In Discourse IV., "Grounds of Trust in God," the following passage contains an inference which many fail to draw, and some refuse to draw, from the unswerving regularity of Nature's laws:—

The *constancy* of God where common observation or science can follow Him, is a sign of His character as the Teacher and Father of Spirits, which we do not sufficiently connect with the tenderness of His regard for man. For why does His power in any observed direction confine itself to appointed tracks, and go forth only in one order? Why does He never in the same circumstances depart from the once-established custom of His ways? Surely He is a God of Law, in our sense of Law, that is, of invariable sequences, only out of the wonderful condescension of His love. He imposes these uniform conditions on His own action only that man may be instructed—may learn, as in no other way he could, to partake and avail himself of God's wisdom and of God's power. These periodic successions of natural beauty, familiar, yet virtually infinite in variety, to us, do not exhaust the Almighty, are not perhaps peculiarly dear to Him. These laws and properties of matter, relied upon by us, are not necessary directions of His power. His will could change it all; yet nothing fails, nothing is fickle; He works as steadfastly as though He were the Servant of Man, and not the free Lord of all things. An expectation created by Him never disappoints. Man's collected lesson is never turned mockingly into vanity. What was true once, remains true eternally. An observation of Nature wisely made to-day, serves the remotest ages. God keeps with us the compact of His works. And this is measureless goodness; it is an infinite condescension. A God who did not love us, who did not wish us to know and rely on Him, who did not seek to have a moral claim upon our confidence, would not thus sustain our faith; He would mock our labour and our hopes; He would turn our wisdom into folly; what we had learned to-day, make untrue to-morrow; lead us through painful processes, with eager expectations of like results, and fail us in the end. In this, His constancy to His ways, He has

never shaken the faith of His children, though He has interpreted Himself by showing in Christ the spirit in man that should be inspired by His will and moulded by His rule. God neither mocks, nor is mocked. We may use or abuse His gifts : He remains faithful to the offered conditions. He does not disappoint hopes of His own raising ; He does not countenance capricious fickleness ; He does not avert natural consequences ; He holds us fast in *personal* bonds. His laws do not fail us ; His power does not succour us if we sin presumptuously. We must be true as He is true, our faith resting upon His faithfulness. (Pp. 52-54.)

In Discourse V., " On the Goodness and the Severity of God," there is a striking and characteristic passage, too long to quote here in full, which indicates the author's sympathy with the Art and Poetry of the ancient Catholic faith, and which will win the assent of many thoughtful readers. Speaking of " what are called *decided* characters, men . . . whose force of impulse has an uncontrolled strength from the narrowness of their sympathies, and who, having once determined on what *to them* seems good, can set themselves to beat down whatever stands in apparent opposition to it, with no discrimination and with no relentings," Mr. Thom laments the losses which the world has sustained, in connection with the most conspicuous practical successes, by the working of " this hardness of purpose, which, open to no perception but one, touched by no sentiment but one, has swept into destruction whatever was associated with the interest it was seeking to destroy, leaving it no place to return and harbour in."

In the work of Religious Reformation, for example, how much has the world lost, and lost for ever, of the sublimest efforts of man's genius, of his devotion to the eternal and the spiritual labouring to express in outward and adequate symbols his ideas of worship, only because those outward monuments of the invisible, vast, shadowy, undefined as the sentiment of Reverence itself—those mystic courts of Prayer that might have breathed to latest generations the inspirations of loftiest piety, giving a tone to the mind like strains of solemn music—had become associated with a superstition, and the ruthless hand

of Reformation, instead of carefully separating and cleansing it away, with an impulse of fierce hate rather levelled with the dust the temples where it dwelt. (P. 66.)

For the completion of the train of thought we must refer our readers to the volume. The general drift of the profound discourse in which it occurs is indicated in the following passage, which severely but justly characterises a state of feeling very prevalent among many of the so-called advanced and liberal thinkers of the present day:—

There are two opposite errors respecting God's character, and our connections with Him, according as the one or the other of these His attributes, His Goodness or His Holiness, is dropped from our view. There is the Calvinism, and its kindred creeds, that takes account of His Severity without taking equal account of His universal Goodness; and there is that description of general religion, of easy and languid sentiment, that is ready to cast everything upon His Goodness and to omit His Severity altogether. I know not a more presumptuous, a more unholy view of God than this general trust in His placability, this loose reliance that we may draw to any extent upon His forgiving mercies—not up to the measure in which we seek to be one with Him, but up to whatever measure we may need to be forgiven. This is the feeling of those who have cultivated no personal sense of God, no spiritual union with Him, but who make general acknowledgment of their sins and their shortcomings and their need of mercy, and would seem to have persuaded themselves that this loose confession of their need is all that is required to ensure them unmeasured grace and forgiveness. But forgiveness is not the remission of penalty, leaving the man what he was; it is the restoration of union with God. His mercy indeed is infinite; but then it is the mercy of a holy God that embraces us, and not the unmoral compassions of a Being made in our own image. Dreadful is that perversion of the truth that man is made in God's image, which first obliterates *His* image in us through spiritual carelessness, and then proposes that *He* is made in *ours*. (Pp. 75-6.)

From Discourse VI., "Ours to Work out what God Works in us" (Philippians ii. 12, 13), space forbids us to extract more than the brief concluding passage:—

We are often told in these days that Christianity requires

some new utterance to give it power, some development of undiscovered energy to make it equal to the world's salvation. It wants nothing but a faithful heart to take it up; it wants nothing but that man should do his part. If any man wills to do His Will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God. Are we to hear from easy men, or from the mere critics of religion, that Christianity is failing? Have any of its Cross-bearers told us so, the workers or the martyrs of any age? God send us the captive heart, the listening spirit, the obedient will, that we may work out the great salvation of knowing that a man's life consisteth not in the things that he possesseth; that we too might live like God's children, and our Father be gracious to us as to him that dwelt in His bosom; that faith, hope and charity fail not from the earth; and that the Comforter abideth for ever! (Pp. 95-6.)

We must pass on to Discourse IX., "Circumstance, 'the unspiritual god,'" a most stirring and improving rebuke to an undue reliance on outward aids. In the following passage the ordinary appeal to Experience as the best teacher, is criticised with just discrimination:—

It would not be untrue to say, that in all essential things Experience is the teacher only of fools, of those who have gone astray through turning a deaf ear to the voice of a prior and more legitimate teacher. There are invaluable lessons of life—much skill, much helpfulness, knowledge of where the need is and sympathy should be—which Experience alone can supply; but alas for him who has got his virtues from his experience of life, for then his first experiences must have been of wrongdoing, and his later experience but the corrector of errors, or of vices, through penal consequences. To our spiritual being the experience of life is not the fountain of right, the source of law, though it ever confirms and seals with its testimony the teachings of nature and of God. In these fundamental things, he who, constrained by Experience, at last "comes to *himself*," has first fled from himself; he who, coerced by trouble, reduced to the coarse and bitter husks of a wasted life, says at last, "I will arise, and go to my Father," has first known, and been obdurate to, his Father's voice. That "Honesty is the best Policy" is a teaching of Experience; but it was well said, that he who has waited for this experience to teach him honesty, or who is honest only in the faith of this experience, the first began his

course in knavery, and the second remains a knave at heart. It is not knowledge of the world that makes a child's heart shrink from meanness, falsehood, dishonour: this wisdom is not borrowed from Experience, but that which shapes Experience when it is best shaped. It would be dangerous error to inculcate on the young, as a lesson in modesty, such deference to older experience as might weaken their reliance on the primal teachings of God. In no way has spiritual life been so much dwarfed, severed from its feeding spring, as by the substitution of the wisdom of man for the fresh inspirations of God. In truth, in the highest things experience of life is not our guide, but rather the touchstone of our weakness, for we all degenerate, if not from the attainments, certainly from the ideals of our youth. The best man is worse than his thought; and the worst has not extinguished the inciting light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. Experience is a mighty helper, but sometimes a timid counsellor, an unspiritual leader. Often the wisest counsel, that which alone subdues the difficulty, is the simplest utterance of sincerity and truth, a wisdom that comes from babes. (Pp. 136-8.)

From Discourse XI., "Moralities without the Spirit of Life," founded on Mark x. 17: (the young man who had kept all the commandments, but could not make the sacrifice of his great possessions), we give the following passage as an indication of the author's moral sympathy and insight:—

There is often a singular engagingness, much lovingness, in characters that have but little of the continual spring of fruitful principle, or of a consistent fulness of action. There is a class of minds of which it may serve for a description that you cannot help being attracted by them, whilst you cannot entirely respect them. Some of them attract us by the rightness and beauty of their impulses, the play and warmth of their affections, though we know that the impulses are excessively irregular, and the affections, if not capricious in their objects, at least very uncertain in manifestation, and far indeed from constant lights of sacrifice and love. Others of them attract us because of a gentle and equable goodness, a sure serenity of peace, even though we know that its sphere is mediocrity—characters whose tender conscientiousness keeps them kind and faithful, full of delightful repose, in the regularities of duty, but who never put forth an unexpected virtue out of the accustomed walk, never take a new

step on the by-paths or on the loftier heights—who keep in the open day and the blessed sunshine, taking calmly and bravely the familiar things that meet us there, though the day should suddenly darken and the sunlight depart, but who explore no tangled thickets and scale no mountains of the Lord,—men of whom you would never say that, since spiritual power was incalculable, and spiritual life of inexhaustible richness and force, you could not tell of what they were capable, or what great things they might do—on whom you might stake your life for all reliable qualities, but whom you would fear to commit to great emergencies in which the spirit must guide itself—of whom you never have a moment's fear that they will go shamefully wrong on a plain path—of whom you never have a moment's hope that they will go exceptionally right, and dare to be greatly good. (Pp. 168-9.)

Discourse XII., “No Supererogation in Christian Service,” lays down a doctrine which, though from one point of view undoubtedly and severely true, from another point of view might perhaps be modified and softened. The text, Luke xvii. 10, appears unduly harsh by seeming to place on the same level servants who had performed all their appointed duties with the “unprofitable servant” in the parable of the talents, who had made no use whatever of the talent entrusted to him, and was “cast into the outer darkness.” The word “unprofitable” clearly cannot have the same meaning in both places. In the sense in which it is used in the text of this Discourse it would be equally applicable to the “good and faithful servants” who had done the best they could with their talents, and were therefore invited to “enter into the joy of their lord.” It is undoubtedly true that no really devout and conscientious man will claim merit for himself, humbly regarding the utmost that he can do in the service of God as simply the due of Him to whom he owes life and breath and all things; but if we may venture to place ourselves in the position of Him to whom the service is rendered, is it possible to conceive that He will not regard with a higher degree of sympathy and love, those who yield an earnest and loving obedience to His will, than those who go through

a cold and mechanical routine of duties, or even consciously and wilfully transgress His laws? With this preliminary comment we can give our unreserved assent to the doctrine of this eloquent and striking Discourse, as contained, for instance, in the following quotation :—

We often assume to be acting from loftier feelings partaking of the nature of Generosity, whilst in fact we have reached only to a most slender appreciation of what simple Justice would require. We confuse our ideas of Goodness by supposing that it springs from a great variety of *sources*, some of which are more essential than the others, and that it has a great variety of forms, some of which are works of supererogation, moulded by an unsubstantial sentiment, the absence or the violation of which involves no forfeiture of righteousness ; whilst in truth all possible goodness, the moment it is distinctly conceived, takes the obligation of *duty*, and consists simply in being true in action and in feeling to the full claims of the relations in which we stand. Justice, to one who discerns what on all sides is due from him, in his indebtedness to God, covers the whole ground of Righteousness, and of more than is ordinarily comprehended in Righteousness, of spiritual perfectness and the beauty of holiness. All the sensibilities of our nature are of use only as they become feeders of our fuller sense of Christian obligation : until they are this, they are wasted and abused, failing to accomplish that for which they were given. The utmost graces of character are, after all, nothing more than the actions and offerings of a just spirit fairly meeting its obligations—obligations which not to discern is of the nature of spiritual blindness, and when discerned, not to honour and discharge is of the nature of wilful sin. There are men of iron conscientiousness who never evade a known duty, but deficient in delicacy of perception, in sympathetic observation, in quickness and range of moral feeling, in spiritual promptings, who would be and do more, if only they discerned that more was involved in the legitimate demands of Righteousness ; who, if they did not spontaneously flower into moral loveliness, would at least do their best to perform its outward deeds, if only it came to them in the shapes and with the claims of Equity. And there are others, men of sensibilities, who are habitually abusing the finest opportunities of life, the clearest claims of the affections, without discerning that in so doing they are ceasing

to be honest, failing to meet the just demands of the relations they assume. The former require that their conscientiousness should extend to gracious impulses and suggestions of goodness to which they are now insensible : the latter require that their sensibilities should become conscientious : *both* require to see that the beauty of holiness, the utmost grace and charm of life, as only the adequate responses of a clear-sighted spirit to equitable claims, can be no more than that which it is "our Duty to do." (Pp. 183-5.)

All who have looked, whether in the course of their professional duties or from an impulse of Christian charity, into the darkest abysses of the human lot, will confirm the truth of the following passage, which is all that we have space for, from Discourse XIII., "Christ's Sense of Brotherhood" :—

By far the largest part of the inertia, the insensibility, the moral indifference of the world, arises from an incapacity to realise the positions where the want exists, and our help might interfere. We are not so much hard, or even careless, as we are dull and slow to understand. It is not so much that we disregard the evils which we see, as that through remoteness of position and the inaction of thoughtful, imaginative sympathy, we see them not at all. Every one has had experience of how absence and distance blunt sensibility—how even sufferings and wants of which we have the most intimate knowledge, to which perhaps we have daily ministered, can begin to grow indistinct when place interposes its screen. There are men who now do nothing, who lose not an hour of the day, not a watch of the night, through their care for human sufferings, who if they saw with their own eyes the things that are, would pour out their wealth like water, and know no rest until they had removed the horrid image from their thoughts. (Pp. 213-4.)

We must ask our readers to refer for themselves to Discourse XIV., "The Judging Spirit," for some eloquent home-thrusts, especially at those who live in circumstances of ease and comfort ; in which, however, there is nothing inconsistent with a previous Discourse, "Circumstance the Unspiritual God," though the latter may be usefully read as the counterpart or obverse of the former. Discourse XV.,

"The Morality of Temper" (James i. 20), has some most useful and striking applications, from which we extract a sentence or two in relation to childhood.

There is nothing on earth more melancholy than when the shadows of hard, unfeeling Authority fall in dark masses on the springing life of childhood—when the tyranny of Temper stamps on it the correspondent vices of slavery, the servility, the terror and the trick—when irritability is felt like a jarring blow through and through the tender organisation, striking down the spirit of joy and trust, even, as some one has expressed it, as if a stone was suddenly cast against a tree wherein the birds are singing. The birds will sing again when the fright is over; but never again will the music of a child's heart be given out as freely to one whom it has learned not only to dread, but to distrust, as capable of being at any moment unjust and cruel through mere Temper. (P. 241.)

We must dismiss Discourse XVI., "Self-denial" (Luke ix. 23), with the mere remark that it is one more indication of what pervades the whole volume, that this preacher, Unitarian as he is, is filled with the spirit of Christ, and certainly does not preach mere Theism or cold morality. In like manner we must pass over Discourse XVII., "A Perfect Man, who offends not in Word." Discourse XVIII., "Strengthen what Remains" (Rev. iii. 2), is a much-needed vindication of the sufficiency of existing resources for spiritual influence and support, if only appreciated and used aright. From Discourse XIX., "Not of the World, as Christ was not of the World," we must find room for the following passage on immortality as necessarily implied in the teaching and the life of Christ :—

The encircling, though not the central or root, faith of Christianity is the immortality of the spiritual part of man,—all-encircling, because, if we are not immortal, we are not, what an Apostle calls us, "partakers of the Divine Nature"; we are not, what Christ calls us, "children of God," heirs of all that is His; and because, if we are not immortal, though what is noble and right would not change its nature, we could no longer regard discipline, bereaved affection, sorrow, temptation, disappointment, experience of wrong, pain and anguish, as means

towards the ultimate perfecting of ourselves and of all our brethren ; they would often themselves be ultimate and insoluble facts of evil. Immortality, therefore, was the great postulate of Christ ; he brought it into the light of life, but he never professed otherwise to reveal it ; he assumed it—to deny it being the negation of the Fatherhood of God, for there is in reality on the part of God no personal relation or friendship between His Spirit and ours if, notwithstanding the hope, the faith, the love, which He feeds, we fall from Him into annihilation. And the law of immortality requires us to withdraw our *heart* affections from whatever is not eternal in itself, nor fitted to educe, exercise and nourish, some portion of us which is eternal. The imperishable for its own sake, the perishable for the sake of the imperishable, is clearly the law which immortality prescribes. (Pp. 299-300.)

Discourse XX., "Our Lord's 'Trouble of Soul'" (John xii. 27, 28), is one which, we think, would deeply interest believers in the two natures of Christ, and which they would read with admiring sympathy, if not with theological assent. We must restrict ourselves to a brief extract near the conclusion.

We have very little command over the circumstances in which we may be called by God to bear our part—unlimited command over the temper of our souls, but next to no command over the outward forms of trial. The most energetic will cannot order the events by which our spirits are to be perilled and tested. Powers quite beyond our reach—death, accident, fortune, another's sin—may change in a moment all the conditions of our life. With to-morrow's sun, existence may have new and awful aspects for any of us. We know nothing but that in this disposition of things we are called to show a filial heart, the equal mind of Christ—that "*for this cause came we to this hour*"—and that if we put it away from us we may be putting away a glory, a purpose of our Father's Love as great towards *us* as our Lord would have put away if he had not turned from nature's instinct to the grace of God. (Pp. 320-1.)

We had marked for extract an important and instructive passage, referring with true discrimination to the designation of Christ as "a man of sorrows," in Discourse XXI., "Spiritual Counterparts to Temptation and Despondency"

(Heb. xii. 12, 13), but our space warns us to forbear. For the same reason we must pass over Discourse XXII. "Loving God with our Strength" (1 Cor. xvi. 13), though full of suggestive thoughts. Discourse XXIII., "Disquiet of Spirit" (Ps. xlii. 5), beautifully conveys some most useful and much-needed lessons, to which we can only refer our readers. This is appropriately succeeded by Discourse XXIV., "Quiet from God" (Job xxxiv. 29), equally original and impressive; and the volume closes most fittingly with Discourse XXV., "From the Seen to the Unseen" (2 Cor. iv. 16—18), illustrating the repose of spirit in those who possess the heavenly Wisdom of immortal Trust. We must give two or three sentences from this Discourse as our final extract.

The unconscious child and the conscious immortal are the only two beings whose world is commensurate with themselves. Childhood is a morning hour of unpurchased joy before the toil and heat of the day, ere yet the soul has arisen to envelop us in the shadow and the glory of the Future: and old age should be an evening hour of illumined Rest, when the spiritual lesson has been fully learned, the harmony broken for a time restored for ever between the spirit and its sphere, that as life began with the instinctive joys of irresponsible being, it should close with the conscious peace of tested love and ripened faith. (P. 394.)

Those great Trusts in God which we call religious principles of life are so many homes and refuges for the soul, wherein we rescue ourselves from subjection to apparent things. He is a man of religious principle who can look beyond appearances to the True and the Real, to whom things seen are signs of things not seen, and who looks for the passing away of the symbol that the imperishable Reality may come. And *he* is a man without religious principle, to whom the Present is no more than it appears, freighted with no eternal meanings, whose righteousness has no root in God, his peace no refuge amid the wrecks of time. (Pp. 395-6.)

The Discourses under our notice address themselves with such instinctive *authority* to the reader, that they seldom seem to admit of criticism or even analysis; and we have, therefore, endeavoured to indicate their character by care-

fully selected extracts, which, however, we hope, will induce our readers to peruse the whole for themselves, if they have not already done so. It will be apparent from the passages we have quoted, and still more after a careful perusal of the volume, how truly *catholic* is its application of Christian truths. Though the author possesses remarkable powers of acute and logical analysis, and the doctrine he teaches is clear and well defined, the intelligent and candid reader, whatever be the form of Christian faith which he has been led to adopt, will find little to which he cannot assent, or which can fail to excite his sympathy and admiration.

These Discourses do not deal with textual criticism or theological controversy, but are filled with the prophetic spirit. Their author speaks the thoughts of his own mind, and the consciousness and aspirations of his own soul. They are addressed, however, to thoughtful and cultivated readers. We fear that their refined ideas and graces of expression would be without attraction or significance to the multitudes who form the Salvation Army. But they may develop religious sentiments and quicken religious life in original and philosophic minds, and by some of these be reproduced in more popularly intelligible forms, cast forth as seed upon a greater breadth of soil, to be followed by an abundant harvest of spiritual good.

JOHN ROBBERDS.

MAN AND HIS RELATIVES : A QUESTION OF MORALITY.

THE question of the moral relationship which ought to exist between man and the lower animals is one that underlies the whole discussion of the Ethics of Vivisection. However useful experiments on living animals may be proved to be, no right-seeking Legislature can be asked to sanction them if they are in themselves immoral, or even if—supposing that we must give up the theory of one rigid law of morality existing through all time—they demand a step backwards in the morality of our day.

The advance of intelligence in the human race has been marked by the enlargement of its sympathies. Selfishness cannot be altogether extirpated from human motives, because self is the medium by which the universe is reached and understood; but the difference between higher and lower natures is chiefly marked by the enlargement or the narrowing of the bonds of this selfishness. The man who cares only for his individual pleasure is at the lowest extreme, and is universally despised. From him the line of development spreads outwards to the man who cares for his household, to the good citizen, to the patriot, and farther still to the philosopher whose conscious interest includes that of the whole human race. At the present day there are many who would go even beyond this, and who demand that our sympathy and kindness should be extended to all sentient fellow-creatures—that is to say, to all existing beings which possess organs of consciousness, and are therefore capable of pleasure and pain.

Indeed, if the moral duty of mankind ends with man, it is difficult to see why it should reach so far. Duty may be

regarded as a circle of unknown radius ; individual life is necessarily its centre, and the nearest things to each individual must claim the first attention and have the chief importance. But the circle has no definite limit ; for its circumference has been changing with us for ages, and exists still at its various forsaken stages among people of different degrees of civilisation. We find at the one extreme the savage who acknowledges no law of kindness outside his own tribe ; and at the other—or very near it, and claiming to be actually there—the physiologist who tells us that the limit of man's duty is man, and who holds with Sir William Gull that man is “ placed here to subdue the world to his purposes.”

Nevertheless, this theory of the physiologist, however it may differ from that of the savage in degree, is not altogether unlike it in kind. The one appeals to a more intelligent but not less absolute selfishness than the other. Both reduce the law of kindness to a mere bargain between opposing powers. The bargain may be an extremely limited one in the case of the savage, not extending beyond the boundaries of a single tribe. It is broader and fuller among civilised Europeans ; for these boast a world-wide ken, and have an educated perception that man can only be safe, whether Englishman, French, or Russian, through a universal acknowledgment of the sacredness of all mankind. It is not sufficient, in these days of commerce and travel, that each nation should regard the personal rights of its own members as inviolable ; the sacred halo of “humanity” must be extended to all the world. Nevertheless—and this fact is significant—negroes were long excluded from the common right, simply because they were not strong enough to have any voice in a selfish convention ; and gross injustice to women in domestic life was for the same reason, and for many generations, sanctioned and applauded by nations that were “free.” And still, however fine our theories may be, there is a great tendency among the ignorant and the indifferent to treat with injustice any people far removed from them in habits, and inferior to

them in strength. Such injustice receives, however, no deliberate sanction from intelligent and thoughtful persons. These are generally prepared to extend the rights of humanity to the lowest human form. Savages and madmen, negroes and women, are now acknowledged to have their claims on the common weal : they may appeal to justice instead of pleading for indulgence. It is quite outside all distinctions of colour, sex, or sanity that the debatable ground of moral right lies to-day. The deliberate torture of the most degraded savage is held to be inadmissible for any purpose, even the most admirable ; but we are told by many clever, humane men that the torture of animals, however faithful, intelligent, and sensitive, may be not only justifiable, not merely laudable, but sometimes also a direct duty.

The age we live in claims to be eminently an age of reason ; and yet a limitation of the justice of kindness to the members of our own race does not seem to have any reasonable foundation. It is only when moral considerations are ignored and expediency is discussed that an arbitrary line which includes one sentient being and excludes another becomes comprehensible. It is, undoubtedly, expedient for the good of the whole human race that the sacredness of humanity should be held inviolable, while no such consideration need govern us in our treatment of the animal kingdom. Animals have not intelligence enough to remember, generalise, and combine ; therefore, no thought of expediency compels us to strike a bargain with them as we do with each other. But this fact lies altogether outside the question of moral obligation, and so far no sufficient reason has been given to justify us in drawing the line of this obligation where it suits our personal interests that it should be.

For, if it is not merely for the sake of our own interests that our moral laws concerning cruelty differ from those of savages, if they so differ from a nobler reason, namely, that we have realised the meaning of suffering, and have acknowledged it to be an evil as great when felt by another as by

ourselves, an evil, therefore, which we ought not to inflict on another voluntarily; if it is for these reasons and not from motives of mere expediency, that we have abolished torture and all the infernal devices of dark ages, then the protection which we have extended to the whole of our own race should be extended also to the *whole sentient part of creation*, to all those animals which we have reason to believe are capable of conscious suffering. It is not reasonable, indeed, for scientists—still less reasonable for them than for the more ignorant among us—to claim exception for man on the ground that he is man; that, in fact, he is a more extended *Ego*. They profess to leave the realms of prejudice and of imagination, and to stand only on matters of fact; yet no fact (except that of power, brutal and intellectual force combined) has been demonstrated which can be held to justify the torture of a conscious being *not* called man while it is admitted to be wrong to torture one who *is* so called. It is, indeed, the scientists themselves who have proved to us the close relationship existing between man and animals, and their probable development from the same origin. It is they who instruct us to cast aside the old theology which makes man differ from the beasts of the field, inasmuch as he was created in “the image of God,” and who yet would arbitrarily keep, for their own convenience, the line of division which such a belief marked out between man and animals.

Richardson makes, in one of his novels, a fine remark on this subject: “In my opinion the world is but one great family. Originally it was so. What, then, is this narrow selfishness that reigns in us but relationship remembered against relationship forgot?”

The great naturalists of the present day have forcibly reminded us of—or re-proved to us—the “relationship forgot” existing between ourselves and the animal world. Since that relationship still includes many common forms of suffering, we, the stronger in our knowledge, should be the more tender of the ignorant and helpless creatures that are given into our power.

It is true that in demanding this of ourselves we are asking for a consideration which those for whom we demand it are incapable of giving us in return. But in so doing we are only appealing to our self-elected (and somewhat self-complacent) superiority; we are requiring from ourselves obedience to that *moral* law which it is our boast to be conscious of and submissive to. Madame de Staël says of man that he is "*la plus noble des créatures, et la plus noble est celle qui a le plus de devoirs.*" With this axiom physiologists are not inclined to quarrel: they are only determined to argue that among the "devoirs," that of abstaining from all cruelty to animals does not exist, or exists only in a form limited to the exclusion of cruelty which is "useless or wanton" from the regions of the highest morality. The argument is conducted altogether on the assumption of the supreme right of man to do what is best for himself in the universe. Sir William Gull even goes beyond this view of the actual supremacy of man, and concludes that any other order of things is not to be imagined. In the *Nineteenth Century* for February, 1882, he told us that "Mr. Hutton thinks that the moral difficulty would be solved if we spared the lower animals as we should expect to be spared ourselves were we in the power of a higher race. But it is impossible to conceive an order of nature in which intellectual creatures having our moral relations could stand to superior beings as the lower animals stand to us."

It is curious to observe that this impossibility of our standing in relation "to superior beings as the lower animals stand to us" is founded on the consideration of our being "intellectual creatures," having "moral relations," and yet it is the very supremacy of *morals*, as distinguished from expediency, which it is difficult to reconcile with the theory expounded by Sir William Gull and others. Morality is a regard for what is right and just; it is independent of the consideration of what is convenient and profitable; it comprises the claim of the individual on the multitude, as well as that of the multitude on the individual.

Yet some physiologists tell us that if a thing contains a possible benefit to man, no amount of suffering wrung from inferior creatures is too heavy a price to be paid for it. They argue from the point that a man's highest duty is evidently to advance his own interest, that *morality* commands him to do so at all costs! Sir William Gull,* for example, assures us that physiologists "must, from the nature of the case, claim as much liberty as astronomers and other inquirers enjoy in their several researches. What casuist can doubt the moral duty with the parable of the talents before him? Is it not at once the prerogative and the duty of the intellect, essential to its very maintenance and development, that it should have free course for inquiry?"

The allusion to the parable of the talents scarcely needs comment. It speaks for itself. It so completely "begs the question" of what a talent is, that we should only go a little farther up the road in which it leads us if we translated the parable into a free version of a familiar proverb, and made it teach us that "*Opportunity demands a thief.*" The paragraph following this allusion elevates the intellect of man into a deity as cruel and crushing as the cruellest gods of barbarians. The food of the monster must be obtained at the price of any sacrifice of sentient creatures. If, however, the religion with which the intellect of man is to inspire us consists so entirely in the offering up of all things for its nourishment in the greedy and remorseless self-feeding here suggested, may we not put concerning this deity of physiologists the scornful query of Mr. Swinburne—

What manhood in that God can be
Who sees their worship and is dumb?

Sir William Gull must surely acknowledge, after all, that he does not mean precisely what he says in this instance; or if the intellect must, as a matter of duty, have "free course for inquiry" in all that may feed it with knowledge, the darkest paths of sin and the blackest depths of crime may find a justification for their continuance in the supply

* *Nineteenth Century*, Feb., 1882.

of this necessary food. He can only mean *free course for inquiry within the bounds of morality*; and thus he leaves us where he found us, discussing what *is* the morality of vivisection.

Dr. Carpenter uses a similar argument when he says* that, because a member of the medical profession is under an "obligation to do everything in his power for the prolongation of human life and the mitigation of human suffering," this obligation justifies him in experiments on living animals, provided that he inflicts no more pain than is necessary for the advancement of his purpose.

And yet it must be acknowledged that no man can choose one obligation which shall set him free from all others. No man can rightly bind himself to an agreement with one person or body of persons by which he sacrifices the rights of others without their consent. The duty, therefore, of medical men to their patients and to mankind cannot annul their duty to the lower animals, if such duty exists at all.

Again, the statement that "the only restriction which Christian morality imposes upon such practices is that no more pain shall be inflicted than is necessary for the object in view" is open to the same objection of pre-supposing that to have an "object in view" justifies a man in ignoring any claims of morality which may happen to interfere with the advancement of the "object."

The danger of such a theory has already been pointed out by Mr. Gurney, but he himself finds no better line of limitation for the practice of vivisection than this—

"The true principle on which a stand must be taken is the right to inflict a lesser suffering for the sake of averting the greater."

Now, it must be remarked that, in the reasoning of many physiologists with regard to animals, a certain distinction is overlooked which the physiologists themselves would regard as all-important in dealing with man—namely, the distinction between a lesser suffering inflicted for the sake of averting a greater from the *sufferer himself*, and a lesser

* *Fortnightly Review*, vol. xxxi., p. 239.

suffering inflicted for the sake of averting a greater from *some one else*.

If it were not so, Dr. Carpenter would not cite, as an example of pain inflicted without cruelty which could be at all compared to vivisection, a surgeon's operation on a patient for the patient's advantage. It is certain that no one would object to an operation performed upon an animal to relieve its own pain, and it is equally certain that there would be a general outcry against an operation performed upon a human being without his own consent for the relief of the suffering of some one else. Since the whole question of the ethics of vivisection is included in the difference between the two cases, they cannot be accepted as having anything in common.

And again, although it may be, as Dr. Carpenter states,* that the practice of the medical profession "by the great body of hard-worked and ill-paid members who constitute its 'rank and file' is *constantly* inflicting upon large numbers of them a *far greater* amount of suffering" than they "claim the right to inflict upon animals," yet this would not of itself prove their right to inflict such suffering on creatures other than themselves.

At the same time, it may be remarked that, however fanciful may appear the distinction between the sort of suffering implied in experiments on living animals and that undergone by hard-worked surgeons in the course of their practice; or again, between the exposure to danger from infection and the actual inoculation of disease; it can hardly be questioned that, of the scores who are yearly entering the medical profession and gradually involving themselves in its hardships, very few would be willing to inoculate themselves with dangerous diseases, or to undergo painful surgical operations simply for the advancement of knowledge. So that here again, however correct the parallel may seem in theory, when brought to the touch of practice it will not hold good.

The argument, then, that man's duty to man is absolute,

* *Fortnightly Review*, vol. xxxi.

to the rest of creation comparatively nothing, rests so far upon an arbitrary assumption ; and the argument that it is right to inflict a lesser evil on one creature in order to avert a greater from another must be admitted to be of no general application, and to be opposed to the idea of individual right—of property in health or sickness not less than in other possessions—as usually received, and as sanctioned by human laws.

Still, the fact remains, as the great difficulty in the way of a logical conclusion, that we do *not* treat animals as we treat our fellow-men, and that we could not do so if we would. This is the great weapon in the hands of the defenders of vivisection.

To the arguments based on this fact the answer of those who seek to protect animals from man-inflicted suffering is this : while the unintelligent nature of brute beasts makes it impossible to extend *freedom* to them in their intercourse with us, their capacity for *physical suffering*—in many cases apparently as great as our own—takes from us the right to do with them absolutely as we would, and demands in our use of them a consideration for their sensitive organisation not unlike that which we desire for our own. The greater nature must dominate the lesser, but must dominate with intelligent kindness. In fact, Mr. Hutton's position, that it is our duty to spare the lower animals as we would expect to be spared ourselves were we in the power of a higher race, seems to stand closest of any to reason and morality.

Pain is, to our perceptions, the greatest blot of the animal kingdom. Death can be, at worst, only a negative evil, a cessation of sensation. It is a fact of which animals probably live and die unconscious ; for the so-called fear of death, which they have been supposed to show, must be only a fear of painful sensation, a sense of danger, not of death, but of injury, which indeed may or may not have death behind it without the animals understanding or being affected by the fact. Pain is, however, realised by many of them, apparently even to what we call agony ; the necessary organisation for its production is not confined, like the

so-called moral faculty, to man; and pain is the one ugly fact irreconcilable to our moral sense in the animal world, the one we would strike out from existence if we could, certainly the one which we would not in any way choose to produce ourselves.

It is true that the association of animals with men in domestic life, and the remains of old warfare between them outside it, necessitate to-day the infliction of much suffering on the inferior creatures; but the desire of all humane persons is to limit this suffering to that sort from which they are not themselves exempt—namely, that which is inseparable from the chances of life under any conditions. Their aim is to gradually eliminate the old forms of cruelty and to resist the introduction of new; to prevent, in fact, the intrenchment of the latter in the fortress of custom. We need not be physicians or physiologists to know that it is easier to keep two fluids apart than to separate them when once mixed, and that evil habits which have been built into the foundations of social institutions are difficult to detach and destroy. Society is not now being newly established on an ideal footing; it is full of old evils which cannot be uprooted at once; but it can at least progress towards good; and it may reject summarily new immoralities, although it can only struggle slowly to get free of the old.

In spite of Sir William Gull's evidence that vivisection has the "prestige and sanction of ages," it is still, practically, on its trial before the world. It has never hitherto been generally understood and accepted by the public mind. If the moral sense of England declares to-day that vivisection is justifiable and advisable, the meaning of such an assent will strike far more deeply at the roots of human sympathy and human progress than any mere toleration of cruelties that have long existed without coming definitely to the bar of public judgment. And yet the fact even of such a toleration of old evils, which has been used as an argument for the sanction of vivisection, is to the friends of animals a plea against and not for the legalisation of its

practice. It is a reminder of our weakness when we have once yielded a point. The physiologists seem to say to us, "You permit what your moral sense does not approve when once it is customary ; let us get this thing smuggled into custom and you will accept it too." It is precisely such a danger which it is so desirable to avert.

It may be true that late scientific investigations tend to prove that nature acts in the way suggested by Mr. Gurney, taking no note of individual merit, but grinding on through the ages at the modification of species, working out the amelioration of races by the sacrifice of separate members of them. We, with our conscious wills, are yet at liberty to decline to add to the unconscious cruelty and apparent injustice of nature. We have ourselves nerves and brains ; we have experienced in our own sensations the terrible meaning of pain, and we cannot assume the right of altering the distribution of it, taking it from one (possibly) to give it to another (certainly).

We have been assured that we may leave the whole question of vivisection—with the possibilities and actualities of its use and abuse which have been so largely discussed—in the hands of the physiologists themselves. Whatever might be their practice on English soil, unmodified by the law of the land and the expression of public opinion, their theories have been spoken plainly enough in the face of these controlling influences. An English physician, standing on English ground, has declared that experiments on conscious creatures are in the same category as experiments on rocks and trees, and that "the question of the animal being sensitive cannot alter the mode of investigation."

Mr. Gurney,* in rejecting this theory, adds:—"Nor surely could the question of the animal being human."

And certainly, when the *suffering* of creatures is no obstacle, when our *sympathy* with them is no barrier to their torture, it is not reasonable to conclude that man should be held exempt from it. If a man's compassionate

* *Cornhill Magazine*, Feb. 1882.

feeling is not to extend beyond the limit of his own race to other sentient creatures, we do not see why it should reach so far, nor why Englishmen should not torture their enemies and be tortured in return, for the benefit of science. If power must decide this question between man and animals, a bargain must decide it between man and man. "If you won't, I won't." That, and no developed moral sense, must remain for the restraint of European nations to-day.

A. ARMITT.

MEMORY AND PERSONAL IDENTITY.

THERE is nothing more miraculous and mystical than the common-place of Memory. For consider that in memory, the past becomes present, though recognised as past—as the very same experience which was once present, but is so no longer, and yet indeed is so now. The physiological explanation is none at all. We are told that impressions are “stored up” in the brain, ready to re-emerge. But how conscious ideas or feelings, which remembrances are, can be stored up out of consciousness, we are not told. And molecular motions in the brain no more explain correlative remembrances of the same person than they explain his correlative perceptions. The mystery is how the past, which *ex-hypothesi* has vanished into non-existence, can be restored, so as to be recognised as identical with the present impression, though also as rather different from it. To my mind this certainly implies not only the personal identity of the rememberer, but the continuous identity of the object or person remembered, however he or it may seem to our imperfect consciousness non-existent, annihilated. So that nothing can ever be lost, though it may be transformed, and known in higher, wider relations by that fuller consciousness to which we may attain, because it indeed belongs to us, as Divinely-Human. If a remembered person be dead, or a remembered tree cut down, the fact of their being remembered proves that they have a far more real and imperishable existence than their merely visible one. Of course the death or destruction of the outward form implies a change in person and tree—but it is not sufficient to admit a renewed existence of the person and tree in the mind of the rememberer, as even Positivism is prepared to

do, because the question is, what produces the remembrance, seeing it is not always in the mind? And if the original perception implied a cause external to the perceiver in person or thing perceived, so equally does the reproduction of the same idea in Memory imply the revival or continuity of the same external cause, though modified indeed to such dissimilarity as the dissimilarity in the conscious idea suggests, this being no longer a percept, but a fainter remembrance. Still in the case supposed, it is remembrance of a perception, so that the perception itself is less vividly reproduced; but in a dream, or in certain abnormal states of mind, it may be reproduced quite as palpably as before. All this proves, I think, a transcendent being, in which the phenomenal moments, or so-called "accidental" vicissitudes of all existence are involved, and eternal.

If any object exists apart from a subject, different from itself perceiving, or thinking it, that can only be as *self-perceived* or *self-thought*, viz., as another subject thinking. For an object *implies* a subject. Because its properties are all inconceivable, save as differentiated and integrated in one consciousness self-identified. It could not otherwise have, or retain a definite character of its own at all, and therefore it could be *nothing—could not be*. When you try to think of unconscious self-identical force, there is your thought implied giving distinction and identity. Apart from this, and the ideas, or categories of thinking, what is left? Only the thought in other minds, or perchance in the *object*; but if in the object, then the object must be a perceiver, or many perceivers; one self-identical thinker, or many such.

But now, if it *seems* as though material forces could be transformed into thought and *vice versâ*, does it not appear to follow that, since a person's thoughts are not, and cannot, be conceived as material forces, as *phosphorus*, for instance, ("No phosphorus, no thought," says Moleschott) phosphorus and material forces, if they were more truly apprehended, might turn out to have the nature of thought? Yet this doctrine of persistence and transformation of force is, after

all, only a provisional conception of our present stage of knowledge; still, it points to some real fundamental intuition. Truly, the amount of voluntary energy expended in any pursuit, mental or other, seems closely dependent upon the amount and kind of *food* we take—the original determination also to expend it seems equally so dependent, as well as on the capacity of our bodies to be nourished appropriately. So that Cabanis could say “*the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile.*” Either, then, conscience, will, love, thought are of the material nature of roast beef and cheese—or else the latter, if we understood them more clearly, might turn out to be less material than the vulgar imagine. Which seems most likely? For after all *they are percepts and concepts of ours*, nourishing substances for our “body,” also a thought of ours, involving feelings. “Der Mensch ist was er isst,” funnily says Feuerbach. Nay, rather “der Mensch isst was er ist,” I answer. Bread is (of the two) more likely to share, according to its own measure, our thought-nature than we to be perfectly measurable by the lower nature of bread; is not that so?

I may add that the remarkable experiences in “thought-reading” recorded in the *Nineteenth Century*, seem to me strikingly to confirm the theory I have ventured to propound in my *Philosophy of Immortality** concerning individual perception and thought—that proximately these result from a circulation, or transference of ideas and feelings among intelligences of different orders, and in various conditions, the percept or idea being modified by the specific nature of the intelligence impressed—although ultimately our perceptions and thoughts are specific limitations of the Divine Idea, according to the order and grade of the intelligence to whom it is communicated, as James Hinton believed. In “thought-reading” the notion transferred undergoes no change, because the communicating persons are in the same mundane sphere and condition—human, and what we are (rather strangely) agreed to call “alive.” But, indeed, “thought-reading” is only a striking

* Published by W. H. Harrison, 41, Great Russell Street.

instance of that class of phenomena, which has long been known as "mesmeric."

Memory's restoration of the past is, at the same time indeed, the intelligent reason's feeling after, and creation of, the future. And invention, or indeed all induction, implies confidence that the future will repeat the past. I have discussed that question in the Magazine *Mind*, and shown that an ascertained law of nature can only be ascertained by its verification in successive times and different spaces, else it would not be known for a general law at all. Hence time and space do not in themselves tend to make the law doubtful. They are, indeed, nothing but the general forms of the special conditions, and only a change in the special conditions can possibly affect the law (modifying it by another). But without different spaces and successive times the special conditions could not have been known or conceived at all. The future can make no difference to the law, if the conditions are the same. They are indeed properly not "future," if they are the same. The "present" is but a vanishing-point of the past and future. Professor Bain's assertion that we "simply *risk* the future" in trusting it is quite unwarrantable. Our own reason, indeed, is the reason of natural law, and we cannot imagine our reason to become unreason. Reasoning is but a complicating successive perception, and all is alike founded on a changeless intuition that *involves* past, present, and future, but to which there is properly neither. That is now "*faith*" with us, the basis of all. It was, and will be distinctly *reason*. Even if our actual reason be modified hereafter, we shall see the link between the new and the old method of knowledge at some time. God does not foresee; God *sees*; He is the Reason of all; and all is reason. All kinds of reason must be akin, moreover—essentially the same. The development of conscience, or the reasoning faculty in the adult, for instance, does *not destroy* the modes of sense that are involved in early perception; yet it may throw light upon, and *transform* them in a higher conception. We still know the phenomenon as before, but we now know *more*—the reason of it—therefore the very essence and truth of it.

The future will be like the past, so long as our reason remains unchanged. But were reason made less, or more, then certainly it would no longer know the future precisely as it knew the past. Yet even if our powers were enlarged the future would indeed be the past repeated, *only in an interpreted form, indeed, more truly repeated.*

And though you do forget much of your past, yet the successive moments of your experience are bound together by the sense of identity. The moments A and B are felt to belong to the same person M, and so are the moments B and C; therefore, though M forget A, still A belongs to him, and he may claim that also as belonging to him one day. In good sooth, what is an identity that is neither self-conscious, nor consciously known to be identity? The thing is really inconceivable. But Locke, in his chapter on "Personal Identity," has very pregnant and valuable remarks on the necessity of *conscious* self-identification to personal identity. He may put it too strongly of our *phenomenal* consciousness, which does not *always*, and cannot always gather the whole of itself together; still, there must be the *possibility* of this—there must be some time at which it may and will occur. Thus an old man remembers minute details of his childhood he had quite forgotten. And disease only obliterates for a while. But to be transformed into an "*unconscious* identity," which is what Hartmann and other Pantheists promise us, is clearly to be transformed *into no identity at all—to lose all identity*—for even the consciousness of an identity between successive conscious moments of experience is impossible in that, let alone between more distant experiences. And we shall never have that power of self-identification again, according to Hartmann; therefore we certainly *are not* and *cannot* be self-identical after death; nor could any other know us for identical, seeing that personal identity *consists in* such actual, or possible subjective self-identification. But then, how explain the present feeling (or fact) of personal identity at all? And if it exists, how can it utterly cease, and be annihilated?—*be transformed into—nothing whatsoever?*

In truth, moreover, "*unconscious* identity," identity not

self-perceived, or perceived by another subject, is impossible, or utterly inconceivable. *What in such an idea unites the differences? What makes the identity in successive times or spaces?* And how can there be "time" or "space" at all without such conscious integration and differentiation?

Does not this cut at the very root of Hartmann's, and Schelling's *Unconscious Absolute Identity*? But if it is blank self-identity without difference, is it not *zero*? That Behmen, and Hegel have established. Can it do anything, or be of any use? And if it be said to be inconceivable, "unknowable," do not these philosophers talk about it too much as if they did know it after all? At any rate, *how can this living personal identity we know become this "unknowable" impersonal identity*, which does not seem to be identity at all? Does it not, after all, *become zero*, and is that possible or conceivable? No doubt you can *say* that there is identity, and that the "unknowable" constitutes it, between existences that *seem* to be absolutely different, and to have nothing in common; but that does not appear to be a satisfactory philosophy which merely *says* so. This "Unconscious" of Hartmann (and I suppose Spencer's "Unknowable") is an identity that does not know itself for identical, and is not truly so known by any one else; on the contrary, as conscious in each man's own self, and as unconscious in nature, or "in itself" (wherever that may be), it appears totally different, and not identity at all—vague abstract Being (a mere figment, moreover) *is not the same* as self-conscious personality; it is a self-conscious person's abstract notion merely. Are we to be changed at death into an abstraction?—an empty notion of some one else's mind? That philosophical condition threatens to be more uncomfortable than being a gas even, which, at all events, has some sort of respectable concreteness about it. But on either supposition, one does not know what becomes of identity, persistence of force, and the scientific doctrine of non-annihilation. Let us repudiate the old-fashioned trammels of orthodoxy by all means, but must we also part with

all our common sense? in the name of the goddess of reason, and illumination too! If we do not preserve our personal identity, *what* "identity" do we preserve? Is it an illusion? well, at all events, it is what we are surest of, that which makes the possibility of any perception, and knowledge, or even any discussion about identity at all. I am far, however, from asserting that it will always appear to us precisely as it does now, that the *present form* in which our own identity presents itself to us is the ultimate and perfect form of it. I am far from thinking so; nevertheless, its perfect form, whatever that be, must perfect, include, complete it, make it intelligible, and harmonious with all other knowledge, with the identity of other spirits, and nature, with that of God Himself. The perfect form of anything cannot contradict, be less than, indeed totally different from, the less perfect form of the same thing.

There may be in personal identity a more intense, a more deep and large consciousness, swallowing up, absorbing, interpreting the former consciousness; there cannot be *no consciousness at all*. There will be a blending by love, sympathy, knowledge of all spirits in the One—a conscious reunion with Him. That is true identity—not our present isolation and separation. We do not know ourselves, and each other any better than we know God now. Our identity is in Him, and in them, in the God-consciousness, the Universal Reason which transfigures, and harmonises, without annihilating differences. But identity essentially implies synthesis of differences in one self-identical thought—a comparison and recognition of thoughts (or perceptions) as identical—which is only possible to one thinker self-known as self-identical. If this does not involve necessarily a successive process, at least it does involve a simultaneous knowledge of difference.

The truth on which positivists so much insist is all-important—that we are immortal by *influence*. But they do not see how much more that involves than they are willing to admit. If our influence abides, that signifies that *we* abide, influence being an act belonging essentially

to us, not to be divorced from us, even when the energy exerted has become effective in and through another life. The effects of a force *are* indeed the very force itself, when what we call the cause has disappeared. Any being or power is *in* its passing on into something different. A cause has no existence (except in abstract thought) apart from its effects. There may be no distinct reference in the person or thing influenced to the influencer in his or its original guise: that may have disappeared; but the essential in him or it cannot have ceased; else would the result also cease. Which proves that our present isolated, walled-in life, ignorant of its own power for good and evil, as of its own infinite result on the world, is not our true personality. We have yet to attain that, and then we shall consciously claim all we have done, often with shame, sometimes with thankful gladness. Our true being is in others, and theirs in us. Professor Huxley asked Mr. Harrison [in our "Symposium" in the *Nineteenth Century*] if a stone dropped into the water was immortal, because the result of its impulse is? I should have replied: *Certainly; not as a stone, but as a stone, and something more.* The force of which the stone was one symbol and appearance is immortal, and that is what the stone really was: the phenomenon so-called was merely an effect of our imperfect apprehension.

RODEN NOEL.

WAS GARIBALDI AN ILL-USED HERO?

BIOGRAPHICAL writers, when preparing to set their hero on a pedestal, like to make an empty space all round, that no object may impede a full view of his majestic proportions, and thus they heedlessly knock down some respectable figures that might at least have been advantageously grouped in the background. I do not know if the Rev. H. R. Haweis belongs to that class; but there are some points in his clever little article on Garibaldi, published some few months ago in *Good Words*, which I should like to see cleared up. I mention this particular article because the writer positively states for facts what others have talked of as reports. I have given some attention to this subject, and I have read many accounts of the Revolution, by Italians of various shades of opinion, all more or less admirers of Garibaldi, and I have not been able to find any evidence to prove the ill-treatment to which the Liberator of Naples was subjected immediately after his glorious conquest. If it exists we have a right to demand that it should be put on record, so that the question might be settled once for all.

Garibaldi was what Lord Carlingford recently described Mr. Gladstone to be, a fabulous hero in the intensity of the love and the hatred he excites. Of such fabulous heroes much that is untrue passes current, not only with the populace who are fed on rumour, but with that educated and enlightened person known as the general reader, who does not always reflect on what slight data travellers' tales

are sometimes founded. The Neapolitan and Pontifical soldiery believed that steel would not pierce nor bullets penetrate the invulnerable Red Shirt; but in a higher class more probable stories went abroad, to the effect that its wearer was treated with base ingratitude by the King and his Ministers. These stories were of course circulated by the disappointed adventurers who wished to prolong the anarchy at Naples and postpone the Union—a set of hungry cormorants who were almost tearing the Dictator to pieces for places and pensions, who imposed on his trusting good nature, and hated the thoughts of a settled government under the King. Englishmen visiting Naples in this rush of excitement and struggle of parties took up the idea of Garibaldi's ill-treatment. Mr. Bent, in his *Life of Garibaldi*, does not pretend to have any but hearsay evidence, and he rightly qualifies his statements by such expressions as "it is said—if we can believe it," &c. Now, I should like to know if Mr. Haweis has any documentary testimony to adduce for the following statements:—That "insults were now heaped upon the hero;" that the King was guided by mere "caprice" in not reviewing the Garibaldians; that when Garibaldi sent for a carriage to the royal stables to carry him to the steamer he was told to take a cab; that he had to borrow £20 to pay his private debts, and returned to Caprera with 14s. in his pocket! If such evidence exists I should like to know where it is to be found.

All the information I have been able to arrive at goes to prove the contrary of each of these statements. The King was guided by his advisers—not by caprice; he did not refuse a carriage, which was never asked for; he invited—entreated—Garibaldi to accept office and emoluments, and remain to help to pacify and establish order in Naples; finally, Garibaldi had not 14s. of borrowed money in his pocket setting out, but £30 of his own in his secretary's pocket. Why did Garibaldi refuse all these offers and go away so poor, giving the Republicans an excuse for attacking the King and spreading these false reports? Because he was angry and disappointed. He had at first asked to be

confirmed in his Dictatorship for two years, but Cavour appealed to the Parliament, and immediate annexation was voted. This decision Garibaldi accepted gracefully, and welcomed the King with sincere devotion—in fact, to Victor Emmanuel personally he always behaved with a chivalrous self-abnegation. On the King's arrival in Naples he made two impossible requests: "Get rid of Cavour, and let me march on Rome." If Victor did not reply in the rude manner reported—"I will not dismiss my Premier, and you shall not go to Rome!"—it is certain that his answer was to that effect, and could not be otherwise. Angry discussions may have taken place, but neither bore malice, as we see by Garibaldi's farewell proclamation, praising "the glorious hero of Palestro," and bidding the Italians rally round him; and also by the fact that Victor sent Colonel Türr to Caprera with a diamond necklace of great price as a wedding present to Garibaldi's daughter. He was not a man to accept such a favour if he thought himself wronged and "insulted" by the King. The fact is his quarrel was not with the King, whom he liked, but with the King's Ministers, whom he hated with an unreasonable animosity, which was kept alive by the self-seeking men who had got his ear at that moment.

I will refrain from referring to the accounts of the King's Ministers and officials—men honourably distinguished for disinterested services to their country; or, speaking of the state of corruption and anarchy that reigned in the two Sicilies, of the intrigues of a set of adventurers to make Garibaldi break for ever with the monarchy; of the danger to the national cause of allowing the unsettled state of things to continue, and the necessity of establishing a permanent government. But all these things ought to be considered in order to take a fair view of the question, which, like all others, has two sides. I will content myself with citing a Garibaldian witness. Count Carlo Arrivabene was attached to General Garibaldi's staff, and, like all who came under his magic influence, he adored him. In his two volumes of a personal narrative of the revolution through-

out Italy, it will be seen that he is not without prejudices, but sincere and honest. Let us hear him :—

Meeting between Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel, Oct. 26th, 1860.

The two great leaders of Italian unity cordially shook hands, and I could see by their faces that the action was the expression of a true sentiment of affection on Garibaldi's part, and of the greatest admiration on the part of the King. The King complimented the General, saying that but for his daring expedition the unity of Italy would not have been realised for ten years to come. "It may be so, sire; but I could not have attempted the expedition if Victor Emmanuel were not the most noble and generous of kings." *

Garibaldi's Departure from Naples.

When Garibaldi became aware that the question at issue was a mere struggle for power, he could not do otherwise than oppose (resist) the King's *entreaties*, and leave the country he had so heroically freed from its oppressors. This he did on the 9th of November, after bidding farewell to his companions-in-arms in the stirring address annexed. (It is too long to give here, but the following passage is significant.) "Providence has presented Italy with Victor Emmanuel. Every Italian should rally round him; by the side of Victor Emmanuel every quarrel should be forgotten—all rancour should disappear."

I shall never forget the last hours I spent at the Hotel d'Angleterre, where the man who had added nine million (subjects) to the Crown of Italy, had taken up his abode since he left the King. The General had retired to bed at his usual hour, and we agreed to pass the night in the ante-room of his apartment, there to await the day—the sad day of separation. At dawn on the 9th Garibaldi rose and made his appearance in the hall just at the moment when his private secretary, Basso, was telling us that all the money that the recent Dictator of the richest provinces of Italy had at his disposal was £30, saved by him, Basso, by the exercise of the greatest economy during the campaign. When Garibaldi was informed of the low state of his private treasury, he said with a smile, "Do not be anxious, Basso; we have plenty of wood and corn at Caprera which we will send to Maddalena for sale." Before leaving Naples, the General went on board the *Hannibal* to pay a visit to his friend

* *Italy under Victor Emmanuel.* Vol. II. p. 292.

Admiral Mundy, whose guns rendered him the honours due to a General.

"See, Arrivabene," said one of the officers as we set foot on the ladder, "England is more just than Italy is grateful." An hour afterwards Garibaldi was on board the *Washington*, which was to take him to Caprera. He bade us farewell in his soft, clear voice, and turning to Colonel Trechi, handed him a despatch for the King. It contained his resignation of the rank of Generale d'Armata, and of the Order of the Annunziata, which had been conferred on him. A few moments later the *Washington* was steaming to the distant rock of Caprera, carrying on board the man who, after he had conquered a kingdom, was leaving it as poor as when he wandered an exile through the forests of South America. In justice to the King, I must not forget to state that Garibaldi was repeatedly offered rewards and distinctions, all of which, with that lofty sense of honour which in him is almost carried to an excess, he refused." (*Ib.*, Vol. II., p. 308.)

Here we have every minute particular of the last day given by a devoted follower who kept vigil outside the chamber of his chief all night and followed him to the final moment on board the steamer. There is no mention of insults in this or the preceding chapter; honours and rewards are alluded to instead; and not a word about the carriage—which Garibaldi would no more have asked than Victor Emmanuel would have refused.

I may further indicate to the inquiring reader the testimony of another follower of Garibaldi, and a friend of thirty years, now a well-known author—Guerzoni. His biography of Garibaldi lately published in Florence is the book of the day in Italy, and no doubt will be the standard life of the hero in the future. In it will be found an account of the General's departure from Naples, in perfect accordance with the one already quoted from Arrivabene. In it is described, most accurately, the state of affairs in Naples. So far from receiving the King coldly, the inhabitants, of all classes, *forced* Garibaldi by their passionate demonstrations, to consent to the annexation without delay. The cry was *Live Victor Emmanuel! Live Garibaldi! Death to Mazzini!*

and the Dictator had to address the people from a balcony to calm their excitement, reproving them for their violence, but promising that they should see their King in a few days. The same day the National Guards and better class of citizens sent an address to the Dictator, with thousands of signatures attached, begging him to give his support to the party for annexation; and he yielded, with a good grace, to the will of the people. A few lines from the valuable work above-mentioned will show whether the Neapolitans cheered the King only when commanded to do so by Garibaldi, as stated by the writer in *Good Words*; and whether the hero was driven out of the city with "insults heaped upon him by the Prince to whom he offered a kingdom."

Last Days of the Dictator.

On the 7th November, the day fixed for the solemn entry of Victor Emmanuel into Naples, Garibaldi accompanied him in the carriage, seated on his left, the two pro-dictators opposite, under a torrent of rain, which spoiled the arches, deluged the draperies and flowers, *but could not damp the immense enthusiasm of the Neapolitans, intoxicated with the joy of that long-sighed-for day.* It was the last public appearance of the Dictator. He was offered the Order of the SS. Annunziata, the rank of Field Marshal, other honours and stipends; he refused everything. On the 8th November, he consigned to Victor Emmanuel, in the throne-room, the plebiscite of the Two Sicilies, then addressed to his companions-in-arms a last bellicose adieu, and at day-break on the 9th, silently, clandestinely, almost a fugitive, followed by Basso, &c., &c., he embarked, on board the *Washington*, for Caprera. The hero, however, did not leave with empty hands; Basso, his secretary, had in his valise some few hundred francs; and he had put on board—rich spoils of his conquest—a sack of vegetables, another of seeds, and a roll of dried codfish."*

This testimony from ardent Garibaldians, who have various grievances against the Ministry of the day, seems to me a complete refutation of the stories that have been current in English publications. It is to be hoped at least that the monstrous fiction of the *cab* is disposed of. When

* *Garibaldi: Da Giuseppe Guersoni.* Firenze: G. Barbèra. 1882. Vol. II. p. 232.

one has nothing but reports to go upon, one ought to consider the character of the person attacked, and ask, Is this a likely thing for him to have done? In the present case—even without the rebutting evidence—I should say certainly *not*. Victor Emmanuel had a fiery temper, but he was a generous man, incapable of offering a mean, spiteful offence to any one, much less to Garibaldi; he was a gentleman, too, and knew what was due to his own dignity; he was not a fool, and therefore would not wantonly insult the idol of his new subjects, on whose loyalty theirs depended. It has the stamp of untruth upon it, as also that other story set down by Mr. Haweis to the account of Pius IX., but not to be found in the respectable biographies of the Pope, however hostile—that, in 1847, on hearing of Garibaldi's advance he sent an order "to throw that bandit into the sea." In 1847, Pius IX. was working with the Liberal party for independence; and at no time of his life would he have been guilty of the atrocity of giving such an order. Let us endeavour to be just even to Pio Nono, who doubtless will have enough condemnation from posterity without putting to his account the intent of a ruthless murder. We should be as careful about stating dubious facts concerning our hero's rivals as concerning himself, and resist the temptation to make a telling antithesis. We cannot hope, human nature being what it is, to be entirely just in our judgment of an opponent, but it is a thing worth striving after, as Carlyle would say.

To return to Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel. The writer of the article which I have taken for a text does not mention, and probably did not know of, the costly diamond necklace, the gems of which were one by one disposed of by Garibaldi's worthless son-in-law; nor the help which was afforded from the royal privy purse when the General was in distressed circumstances, owing to the extravagance of his family. And here I may add an incident little known, which I learned from a private source. Garibaldi's second son one day took his yacht, the gift of the Duke of Sutherland, out for an excursion and never brought it back. The

fact that it had been sold was conveyed by some means to the King through a friend of Garibaldi. Victor, wishing to give the old General a pleasure, advanced the money to buy it back and have it restored to him; but Garibaldi's false friend—and he had many such—absconded with the sum confided to him. For some years before he died the General enjoyed a Government pension of £2,000; his widow and five children have each been assigned £400 a year—a very handsome provision, the poverty of the country and all things considered. It is unnecessary here to allude to the extraordinary funeral honours in which the King, the Government, and the authorities all took a part. I cannot remember the case of a great man whose services were more amply recognised in all respects than those of Garibaldi.

Aspromonte was certainly a mistake on the part of Rattazzi and the officer in command of the expedition sent to stop the rebel force; but it was a greater mistake on the part of Garibaldi. No citizen, however illustrious or glorious, should set himself above the laws of his country, and make himself arbiter of peace and war. If a British subject did so, would he not have to take the consequences? We have never had a Garibaldi, it is true—he is altogether a product of the Italian soil; but if we had, how would his rebellion have been met?

Anything short of bearing arms against the Royal authority, the King, and the Government, and the nation supported with equanimity and patience. Any one living in the country and witnessing the trying conduct of the old General the last ten years should have been struck by the tact and magnanimity with which all offences were quietly ignored. King Humbert had been taught by his father to love and admire Garibaldi, and though the General set himself in a bitterly hostile attitude towards him from the day he came to the throne, he never failed in deference and consideration, never forgot what Italy and the House of Savoy owed to this republican king-maker, who laid down his Dictatorship like a Cincinnatus, and retired to his fields as poor

as the meanest soldier in the ranks. That was, indeed, the greatest glory, the noblest moment of his life, and no follies or blunders could cancel the memory of it. When Humbert heard Garibaldi was ill in Rome, he paid him a visit ; and when he travelled, the Royal carriages on the railway were at his disposal—the state of his health obliging him to be carried on a bed, so that the ordinary ones were inconvenient.

About two years ago he was so conveyed to Milan to preside at a meeting held by French and Italian Reds of the deepest dye, the business of which was, of course, to denounce monarchy, and all the present constituted authority. He was, however, too ill to appear. Every true Italian was grieved at these performances, but no one spoke harshly or severely ; it was all put down to the evil advisers who had got such influence of late years over Garibaldi's pliant nature ; and the revolutionary letters which were constantly published in his name were either suppressed by respectable journals, or given as the concoction of the worthless set who imposed on the crippled and broken-down old hero, who could not write, and probably never read them. " As wine is sometimes made without grapes, so there is nothing easier than to have a Garibaldian letter without Garibaldi," was the opening sentence of a notice of one of those productions in a popular journal. I always admired as a fine trait this gratitude to and love of Garibaldi, which I freely acknowledge was no more than his deserts.

It is an ungracious task to recall now the fact that the monarchy which in his happiest and best days he helped to build up, in his latter years he used all his feeble forces to pull down and abase, with the *Italia Irredenta*, and such like agitations. It would be more pleasant simply to join in the chorus of praises which have resounded in England as well as in Italy, in all of which I heartily concur. I have been induced to make this protest, not because I am tired of hearing Garibaldi called the just, but tired of hearing unjust accusations of ingratitude against the Italian nation and King, which by dint of heedless repetition have come to be believed.

G. S. GODKIN.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

DR. PRESSENSÉ ON THE PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE, OF BEING, AND OF DUTY.*

WHEN we first opened this massive volume and read the title-page, we did not anticipate any great pleasure or profit from the perusal. It seemed hardly likely that Dr. Pressensé, whose literary performances have hitherto lain chiefly in the study of historical Christianity, should prove competent to deal in a masterly way with the difficult philosophical questions which at present divide the scientific and the religious world. The result, however, has corrected our first impression. The work before us is evidently the mature fruit of both extensive reading and powerful thinking. It is a treatise, too, which appeals simply to the facts of human consciousness, and is quite independent of all "special revelation." Those who have enjoyed the privilege of becoming acquainted with Dr. Martineau's academical lectures—a privilege which we earnestly hope may not long be withheld from the reading public—will be struck with the great resemblance between the doctrines therein enunciated and those set forth in Dr. Pressensé's book. Dr. Pressensé's presentation of his views is, it is true, very sketchy and imperfect as compared with Dr. Martineau's far more full and searching treatment, and we miss in the literary style of the former writer the singular artistic grace which lends a charm to Dr. Martineau's most abstruse philosophizings. Still the fact remains that the two philosophies are in many respects closely akin; and students of heredity may speculate as to whether the Huguenot blood in the illustrious English thinker has anything to do with the circumstance that the current of his ideas flows so much in the same channel as that of the eloquent French Protestant. The tone of Dr. Pressensé's volume may be inferred from the following passage in his preface:—"I am one of those who believe in liberty as the surest safeguard of the truth. To attempt to defend religion and conscience by any

* *A Study of Origins; or, the Problems of Knowledge, of Being, and of Duty.* By E. DE PRESSENSÉ, D.D., author of "The Early Years of Christianity," &c. Translated by Annie Harwood Holmden. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1883.

other means than free discussion is to belie them. The insidious doctrine of 'liberty for the good alone' seems to me essentially evil; for the truth must be in doubt of itself when it wishes to gag the lips even of error. Through my whole public career I have steadily advocated the complete enfranchisement of conscience, and for this I shall ever plead. I desire to see this freedom carried to its furthest issues. It is my one aim to dedicate all the remaining energies of my life to the vindication of the highest truths of morality, apart from which I foresee nothing but ruin and dishonour for my country and irremediable loss to that soul of man which is to live on when all public institutions shall have passed away like a tent set up for a day. I shall be truly happy if this book, written in all good faith, may, in spite of its imperfections, do something to dispel the fatal misconception that science and conscience, liberty and religion, are incompatible. Such an error may well be fatal to the life of a country and of a people."

Of the three problems discussed in this book the first, that of Knowledge is the most important, for its solution carries with it by implication the solution of the other two. In treating of the origin of Knowledge, Dr. Pressensé examines at some length and with considerable subtlety the Positivist position, and shows that it is not possible to limit science to the simple conditions of existence, and to set aside all inquiry into its causes: that Positivism has wholly failed in its attempt to derive all knowledge from the object itself, apart from the activity of the thinking subject, for that this subjective activity is implied in the simplest induction of a general law from the succession of phenomena. "We hold," he says, "that Positivism is not justified either by history or by the facts of present experience. Starting with a disavowal of the principle of causation, which is the very foundation of all reasoning, and which ought at least to be recognised in the category of established facts, it has seen its theory of the three states belied in the past by the permanent co-existence of theology, metaphysics, and science; and in the present (which ought to be the exclusive age of Positivism), by the new and eager impulse given to philosophic and religious thought. It has mistaken for three successive and incompatible states of the human mind, three aspects of things, which may be usefully distinguished, but not separated from each other, since they are mutually complementary. Neither religion nor metaphysics can dispense with positive science, while on the other hand positive science is not self-sufficing, since, in formulating the simplest laws which extend beyond single phenomena, something more is implied than the results of mere sensation and positive observation" (p. 29).

The theory of Knowledge put forth by the English psychologists is next considered. With reference to the associational view Dr. Pressensé clearly demonstrates that in order that the mind, or ego, should bring together and compare two ideas or sensations it cannot simply be the sum-total of these ideas or sensations, for if this were all, the mind must be defined as an addition sum adding up itself, which would be nonsense.

He dwells, too, with much force on Mr. J. S. Mill's admission that the phenomena of memory are inexplicable and paradoxical on the theory which denies the existence of a permanent self. It is an exception to Dr. Pressensé's usual accuracy when he says that according to Mr. Mill "the idea of space has arisen out of the constantly repeated experience, that we can always suppose a point beyond that at which we have arrived," for Mr. Mill derives the idea of space from muscular and tactual feelings, and it is the notion of the *infinity* of space that he traces to the above source. In criticising Mr. Spencer's system, it is shown that "matter seeking to understand itself, is no longer matter; motion which is conscious of itself, is no longer mere motion. Evolution cannot give more than it possesses. The total of an addition cannot be more than the sum of the figures composing it. Before we can derive thought (not to speak of the moral life) from mechanical force, new quantities must have been surreptitiously brought into the operation" (p. 48). Under the head of "French Psychology" Dr. Pressensé describes and refutes M. Taine's theory of intelligence, which he happily characterises as French fireworks made out of English powder; this is followed by an acute criticism of the "German Psychology" of Fechner and Wundt.

His own view of the true theory of Knowledge Dr. Pressensé derives in part from Descartes and in part from Kant, but it evidently owes its essential features to Maine de Biran, who is represented as the reconciler of Cartesian and Kantian doctrines. "It would be difficult," writes Dr. Pressensé, "to overstate the services which Maine de Biran has rendered to philosophy by his theory of Effort, which he himself sums up in these words: 'I will, I act, therefore I am. . . . I am not vaguely a thinking thing, but definitely a *willing* thing, which passes from will to action by its own energy, as it resolves within itself or acts beyond itself.' Here, again, Maine de Biran requires to be supplemented by Kant, for he has too much neglected the properly moral aspect of free action, that which belongs to the categorical imperative. It is not enough to say, 'I will, therefore I am;' it should be *I will, I ought, therefore I am*. Only in this way is the Cartesian formula sufficiently widened. It is not my being only which is thus affirmed, but the Being also on whom I depend; the Being who commands me and constrains me to say '*I ought*.' This Being, to whom my conscience and reason alike point is not only an infinite substance, but infinite liberty, since He is the Absolute Good, the eternal type of the moral law."

According to Maine de Biran the mind attains in the experience of resistance an intuitive knowledge both of itself and of the external world; and to the same consciousness of personal activity he ascribes the notions of causation, substance, space, and time. Dr. Pressensé agrees with M. Ernest Naville that Maine de Biran has exaggerated the part taken by our subjective experience in the formation of these great fundamental ideas of the reason. The ideas of causation, space, &c., could not have been evolved from this experiment of the ego upon itself unless they had been implicitly contained in it. It will be re-

membered that Dr. Martineau in an article in the *National Review* called attention to the high value of Maine de Biran's psychological views, and in the qualifications which he suggested in reference to these views he anticipated, if we remember rightly, Dr. Pressensé's present criticism.

There is also an interesting account and criticism of the modification of the Kantian philosophy recently propounded by M. Renouvier, who rejects the notion of "the thing in itself" and of the ego, and develops a theory of pure phenomenism, which is essentially in agreement with the doctrine which Dr. Shadworth Hodgson has been elaborating in this country.

We have not space to follow Dr. Pressensé into the two remaining sections of the volume, which treat respectively of the origin of Being and of Duty. In the former will be found a valuable exposition and examination of the evolution theories of Hæckel and Spencer, including very instructive dissertations on the relation between thought and brain and between man and the brutes. In the latter Freewill is vigorously defended, and the intuitive basis of ethics and religion is very ably and eloquently maintained. We can confidently recommend this book to our readers as presenting what seems to us a sound philosophy of God, man and nature, and as giving in a condensed form much of the best thought of recent French writers on this fundamental subject.

C. B. U.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.*

IN this new volume of Blackwood's "Philosophical Classics" Professor Veitch has depicted the life and philosophy of his distinguished friend with a careful and skilful hand. If in his defence of Sir William Hamilton's views against Mr. J. S. Mill's strictures he betrays at times the tone and temper of an advocate rather than of an impartial judge, this defect is more than compensated by the advantage which the reader derives from being admitted into the inmost heart of Hamilton's system by an ardent admirer, whose insight into the meaning and worth of the philosophy he expounds is far more clear and penetrating than that of an unsympathetic critic could possibly be.

The biographical portion of the book is brief but effective. Now that the influences of heredity are regarded as determining the mental and moral type of the child as well as the physical form, the pedigree of an eminent man acquires additional interest; and Professor Veitch's elaborate sketch of Hamilton's ancestors from as far back as the beginning of the sixteenth century shows that his hero came not only of a "good"

Hamilton. By JOHN VEITCH, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1882.

stock, but also of a stock that had frequently manifested both subtlety of intellect and force of character, and therefore "young William Hamilton had a constitutional right, if there be anything in heredity, to a very vigorous and varied activity." His student years were passed first at the University of Glasgow and then at Oxford, but at neither place does the influence of his teachers appear to have given to his thought its distinctive character. At Oxford, however, the line of reading which he mapped out for himself, embracing as it did the *De Anima*, the *Ethics*, the *Organon* and the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle foreshadowed the special direction of his future philosophical researches. His final University examination in 1810 he passed with unparalleled distinction, and, indeed, on this occasion the position of examiner and candidate appears to have been inverted, for the latter was confessedly far deeper than the former in Aristotelian lore. Many of Hamilton's forefathers had been Doctors or Professors of Medicine, and on leaving college he hesitated about entering that profession. Finally, however, he adopted the profession of the law, and became somewhat of an authority in antiquarian and genealogical cases. The most conspicuous use he made of his legal skill was to prove his own right to a baronetcy which his ancestors had for more than a century failed to take up. But law had always for him less charms than "divine Philosophy."

Hamilton (says Professor Veitch) was exactly the kind of man, the pure scholar and thinker, for whom Scotland had and has absolutely no sort of provision. The only chance for a man of this type, in the lack of any means for fostering scholarship or culture, is a university chair. And this chance is but occasional; it may be got or lost for a generation, or even a lifetime. Hamilton's friends accordingly in 1820, when Dr. Thomas Brown died, urged him to become a candidate for the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Edinburgh. He did so, but lost it; John Wilson being appointed Professor. The decision turned very much in those days on politics; it lay with the Town Council. Hamilton was a Whig, Wilson a Tory. The Tories were in the majority, and put in their man. Hamilton after this had no chance of any appointment of the least importance for sixteen years" (p. 8).

The most productive period of Hamilton's life was the seven years from 1820 to 1836. At the opening of this creative era he was forty-one, and though he had written little beyond a scientific refutation of the phrenological theories at that time so much in vogue, he had amassed a vast store of philosophical knowledge and had matured his admirable dialectical skill. It was a most providential circumstance that at the time when Hamilton had prepared the first and most celebrated of his Essays, the *Philosophy of the Unconditioned*, in which he criticises Cousin's doctrine of the Infinite-Absolute, the *Edinburgh Review* changed its editor. The new editor, Mr. Macvey Napier, happened to be one of the few men in this country who were capable of appreciating Hamilton's genius, and under his encouragement that series of review-articles was written which were afterwards collected in the volume of "Discussions," and on which Professor Veitch thinks Hamilton's repute as a thinker must for the most part ultimately rest. A letter which Jeffrey wrote to Napier on the publication of the review of Cousin is worth quoting as a characteristic

specimen of the average British estimate of philosophical writing of the profounder sort:—

Cousin, I pronounce beyond all doubt the most unreadable thing that ever appeared in the *Review*. It is ten times more *mystical* than anything my friend Carlyle ever wrote, and not half so agreeably written. It is nothing to the purpose that he does not agree with the most part of the mysticism, for he affects to understand it and to explain it, and to think it very ingenious and respectable, and it is mere gibberish" (p. 28).

Hamilton's essays in the *Edinburgh* riveted the attention of many eminent continental thinkers, and it was chiefly through the influence of Cousin, Brandis, and others brought to bear on the Town Councillors of Edinburgh, "who knew as much of philosophy as they did of the differential calculus," that Hamilton by a small majority obtained in 1886 the appointment to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics. The Lectures on Psychology and Metaphysics and those on Logic as we now have them were written during the nights of the winters of 1886-87 and 1887-88. "These Lectures were for twenty years the most powerful factor in the philosophical thought of Scotland." They were composed under great pressure, and yet, strange to say, received only slight changes during the twenty years of his professorship. Professor Veitch also calls attention to the patchwork appearance of several of these lectures. Hamilton is often content to piece together long passages translated from foreign authors who had clearly stated current or received opinions. Some excuse may be found for this in the peculiar circumstances under which the Lectures were originally written, but, as his biographer remarks, Hamilton had ample time afterwards to apply a remedy. Professor Veitch elaborately repeats in this volume the charge which he previously made against Mr. Mill of having unfairly taken the Lectures as the latest form of Hamilton's philosophy, whereas it is in the notes to the edition of Reid, and in the appendices to the Discussions, that his ripest thinking is to be found.

The philosophical portion of the treatise is an admirable summary, exposition, and defence of the chief features of the system. To those who have not read the original it will give a good general view of Hamilton's position, and of his antagonistic relation to the British sensualists on the one hand, and to the Hegelians on the other. Professor Veitch's admiration for his master does not blind him to certain very questionable features in his philosophy. In particular he signifies his dissent from Hamilton's doctrine concerning the knowledge of the Ego and from his view of Causality. On both these important points Professor Veitch's criticisms have been anticipated by both Dean Mansel and Dr. Martineau, and we are surprised that throughout the volume we find no reference to Dr. Martineau's profound and eloquent paper on "Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," a paper which, though now thirty years old, has not been superseded by any later criticism, and in respect to the doctrine of Causality especially presents a far more clear and thorough exposure of the unsoundness of Hamilton's views than is given in the volume before us.

Professor Veitch adduces reasons, which appear quite satisfactory, for rejecting Hamilton's view of the Ego as a substance whose existence we do not intuitively know but only *infer* from the phenomena of consciousness. "The Ego or Self," he maintains, "cannot be truly said to be unknown or unknowable. It is true that we do not know a self *per se*, or an Ego, out of relation to a state or act of consciousness. . . . But I do apprehend or know myself truly, really, when I apprehend or know any state of consciousness."

Of Hamilton's view of the Axiom of Causality as resulting from impotency on our part to conceive an absolute commencement of being, Professor Veitch pertinently remarks "that Causality in such a case would cease to be a necessary law of things, and become a mere subjective necessity on our part. . . . And even supposing that we could not conceive the existent arising from the non-existent, this would not give the explanation of the movement or transmutation in the previously existent—that is, the dynamic force implied in change."

We are disposed to think that there are some other important errors in Hamilton's philosophy besides those indicated by Professor Veitch. His view of Sensation as, apart from Perception, giving us knowledge of our own organism is, we think, a mistake. In the absence of that percipient faculty which is called into activity when our voluntary movements are resisted by external bodies we should have no more knowledge of our own organism than of the objects around us. Hamilton appears to assume that sensation necessarily carries with it the knowledge of itself, and therefore he never contemplates *infra-cognitive* states of sentiency. He never takes into consideration the sensations of the lower animals, but if his view that sensation necessarily implies knowledge be correct, the worm, if it has sensation, must also apprehend the Ego as contrasted with the Non-Ego.

Again, notwithstanding all Professor Veitch's ingenious pleading we cannot see how Hamilton's Natural Realism, which he holds when treating of Perception, can be harmonised with his ontological doctrine that we know nothing of things as they exist apart from our perception. Do the primary qualities of bodies—their shape and solidity—exist as we know them in the absence of the knowing mind? In dealing with Perception, Hamilton speaks as if they did, but when discussing the relativity of knowledge he tells us we cannot say that any of the qualities of bodies exist absolutely as they are presented in our perception. In fact his theory of knowledge is sometimes that of Reid, and sometimes that of Kant, and the two theories are never reconciled.

On the interesting question of the relation of *knowledge to belief*, that is, of philosophy to theology, Hamilton's doctrine does not, even when developed by Professor Veitch, yield very satisfactory results. His agnostic view of Substance and Causality goes far towards undermining the foundations of all rational theology. Professor Veitch says that on Hamilton's principles we may attain to some knowledge of God by the perception of analogies between the intelligence in ourselves and

the intelligence in nature, but it is difficult to see how we can safely reason from the visible cosmos to its Cause, or from the facts of our moral and spiritual consciousness to a Divine Inspirer of that consciousness, if our very notion of causality is no intuitive truth, but only a manifestation of our mental impotence. But this difficulty is not recognised by Professor Veitch, who thus winds up his account of Hamilton's theology:—

This, however, is clear, that Hamilton is an agnostic only in the sense of denying and exploding a ridiculous absolutism; and though in the process of inference, Hamilton leaves several links unsupplied, there is yet no other opening into the supersensible, unless through Analogy. If we find not the image of God in our own consciousness, we shall rise neither to the belief nor to the knowledge that there is a God and a God for us" (p. 267).

We have occupied our limited space in pointing out what seem to us defects in Hamilton's philosophy, but we need not remind our readers that even if our criticism on these points be valid, there still remains a vast treasure of true and lofty thought in Hamilton's writings.

It is a pity that more care was not employed in taking the work through the press, for the occasional misprints make a difficult subject still more perplexing. On page 209 "subjectivo-objective" should be "objective-objective;" on page 255 "mere difference" should be "mere indifference;" and on page 258 we meet with the startling statement that the Deity, as described by Cousin, is "an imperfect, inchaotic, thing," where for "inchaotic" we suppose "inchoative" should be read.

C. B. U.

LENORMANT'S 'BEGINNINGS OF HISTORY.'*

THE works of the accomplished Assyriologist deserve to be generally accessible. He touches on the stories of the creation of man and the stories of the first age of humanity, current among all nations whose mythology we know, with the skill of a master of universal knowledge, and thus brings to a focus all the light which can illustrate the initial chapters of Genesis. Similar comparisons have often been made by others; but in some respects this is perhaps the most satisfactory work of the kind which has been attempted. It is the most exhaustive; and it is the most recent. The author is thus enabled to enter fully into the due estimation of the Assyrian and Babylonian mythology, which from his own special studies he can appreciate for himself, and need not accept from the mere statements of others.

In form the book is a commentary on the first eleven chapters of Genesis, which are presented in a new translation, exhibiting the portions

* *The Beginnings of History according to the Bible and the Traditions of Oriental Peoples.* From the Creation of Man to the Deluge. By FRANÇOIS LENORMANT. Translated, with an Introduction, by FRANCIS BROWN. London: Sampson Low. 1893.

due to the two "sources" recognised by the author, the Elohist and the Jehovistic, and noticing certain corrections of the text supplied either from the Versions or from conjecture. The translation is not remarkable, and hardly calls for any special notice. * The corrections are not always wise, nor the facts concerning them correctly stated. For example, after i. 7 the author inserts from the Septuagint (as he says) the words "And Elohim saw the firmament, that it was good." But a comparison with verse 10 convinced me that these words, if they were in the original text at all, must have stood after the first part of verse 8, *i.e.* after (not before) the naming of the heaven. On referring to the Septuagint I found that that is their place. Yet M. Lenormant takes them, inserts them in another place, and tells us nothing about the transposition. If many cases of this sort are found in his book, it cannot be accepted without very rigorous and even suspicious testing of all points of importance. The author, no doubt deliberately, translates Tubal-cain "Tubal the smith," though he had previously written that the name of Cain (son of Adam) means "the creature, the offspring"; but I do not find that he gives a reason for attributing two distinct meanings to the same word. I desired a more critical separation of the various documents than I find here. It is obviously not enough to recognise one Elohist and one Jehovistic document. The story of Eden in ch. ii. and iii. is distinguished by the double name Jahveh-Elohim, which occurs nowhere else in the Pentateuch; and the story itself is apparently a very late one, being nowhere distinctly referred to, only the phrase "Garden of Eden" as a name for a very fruitful place being first used by Joel; it might be of the age of Ezekiel, who both mentions Eden very prominently as a "garden of Jahveh" and uses the name Jahveh-Elohim. It is misleading simply to call it "Jehovist," and thus to create an impression that it may be of the same age as other passages (*e.g.* vi. 1—4) which may be really ancient. So also, if the account of the Flood is to be actually divided between its two or more writers, it is by no means sufficient to print the whole story in the order in which it stands in the Bible, distinguishing the two sources by different types; for this process leaves verses which contradict each other side by side. Yet it is evident from p. 377 that the author really recognises these two "fundamental documents" and a final editor.

On the principle of M. Lenormant's commentary I find it impossible to avoid uttering a slight protest, since the whole book is tinged by what I cannot but regard as an unfortunate and unscientific introduction of religious questions into the domain of ancient cosmogony and mythology. The keynote is struck at the beginning of the preface, where he says, "I

* The *status constructus*, so well understood since Ewald explained it, is still not acknowledged in i. 1, ii. 5, 6, 10—14, &c. The spelling of the proper names, which attempts to represent the exact Hebrew Massoretic pronunciation, is at times incorrect: thus if we are to have *Lemek*, the ordinary, not the pausal form, we ought to have *Hebel* and *Yepheth*; whereas we find *Hábel* and *Yápheth*; *Kená'an*, *Yáqtán* are bad mistakes for *Kena'an*, *Yogtán*. I do not know whether these are due to the author or the translator.

am a Christian," and further, "With special reference to Biblical questions, one series of which is treated in the present work, I believe firmly in the inspiration of the Sacred Books, and I subscribe with absolute submission to the doctrinal decisions of the Church in this respect." It need not surprise us after this, that the author after describing the ideas of four ages of the world gradually descending from primitive purity to corruption and disintegration of society, as described by Hesiod, the Indians, Zoroastrians, and others, tries to establish a difference of kind between them and the idea embodied in the Bible, saying, "How much more consoling is the Bible theory, which at first sight seems so revolting to human pride, and what incomparable moral perspectives it opens to the soul! It admits that man is fallen. . . . The four ages of the pagan conception unfold a picture of ever-increasing degeneracy. All the economy of the Bible history . . . offers us the spectacle of a continuous uplifting of the human race, starting from its original fall. On the one hand, the march is for ever downward; on the other, for ever upward," &c. Thus there is a succession of steps upward, he says, to Abraham, thence to the Mosaic law, thence to the prophets, "who in their turn announce the last and supreme attainment in this progress, resulting from the Advent of the Messiah." If this were all true, it ought surely to be left to preachers to expend their eloquence upon it. But general lessons of this sort are in reality only the outcome of the Church theory of a Canon of the Bible, which treats half a hundred or more writers through many ages of history as all telling the same story and pointing the same moral. We shall never truly understand any book, or any chapter, of the Bible, as long as we persist in recognising this solidarity. And if I were to take M. Lenormant on his own ground, I should say that he nearly inverts the truth. To the Hebrews their great ancestor Abraham, who contended victoriously with Jahveh about Sodom, was the purest and greatest of men; Isaac and Jacob exhibit a gradual declension; and in a later age Moses is again the greatest, "and there arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom Jahveh knew face to face," to be followed by Joshua and other lesser leaders. And finally the prophets testify to the constant degeneracy of the people in their days, and exhibit in their own line a gradual declension from the grand earnestness of Isaiah to the conceits of Ezekiel, till they become extinct altogether and only leave the bequest of a hope of a new prophet in the dim future, to restore Israel. Surely this is not a story of constant upward progress? It is the new *and different* ideas of Christianity that have warped M. Lenormant's judgment on the Jewish Scriptures. He might have judged better if he had *not* been a Christian. Another instance of prejudice produced by religious partiality I think I discover in his declaration that there is no trace in Genesis of the idea of the four ages of the world, and that Ewald and Maury have not been successful in detecting it. But M. Lenormant is too enlightened as a scholar to press the dogma of verbal inspiration; he sees evidence of compilation from various sources, detects discrepancies and idiosyncrasies like any ordinary mortal. Having gone

so far, one would have wished he could have gone a little further, so that his "Christian faith" might not weigh so heavily on his soul just when one would like a free judgment.

I have wasted too much space on the weak points of M. Lenormant's book to speak fully of the details of his commentary, in which his strength lies. But in truth that would be utterly impossible in a short notice. The "Comparative Study of the Biblical Account and of Parallel Traditions" contains eight chapters entitled "The Creation of Man," "The First Sin," "The Kerubim and the Revolving Sword," "The Fratricide and the Foundation of the First City," "The Shethites and the Qainites," "The Ten Antediluvian Patriarchs," "The Children of God and the Daughters of Men," and "The Deluge." The fullest account of parallel stories current among the various nations, especially of antiquity, and with due prominence given to Assyria, Babylon, Phenicia, and Egypt, is found in all these chapters; and a sound critical judgment is evinced in sifting the evidence and retaining the best attested reports and rejecting the spurious or questionable ones. This, since the decipherment of the cuneiform writings, makes this book peculiarly valuable, as most of the modern commentators on the primeval history, whose works are otherwise rightly trusted as standard, such as Tuch, Ewald, Knobel, Hupfeld, wrote before the flood of light from Assyria had materially altered the conditions of the problem. The references to authorities are commendably copious and contain frequent citations of long passages, besides a hundred pages of documents printed as appendices. And the translator has most scrupulously added references to the latest editions and to English translations wherever such existed. The translation is admirably executed in point of style; I have only found one error, which from the context will mislead no one, the use of the word *pine-apple* for the cone or fruit of the pine or cedar.

R. M.

'THE EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIANITY.'*

THE anonymous author of this book undertakes to account for Christianity, and for the Judaism that preceded it, by means of purely natural or human agencies. His standpoint is essentially the same as that of Bolingbroke and Voltaire, and the smartness of his literary style frequently reminds us of his brilliant forerunners. He is fairly well acquainted with modern criticisms and researches. He has certainly read the Bible without any prejudice in its favour, and he is quite at home with the Gnostics. Indeed, his account of the Gnostics and the Book of Enoch is thoroughly well done. Still, on the whole, the 'Evolution of Christianity' is disappointing, and the execution of the work does

* *The Evolution of Christianity*. London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate. 1893.

not come up to the interest excited by its promising title. The very smartness of the author's style betrays him into levity, and his chapters on various Hebrew worthies read more like semi-jocose articles in Voltaire's "*Philosophical Dictionary*," than portions of a serious treatise on religious history. We are sorry for this, because it spoils the effect of much otherwise good and honest work, and will make many readers throw the book down after they have gone through a few pages. The author lacks historical perspective; he has small feeling for poetry, and he assumes too many airs of superiority. Of course, it may be quite true that we all know more now than Moses and Paul and the rest of the old Jews and Christians knew; but we do not see that that fact, if it be a fact, is a good reason for the author of this book to take every opportunity of singing the praises of our own times, and pitying the simplicity and the ignorance of the ancients. Modern religionists who have mastered the meaning of evolution in relation to religion will no more pity Moses and Paul than most of the scientists now pity Aristotle and Archimedes.

In Book I. the writer discusses Judaism under such headings as the Hebrew Deity, Hebrew Morality, the Prophets, David, Solomon, &c. and comes to the following conclusions—viz., the thoughts, words, and actions of Jehovah are not consistent with the attributes of infinite Divinity; the Divine origin of Hebrew morality is not attested by superiority to all merely human systems of ethics; the Hebrew annals do not sustain the theory of a chosen race so highly favoured as to possess the Supreme Deity as their temporal Ruler. With these three conclusions we find no fault. His illustrations are graphic, and his practical arguments are often very telling. But the tone of his criticism grates on us. He has the accents of a sharp barrister cross-examining witnesses and forcing them to make fools of themselves. He tries Biblical men, however, by rules that they knew nothing of. Probably he would tell us that the orthodox theory of the Bible maintains that the Bible teaches infallible morality and religion. Against this theory he is overwhelming. He proves clearly enough what Judaism is not; but when we inquire what Judaism is, what is its place in the order of religious development, that is, what does it mean in the language of evolution, he has nothing to say.

In Book II. the writer discusses Jesus of Nazareth. He thinks that Jesus was a disciple of the Essenes, and compiled the Lord's Prayer from existing liturgies, and borrowed most of his parables and precepts from the moral and religious consciousness of the nation. He repudiates, of course, the miracles ascribed to Jesus, as well as the Divine birth and the human perfection. His literal method of criticism easily enables him to make seeming nonsense of some of the most touching utterances of pious feeling. The best part of the second book is the account of the Book of Enoch, and the influence which he thinks it exercised over the ideas of Jesus concerning the early end of the world. He condescends to pity Jesus for being led astray by such a silly book as the Book of Enoch. The martyrdom of Jesus is thus accounted for: There were known pro-

phesies of a Messiah, and Jesus mistakenly imagined that they applied to him; the pseudo Enoch described the coming Judgment as close at hand, and Jesus appropriated the imagery, and mistakenly imagined that he was to be the judge. He was the victim of a double delusion and an honest fanatic.

Book III. is on Christianity. After examining and rejecting the tradition of the Resurrection, the writer proceeds to the formation of the Early Church. He propounds a startling theory concerning Ananias and Sapphira. This unhappy couple were simply executed by the authorities of the secret society to which they belonged, and whose communistic orders they disobeyed; and Peter was a sort of captain of a band of Palestinian "Invincibles." He traces the evolution of the Divinity of Jesus and the Trinity, together with the Atonement and other doctrines. to the influence of Paul and pseudo-John, and follows the course of the theological growth down to the time of the Nicene Council, and then briefly takes it up again in the time of Anselm.

Judging, from incidental remarks, the author would probably call himself a rationalistic disciple or admirer of Jesus of Nazareth, considered as a moral teacher and a practical religionist. But he would criticise all statements with more freedom than reverence, he would treat what we call spiritual experiences as hallucinations, and generally he would interpret religious ideas in the language of prosaic common sense. The author's want of imagination and lack of historical perspective have prevented him from doing justice to his own powers; and he has been by no means thorough enough to keep the promise of his title. So we have one-sided versions and arbitrary assumptions and nineteenth-century omniscience, with a scorn for fanatics. We learn, by the way, that he admires Lord Beaconsfield's foreign policy, and dislikes Radical doctrinaires. He does not explain the evolution of Christianity; but, taking it altogether, the book is able, varied, and interesting, and certainly well written.

In connection with the above brief review, we may call attention to a thoughtful study,* by M. Sayous, of the series of writers whom the author of "The Evolution of Christianity" has imitated out of due time. He begins with Lord Herbert and the Deism of the seventeenth century, and includes Locke and Hobbes in the same chapter. The opportunity for critical exposition and comparison which is afforded to him by these three names he makes ample use of for the benefit of his readers. With the exception of Shaftesbury, the English Deists have long since lost all living interest to us beyond marking a phase of development through which English thought has passed, necessary at the time and pregnant of many healthy results, but nevertheless dreary to look back upon. M. Sayous is much more learned and much more liberal than Leland, and although he does not show the metaphysical ingenuity of Mr. Leslie

* *Les Deistes Anglais et le Christianisme*, principalement depuis Toland jusqu'à Chubb. Par EDOUARD SAYOUS. Paris: Fischbacher, 1882.

Stephen he has the advantage over the brilliant author of the "History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century" in the important desideratum for a religious historian that he himself evidently possesses strong and tolerably definite religious convictions. In succession he reviews Toland, Shaftesbury, Collins, Woolston, Tindal, Morgan, and Chubb. His account of Shaftesbury is decidedly the best, as well as the most interesting. But, indeed, the whole of the accounts are well written and fair-minded, and furnish altogether a satisfactory *résumé* of the speculations of a period which, though we have outgrown it, still survives in its influence, and which no theological student can safely afford to be in ignorance of. If M. Sayous had dealt with the Deists of the eighteenth century in the same cavalier, lofty, and scornfully condescending fashion in which the clever author of "The Evolution of Christianity" deals with the infancy and childhood of Hebrew Christian ideas, he might, no doubt, have made himself very merry over their numerous blunders. He pursues, however, a wiser course. A Liberal Christian as he is, he makes just allowance for the merits of dissentients from Christianity under any recognised form in the last century, and comes to the conclusion that if Christianity were taught more in the spirit of Jesus, and less in the crystallisations of dogma, there would be fewer dissentients from it than there are now. M. Sayous has written a chapter, short but useful, of the history of "The Evolution of Religion," and we shall be glad to meet him again on purely modern ground.

We shall be glad also to meet again the author of "The Evolution of Christianity," and we hope that when we do meet him he will use his fine literary powers for constructive purposes. It is to be borne in mind, especially by theological controversialists, that men are not necessarily fools, fanatics, or cheats because they are mistaken, and that God may have had other ways of educating His children for the perception of the full daylight of truth besides those with which we are at present familiar. And after all, we have learnt so little ourselves that simple fellow-feeling should lead us to judge leniently our religious ancestors who, like us, learnt little before us. The true philosophy of Evolution at once possesses a wide outlook, and encourages a wide charity.

WILLIAM BINNS.

DISCOURSES BY PROFESSOR BOUVIER.*

THE reviewer of these books has the luxury of offering almost unqualified praise. M. Bouvier is a theologian of the Reformed Church in Geneva, who has the precious faculty of popularising his science without vulgarising it. He is professor in the Academy of Geneva, is a man

* *Le Divin d'après les apôtres*. Douze Discourses sur les Epîtres du Nouveau Testament, par AUGUSTE BOUVIER. Genève: Cherbuliez. Paris: Fischbacher. 1868.

Paroles de Foi et de Liberté, par AUGUSTE BOUVIER. Paris: Fischbacher. 1882.

of earnest liberal views, of entirely constructive and tender habit of mind, and the centre of an influence not marvellous to any reader of these books, but not due wholly to his fascinating insight and expository grace. He is a man as well of deep goodness and practical activity, with a fine sense of the needs of his age, and a most winning mien in the face of them. It may express more than many words if we state our impression of him as a popular edition of Dr. Martineau. Any man who can read M. Bouvier's pages and then persist in a denunciation of theology must be accused less of lack of mind than of defective culture and soul.

The first-named work is more popular, the second more academic. M. Bouvier is anxious to recover for theology the public interest it possessed at the Reformation. He aims therefore in *Le Divin* at giving results rather than processes and avoiding metaphysics. His object is twofold—"to instruct the religious public in the true sense of the Epistles, and to throw into high relief that high and free spirituality which marks the religion of Christ, and of which the Apostles, especially Paul, were the first true interpreters." "In expounding each of these Epistles we have indicated its *milieu*, its object, its leading thought, its coherence, and its true significance for our age. But we have never lost sight of it as a whole. Each is a living organism, and we would seize its palpitating life to lay before our readers." There is no effort, as indeed with such a purpose there is little temptation, to torture the various Epistles into uttering a doctrinal confession of strained and outward consistency. It is the same life that speaks throughout, the same voice, the same spirit, however the expressions or the views in each document may vary. It is this common life that M. Bouvier would expound by turning facet after facet of it towards us in the New Testament Epistles. "But why do I speak of the divine rather than of God? The divine is what may be experimentally known of God inaccessible in himself. It is his presence, his spirit, his action in the world and in us. It is the life which flows down from him to quicken nature, to fashion and fire mankind, and which imparts itself to beings made in his image and destined to become like himself spirit and love. It is what the Gospel proclaims and commends in the living contact of God and man." Christianity, he says, is faced on the one side by literature, on the other by materialism. It can master both only by an escape into true spirituality, that is, into Christian freedom. And there has never been any such expression of that, he says, as the apostolic thought. The need of our age is to have that truly and faithfully interpreted. So, we may conclude, the pulpit has yet a few years to survive if it only understand its business—which indeed is the growingly imperative condition of any survival for any good.

We suspect M. Bouvier has not much taste for the metaphysical aspect of Christian truth, and there may lie in his statement about the inaccessibility of God in himself a vacuum fraught with danger to the stability of a merely economic or regulative theology. But really we have so little ground of a speculative sort to go upon in M. Bouvier's pages that the above remark is almost irrelevant. And Paul, however philosophic, was

not a metaphysician except implicitly. He exercises, as M. Bouvier says, a wise (or as we should rather say a naïve) reserve about the Trinity. It were only to be wished that we were more prolific in theologians with M. Bouvier's happy and easy power of making Paul and his kind presentable to the age. The apostles need no credentials to the court of conscience at any time, but they are sadly in want of interpreters like this.

Le Divin consists of twelve lectures on the leading epistles and the aspect each presents of the Divine operation. Two are devoted to the Romans, or the Restoration of the Divine in humanity. One goes to Galatians or the Divine Liberty. Ephesians follows, setting forth the Divine Unity. Then Philippians, or Communion with the Divine. Then the two epistles to the Corinthians with the Ministry of the Divine. Then Thessalonians, or the Divine Crisis. Then Hebrews, or Faith; Peter, or Hope; and the first epistle of John, or Love. Such a mere catalogue is worth quoting for the indications it affords of M. Bouvier's method and spirit. But nothing, except quotations too long for our space here, could give an idea of the graceful, luminous, and, we may also say, original style of treatment. Nothing could be further from the traditional handling of the apostles than this fresh and engaging freedom. Nothing could be nearer the spirit of devout and spiritual Christianity which marks the best traditional work. It is most characteristic of M. Bouvier that the cant of free-thought is on his pages replaced by an earnest insistence on free-faith in many tempting passages. And it is no less to his distinctive credit that he protests against the abstract and crude supernaturalism which is merely mystic, in favour of the true intimate and natural supernaturalism which is the creed of genuine Christianity. We can foresee no end of trouble in the discussions of the future rising out of pure misapprehension on this head—misapprehension which our religious teachers either cannot or will not obviate. M. Bouvier holds very firmly the fact of the Resurrection of Christ, and his continual presence and guidance, though he says he is not concerned about what became of the crucified corpse. The death of Christ is, for him, the consummation of the victory over the flesh, and he places the prominence of this view in Romans in ingenious connection with the fleshly enormities of Chapter I. We have not observed any recognition of the support really given by Paul (as Pfeiderer shows) to the substitutionary aspect of Christ's death, but M. Bouvier may regard that as one of the more foreign or less completely assimilated parts of the apostle's system. It is in this way he deals with the suggestions of eternal perdition in Paul's writings. They were less his own than the undigested *débris* of his age, incorporated but not organised, and held by him in unconscious antagonism to his great and characteristic doctrine of universal redemption. M. Bouvier brings into just prominence the apostle's habit of dealing with mankind as a unity, and condemns the abuse of his system which has in view, firstly and directly, individual salvation. And, indeed, between abstract individualism and abstract supernaturalism it is no wonder that Pauline Christianity has become

discredited to the modern mind with its passion for organism and solidarity. And it may probably be found that the radical cure for the social individualism, which is becoming so dangerous, will be an idea of God which treats him less as a magnified individual and more as an infinite spirit, less as the superintendent than as the soul of things. Whoever helps us to such an idea of God while steering us clear of Spinozism will help both to interpret Paul, to inspire science, and to save society.

Before Christ can save society he must be delivered from Christianity, and the Redeemer as it were redeemed. The unique interpretive power of our age must rescue the Saviour from the traditions of the saved, and present him in the luminous attraction of the New Testament cross. Then the true and native power of Christ on men will have free course, and be glorified in a new and better social order which is yet the old. It is a social inspiration and cement that our time demands from religion. Many who are careless about the saving of souls are passionate for the salvation of society. This aspect of a pure Christianity receives more attention in the second-named of M. Bouvier's works. It consists of seven lectures—on "Modern Piety" (by which he means the order and fashion of piety which naturally flows from the theology of the creeds and confessions), on "Religion in Spirit and in Truth," on "The Religions," on "The Letter and the Spirit," on "The Continuous Reformation" (2), and on "The Popularity and the Unpopularity of Christianity." The last of these is specially interesting in these days of religion for the million and salvation in mobs. The third lecture on "The Religions" is in two parts—"The Religions and Society" and "The Religions and the Religion." What the author means by *the Religion* is clear from the three theses which he propounds in the first part.

1. From the social point of view Christianity is superior to every other religion.

2. For Society it is the supreme and final religion.

3. To attempt to suppress it is to do Society the most grievous violence.

Farther we may not go in discussing these quick, piercing, and kindling volumes so happily blended of Christian feeling, Christian truth, and Christian life. M. Bouvier has the *esprit* of France and the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.

P. T. AND M. FORSYTH.

DR. DEWES'S 'LIFE AND LETTERS OF ST. PAUL.'*

ANY competent scholar who endeavours to make the writings of St. Paul intelligible to the ordinary reader enlists our sympathy and deserves our thanks. The fact that they are not intelligible in the authorised version prompted Dr. Dewes to plead, fifteen years ago, for a new

* *Life and Letters of St. Paul.* By ALFRED DEWES, M.A., LL.D., D.D. London: Longmans. 1882.

translation of the Scriptures; and he appended to his "Plea" a translation of the Epistle to the Romans as a specimen of the kind of translation which he believed to be needed. This was highly approved by Dr. Prince Lee, the late Bishop of Manchester, who urged the translator to take in hand the rest of the epistles, adding "As your Bishop I tell you that, if you do not continue the work you have begun, you are culpably neglecting the gifts God has given you!" The obligation to fulfil this task, long postponed through illness and pressure of parochial work, seemed to be abrogated by the appointment of the New Testament Revision Company; but alas! when the revised version appeared, Paul was, in Dr. Dewes's opinion, no more likely to be "understood of the people" than he was before.

The late Revisers, fast tied and bound by the directions laid down for their guidance, have simply contented themselves with following the plan of the Authorised Version; and in many places—notably in St. Paul's epistles—have not even aimed at being intelligible. Passage after passage occurs, which cannot possibly convey any meaning whatever, except that which some commentator or other has first put into it. If the Revised Version is ever authorised, continually will it be the case in the future, as it has been the case continually until the present time, that Lessons will be read in church, which cannot possibly convey a meaning, unless it be a wrong one, to the great majority of those who hear them. . . . The Revised Version will be of great service to all students of the Greek Testament, especially to those who are not yet at home in Hellenistic Greek. In many ways it will be of great service to the general reader also, who is familiar with no language but his own; but it will do little or nothing towards the supply of that which is the sore need that oppresses us—the need of a translation which the mass of the people can understand. (Preface pp. ix. x. xix.)

Let us then see what Dr. Dewes has to offer, merely noticing that his *Life of St. Paul*, which "for the present purpose" takes for granted that the book of Acts is trustworthy, and that St. Paul did write every letter that professes to be written by him, is an uncritical sketch, agreeing, for the most part, with Wieseler and Conybeare and Howson as to dates, and order of events and writings, and prolonging the Apostle's life to at least 67 or 68 A.D.

Intelligibility is our translator's aim; a literal version is only the first stage of the process of translation; how best to convey the sense, and in the best English, is the next problem. Hence frequent paraphrase, and occasional inversion of the members of a sentence. The text is to tell its own story, without note or comment; hence some exegetical amplification, often of a valuable kind. We wish we had been able to try the experiment of getting "the ordinary Englishman" to read a moderately long passage of Dr. Dewes's translation. In the first place, it would probably strike him as looking like a book that anybody might understand; and he might possibly be induced to forget that to "read a chapter" is all that one is expected to do with any part of the Bible. Certainly, if Dr. Dewes induces any considerable number of people to read a whole epistle at a sitting, he will do more for the popular understanding of Paul than has yet been achieved by any writer or preacher.

Next, the reader would experience a certain freedom from the embarrassment with which the lay mind habitually regards a number of words that are supposed to be of deep theological import; though for ourselves we are bound to confess that we are a little impatient of some of the Doctor's recurring periphrases, e.g., *ἐπαγγελίειν* to tell the glad tidings; *προφητεία* the gift of inspired speech; *δικαιῶσθαι*, to be brought into a righteous state; *περιτομή*, the outward mark of God's people. Again, the import of many passages will be understood, we doubt not, for the first time. A missing link of argument is supplied, or the change of a word opens, with a shock of surprise, the meaning of a too familiar verse. But with much gain, there is some loss; a Paul who completes his arguments and rounds his periods is not the Paul we know. We miss the full impression of the breaks and the fresh starts, the strange *aposiopeses*, the involving of argument within argument, the adding of a note, as with an asterisk, referring, perhaps, to one word only in a verse that has long preceded. And we cannot help thinking that the knowledge of Paul himself, which is gained by the noting of such characteristics, is, perhaps, worth more to the reader than the more exact understanding of any particular passages in his writings. Dr. Dewes's ability in steering through broken water is seen in his rendering of Gal. ii. 1—10 and Rom. v. 12—19. The Greek text followed is that of Westcott and Hort, and its superiority, especially with regard to punctuation, over that of the revisers is seen in such passages as 1 Cor. vii. 88, 84—(and while the page is before us we must applaud Dr. Dewes's rendering of *ἡ παρθένος αὐτοῦ* in v. 86, "the maiden espoused to him"—the "virgin daughter" of the R.V. being surely absurd)—and ix. 15, "it were well for me rather to die than—no one shall make me a boaster in vain." And our translator is happy in his suggestions of ironical quotation by the apostle of the language of the "advanced" Corinthians, e.g., 1 Cor. viii. 1. "We all have knowledge;" who can doubt it? x. 28. "All things are lawful." "Yes! but all things are not profitable." Good examples of his free expository handling of single words are found in 1 Cor. ix. 17, "If in truth I do this willingly, a reward I have; whereas if I do it unwillingly, *I am but exercising a stewardship I have been entrusted with*," and xv. 84, "Exchange your revellings for righteousness" (*ἐκτῆσθε δικαιοσύνην*). But as the main point of the book is the paraphrastic treatment of difficult passages, we must illustrate this by a specimen or two:

II. Cor. i. 12—14. So aid us ye well may; for this is our boasting, the witness our conscience is bearing us, that in holiness and godly sincerity—not by fleshly wisdom, but by the grace of God—we framed our course in the world, and more especially in our conduct towards you. In sincerity, I say, for we write to you none other things than those which ye are reading as written in the letter, or even reading as written in your own hearts; and I hope ye will read them as written in your hearts to the end; even as part of you did read it as written there of us, that we are the ground of your boasting, as ye also are the ground of ours, in the day when our Lord Jesus shall come.

Gal. iv. 12—16. Brethren, become as I am, I beseech you; for I too was once as ye are. Ye have given me no cause of complaint; on the contrary,

ye know that it was owing to bodily infirmity that on the former occasion I made the glad tidings known to you; ye know also that ye were not indifferent to—nor did you, as you might well have done, even turn with loathing from—that which in my bodily condition was a trial to you: but ye received me as an angel of God, as ye would have received Jesus Christ. Ye pronounced yourselves blessed: what then has become of your blessedness? Verily I bear witness that, had it been possible, ye would have plucked out your own eyes and have given them to me. So that I have—have I become your enemy by telling you the truth?

We would gladly notice, if our space permitted, a few points of special interest to the closer student of the epistles (e.g., Dr. Dewes agrees with Calvin and De Wetto in taking the final κεφαλὴν in 1 Cor. xi. 5 to be Christ, as in v. 8, and renders *ιδίως* in xiv. 24 "one who is not inspired," with Meyer). But we must content ourselves with saying, in conclusion, that Dr. Dewes's translation is an honest, sensible, and interesting piece of work, to which, though differing from him in many particular points of interpretation, we shall continue to refer with pleasure and profit.

J. E. O.

CANON FREMANTLE'S 'GOSPEL OF THE SECULAR LIFE.'*

THERE have been University sermons remarkable for eloquence, for learning, intellectual subtlety, critical method, or philosophic acumen; but none can have done truer service than those which Canon Fremantle preached before the University of Oxford, and which, under the title of "The Gospel of the Secular Life," he now addresses, through the press, to a wide circle of readers. Canon Fremantle is well known for the earnest interest he has taken in everything that might avail to heal the divisions of Christendom and to foster the growth of a generous spirit of mutual recognition and, when possible, of practical co-operation among the members of the different Churches. So in the attempt, in the volume before us, to direct Christian thought to "its great, not to say paramount, concern with the general, common, or secular life of mankind," he has been animated by the hope of doing something to help those who, while they lament and are ashamed of the fact that Christianity is a source of disagreement rather than of unity in the world, "fall back helplessly into sectarianism, at least into that modified sectarianism which is content with outward courtesy without healing the division, and which is thus liable to the reproach of want of principle."

The surest way to get rid of this sectarianism is to find new ground that is unaffected by it. . . . When Christians find out that their main business is to promote truth in all departments of human knowledge, and love in all the relations of human life, and that they have a concern also in all that beautifies and refines human existence, and that all the energy of their faith in God and in Christ is needed to sustain the progress of mankind, they

* *The Gospel of the Secular Life*. Sermons preached at Oxford. With a Prefatory Essay. By the Hon. W. H. FREMANTLE, Rector of St. Mary's, Bryanston-square, and Canon of Canterbury. London: Cassell. 1882.

will find out also that the ground of their discord recedes into its natural littleness, and that the faith by which they all are actuated is a great moral power, as to the possession and use of which there is no controversy (Prefatory Essay, pp. 10, 11).

We heartily commend to the careful attention of our readers the whole of the wise and earnest preface, in which the author takes a general survey of his subject and discusses the several ways in which a Christian teacher may treat the matters of the secular life, especially in its three higher departments of Science, Art, and Politics.

Canon Fremantle has treated his subject with admirable candour, sincerity, and breadth of Christian wisdom. He is in sympathy with all earnest and reverent seekers after truth, and welcomes with hope the results of modern knowledge and research in their bearings on faith; and he successfully vindicates religion from the charge of any hostility against science, or any incompatibility with the claims and interests of the "world." Quoting Richard Rothe's saying that Christianity was the most mutable of all things, and that this was its special glory, he accepts this as a vivid statement of "its power of adaptation to changing circumstances, and its capacity for profiting by new discoveries of truth."

Such a re-adaptation (he continues), appears to be in progress now, and the object of the present publication is to help in effecting it. The possible results of this re-adaptation are such as should fill every Christian with enthusiastic hope, the hope of restoring unity where now there is division or mistrust, of extending the dominion of the Spirit of Christ, of combining elements which now neutralise each other in the task of elevating the whole life of mankind; for in that direction lies the kingdom of God (pp. 28, 29).

We regret that we have no room to quote any other of the many passages which we had marked as illustrations of the practical wisdom of these fine discourses, the one on "Critical Thought and Practical Ministry" furnishing some especially suggestive and characteristic examples, as in the delicate and sympathetic treatment of the case of what we may call the Higher Agnosticism, which is professed by so many sincere and reverent minds, and in the closing pages, in which the positive and vital results of the criticism that is often characterised as negative and destructive are summed up in a spirit of quiet, religious confidence which the author's whole argument justifies and helps us to share. Our readers will remember with interest and expectation, that the author of these admirable sermons is the Bampton Lecturer for this year, and that the subject he has taken is, as here, the relation of the Church to the World.

DR. FREEMAN CLARKE'S 'LEGEND OF THOMAS DIDYMUS.'

IN a work,* which shows both extensive learning and tender religious feeling, Dr. Clarke attempts to give us a picture of Jesus Christ as he appeared to his contemporaries, before time and distance had thrown

* *The Legend of Thomas Didymus, the Jewish Sceptic.* By JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE. Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1831.

any halo, real or unreal, around his person and his achievements. And Dr. Clarke has produced a book of very vivid interest, teeming with suggestive thoughts and ingenious explanation. He thinks that Jesus possessed some extraordinary power over nature and life; but exercised it, not to confute opponents, but as a simple natural outcome of his own spirit. An immediate consequence would be that many a simple act or figurative saying would be soon turned into something much more marvellous than it ever really was :—

To show how easily a proverbial expression may be turned into a fact, I will add this incident. On the day when John Brown was executed in Virginia, and the whole North was filled with sadness, I heard two very ignorant men talking behind me in the railway train. One asked the other, "What are they going to hang this Brown for?" The other answered, "I don't exactly know, but I heard tell that he set fire to a powder magazine in Virginia." Some one had probably said, in his hearing, that Brown's course among the slaves was like bringing fire into a powder magazine.

This is a telling illustration, and suggests a principle which will account for a good deal. But there is a well-known danger in the possession of great fertility of resource for the explanation of difficulties, the danger of the harmonist, and we cannot think that Dr. Clarke has altogether avoided this. Our criticism applies chiefly to the way in which he works in the narrative and speeches of the Fourth Gospel. To some it will be refreshing to find how ingeniously this can be done, how nicely it all comes out—*e.g.*, when we suppose two farewell suppers and a slight confusion by an amanuensis in the arrangement of the material furnished by the apostle John. To us the loss seems far greater than the gain; we lose clearness and consistency in the Jesus we have learned to know from the synoptics, we lose the clue to the way things are put furnished by the thought of the age and plan of composition; and we gain a number of doubtful facts, whose only possible value would be to give us fuller knowledge of the character of Jesus and the origin of the Christian Church. Even the nominal gain, therefore, is at a sacrifice that robs it of almost its whole value. Dr. Clarke's method of dealing with the gospels seems to us based on an insufficient study or appreciation of the results of recent criticism concerning the origin of these gospels, particularly their date and whole manner of composition. Such criticism often seems dry and barren to outsiders, but no work will be of permanent value which ignores it. We are learning more and more that instead of ascribing the minimum of inaccuracy to the gospel narratives, and exercising the maximum of ingenuity in explaining their divergencies and improbabilities, we must recognise the fact that these gospels grew up under conditions which practically forbade great accuracy in matters of details and that for facts, alike well assured and really important, we must look to larger questions and wider issues. These main facts, the synoptics, at least, do give us with substantial accuracy, sufficient at any rate to enable us to trace the origin and growth of a movement both natural and spiritual, and of all-surpassing importance in the world's history. Here is a

field in which we should have especially welcomed the labours of so diligent and sympathetic a scholar as our author, and we regret to see so much of his strength go on the vain task of harmonising statements of facts which may be unreal, and are certainly supported by insufficient evidence. By the way, Dr. Clarke says he has never seen any previous statement of the reason he gives why Jesus turned the dealers out of the Temple—viz., that they were occupying the court where the Gentiles should have been able to come and worship, so that the Temple might be a house of prayer for *all* nations. We certainly have met with it before, and fancy it has been rather a common explanation, but anyhow it is expressly rejected both by Keim and the modern Dutch school, who both deny that at this moment Jesus could have been thinking of the Gentiles at all, and consider Mark's addition of the words "for all nations" unhistorical, and simply borrowed from Is. lvi. 7. It is, we fear, a little characteristic of Dr. Clarke's critical standpoint, that he should expressly mention as an original explanation of his own an idea which more modern scholars are just agreeing must be abandoned.

H. S. S.

DR. DE RIDDER'S 'EARLIEST CHRISTIANITY.'

DR. Herman de Ridder's doctoral dissertation* is occupied with the consideration of von Hartmann's views as to the character of the earliest form of Christianity. (*Das religiöse Bewusstsein der Menschheit im Stufengang seiner Entwicklung*. EDUARD VON HARTMANN. Berlin. 1882.) The author maintains, against von Hartmann, that Christianity, at its source, was not eudæmonistic, did not recognise the binding force of Mosaic laws and institutions, and was (in principle at least) universalistic. The ground covered by this essay, it will be observed, has already been frequently traversed, and it could hardly be expected that de Ridder would be able to find anything very striking or original to say on the right side of so well-worn a controversy. It is easier to be brilliant, easier even to be impressive, if one takes a novel—and presumably paradoxical and incorrect—view in such a matter. Still it is well that the old facts should be again marshalled with special reference to the telling attack that has recently been made on the old position. The best part of the dissertation, as it seems to me, is the chapter that deals with the alleged eudæmonism of the earliest Synoptic tradition. Did Jesus teach men to be good *in order* that they might be blessed? Or rather: is this the teaching of the earliest Synoptic tradition? In answering this question in the negative, de Ridder appears to lay too much stress on the use of *ἵνα* (not *ὅτι*) in *Mat.* v. 8, &c., though he is certainly right in insisting that to point to an inevitable consequence of this or

* *Bijdrage tot de Kennis van het Oudste Christendom*: door J. HERMAN DE RIDDER, Jr. 's Gravenhage: G. C. Visser. 1882. (Academisch Proefschrift.)

that action is a different thing from appealing to that consequence as the chief or only motive that can inspire the action. Very much to the purpose also is the reference to the parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard and to the astonished disclaimer of the righteous dead in Mat. xxv., when they are told of their good deeds. To one who never doubted, or knew that any one else doubted, the absolute certainty of God's rewarding the virtuous, it would never occur to speak of the result of virtue in carefully guarded terms for fear he should be understood to recommend it *on account* of its results. There certainly are passages which cannot without considerable violence be robbed of their eudæmonistic form, and it could not well be otherwise. At the same time we are able to see clearly enough, from other passages, that even when the mind of Jesus was not in any way dwelling on the results of goodness, goodness itself retained its sanctions unimpaired. This is all we can reasonably ask to know. The remaining chapters of de Ridder's treatise, which collect and discuss the passages that bear on the attitude adopted by the earliest Christians towards the Jewish Law, and the measure of their universalism, do not call for any special notice.

P. H. W.

DR. OLDENBERG'S LIFE AND DOCTRINE OF BUDDHA.*

THIS treatise is a most important contribution to the exposition of Buddhism, which has of late years occupied the attention of so many scholars and excited so much general interest. The author is well known by his devoted labours in the publication of the Vinaya Pitakam; and the citations from unprinted works in which this volume abounds, give additional proof of his wide acquaintance with the MSS. of the Pāli Scriptures, while they enable him to supply many fresh illustrations and confirmations of his views. Indeed, some of the principal topics which he discusses receive such ample elucidation that ordinary students will be saved the necessity of further hunt for materials in explanation of the leading ideas of Buddhist metaphysics.

The volume opens with an introduction of seventy pages, in which the condition of Indian thought prior to the rise of Buddhism is exhibited with considerable skill. An interesting point is made at the outset, and is further developed in an appendix, on the geographical extension of the Vedic culture, and the Brahmanism which followed it; and it is shown that the home of the oldest Buddhist communities lay in a region which Brahmanism had scarcely entered, or had never wholly subjugated. Nevertheless, the roots of Buddhist thought lay in Brahmanical speculation. The terms which it employed were current in the philosophical

* *Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order.* By Dr. HERMANN OLDENBERG. Translated from the German by William Hoey, M.A., D.Lit., &c. Williams and Norgate: London and Edinburgh. 1882.

schools; and the form of monastic life which it adopted had its parallel in the ascetic fraternities of the older faith. The Upanishads and the Brāhmaṇa of the Hundred Paths furnish the chief materials for this sketch, which presents an excellent analysis of the doctrine of the *Ātman*, the self, or subject, and its development into the basis of the unity of the universe. Dr. Oldenberg seems to us less happy in his attempt to trace the origin of the pessimistic doctrine of the sorrow of the world, and especially of the belief in transmigration. His note on p. 44 hints at the possibility of another derivation of the idea of metempsychosis beyond the region of Aryan thought. It is true that he rejects it as incapable either of proof or of disproof, and the question may perhaps be wholly beyond solution; but we cannot share Dr. Oldenberg's confidence in the simplicity of the process of Brahmanical evolution apart from all extraneous influences. Still, however, the chapters of this introduction supply the best picture hitherto drawn of the state of feeling and the objects of intellectual investigation prior to the appearance of Gotama Buddha.

The way is now clear for the account of Buddhism itself. This is naturally divided into three parts, corresponding to the three terms of the well-known formula of Refuge in the Buddha, the Doctrine, and the Order. In discussing the traditions of Gotama's life, Dr. Oldenberg takes occasion to make effective reply to M. Senart's effort to show that they have arisen out of ideas whose solar character had ceased to be understood. Nothing can be better than the author's critical sifting of the details of the tradition, which he carefully traces back to their simplest and oldest form. This process leaves a clear historical residuum free from any mythological features, and so securely connected with given places, times, and persons, as to produce conviction of its origin in real events. It must be said, however, that the solid nucleus thus attained is stripped of most of those moral attractions which shine through so many of the Buddhist legends: and Dr. Oldenberg is obliged to confess that the figure he draws represents rather the type of ancient Buddhist life than the individuality of Gotama himself. The texts, it is well known, give no clear chronological account of his proceedings during the forty years or more which intervened between his conversion and his death. The dates which are found in the Burmese version of the Life published by Bishop Bigandet, seem due to the effort of later compilers to introduce some order into the confusion of the records of his travels and teachings. Nevertheless, we are hardly inclined to think the task so hopeless as Dr. Oldenberg appears to suppose, though it may seem somewhat presumptuous to hazard such an opinion in the face of his unrivalled knowledge of the materials at command. The difference, however, arises from the peculiar point of view from which Dr. Oldenberg has conceived Buddha and his work. The Translator, in his preface, speaks of Buddhism "as the highest effort of pure intellect to solve the problem of being." The author does not raise for it so great a claim: but he does throughout treat of it rather as a metaphysical system than

as the vehicle of a great moral impulse. The contrast between the character of the teaching ascribed to Buddha and that attributed to Christ is thus expressed :

It cannot be forgotten that the fundamental differences of the thoughts and the dispositions with which the early Christian and early Buddhist communities dealt, were such that these differences must also find expression in the method of religious instruction. Where the pure sentiment of the simple, believing heart is supreme, where there are children to whom the Father in heaven has given his kingdom to possess, there the brief and homely language, which comes from the depth of a pure heart, may touch the proper chords more effectually than the highly organised development of a system of ideas. But the mode of thinking of the world in which Buddha lived, moves in other paths : for it all weal and woe depend on knowledge and ignorance ; ignorance is the ultimate root of all evil, and the sole power which can strike at the root of this evil is knowledge. Deliverance is, therefore, above all, knowledge : and the preaching of deliverance can be nothing less or more than the exposition of this knowledge, which means the unfolding of a series of abstract notions and abstract propositions (pp. 178—9).

It is doubtless true that deliverance is represented as following upon knowledge : but knowledge of what ? Of the real conditions of inward self-mastery and peace. These are inextricably blended with metaphysical discussions, theories of being and not being, and so forth ; but they are in themselves essentially ethical, and we cannot help thinking that Dr. Oldenberg has kept them far too much in the background. Thus while he devotes the second part of his book to the exposition of the doctrines of Buddhism—an exposition of great value—he curtly dismisses the four stages of the way of holiness as a later ecclesiastical addition (p. 819). It is quite possible that the methodical division of the pilgrim's progress towards Nirvāna into these four stages may be due to the systematising tendencies of later times. But Dr. Oldenberg himself adopts and confirms the theory of Nirvāna first propounded by Professor T. W. Rhys Davids that Nirvāna is the attainment in this life of that state of sinlessness which secures deliverance from liability to re-birth. This state is essentially a moral condition, and constant stress is thrown in the Buddhist scriptures upon the arrival at Arahatsip, or Saintliness, in which it is realised. This, however, is passed over by our author, and though his sketch of Buddhist morals contains many admirable and just remarks (such as his contrast between the Buddhist goodwill and the Christian love), it seems to us to lack the completeness of his presentment of the dogmatic contents of Buddhist metaphysics, and especially to fail in connecting it with the personality of the Teacher himself. How deep was the ethical passion which breathed through primitive Buddhism may be seen in the temptation which was alleged to have beset Buddha before he finally resolved to proclaim to the world his new-found truth. The difficulty of making it known to common minds, plunged in earthly callings, nearly overwhelmed him. The prospect of labour and weariness filled him with dismay. Only the intercession of Brahma Sahampati, who saw that the world would be lost if Buddha remained in

quietude and refrained from preaching the doctrine, at last succeeded in overcoming his reluctance. The whole scene is given at length by Dr. Oldenberg, from its earliest form in the *Mahāvagga*: but he scarcely seems to have realised the pitch of moral enthusiasm which it implies, or the sense of the immense momentum needed for the quickening of a new moral impulse such as Gotama imparted to the disciples who gathered round him. And if this was the real work of Gotama, it must be possible to recover from the texts something more than a type; through the legends and the strangely abstract form of many of the discourses attributed to him, there must live and move the power of a distinct personality, whose influence can be investigated, and whose character can be portrayed.

In other respects the exposition of the Doctrine and the description of the Order leave nothing to be desired. Many features are brought out with fresh clearness, and consequently acquire new interest. In the analysis of the famous chain of causation, and the interpretation of its technical terms and their relation to each other, Dr. Oldenberg displays great skill, and his grasp of his materials is broad and strong; but we should like to know whether the gap to which he draws attention (pp. 285, 286) between contact, sensation, desire, and clinging to existence, in the earlier group, and being, birth, old age, death, &c., in the latter group, may not be explained by referring the second set (which he regards as involving a sudden retrogression) not to the first origin of all existence but to its continuance through birth after birth, life after life, in the endless cycle from which the believer seeks deliverance. The remarks on the manner in which the official teaching of the church really evaded the question as to the ultimate goal of all (pp. 274—284) are especially significant, in view of the missionary enthusiasm sometimes supposed to be associated with the annihilation doctrine; and they show that that enthusiasm was really excited by *Nirvāna* as a moral ideal, and not by the extinction of existence to which it might—or might not—lead.

We are sorry that we cannot altogether congratulate the translator on his work. His English is sometimes slovenly and awkward, as in such phrases as "there is nothing else but I" (p. 88), or "the to-human-life-so-momentous and destructive power of this movement" (p. 259). Nor is his choice of words always happy. "Body-cum-spirit" may be allowed to pass; but "bēent" and "non-bēent" (pp. 87, 287) are simply detestable. "Conceptionlessness" (p. 106) is, we suppose, intended to represent *saññāvedayitanirodho* though it is not adequate for it: and "egoity" (p. 118) is a poor version of *asmimāno*, literally "I-am-pride," i.e., the pride of being an independent self. Elsewhere "egoities" (p. 88) seems to mean separate individualities. In another edition these and similar blemishes might easily be removed. The page-headings are good, but the second index is very imperfect.

It may be added that in three short concluding essays, scholastically entitled *excurus*, on the relative geographical location of Vedic and Buddhist culture, on the authorities for the history of Buddha's youth,

and on some matters of Buddhist dogmatics, Dr. Oldenberg has brought together a number of important passages inaccessible to ordinary students, full of suggestive material and equally suggestive criticism.

J. E. C.

MR. MARTIN RULE'S LIFE OF ANSELM.*

THE character and work of St. Anselm have been made so familiar to the English public by the biography of the Dean of St. Paul's, that we cannot be surprised at a new attempt to write his life on a more extended scale. To such an undertaking there could not be a better model than Dean Church's sketch; inspired with a deep sympathy with Anselm's age, it overlooks whatever was petty in its aims and aspirations, and draws out with matchless delicacy the nobler realities which underlay them. But there is no doubt room for a new biography, because Anselm was not only the saint and the churchman, but also the foremost philosopher between John Scotus and Abailard; and it was plainly incompatible with the popular plan of Mr. Church's book to enter at length into fine metaphysical discussions. We, therefore, opened the new "Life" of Mr. Martin Rule with a confident anticipation that this great chapter would be written in it with the grasp and penetration which it deserves. It is as well to state at the outset that this, like every other anticipation which we had a right to form, is disappointed in the work before us. It is, in fact, written on exactly opposite principles to that of Mr. Church. The author's interest is confined to the mean, the trivial, the temporary; and he is as ignorant of philosophy as he is of history.

First, in regard to philosophy, although the book extends to some 850 pages, and in every point of antiquarianism or ritual is technical in the highest degree, Mr. Rule takes occasion to remark that "a detailed account" of Anselm's dialectical treatises "would be out of place in these pages" (vol. i. p. 186). The real reason, as the reader easily discovers, is the total vacancy of the author's mind on philosophica subjects. His ignorance of the intellectual history of the Middle Ages is almost too profound to measure. "It would perhaps," he says, "be impossible to ascertain the extent of" Anselm's "acquaintance with the works of Plato; but whatever the field it embraced, there cannot be a question as to its depth and accuracy. And if the form of some of his philosophical treatises may be a guide to us, we shall have to own that he followed Plato's great master by adopting an interlocutory method of instruction" (l. c.). The "little treatise, 'De Grammatico,' proves that the walls of Le Bec often heard the name of Aristotle, and affords us a more than favourable notion of the power, versatility, and subtilty of the

* *The Life and Times of St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of the Britains.* By MARTIN RULE, M.A. Two volumes. Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1883.

analytical method which Anselm had borrowed from the Stagyrte" (*ibid.*). Mr. Rule proceeds to "reflect that his acquaintance with Greek philosophy was the Egyptian treasure which he is described as bringing with him from Aosta to Le Bec," and adds this astounding explanation: "He had owed its possession indirectly to Lanfranc, no doubt, and to Lanfranc's intercourse with the East through the merchant vessels which came thence across the Adriatic, and up the Po and the Ticino to Pavia; and to Lanfranc was he indebted for its subsequent assortment and valuation" (vol. i. p. 188). Any one who has the slightest acquaintance with the researches of Jourdain, Cousin, Hauréau, or Von Prantl, to name but a few labourers in a well-worked field, knows pretty accurately how much of Plato and Aristotle was read—in Latin versions or summaries—in Anselm's time; he knows that Anselm gives not the smallest evidence of Greek learning, and, whatever his position as a philosopher, adds absolutely nothing to the scholarly material open to his contemporaries: finally, if any fact is notorious, it is that the dialogue had been the accepted popular form for philosophical treatise from the time of Alcuin, to go no further back. To Mr. Rule, however, every fact in his hero's intellectual history is as much a surprise as a new toy to a child, and he accounts for it with equal naïveté. *Omne ignotum pro magnifico* describes truly his attitude in regard to most things, and we will not, therefore, trouble our readers with more samples of his dealings with matters of philosophy. Suffice it to say that the name of Gaunilo, who challenged Anselm's arguments on more than equal terms, is not mentioned in the book. Mr. Rule is at least so far to be commended that he says very little upon the subject; but the omission tells heavily against the serious character of his work. When a German, Professor Hasse, wrote a life of St. Anselm on something like the scale of Mr. Rule's, he devoted one volume to the biography, and the second, a considerably larger one, to the philosophical and theological writings of the archbishop. With this careful and discriminating study Mr. Rule does not appear to be acquainted; indeed, he seems to be ignorant of German, probably deterred by a "sound" antipathy to what he no doubt considers the language of "neology."

If, then, he omits one-half of Anselm's life-work, how has he managed to fill these goodly volumes? The answer is simple. His book is not a biography, but an historical romance. As, however, we do not intend to be unjust to one of the highest classes of fiction, we hasten to explain that Mr. Rule's book could only pass as an inferior historical novel for Sunday reading. It is totally devoid of literary style, brimful of all the worst excesses of "fine" writing. To Mr. Rule the sea is "the briny wave" (vol. i. p. 228), water the "limpid fluid" (p. 81); flints are "siliceous nodules" (p. 77); the donkey is "that humble beast of burden whose more familiar name has been repudiated by our great lexicographer" (p. 75); the children of a monastery are "those wondering, round-eyed little oblates" (p. 182). People are "furibund" (p. 64), or "errabund" (vol. ii. p. 21). But to give instances properly would be

to quote the whole book. We ask then again, How did these volumes arise? The author himself tells us in his preface: "The work I now put forth to the world has attained its present size and pretensions I scarcely know how, and in my own despite." We are equally puzzled, for its size and "pretensions," in the usual sense of the word, as implying "claims not justified," are incontestable. The book, we repeat, is in no sense an historical production. Any one who will look at the elaborate appendix devoted to Anselm's genealogy (vol. i. pp. 402—415) will see that, not probability even, but bare possibility is regularly taken as proof. Mr. Rule is a stranger to the very notion of criticism, and has made up his biography, as he has done this pedigree, upon guesses. For example, we know that Anselm on first leaving Piedmont travelled across Burgundy and France to Normandy. Mr. Rule is not satisfied with this simple statement, he must fill up the journey in detail. After leaving Lyons he says, Anselm's "first resting-place . . . must have been Cluny." Then follows an account of the famous abbey, of which, by the way, he calls St. Odo the fifth, instead of the second, abbot.

But Anselm might not be numbered among its inmates, for he must soon have discovered that such health as his could never endure the severities of its terrible discipline, and that, even though its cloister were composed of sub-Alpine marble, and the high altar of its church were covered with a baldachin of silver, no aesthetic charms could avail to disenchant a feebleness which it was his fate to carry with him to the grave. But he bore the mortification and hoped on. Perhaps, however, he attended a course of lectures in the *schola clericalis* of Cluny; although it is more likely that whatever lengthened stay he made in Burgundy was made not there, but at Dijon, [where] the monks . . . of St. Benignus were more than willing to set at his disposal all they had to offer him of oral teaching, of written documents, and even of instruction in the fine arts (vol. i. pp. 102—104).

The transition from "might be" to "was" is quite unconscious, and the reader, unless he be very watchful, is apt to think that Mr. Rule must have some authority for relating what, as a matter of fact, is pure imagination. In the same way, in vol. ii. pp. 182—185, he "suspects" a certain connection, which a few pages after (p. 146) is repeated as an ascertained fact. After this sort of thing one is not surprised at smaller blunders. Mr. Rule, for instance, has a theory that Lanfranc was born in 997 (see vol. i. pp. 182, 229, 868), and makes him an active and vigorous statesman at the age of ninety-four; whereas the only date we possess about his early life is that he left Italy in 1040, after some experience as a teacher. The usual inference is, of course, that he was born about 1006, although, according to the custom of those days, there would be nothing strange if he turned out to be some years younger.

Equally little can we trust Mr. Rule's general views of history. Not that we have any quarrel with those who accept the high ecclesiastical point of view as the only one possible to religious men at the end of the eleventh century; but we do protest against the assumption that what Leo IX. and his successors "did in regard to the Empire was to assert the eternal and irreversible authority of first principles" (vol. ii. p. 289).

Whatever be the rights of the case it is notorious that the innovation was on the side of the Pope. In order to make facts square with his hypothesis, Mr. Rule is at endless pains to prove that Archbishop Lanfranc held the same ecclesiastical position as his successor, and to "read between the lines" (to use a favourite phrase of our author, which not ineptly describes his method) of the unfriendly correspondence between Lanfranc and Gregory VII. Dr. Stubbs, who least of all men can be accused of any animus against the Church, has a pregnant sentence in which he notes that Lanfranc was "an Italian . . . and, therefore perhaps, not a papalist" (*Constitutional History of England*, i. 281); but Mr. Rule seems to think it necessary that all Anselm's friends should present the same pattern of churchmanship as himself, all his opponents be as unprincipled as William Rufus. It would be difficult to match Mr. Rule's account of the conflict between the Archbishop and Henry I. as a piece of violent special pleading. This bitter partisanship is the presiding spirit of the book—a partisanship which continually leads the writer to draw conclusions without a shadow of evidence. (See, for instance, the singular treatment of Anselm's letter to Urban II., vol. ii. pp. 98, 94.) He is an adept at manipulating facts; and when his own imagination fails, he resorts to verbal fancies of the most childish kind. For instance, *nobilis*, he says, denotes one sort of rank, but *nobiliter* and *nobilitas* one quite different and far more exalted (vol. i. pp. 402, *et seqq.*, ii. p. 262 note): or again, Anselm's *antecessores* are not the archbishops (they would be *praedecessores*) but "those who held the Canterbury lands pending his return from exile" (vol. ii. p. 254). In the same way Mr. Rule constructs from the headings of Anselm's letters the terms of an oath of homage (vol. i. pp. 383—385). One is almost tempted to think that he believes in the verbal inspiration of medieval literature, so anxiously does he educe ten times the meaning which any given words can express: "It need not be remarked," however, as Mr. Church pertinently says (*Saint Anselm*, p. 86), "that in the accounts written of these times we meet with endless exaggeration. . . . Men wrote not in their own language, but in a foreign one, which they only half knew how to use." It is really comical to see how Mr. Rule maintains that when Lanfranc, tied naked to a tree in the forest, *voluit Domino laudes debitas persolvere*, he meant to recite "offices comprising, apart from hymns, versicles, responses, and antiphons, two lessons out of St. Paul's Epistles and twenty-one psalms, besides the Te Deum, the Benedicite, and the Benedictus" (vol. i. p. 87).

But Mr. Rule is before all things a ritualist (in the technical not the popular, sense), and rejoices in describing at length from his own imagination, every ceremony of pomp or solemnity that occurred or might have occurred in Anselm's experience. It is of a piece with this wholesale romancing, that he likes to think of his characters as Frenchmen, styles every monk "Dom," and even talks of Robert de "Moubrai," Earl of Northumberland (vol. ii. p. 86). In everything there is the same defiance of historical method, the same ignorance of the choice

and use of authorities, the same dependence upon irrelevant evidence and straining of it until the original meaning is entirely destroyed or inverted. We do not mean to deny that Mr. Rule has brought together the results of a good deal of reading, or that his garrulousness is occasionally entertaining. We are grateful to him for printing a catalogue from a MS. in the Vatican of the monks at Bec down to the end of Anselm's abbacy (vol. i. pp. 894—896). But the total lack of judgment displayed throughout so vitiates the book that we are bound to warn the ordinary student against it. Those who know enough to correct as they read may learn something from it in out-of-the-way detail; but we question whether the grain is sufficient to be worth threshing out.

R. L. P.

MR. PICTON'S 'OLIVER CROMWELL.'*

THAT Mr. Picton has succeeded in producing a very readable book on the hero of the Great Rebellion is beyond question; nor is it to be wondered at, considering the writer and his theme, for it would be a dull scribe indeed who could fail to interest us with such a subject, and it would be a dull subject indeed that an author like Mr. Picton would fail to enliven. We quite agree, moreover, with the writer that the great work of Thomas Carlyle has not entirely excluded the need of humbler efforts to tell the story of Cromwell's life. To speak of no other reasons, documents and facts have come to light which were not known when Carlyle wrote, and the most religious devotees of the sage of Chelsea would not deny that his most brilliant historical essays are too deeply tinged with the subjectivity of the writer to answer completely the ends of sober history.

That Mr. Picton follows Carlyle in his general estimate of Carlyle's greatness of soul, loftiness of purpose, and superiority to vulgar ambition, that he credits him with perfect sincerity, and with a tenderness of heart, displayed alike in his domestic affections and in his public acts, that he is, in short, an admirer—albeit, not a fatuous admirer—of Cromwell, the reader who knows anything of Mr. Picton's antecedents will be prepared to find. But those who are acquainted with his judicial treatment of Biblical subjects, will be surprised to meet in this volume with what seems to us some singular aberrations of the critical faculty. For example, in his eagerness to discredit an obviously legendary incident in Oliver's boyhood, he quotes and comments as follows: "The Rev. Mark Noble, after dismissing other idle tales, says: 'It is more certain that Oliver averred that he saw a gigantic figure which came and opened the curtains of his bed, and told him that he should be the greatest person in the kingdom, but did not mention the word king.

* *Oliver Cromwell: The Man and His Mission.* By J. ALLANSON PICTON. Cassell, Petter, Galpin, and Co. 1882.

And though he was told of the folly, as well as the wickedness, of such an assertion, he persisted in it; for which he was flogged by Dr. Beard, at the particular desire of his father. Notwithstanding which, he would sometimes repeat it to his Uncle Steward, who told him it was traitorous to relate it.' This story shows such barbarous ideas of education, both on the part of Robert Cromwell and of Dr. Beard, that we may be permitted to hope it is more than doubtful" (p. 25). In other words, Mr. Picton singles out the one probable feature of the story—viz., that *if* Oliver Cromwell ever had such a vision and related it, he was flogged, as the first reason for disbelieving it. Robert Cromwell and Dr. Beard must, indeed, have been ages in advance of their time, and of ordinary middle-class theories, even at the present day, if, with the Bible in their hands, they entertained the smallest misgiving that the rod was the Heaven-sent wand wherewithal to conjure folly out of the heart of a child. The really obvious solution, viz., *vaticinium post eventum*, and the analogy of cognate myths, from the stories of Romulus and Alexander downwards, almost escapes the notice of Mr. Picton, so anxious is he to vindicate for the house of Cromwell an enlightenment in regard to the training of the young—rare enough in this nineteenth century!

For the rest, the story of Cromwell's career is graphically, discriminatingly, and, one would fain hope, truthfully told. The unmistakable aversion of the people's leader to extreme measures, his willingness to hope, even against hope, in the amenability of the King to reason and appeals to honour, his reverential and, to our modern judgment, almost exaggerated loyalty to the principles of monarchical government, are brought out into strong relief. No attempt is made to palliate the ferocity displayed by Cromwell in his conquest of Ireland, which is justly characterised as the "darkest blot on his fame as a soldier!" "But," Mr. Picton continues, "it is unjust to exaggerate that stain by dwelling only on the frightful bloodshed of his victories, and forgetting the circumstances that occasioned it. Even in the nineteenth century, as the stories of the Indian mutiny and the negro riots in Jamaica prove, the English race, when wronged by those it esteems to be of a lower caste, is capable of reverting to the ferocity that made its primitive Saxon forefathers the terror of Northern Europe. But in the middle of the seventeenth century the vindictive passions of the nations were aggravated, not only by the inferior culture of the general population, but by the long prevalence of a bitter civil war; and, it must be added, by a misguided use of Old Testament precedents" (p. 29).

The story of the Commonwealth under the Protectorate, from its beginning to its virtual close by the death of the Lord Protector, is vividly and thrillingly told in the chapters bearing the seductive titles of "Benevolent Despotism," "A Quiet Year," "The Rejected Crown," "The Weary Titan," and "The End," concluding with an admirable summary, and tempered, but eloquent, panegyric of Cromwell in the character of warrior and statesman, in both of which he had the rare felicity, denied to a Wellington or a Bismarck, to shine with equal

splendour. Mr. Picton finishes his deeply-interesting biography with a brief outburst of indignation against the paltry malice of the Restorationists, shown in the desecration of the tomb of the Protector, an outburst which dies away into the following lament: "Our fathers emptied his sepulchre, and we make conspicuous by its absence from our historic monuments the figure of the most human-hearted Sovereign, and most imperial man in all our annals, since King Alfred's days."

E. M. G.

DIARIES AND LETTERS OF PHILIP HENRY.

WE are always thankful for fresh light thrown upon the thoughts and lives of the older English Presbyterians, since it helps us to understand more clearly the differences, as well as likenesses, with regard to them, which are so marked in their successors. In the present volume * we have Philip Henry depicted by himself, in the midst of daily worries, now from property, and now from persecution; in the midst, too, we may add, of considerable comfort, if not prosperity. His life becomes to us, thus, more human and, therefore, more real than as hitherto presented to us. His deep devoutness, his unswerving loyalty, with an almost at times painful sensitiveness, to conscience; these remain to us a "possession for ever." His large-hearted charity (in feeling, *e.g.*, for those who saw their way to conforming [p. 244] and in deeds to many who needed help), finds expression on almost every page. He sometimes protests against the narrowness of many of his contemporaries as to play-acting, for instance (p. 171), and the interpretation of the Bible (p. 364), but seems to have largely shared in their credulousness, recording providential judgments and various impossibilities of natural phenomena without apparent misgivings. Like most of the first generation of English Presbyterians Philip Henry was a Churchman in everything but acceptance of a King after the Stuart type, and of the thinly veiled mass of Roman Catholic doctrines and practices retained by the bishops in 1662. So far as parish order, &c., was concerned he was as opposed to "Independency" as his editor and descendant, who makes more than one point of the "Tu quoque" kind against the Liberationist, whom he takes to be the typical Puritan (*cf.* pp. 250, 253, 362, &c.).

We have been struck by the careful way in which Philip Henry always refers to God through Christ. This, together with his strong objections to kneeling at the Sacrament (pp. 178, 362), to bowing at the name of Jesus (p. 300), and his notice of the burning of a picture of the Trinity (p. 235), shows, we think, a state of mind more scriptural than orthodox, which may account, in some measure, for the almost universal lapse into Arianism of the English Presbyterians of the next generation.

This book has a further value in our eyes. It reveals to us not only

* *Diaries and Letters of Philip Henry, M.A.* Edited by MATTHEW HENRY LEE, M.A. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1882.

Philip Henry but his Conforming descendant. The moral insight fostered by Nonconformity and by Conformity are here curiously confronted, and we shall dwell some little on the contrast. Philip Henry protested, by every means in his power, against prelacy and all that it, then, implied (cf. the list of things objected to, p. 80). Every page of his diary records some condemnation of it or some suffering endured whilst making his condemnation known. Yet Mr. Lee can bring himself, in the face of this fact, to say of him that "though he could not see his way in the matter of reordination, there was nothing about him of a separatist spirit" (Preface, p. vi.).

It is simply matter of history that the Protestant Church of England no more allowed any breach of uniformity than did the Roman Catholic Church of England; and that she punished in every way within her power all who made such breach. Mr. Lee tells us that the Independents "seceded" in 1668, and the Baptists in 1638 (p. 155). It is equally matter of history that the Protestant Church of England took possession of the Roman Catholic Church of England and all its belongings by the simple expedient of getting rid of every Papist that resisted the usurpation, and that the Papists surviving at home or abroad kept Elizabeth in a life-long fever of fear by their determined plottings. They were, moreover, the chief movers in the rebellions of 1715 and 1745. Mr. Lee now tells us that the "Papist Nonconformists" (!) "seceded" in 1570 (p. 155), and that whilst Church and State had actually been overthrown by the Puritans the Papists had, as a body, been true to the State and had not injured the Church! (p. 86 note). Yet he speaks of certain men—Bicentenary orators may be! (p. 156)—who "darken counsel with words without, knowledge" and seek in vain to explain away the state of public affairs, &c. (p. 875).

Philip Henry records how a brother Nonconformist solemnly renounced his former orders "derived from his father and the classis" (p. 202) and gives a notable device by which this renunciation could be evaded (p. 810). Mr. Lee sees only pride that will not "submit" (p. 202 note) in the scruples as to reordination. We are glad to see that Philip Henry's quiet rebuke of the device by putting directly after it the words of formal renunciation actually enforced has rendered even Mr. Lee's usual note impossible.

The "New Act of Restraynt" denounced in the text (p. 226) is whitewashed in a note wherein Mr. Lee seems to think that the cruelties practised by the Presbyterians in 1645 justified those practised on them in 1662. In the next edition we think the words "tit for tat" would be an appropriate addition.

Philip Henry, speaking of the late war and covenant, says (p. 102) "tho' particular instruments might miscarry yet 'twas in general the cause of God and religion." Mr. Lee, who can see in his ancestor no trace of a "separatist spirit," here quotes that impartial historian, Hume, to the effect that the faults of the Royalists were the infirmities of men, whilst the faults of the Parliamentarians were the vices of devils.

Philip Henry suggests that the Conformists should invite the Nonconformists to preach in their pulpits and so bring back, if not uniformity, at least unity. Mr. Lee's note we prefer to give in his own words (p. 250). "This had been tried before and failed. In the eighteenth century an amusing story is told of a Presbyterian obtaining permission to preach in the chapel of his brother, who was a Socinian, on condition that he did not touch upon disputed points, and beginning his address by these words: 'Now that I have, by what might be called a holy stratagem, got possession of this pulpit, I am determined not to leave it until you have for once heard the gospel,' and then, &c." We fear that a good many Conformists might in the present day use the first words of the holy strategist with perfect fitness, and can understand some little how they can find a fraud such as this "amusing" and nothing more!

Here, too, we have the usual misuse of the term Socinian with more than the usual orthodox ignorance or carelessness. Arians, who regard the master as a Divine being, are, in Poland (!), said to take the sacrament sitting, not because sitting is a trace of the original posture, but, "in order to show that they do not believe Christ to be their God but only their fellow creature" (p. 178), whilst the English Presbyterians, who more and more inclined to regard Christ as their "fellow creature" and who certainly ceased to worship him as God in any sense, are called by the name of men who were Christ-worshippers (though in a modified sense), viz., Socinians.

These contrasts of the states of mind produced by Nonconformity and Conformity respectively; by the use of private judgment and by "submission" to authority; are all the more instructive by being unintended. Our readers will, we think, not wonder when we say that we infinitely prefer the moral insight shown in the text to that revealed to us in the notes. At the same time we are glad to be able to say that Mr. Lee has not allowed his ecclesiastical prepossessions to influence his work as editor of the text, which seems to us to have been done with conscientious thoroughness.

R. P.

SIR WILLIAM ROWAN HAMILTON.*

IT is probable that not a few readers whose attention is called to Mr. Graves' book will ask, Who was Sir William Rowan Hamilton? And when they are informed that he was the Astronomer Royal of Ireland, and Andrews Professor of Astronomy in the University of Dublin, that he was an eminent mathematician, and made one of the most noted of modern discoveries in mathematical science, they will conclude that the memoir has been produced in the interest of scientific

* *Life of Sir William Rowan Hamilton*. Including Selections from his Poems, Correspondence, and Miscellaneous Writings. By ROBERT PERCEVAL GRAVES, M.A., Sub-Dean of the Chapel Royal, Dublin. Vol. I. Dublin: Hodges. London: Longmans. 1882.

students and specialists, and that the thick volume, which embraces only twenty-seven out of the sixty years of Hamilton's life, must have a large proportion of its pages filled with mathematical symbols and abstruse calculations. But then they may be told that Hamilton was the intimate friend and correspondent of Wordsworth, and of Mr. Aubrey de Vere, among other men who had nothing to say about Quaternions or Conical Refraction; and that Wordsworth said that he and Coleridge were the two most wonderful men, taking all their endowments together, that he had ever met. The inquirers will by this time be prepared to allow that the life of such a man, with copious selections of letters to and from his friends, may have a wide interest and permanent value, which will justify the years of labour which Mr. Graves has spent over it, and will justify also the somewhat large scale on which he has carried out his work. The author has boldly and wisely determined to take no account of the readers who stand in dread of a book which cannot be got through comfortably in time for the return "Mudie Box;" and those to whom the idea is monstrous of a life only half told in some seven hundred well-filled pages, when it is unrelieved by indiscreet personal revelations, society gossip, and "good stories" told at the expense of reputations past or present. We fear that the very thoroughness and high quality of the work may hinder it from being appreciated as widely as it ought to be. But within the circle, still not a narrow one, let us hope, of real lovers of good books, of serious readers and thinkers, Mr. Graves will receive nothing but thanks for the generous spirit in which he has given himself to his task; and he need not fear that any one will reproach him for having drawn so largely on the rich stores at his disposal.

He has judiciously confined his treatment of technical and purely scientific matters to comparatively few pages, so that the interest of the memoir is very largely of a biographical and literary kind. He has presented in its own attractive beauty the picture of a life rich in goodness, in high thought and noble purpose, the life of a poet and philosopher, a man of singular simplicity as well as depth of character, keenly alive to all intellectual interests, winning for himself as much love and esteem as could well fall to a man's lot, and leaving behind him an enviable reputation for original scientific thought and work, and for beauty and goodness of personal character. He was, as we have said, a poet; first in the literary sense of the word as a composer of verse, which, with certain evident defects of artistic expression, is the genuine utterance of pure, high, and devout feeling, and then, more remarkably, as showing a power of imagination in all his scientific work. This breadth of mind, this combination of intellectual and moral sympathy, and eager recognition of all that makes life worth having, constitutes the pervading charm and interest of the memoir. When the work is completed, we hope to give a more adequate view of the life and character of Hamilton than would be possible within the space now at our disposal.

Among the pages to which many readers will turn with special expectation are those which contain the report of Hamilton's personal

intercourse with Wordsworth, and the letters which passed between the two friends. Those of Wordsworth are occupied a good deal with matters of literary criticism, chiefly in connection with the poems which Hamilton from time to time submitted to his judgment. They contain, amongst other characteristic matters, some interesting illustrations of the poet's own methods of working and canons of art—as where he speaks of “what appears in itself of little moment, and yet is of incalculably great, that is, workmanship—the art by which the thoughts are made to melt into each other, and to fall into light and shadow, regulated by distinct preconception of the best general effect they are capable of producing.” All lovers of Wordsworth will be grateful for Miss Eliza Hamilton's bright description of the poet, on his visit to her brother at Dublin in 1829.

Coleridge was a special object of Hamilton's reverence, and he made a pilgrimage to Highgate, and was admitted to two interviews with the philosopher in his sick-room.

Towards the close of the volume Mr. Graves prints a number of letters from Aubrey de Vere, which are so full of varied interest, so clever and original, that the continuation of the correspondence will be eagerly looked forward to by his readers. These letters show a knowledge and intellectual grasp which are truly remarkable in so young a man (he was not eighteen when the correspondence began). It is difficult not to think of them as the fruit of mature years and a large experience of life. And the same general impression is given of Hamilton's own character, as disclosed in the biography and in his letters and other writings. We are obliged to glance at the date at the head of the page (for which we have to thank the careful editor) to remind ourselves what stage of the history we have yet reached, when the only signs of inexperience and youthfulness are in the singleness of purpose and warmth of feeling, and enthusiasm for goodness, truth and beauty, which happily were always fresh and unimpaired.

Among the many poems which are scattered through the volume, and most of which, with all their high qualities of thought and sentiment, have certain weaknesses and artistic blemishes, which the author was partly conscious of, but had not the skill to amend or avoid, there is one sonnet which stands out from the rest for its pure beauty both of thought and expression. It occupies a place of honour in Mr. David Main's “Treasury of English Sonnets,” and will bear comparison with the best in that choice selection of the finest sonnets in the language. We must allow ourselves the pleasure of quoting it for the benefit of those of our readers who do not already know it; and it may fitly close our present brief notice of the record of a life, the essential spirit of which is expressed with simple truth and sincerity in these exquisite lines:

O brooding Spirit of Wisdom and of Love,
Whose mighty wings even now o'ershadow me:
Absorb me in thine own immensity,
And raise me far my finite self above!

Purge vanity away, and the weak care
 That name or fame of me should widely spread;
 And the deep wish keep burning in their stead
 Thy blissful influence afar to bear,
 Or see it borne! Let no desire of ease,
 No lack of courage, faith, or love, delay
 My own steps in that high thought-paven way,
 In which my soul her clear commission sees:
 Yet with an equal joy let me behold
 Thy chariot o'er that way by others roll'd!

DEAN BRADLEY'S RECOLLECTIONS OF DEAN STANLEY.*

THE Dean of Westminster's Edinburgh Lectures are a most graceful and worthy tribute to the memory of the predecessor, who was also his dear and honoured friend for nearly a life-time. They were delivered to an audience that he knew would be, on almost every point, in sympathy with him; and in such a congenial atmosphere it would be the easier, while guarding with due reserve the sacred memories of intimate friendship, to put on record many private reminiscences, characteristic anecdotes and sayings, which all combine to make the portrait more life-like. We need hardly add that the more exact the likeness the more beautiful and attractive it is sure to be.

The author's personal recollections date from the beginning of his own University career, when the newly-elected fellow of University College welcomed the young scholar from Rugby, and straightway won his heart. In the compass of a hundred and fifty pages he gives a clear outline of his friend's life, devoting one of the three chapters to the account of his home at Alderley, his school-days at Rugby, and his undergraduate career at Balliol. Then we follow him in his studies and travels, his seven years at Canterbury, the five years of his Regius Professorship at Oxford; and the record ends with a most interesting review of the eighteen years of singular happiness, and of never-tiring energy and zeal, which he spent in his beloved deanery of Westminster. Dr. Bradley delights in giving illustrations of that combination of gentleness and simplicity of heart and boundless charity with immovable firmness and undaunted courage, which gave Dean Stanley an almost unique place among his fellow Churchmen. He recalls some incidents in certain half-forgotten controversies, in which the Archbishop of Canterbury's saying was illustrated, that "he was almost bigoted against bigotry, and almost intolerant of intolerance," and that of another divine, that he was "the champion of the vilified name, the lost cause." Nothing could well exceed the scathing severity and bitterness of scorn to which he was moved by the sight of what he considered clerical bigotry and injustice, as in the cases, for instance, of the condemnation of the famous "Essays and

* *Recollections of Arthur Penrhyn Stanley*. Three Lectures, delivered at Edinburgh, in November, 1882. By G. GRANVILLE BRADLEY, Dean of Westminster. London: Longmans. 1882.

Reviews," and the excommunication of Bishop Colenso. The fact that he was not in intellectual sympathy with either the essayists and reviewers, or with the Bishop of Natal, heightens the effect of his chivalrous fidelity to principle in his judicial defence of their position, and the vigorous way in which he carried the war into the enemies' camp; and it becomes a minor consideration whether he really succeeded in proving every one of his points in detail. Dr. Bradley describes very fairly, without criticising it, Stanley's own theological position, in which he stood aloof from all parties in the Church, the "spirit of combination for party purposes" being, he used to say, the only thing which the New Testament called *heresy*. His hatred of "dogmatism" made him shrink from any clear and well-defined statements of theological doctrine, and enabled him to regard the creeds and formularies of the Churches as interesting historic documents, which might be in some loose connection with the ecclesiastical bodies without compromising anybody's practical freedom of belief. Dr. Bradley discerns clearly enough, without insisting on it, that Stanley had no genius for anything like a scientific theology; and he does not commit himself to his friend's doctrinal position. At the same time he gives very satisfactory evidence of his sympathy with his Catholic Christianity, his hatred of the spirit of sectarianism, and his absolute insensibility to the dividing influences of differing creeds. Some touching incidents are recorded which testify to the love and confidence which Dean Stanley inspired in men of all ranks and conditions, and to the beautiful and delicate courtesy with which he bore himself towards the very poorest and humblest of those with whom he came in contact, and whom he delighted to seek out for the purpose of doing a kind act or speaking a kind word. But we must refer our readers, once for all, to Dean Bradley's genial pages.

RECREATIONS AND STUDIES OF A COUNTRY CLERGYMAN.*

WE are indebted for a very pleasant and entertaining book, first to the original compiler for not finishing his work a couple of generations ago, so that it would have now been long out of date, if not forgotten, and then to the present editor, who has had charge of his great-uncle's papers, and who gives us a judicious selection from them in the compass of a moderate-sized and very attractive-looking volume. It is a specimen well worth preserving, of the easy, familiar letters of a clever, genial and kindly humorous man, not undistinguished for classical learning and general culture, fond of literature and art—especially music, for which he had a decided talent—interested in what was going on in the social and political world, enjoying his home travels in search of the picturesque, and always ready for a chat, pen in hand, about his "recrea-

* *Recreations and Studies of a Country Clergyman of the Eighteenth Century.* Being selections from the correspondence of the Rev. THOMAS TWINING, M.A. London: John Murray. 1882.

tions and studies." The letters are dated from 1761, when the writer was a student at Cambridge, to 1808, a year before his death. Thirty years of his retired and uneventful life were spent at the parsonage at Fordham, near Colchester. Among his friends were Dr. Hey, the Norrisian Professor, Dr. Parr, and Dr. Burney. Dr. Parr contributes a characteristic testimonial to Mr. Twining's worth in a letter to the original compiler, in which he says: "I consider your brother as possessing a talent for epistolary writing, certainly not surpassed by any of his contemporaries—wit, sagacity, learning, languages ancient and modern, the best principles of criticism, and the most exquisite feelings of taste, all united their various force and various beauty. Whether he wielded an argument, or tossed about an opinion, all was natural, original and most delightful." Making due allowance for Dr. Parr's love of a well-turned phrase, the reader will not be disposed to quarrel with him about the terms of his eulogy. Good sense, good humour, and keen intelligence everywhere prevail, and Mr. Twining easily enlists our interest in [his pursuits,—sometimes his more serious studies, but more generally his recreations, in which music, books and travel held the chief place. A leisure hour or two may be very pleasantly spent in such genial company.

MR. EDWIN ARNOLD'S 'PEARLS OF THE FAITH.'*

THOSE who were the most ready to receive with a welcome the completion of Mr. Arnold's "Oriental Trilogy" will probably have felt the most disappointment on reading *The Pearls of the Faith*. No doubt it would have been unreasonable to expect that the author's eminent success in combining a high poetical beauty with the great religious and ethical beauty of the story of Gotama should have been repeated when his subject lent itself less readily to poetical treatment. But it is impossible not to feel that Mr. Arnold might, in many ways, have been happier both in his choice of material and in his way of dealing with it. And then the explanation of some of the defects of the new work only increases our regret. Mr. Arnold was under no compulsion to publish without further elaboration the fruits of "a brief summer rest from politics;" and the indulgence he asks from scholars, on the ground that no library was near at hand for references, could only be granted on the supposition that it was necessary to rush into print without waiting for the opportunity of revision. It is matter of regret that the author was not more jealous of his own literary reputation, and more careful to do justice to the subject on which he has so hurriedly tried his hand. In saying this, however, we are far from denying the value and interest of much that

* *Pearls of the Faith*: or Islam's Rosary. Being the Ninety-nine beautiful names of Allah; with Comments in Verse from various Oriental Sources. By EDWIN ARNOLD, M.A. London: Trübner. 1883.

the volume contains. The "rosary" is the selection of ninety-nine of "the beautiful names of Allah," by which a pious Muslim reminds himself of the different Divine attributes as he prays, counting his beads. With each name Mr. Arnold has connected an appropriate "Comment," in the shape of a brief passage from the Koran, or a parable or allegory taken from some Mohammadan source. We could have wished that there had been a much larger proportion of these Oriental epilogues. Those that are given are generally well chosen, and are related in verse which is pleasant to read and is sometimes of excellent quality; and each of them conveys some fine, humane lesson in religion or morals. The bits of the Koran, which often have but little in them as they stand, gain nothing, but rather lose, by being turned into verse which has seldom any charm of its own. It would have been pleasanter to have been able to welcome Mr. Arnold's new book without reserve. Perhaps the two other members of his Trilogy had led us to expect too much. It is because *The Pearls of Faith* is by the author of *The Light of Asia*, that we judge it by a high poetical standard; and, while acknowledging how much there is to enjoy and to profit by, we still ask, with some discontent, why there is not more.

MR. PECK ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND AS THEY AFFECT THE POOR.*

FEW men are better qualified than Mr. Francis Peck to discuss the painful and difficult social questions which he has considered in the volume to which he gives the sadly suggestive title "*Social Wreckage.*" Mr. Peck is no sentimental philanthropist, or unpractical theorist, but has studied for himself the causes of the evils which he would try to remedy; and he has been as generous of the time and labour and anxious thought which cost him much, as of the material help which counts for less. No one can deny the truth of the author's comment on the saying that it is not possible to make men virtuous by Act of Parliament—"whether it is true or not that good laws may fail to influence men for good, it is perfectly certain that unjust or even inadequate laws exert a most malign influence upon those who are affected by them." The laws and the methods of administration which concern the well or the ill-being of the poor and the working classes are those which are described and criticised, and if we differ from the author in a few details, it would, we imagine, be very difficult for any earnest worker or any observer of our modern social state to gainsay the truth of the statements made, or the justice of the conclusions drawn. The main points which Mr. Peck has established, or concerning which he has given facts which speak for themselves, are:—(1) The influence of the Poor Laws, even as now administered, is to foster pauperism and discourage thrift. (2) The

* *Social Wreckage.* A Review of the Laws of England as they affect the Poor. By FRANCIS PECK. London: Isbister. 1883.

licensing laws throw unnecessary temptations in the way of the poorer classes, and the lenient treatment of drunkenness tends to make it felt to be a venial offence. (8) The administration of justice is unequal, frequently dilatory and expensive, and consequently oppressive and injurious to the poor. (4) The contrast between the punishment for offences against the person and against property, treating often the smallest theft as more criminal than the grossest cruelty, tends to brutalise the lawless classes. (5) The laws relating to women are immoral and unjust. (6) The punishments for serious crime are so unwisely inflicted that they seldom or ever reclaim an habitual criminal, while they generally ruin irrevocably the younger offenders who, under wiser regulations, might have been saved. Mr. Peek is not content with merely exposing the evils he laments; he has practical proposals to make, which are entitled to the earnest consideration of every social reformer. And apart from the remedial measures which can only come in the course of that home legislation, the seemingly hopeless delays of which fill one's heart with something like despair, the reader will find many suggestions of personal service, and will see how much of the evil might, even now, be alleviated by the wiser and more humane administration of laws, the effect of which depends in large measure on the spirit in which they are applied. It is all told in the compass of half-a-dozen concise chapters, with well-marshalled statistics, and the clearest possible statement of the case. We earnestly recommend the book to the very serious consideration of our readers.

DR. GEORGE MACDONALD'S ESSAYS AND DISCOURSES.*

DR. MACDONALD confesses to a doubt—when too late—whether the word he has used to describe the essays and discourses collected in this volume is an appropriate one. We should say, without doubt, that the title is both an ugly one in itself, and is anything but suggestive of the serious and carefully thought-out work which the volume contains. An “ort” is an unconsidered fragment, or scrap, and as the author says, “no one would insult his readers by offering them what he counted valueless scraps, and telling them they were such.” The writings Dr. MacDonald offers us are by no means all of equal value, but there are no mere “orts” among them. His hesitating defence of his definition of them is that they are “fragmentary presentations of larger meditations.”

The most noteworthy and characteristic of the papers here printed are those in which the author speaks from his own spiritual experience, his meditations on life and faith; and of these the most mature and consistently worked out is the one entitled, “A Sketch of Individual Development.” If we were to examine in detail the ideas implied in this representation of the spiritual development, declension, and ultimate redemption of a soul, we should probably not find ourselves altogether in

* *Orts*. By GEORGE MACDONALD, LL.D. London: Sampson Low, 1882.

intellectual agreement with the author; but Dr. MacDonald looks for the assent of spiritual sympathy, and leaves logical argument out of the question when speaking of things which he says "it is God's work to show, for logic cannot." He writes as the poet and mystic; and whatever science may have to say of his definition of the ultimate purpose and meaning of a snowdrop or a primrose, or however the philosophy now most in vogue may deride his trust in the inner voice, it is a good thing to be reminded of the mysteries and wonders which are "spiritually discerned." The essay on "The Imagination," contains much fine and suggestive thought, and ends with some good practical counsel on the right culture of that faculty. In the studies of Shakspeare the author, like many another Shaksperian critic, is at his best when he takes a wider survey of his subject and work, and is apt to be over ingenious in his discoveries and illustrations of the poet's purpose and method. Amongst the other literary papers are an analysis of Browning's "Christmas Eve," the report of a spoken address on Wordsworth, too short, but marked by insight and true appreciation, and a paper on Shelley, partly biographical, partly critical, rather dry, and not quite so instructive as might have been expected. There are two sermons proper, one preached before a Unitarian congregation, containing a profession of faith in Jesus as "the eternal Son of the eternal Father," the "divine man" and the "human God;" the other on "True Greatness." One or two slighter matters complete the list; but even these we should hesitate to bring under the proper definition of "orts."

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

WE are obliged to confine ourselves to a brief note on the following books received:—*Thoughts in the Cloister and the Crowd*. By Sir ARTHUR HELPS (Wilson and McCormick). A charming little reprint of the author's earliest work.—*The Galilaean Gospel*. By A. B. BRUCE, D.D. (Macniven and Wallace). A series of discourses, in a clear and popular style, avoiding critical questions, and dealing chiefly with the features of Christ's recorded teachings which have the fewest associations with controverted points of theology.—*The Story of Theodore Parker's Life*: written for Young People. By F. E. COOKE (The Sunday-school Association, 87, Norfolk Street). A very successful attempt to show, within a small space, the essential features of a noble life, and to explain what the vital principles were of those teachings, which have suggested the remark, in the Preface, that "some of the heresies of one age become the gospel of the next."

The following must be reserved for future notice:—*The City of God*: a Series of Discussions in Religion. By A. M. Fairbairn, D.D. (Hodder and Stoughton); *Sunshine and Shadows*. By W. B. Clulow. (T. Fisher Unwin); *R. W. Emerson*: an Estimate, &c. By A. Bronson Alcott (Boston: Williams); *George Ripley*. By O. B. Frothingham, (Boston; Houghton.)

THE MODERN REVIEW.

JULY, 1883.

THE BOOK OF JUDGES.

THE Book of Deuteronomy* was a protest of the prophetic party of the seventh century B.C. against the connection of unspiritual and heathen elements with the worship of Yahveh. The prophets of an earlier age had likewise lifted up their voices against the popular idolatries. They had declared that Israel must be punished; they had even described the heathen invasions as the chastisement of Yahveh, and Isaiah had addressed the monarch of Nineveh as "the rod of Yahveh's anger and the staff of his indignation." But they had anticipated that the penal day of doom and suffering would be followed by an age of regeneration, when the spirit would be poured out from on high; Yahveh himself would effect a miraculous transformation in his people; nature would yield up her enmities in universal peace, and the reign of righteousness would begin. The overthrow of Sennacherib's army seemed for a time the justification of these high hopes: Isaiah's policy of quiet but uncompromising resistance was vindicated: Yahveh delivered Zion. But the new dawn of a sun of sevenfold brightness did not appear. The attempted reform of Hezekiah had no permanent effect; still less did his successor Manasseh correspond to the ideal king. The revival

* See *Modern Review* for April, 1883.

of idolatry, the introduction of fresh forms of Eastern worship, the rapid spread of fashionable cults adopted by the court, placed the adherents of the Mosaic tradition in great danger. Persecution broke out, and the streets of Jerusalem ran red with blood. The very existence of Yahvism seemed imperilled, and it was evident that the future which Isaiah had predicted for it was further off than ever. The initiative of heaven was suspended. The people were not ready for any great spiritual revolution wrought by divine agencies: and prophecy therefore had to descend from its ideal heights and apply itself to existing conditions. It was compelled to enter the sphere of practical affairs, and undertake the religious education of the people. It could do this only by surrendering to some extent its free impulses, and clothing its abstract ideas in the guise of concrete duties. The first and most obvious of these was the purification of the worship of Yahveh by casting out every species of idolatry, native and foreign. The sole method available was the formulation of the claims of prophetic thought in a positive legal code: and hence it came about that in the book produced in the reign of Josiah prophetism assumed the form of law, and the authors of Deuteronomy exhibited to the people of Judah the fundamental requirements of religion in the shape of a worship freed from corruption and centralised at "the place which Yahveh had chosen to set his name there."

The Book of Deuteronomy was cast into the mould of Mosaic legislation. Its writers no doubt believed that they were correctly representing the principles of Moses applied to their own time. These principles were in fact the results of a long religious development. They were the outgrowth of the conceptions first declared by Moses, and since his day expanded, transformed, and enriched, by the experience of centuries. But the prophetic spirit could not regard them as historical products. They were embraced with an ardour which lifted them out of the limits of time-evolution. They were apprehended as eternal truths which had been valid always with the same obliga-

tion ; and they therefore afforded the standard not only for present reform, but for review and judgment of the past. The lofty monotheism, the stern opposition to every mingling of idolatry, which the religion of Yahveh demanded in the days of Josiah, it must have demanded all along. There could be no compromise with a being so transcendent, a sanctity so profound. The revelation of Sinai had taught at least that one lesson, "I am Yahveh thy God that brought thee out of the land of Egypt. Thou shalt not have any other gods before me. Thou shalt not make thee any graven image." Here were the first and simplest, but at the same time the most universal conditions of the religion of Yahveh. These were in force alike in the desert and in the promised land. They were independent of the sacred Tent of the wanderings, or the fixed Sanctuary of the earlier settlement, or the permanent Temple of the monarchy. They formed, therefore, a legitimate test of the faithfulness of the people.

Nor was this all. The prophetic preaching had sought to interpret the events of history by the light of a divine law of retribution. The bond between Yahveh and his people was so close that he could not be indifferent to their conduct. "You only have I known among all the families of the earth," said Amos in the name of the Lord of the world, "*therefore* will I punish you for all your iniquities." Apostasy must be followed by chastisement, calamity and suffering fall upon idolatry and false religion. This sequence was so fixed that the presence of either term always involved the other. The prophet who beheld his people frequenting the licentious orgies of the Baals had no hesitation in announcing that disaster was at hand ; and the historian had simply to invert the order, and from the record of defeat to infer the antecedent sin. It was in the light of this philosophy that the story of Israel's past was rearranged. From the conquest to the fall of Jerusalem the editors gathered the national traditions and revised the national annals under the focus of this central idea. Some periods naturally lent themselves to this mode of treatment more easily than

others. Where the materials were scanty, and the personal details were few, events could be fitted more easily into a systematic scheme: where, on the other hand, as in the career of David, the court histories were tolerably copious, the traces of this method are less clear and prominent. No book, however, shows plainer evidence of having undergone this prophetic reconstruction than the Book of Judges. As we have already examined the Deuteronomic principles in relation to the circumstances of their own time, it may be instructive now to consider the real significance of that antiquity with which they stand in such sharp contrast.

I.

The component parts of the book are easily disentangled.* There is an introduction—chapter i.—which briefly describes the conquest of Canaan west of the Jordan. Next to this is placed a short fragment, ii. 1—5, unconnected with what precedes or follows, and apparently intended originally to relate the transfer of the common sanctuary from the Jordan valley to middle Canaan.† The main portion of the history begins at ii. 6, with the death of Joshua, and con-

* The results of the most recent examination of the Book of Judges will be found in the sections relating to it in Wellhausen's *Geschichte Israel*, bd. I., and his edition of Bleek's *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*. See further Stade, "Vordeteronomisches Richterbuch" in the *Zeitschr. für Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1881, p. 339. Compare also Reuss, *Geschichte der Heiligen Schriften*, pp. 114—133, and pp. 335—343. In this paper I have thought it useless to burden the general reader with perpetual references. Besides the detailed treatment in the great histories of Ewald and Kuenen, valuable hints on the interpretation of the period will be found in Prof. W. Robertson Smith's volume on the *Prophets of Israel*.

† The dislocation of the passage is evident from the first words of the angel, ii. 1, which should be translated, "I will make you to go up," &c., showing that something has dropped out. No such place is known as Bochim: the LXX. introduce Bethel. The speech and its consequences 1 b—5 a, seem interpolated. By the angel must probably be understood some manifestation or symbol of Yahveh's presence, such as the ark and the traditional pillar of cloud; cp. *Es.* xxiii. 20 sqq., xxxiii. 12—15, *Num.* x. 33—36.

cludes with the death of Samson, xvi. 31. At the close of the book two episodes are appended, of uncertain origin and date. The first of these, xvii., xviii., is of great antiquity, and relates the establishment of the sanctuary at Dan, of which a grandson of Moses, Jonathan-ben-Gershom-ben-Mosheh, became the priest, and the founder of a temple-guild which lasted till the fall of the northern kingdom. The second, xix.—xxi., is of a totally different spirit. It is concerned with the war of "the people of God" against the tribe of Benjamin. The conceptions of this story, its impossible victories and defeats, its representations of the national unity under the subsequent ecclesiastical type of the "congregation," its plain dependence upon previous records, all stamp it as a symbolic rather than an historic narrative; it appears to be later than the Deuteronomic revision, having far more affinities with the priestly codex of the Pentateuch, in spite of some distinctive peculiarities of its own. Detailed analysis of this section would, however, be out of place within our present limits. We may dismiss it, therefore, from our survey of the real Judges-Book, ii. 6—xvi. 31.

The opening of this work was plainly intended to take up the story of Israel's fortunes where the Book of Joshua dropped it; the narrative of the death of Joshua, ii. 6—9, being reproduced from *Josh.* xxiv. 28—31. The main theme, therefore, is the history of the tribes after the conquest. This is cast into the form of the exploits of a series of deliverers, most of whom are said to have "judged Israel." The series contains twelve names; but it at once becomes evident that the elements of which it is composed are of very unequal value. Of some the traditions are full, and rich in heroic episode or suggestive material: who does not know the names of Deborah and Barak, of Gideon, Jephthah, Samson? Others appear on the scene only to vanish, and seem to have no other purpose than to fill out a preconceived scheme. As matter of fact, however, the successive stories have no connection with each other; and we cannot tell whether their arrangement corresponds to a real historic sequence or not. They are plainly drawn from

various sources ; and represent rather the traditions of clans and tribes than of the nation at large. Nothing, indeed, is clearer than that the unity of the wanderings was broken up by the settlement and the dispersion of the people through Canaan. Judah drops out of view, for the episode of servitude under Cushan Rishathaim, iii. 8—11, cannot be regarded as historical; the very name, "the Ethiopian of the double wickedness," being enough to throw doubt on the whole story.* Even in Middle and North Canaan there are not many traces of concerted action. The efforts of Jephthah are confined to the east of the Jordan : Samson's adventures belong to the tribe of Dan : and in neither case can the statement "he judged Israel" be understood of any national authority. It is indeed difficult to see in what sense the function of "judge" can be ascribed to such a personage as Samson at all : but it is plain that the name indicates a warlike deliverer instead of a civil ruler (ii. 16), and refers rather to enterprises of might and prowess than to the patient hearing of pleadings and the impartial administration of law.

The tales of daring and adventure which sprang out of the valiant deeds of tribal heroes lived long in the memories of later generations. But they were not passed on from age to age without some loss of their first freshness. They were insensibly modified as circumstances changed, and beliefs were gradually altered. The causes of these slow transformations can sometimes be traced in outline if not in detail. Their general tendency is to bring the primitive representations into harmony with later thought and feeling, to prune away local peculiarities, to soften down elements of antagonism to received ideas, and thus to diminish the differences between the actual reality and the subse-

* Further difficulties appear in its form (see below); the King is vaguely called "King of Mesopotamia," whereas the sovereigns beyond the Euphrates are described historically as Kings of Assyria or Babylon; and lastly, Othniel is not really a person, but a Kenizzite or Edomite clan, op. i. 13; see Kuenen, *Religion of Israel*, i. p. 176.

quent interpretations of it. Occasionally, indeed, some precious fact lies embedded in a name, a phrase, or a story which, whether true or not, serves at least as an index of belief when the tradition was recorded. Thus Jerubbaal-Gideon appears as the hero of Yahveh; but his name "Baal contends" (compare Israel, "El fights") implies that he or his family was by no means averse to the worship of the local Baal, or else that it was not thought improper to designate Yahveh by that title. Jephthah recognises that as Ammon possesses what his god Chemosh gives him to possess, so Israel will hold in like manner as much as his god Yahveh can conquer for him, xi. 23, 24; and thus a piece of valuable evidence of early popular thought concerning the relations of Yahveh to the gods of surrounding peoples, is accidentally preserved. Samson, again, whose strength lies in his hair, as the sun's might is symbolised by his streaming rays, has dropped his solar character to take his place as the consecrated Nazirite under vow of abstinence; while the historian of his feats finds it not incongruous with his religious notions to describe him in prophetic style as slaying thirty harmless Philistines "by the spirit of Yahveh," for no better purpose than to procure thirty suits of clothes for his wife's relations who had found out his riddle!

These modifications, however, were slowly wrought in the substance of the traditions long before they were collected together in consecutive form. In some cases, notably those of Deborah and Gideon, there is plain evidence that more than one version existed; and in the narratives which we possess attempts have been made to combine the different representations into a single whole. These in their turn were then arranged in some simple order, and by degrees a group was framed, in which the vicissitudes of the fortunes of the several tribes were exhibited. These constituted the material to which the later editor applied his religious system. Eras of prosperity were followed by defeat and oppression. They could have but one meaning. Prosperity brought temptation; temptation led to

unfaithfulness to Yahveh ; unfaithfulness to Yahveh was requited with calamity and suffering. But in time these agents of Yahveh's justice wrought their penal work, and he was ready to listen to the cry for help. Then came success, deliverance, and restored power ; in other words, repentance and amendment secured once more the favour of Yahveh. So the whole history was generalised under the ideas of sin and suffering, conversion and rescue. Generation after generation the rhythmic succession was renewed, from idolatry through chastisement to conversion, penitence, and peace. In two passages in particular is this primitive philosophy of history set forth, ii. 11 sqq. and x. 6—16. A few verses must be quoted to illustrate their tendency.

ii. 11. And the children of Israel did evil in the sight of Yahveh, and served the Baals. And they forsook Yahveh, god of their fathers, which brought them out of the land of Egypt, and followed other gods, of the gods of the people that were round about them, and bowed themselves unto them, and provoked Yahveh to anger. And they forsook Yahveh, and served the Baals and the Ashtoreths.* And Yahveh's anger was hot against Israel, and he delivered them into the hands of spoilers that spoiled them, and he sold them into the hands of their enemies round about, so that they could not any longer stand before their enemies. . . . Nevertheless Yahveh raised up judges which delivered them out of the hand of those that spoiled them. . . . And when the judge was dead, they used to corrupt themselves again more than their fathers, in following other gods to serve them and to bow down to them ; they ceased not from their own doings nor from their stubborn way.

x. 16. And the children of Israel did evil again in the sight of Yahveh, and served the Baals and the Ashtoreths, and the gods of Syria, and the gods of Zidon, and the gods of Moab, and the gods of the children of Ammon, and the gods of the Philistines, and forsook Yahveh, and served him not. And the anger of Yahveh was hot against Israel, and he sold them into the hands of the Philistines, and into the hands of the children of Ammon. . . . And the children of Israel cried unto Yahveh saying, " We have sinned against thee, both because we have forsaken our God, and also served the Baals." And Yahveh said unto the children of Israel, " Did not I deliver you from the Egyptians, and from the Amorites, from the children of Ammon, and from the Philistines ? The Zidonians also, and Amalek and Maon [probably an error for *Midian*] did oppress you, and ye cried unto me, and I delivered you out of their hand. Yet ye have forsaken me, and served other gods, wherefore I will deliver you no

* Probably an error for *Ashéras*, *Ashêra* being the female counterpart of the Baal.

more. Go and cry unto the gods which ye have chosen: let them deliver you in the time of your tribulation." And the children of Israel said unto Yahveh, "We have sinned; do thou unto us whatsoever seemeth good unto thee; deliver us only, we pray thee, this day." And they put away the strange gods from among them, and served Yahveh; and his soul was grieved for the misery of Israel.

This list of seven sets of false gods (x. 16) is in reality a retrospect from a much later time. Israel did not enter into relations with Syria and Phenicia till the reigns of David and Solomon, and these powers were far too remote to affect the desert warriors in their new settlements on the highlands of Canaan. Equally artificial is the arrangement of the seven oppressors who punished them; the Egyptian bondage being actually represented as the penalty for idolatry. This is an extreme instance of the determination with which the editor carries his principle through the incidents of the national history. No extant form of Israel's tradition ever exhibited the servitude under the Pharaohs in that light. Only Ezekiel accuses Israel of idolatry in Egypt, xx. 5—9, and declares that Yahveh would have destroyed them there but for his name's sake. This is indeed the later view of the prophetic schools. It followed inevitably from the prophetic method of accounting for suffering as the divine judgment upon sin: if the offence was unrecorded in history, all the more need for the interpreter, reading the moral in events, not to pass it by. The harmony of the passages just quoted with the Deuteronomic modes of thought, is apparent from a simple inspection of the parallels through which a common stock of phrases may be traced.* The seven forms of idolatry, and the seven

* Thus compare the following expressions:—ii. 11, "do evil in the sight of Yahveh," *Deut.* iv. 25, ix. 18, xvii. 2, xxxi. 29; ii. 12, 19, "go after other gods," *Deut.* vi. 14, viii. 19, xi. 28, &c.; ii. 12, "provoke Yahveh to anger," *Deut.* iv. 25, ix. 18, xxxi. 29; ii. 14, 20, "Yahveh's anger was hot," *Deut.* vii. 4, xi. 17, &c.; ii. 14, "enemies round about," *Deut.* xii. 10, xxv. 19; ii. 22, iii. 1, 4, "to prove Israel," *Deut.* viii. 2, 16. So in x. 6—16 observe the constant recurrence of Deuteronomic expressions such as "forsake Yahveh," "serve other gods." With these two passages, compare the religious retrospect of the Deuteronomic editor of Kings after the fall of the northern kingdom, 2 *Kings* xvii. sqq., where similar judgments are passed in similar language, plainly resulting from similar conceptions.

corresponding oppressions, have their counterpart in the seven mighty nations which Israel encounters on first entering the promised land (*Deut.* vii. 1); and the special type of sin which determines the national fate, is precisely that against which the Deuteronomic writers hurl the whole force of their passionate invectives and their legal commands. There is, it is true, no reference to one of the leading consequences of the Deuteronomic idea, viz., the centralisation of the cultus at the temple at Jerusalem. This could not enter into the view of the history before Solomon; and the Deuteronomic editors of *Kings* expressly exonerate the people for sacrificing at the local sanctuaries till Yahveh had chosen Zion to set his name there (1 *Kings* iii. 2, viii. 16 supplemented from the parallel passage 2 *Chron.* vi. 5, 6). It is, then, from their school that the final construction of the ancient history proceeds. The method by which the periodic successions of disaster and rest are blended with the episodes of victory into a definite chronological system is too complex to be here described. It need only be said that it affords additional evidence of the artificial character of the later treatment of the older traditions. Our inquiry must rather deal with the question whether this standard of judgment is correctly applied. Does the religion of Israel under the Judges deserve to be tested by the high conceptions of seventh century prophecy? The answer must depend on our view of the effects of the settlement on the invading tribes. How far can we trace the modifications produced on the religion of the immigrants from the desert by the first contact with the luxury and civilisation of Canaan?

II.

The traditions of the Conquest adopted and developed by the authors of the book of Joshua represented it as the triumphant action of the entire nation, marching in united hosts from city to city, and leaving behind them nothing but blazing homes and slaughtered people. Town after town, village after village, succumbed beneath their onset.

The confederations of the middle and north of the once populous and thriving land fell before the impact of the army of Yahveh. There was no virtue in the petty royalties which could avail to stay the conqueror's hand. He acted under a divine mandate which must be executed in its full severity, for Amorite wickedness had at last met its doom (comp. *Gen.* xv. 16). The war as waged by the troops of Israel was a war of extermination. The hapless Canaanites were laid under the ban. Victory after victory ended in that awful slaughter known as "devotion to Yahveh;" and there were left only blackened walls and smoking ruins to mark the sites of industrious communities, and the scenes of civil and domestic life. Into these homesteads the Israelites had only to enter and take possession. They reaped the advantage of the long labours of the people whom they had massacred, or at least dispossessed. They found houses (or their remains) which they had not builded, vineyards and olive gardens which they had not planted, wells which they had not digged, all ready to their hand. They settled down in the full enjoyment of Canaanite toil without the danger of Canaanite influence, for the simple reason that, according at least to the story, there was no one left to tempt or to seduce them. They planted their sanctuary in the centre of the land, whence each tribe marched forth to its allotted inheritance, and nothing interfered to prevent them from still keeping up that bond of connection which had united them round it in the wilderness. Thither they might repair at the appointed seasons of festival service, and the whole series of Mosaic institutions could be faithfully maintained. In full possession of the Law, with all its high demands for the pure worship of one Yahveh alone, they were undisturbed in the discharge of its injunctions; no Canaanite survived to invite them to his own cultus. The subsequent idolatries, therefore, which history recorded, of which every hill-top bore witness; could only appear as gross and wilful apostasies from the primitive truth and the obedience due to Yahveh. The Israelites fell simply because they did not choose to

stand upright. Tired of the God who was in their midst, they sought out of pure wilfulness to vary the monotony of their devotions by recourse to new gods of the nations who were round about them. The theocratic view of the conquest, and of Israel's condition in later times, excluded every other explanation but that of determined depravity, intentional insult and treason to their divine deliverer, guide, and king.

Closer investigation, however, reveals the unreal character of this representation.* The first chapter of Judges, together with other scattered hints of popular tradition and of later fact, enables us to correct the Book of Joshua. We know now that as with the tribes of Jute and Angle and Saxon who descended on our own shores, the attack was not made by an entire people, marching with undivided energy throughout the land. It was accomplished only by detachments. Judah and Simeon, accompanied probably by Levi, were the first to move from the Jordan valley; and Judah was aided in its endeavours to find itself a home in the South by the Kenite tribes, which had associated themselves with Israel in the desert, and now formed their settlements round Hebron. Subsequently, Ephraim took up its position in Middle Canaan on the heights about Bethel; and when the two leading tribes were thus planted, the lesser groups made their way into outlying districts, the weaker being pushed forwards into the more dangerous and exposed situations, while the stronger established themselves in secure positions. No cities fell as in the ancient story by the trumpet blast. The defence was stubborn; every inch of ground was hotly contested; and whole districts covered with independent towns remained in the possession of the Canaanites for generations, in the very midst of the most vigorous settlements of the new-comers. The conquest, therefore, was slow, partly owing to the nature of the land, which gave the older inhabitants such advantage. No impenetrable forests, no vast morasses of

* See Meyer, "Kritik der Berichte über die Eroberung Palestinas," in *Stade's Zeitschr. für A. Tliche Wissensch.*, 1881, p. 117.

marsh and fen, seemed to bar the way to fertile provinces like those which for so many years checked the onset of the first English clans ; though it would seem that Canaan was a country rich in woods, alike on the highlands and in the valleys, in which even in much later days new settlements might be made by hewing down the trees and clearing a habitable space (2 *Kings* vi. 1—7). But the walled cities on the rocky bluffs of the great mountain-mass long sheltered their occupants against the warriors of the desert who were unaccustomed to conduct a siege : and the fortresses of the lowland plains had only to open their gates and pour out their chariots to assert their immediate superiority, and drive the nomad invaders back to their fastnesses among the hills. The Canaanites, therefore, were not exterminated according to the theory of the theocratic narrators. Nor were they ejected, like the British by the advancing English, who forced them westward till there was no man left in city or hamlet that was not of Teutonic birth. They remained, partly in conflict, partly in alliance with the ruder tribes from the wilderness, who only by degrees gained the ascendancy. The patriarchal narratives reveal no sign (save in the remarkable case of Simeon and Levi and the clan of Hamor at Shechem, *Gen.* xxxiv.), of any serious antagonism or deadly struggle between Israel and the Canaanites. The conditions there depicted show no hostility ; they are rather those of friendly alliance ; and it seems possible that the settlement of the tribes may often have been effected by peaceable extension rather than by warlike inroad. Be this, however, as it may, the amalgamation of the two populations could not be accomplished at once. The unity of Israel was at first broken up by its dispersion over so large an area. To blend the new elements with it, to re-establish its national character, and evolve a new and higher unity, was the work of centuries. It could not be achieved until fresh forces, political and religious, were called into play. The Book of Judges contains the record of tentative efforts in this direction, especially under Jerubbaal-Gideon. But the time was not

ripe for them, and they failed. What, then, was the effect on the popular religion of the disintegration which inevitably followed the settlement?

III.

The change from the camp life of the wanderings at once brought the tribes under the influence of the Canaanites among whom they lived, and by whom they were even in some cases partially enslaved. The nation ceased to act together. Between South and North there were no common interests. The Canaanite confederation under Sisera in the North Jordan valley could do no harm to the clans around Hebron. The herdsmen on the pasture-lands in the East were beyond the reach of the Philistines. Ammon might range through the tracts claimed by Reuben and Gad, but what cared Dan or Asher on the sea-coast? Each had its own struggle for existence, and the result was inevitable. In many places the Canaanites were subdued. In others they gained distinctly the upper hand. In any case, they were not exterminated; they remained to teach the nomad shepherds the arts of agriculture, to prune the olive, and to train the vine. They gave them by degrees a share in manufactures and commerce, though their progress in craftsmanship must have been slow, for Solomon could not trust the work of native artists, but had to resort for aid in his great building enterprises to Phenicia. With the culture of the land came the elementary ideas of the rights and duties of ownership, and the bases of simple law. Old customs were modified, new arrangements were introduced, as families split off from the clans to which they belonged and spread through adjoining districts, making clearings in the forest, planting themselves in open villages, or forming small settlements with wall and gate where the members of a community dwelt together.

What, under such circumstances, was the fate of the religion of the desert? During the wanderings the tribes had possessed a common sanctuary in the simple Tent of Meeting instituted by Moses, where was enshrined the

sacred ark. The bond which united the tribes around it had been sufficiently firm to enable them to march together; and during the sojourn at Kadesh whence they doubtless spread through the neighbouring valleys in search of fit pasture-grounds, it formed the rallying-point for the administration of justice and the ordinances of the cultus. Without cultus, without sacrifice, without rites of some sort, religion could not then be conceived. It was inseparable from its primitive stage of development. Israel was in this respect no further advanced than its neighbours. From Assyria to Egypt this was the universal rule, and there could be no exception in Canaan. But it was impossible for the scattered tribes now to make their way to one sanctuary. For the ark, indeed, a permanent abode must be found; and the Tent of Meeting passes into the House of God (Beth-El), or the Temple of Yahveh at Shiloh. But it is clear that no single place could possibly satisfy the religious needs of the people. The simple festivals of the agricultural year, the association of sacrifice with the slaughter of animals for food, the necessities of consulting the will of Yahveh by resort to the oracle,—all these things required that altars and priests should not be too far from the homes of the people. The outlying settlers could not possibly leave their little farms, in the face perhaps of a hostile clan watching an opportunity for a border foray, to carry their offerings across the hills to Shiloh. And when the time of struggle with the Canaanites began to pass into that of friendly amalgamation, and the new population sought to replenish itself by intermarriage with the old, other tendencies sprang into existence from a different quarter, but with the same result. Either Yahvism must perish altogether, or fresh altars must be erected and new sanctuaries established. The worship of Yahveh must be carried on independently of the Ark and the Tent, the House, or the Temple, or it could not be carried on at all. The earliest legislation of the Pentateuch (*Ex.* xx. 24), as has been pointed out in a previous paper,* distinctly

* *Modern Review*, April, 1888, p. 262.

recognised this situation, and permitted the worshipper to make his offerings where he pleased. These altars, whether of earth or stone, naturally had a local or district character. They served the hamlet or the village, and those who belonged to the same family or clan paid their vows upon it in common. A wealthy householder like Micah of Ephraim (*Judges* xvii.) could set up his own Beth Elohîm or private chapel, if the expression may be allowed, and instal one of his own sons as priest; as if the country squire were himself to ordain offspring or kinsman to the living at his park gates. At such sanctuaries family rites were kept up, which served as a bond to assemble the scattered members of the clan together, as when David, purposing to absent himself from the royal banquet at the new moon feast, asks Jonathan to allege that the annual sacrifice of his family required his attendance at home (1 *Sam.* xx. 5, 6). And thus through the whole country rose altars at which domestic usage preserved with new modifications the ancestral religion.

But this was not the only change which the Mosaic Yahvism had to undergo. In the contact of Israel with Canaanite life it was impossible to ignore one of its most prominent features, viz., its religion. The Canaanite sanctuaries covered the land. Upon the heights, beside the wells, stood sacred trees and consecrated stones, for which a place was found in patriarchal traditions, so that they were adopted into Israel's faith. Many a local name compounded with Baal indicates the existence of special sanctuaries in his honour; and his symbols—tall, conical stones known as Hammanîm, supposed in some sort to represent the sun's rays, or irregular upright stone pillars called Massebhas—were scattered over the country. Beside them stood the wooden tree trunks with their branches lopped off, which were the recognised emblems of the female counterpart of the Baal, Ashêra, the genial and propitious; nay, with that curious confusion of mind which does not distinguish between the sign and the thing signified, they were often regarded as, in a sense, the goddess herself. The life

and warmth of these nature-powers had given rise to a cultus stained with licence and sensuality, but they had so much in common with one side at least of the creative character of Yahveh that it was quite possible for him to take his place in lower thought with one of the Baals, and pious worshippers of Yahveh seem to have employed the name as an equivalent designation. Sanctuaries to the sun-god himself bore the significant name Beth-Shemesh ("house of the sun" corresponding to Beth-El, "house of God"), and traces of the myths in which primitive peoples have delineated the annual growth and decline of the sun's power may be clearly found in the story of Samson (Shimshon, sun-man), so strangely transformed under later influences into a Nazirite, one of the austere products of the reaction of desert-Yahvism against the luxury of Canaan. In the same way the worship of Dagan (the Canaanite equivalent of the Assyrian Dagan), another god of fertility, may be traced in both the North and the South; while the same witness is found to the cultus of another Mesopotamian deity, Anath, the female side of the hidden heaven-god Anu. If the scanty records of Israel have preserved these names, we cannot doubt that many more have perished. The potent effect which the local religions exerted on a conquering race, may be seen in the case of the northern Hittites, who readily adopted as their own the Baals and Sutechs* of the cities which they occupied. And the significant traces of similar influence in Egypt, where Semitic words were employed to give a fashionable air to correspondence in the time of Rameses the Great, and names compounded with Baal began to creep in, supply similar evidence of the fascinations of the Canaanite cults.

The adoption of Canaanite religion, then, along with Canaanite soil, houses, and products, was to a large extent inevitable in the absence of any strict national organisation and any powerful uniting bond of Yahvism. In many ways it stood far nearer to the old usages of the people than the

* Hebrew *godek*, as in Melchisedek, &c.

loftier truths and the purer cultus which Moses had sought to introduce. Not all the tribes could possibly have embraced at once his higher thought, even after a generation of discipline. The tradition of the wanderings exhibits them again and again as intractable, idolatrous, perverse, ready to take up the first new rites which chance, alliance, conquest, put in their way. And though it might appear astonishing in those who had seen the waters of the Red Sea divide, and the sacred mountain all aflame with Yahveh's holy fire, the historic view of the situation finds such conduct more easily explicable, and less deeply lined with treasonable infidelity. Again and again has it happened that ruder races, in accepting the superior civilisation of the nations they have subdued, have accepted their religion, too. In France, in Spain, in Italy, the Teutonic invaders yielded to Christianity; churches, priesthoods, dioceses, all remained unchanged. Not so complete, indeed, was the acceptance of Canaanite religion by Israel. It had no system, it had only a local character. But it was everywhere diffused, and at each turn the settlers were confronted by it. No doubt the resultant tendency to religious syncretism was a danger to Israel's development. It involved a contest which lasted for centuries. But that development would have been impossible had Israel never quitted the nomadic stage. The desert tribes, such as the Amalekites and Midianites, remained only plundering bands, incapable of further political, social, or religious advance. Even the Edomites, shut up in their mountain fastnesses, though they attained a certain national unity (indicated by the existence of a monarchy in their midst), lacked the larger outlook necessary to give birth to a great religion. Only in some central land supplying it with points of contact with many other races, and so by the clash and struggle of ideas working out the profound conception now planted in its midst, could Israel fulfil its high task. But for the Baals that surrounded him, the Deuteronomist would never have proclaimed, "Yahveh our God, Yahveh is *one*."

IV.

Was, then, Yahvism altogether to fade away under the new Canaanite influences? Were the teachings of the desert to count for nothing? By no means. The Mosaic religion might suffer when it fell into the hands of men less lofty than its founder. It might be assimilated in outward form to the rites and usages of lower deities. Domestic piety might show itself by the dedication of a costly image, as in the case of the Ephraimite Micah. The victor Jerubbaal-Gideon might perpetuate the remembrance of his triumph by setting up a gilded idol for his paternal clan. Harvest and vintage might bring to Yahveh the joyous carousals elsewhere celebrated in the name of the Baal. But there were other tendencies at work as well. The people might be scattered, but they could not forget that they had once been united. The memory of suffering and escape could not be effaced. Deep in the heart of its best representatives lay the thought of the great event which was always afterwards regarded as the real birth-hour of the nation, the deliverance from their Egyptian slavery. This had been the work of Yahveh, and the idea of his might was inextricably intertwined with the attainment of their freedom. "I am Yahveh thy God from the land of Egypt," ran the formula of later prophecy; and the attempt to vindicate for Yahveh a Canaanite or a Phenician origin cuts off at the very roots a tradition which yet lived and grew for centuries with a continually deepening power. Yahveh, then, was the liberator: and when oppression was grievous, it was in the name of Yahveh that the cry for resistance rang forth.

This is plainly the animating power of the rising under Deborah and Barak. The story is told in two forms—a primary poetical version in chap. v., and a secondary prose narrative in chap. iv. The superiority of the first-named as an historical representation cannot be doubted, in spite of

its frequent obscurities. Its lyric-epic style, its peculiarities of speech, its vividness of description, its intense national feeling, all mark it as of great antiquity; and as it preserves various details now lost in the prose tradition, it may be unhesitatingly regarded as the older. The oppressor is Sisera, who in reality is more than the general of Jabin of Hazor*; he is himself a king, his mother a queen, with princesses for her attendants (v. 29, 30), and he stands at the head of a league of kings (v. 19). Under their severities the intercourse of the people languished; the highways kept holiday; only a few of the bolder spirits ventured by unfrequented paths across the hills (v. 6). The weapons of attack and defeat have been seized by the conqueror, or hidden by the vanquished (v. 8). But help is at hand. A woman, fired with martial ardour at the sight of the sufferings of her countrymen, rouses the tribes in the name of Yahveh, God of Israel. It is Deborah; the leader who stands by her side is Barak. The poem appears to connect them both with Issachar (v. 15), though the prose story assigns Deborah to Ephraim and Barak to Naphtali. The tribes of North and Middle Canaan, on whom the tyranny pressed most grievously, rally near the plain of Jezreel, the once vigorous Ephraim with its southern offshoot Benjamin, Machir one of the clans of the brother-tribe Manasseh, Zebulun, Issachar, and Naphtali. The stress of the battle fell on Zebulun and Naphtali (v. 18), who alone are mentioned in the prose story. But they did not fight alone. The very stars in their courses aided them. A storm came up from the south, the torrent Kishon rose swiftly over its banks, swept away the chariots of the Canaanite kings, and as the horses struggled with the flood, turned their onset into defeat and flight. It was as though Yahveh had himself arrived from his sacred mountain in the wilderness to deliver his people. The victory called forth an outburst of

* According to *Josh.* xi. 1—11, Jabin of Hazor with his allies had been utterly crushed by Joshua, Hazor burned, and its inhabitants massacred.

impassioned faith which gathered form as it recounted the incidents of the fight.

Hear, O kings ! give ear, O princes !
I, to Yahveh will I sing, I will praise Yahveh, Israel's God !
Yahveh, when thou camest forth from Seir,
Marchedst from Edom's fields,
The earth quaked, yea the heavens dropped,
Yea the clouds dropped water.
The mountains ran down before Yahveh,
This Sinai before Yahveh, Israel's God.

Israel, then, is still one, though some of the tribes but dimly recognised the bond of national duty. Reuben lingered among his sheepfolds and beside his streams. Dan clung to the safety of his boats. Asher would not move from his quiet havens on the coast ; Judah scarcely belongs to the true Israel at all. Yet Israel is really one ; the ideas of nationality and religion did not part company when the tribes effected their different settlements ; they found a new power of union in the possession of the land. As their grasp of it became firmer, and their feeling of occupancy more secure, the sense of unity began to return on this new basis. This had a twofold tendency. In the first place, Yahveh was one, the Baals were many, and no rising of the tribes is ever concerted under their protection. Yahveh as a single personality could be more easily conceived as the guide of his people's destinies. So it is his name that figures in the war-cry, "For Yahveh and for Gideon." In the direst distress he is himself called on to defend his country. It is significant of the growing ascendancy of Yahvism that when it emerges from the obscurity of the age of the Judges, Eli, the priest of the central sanctuary at Shiloh, is the chief authority ; and, with his sanction, the sacred ark, the symbol of Yahveh's actual presence, is taken into the field against the Philistines. The close connection of Yahveh with the liberties of Israel cannot be more clearly proved.

Through this Book of Judges it is plain that the religion of Yahveh is but one side of the national existence. In spite of its local limitations, in spite of its idolatry, in

spite of its crude morality, it is the expression of Israel's vital energy, the emblem, nay in part the very cause of all its higher aspirations. And as such it can never fail to interest those to whom freedom is dear as the necessary condition of the noblest life, and who see in the struggle for freedom one of the greatest forces of moral education. But the religion of Yahveh was not occupied with this alone. Side by side with the traditions of the deliverance from Egypt stand those which connect the name of Moses with the beginnings of sacred law. In the simple communities of the desert, the highest authority of religion had also been entrusted with the supreme decisions of justice. Out of these decisions, founded no doubt on ancient custom and the long traditions of usage, grew a body of teaching or *Torah* (law), handed down from generation to generation among the guardians of the sanctuary. To them were brought all doubtful cases which the elders of the clan or the tribe were unable to settle; and thus the sanction of Yahveh was gained for their awards. The transition from nomadic to agricultural life must have vastly widened the range of questions thus submitted to the priests for settlement. The first transfers of property took place by right of conquest: but when these were effected a new set of relations was established, out of which must have grown other possibilities of dispute. Doubtless much of the old law remained. The claims for personal injury, the rights of the family, the laws of marriage and adultery, of property in cattle, and many others, passed on unchanged, and served as the social framework for Canaan just as much as for the desert. These depended upon principles of immemorial antiquity; they were doubtless venerable in the days of Moses himself, and were only regulated by him and his successors beneath the name of Yahveh. But there were others plainly arising out of the new settlement, affecting the house and the field, the standing corn, the stack, the dedication of the firstfruits of the land,—these must have grown partly out of the prescriptions of the country, partly out of appeals to the possessors of the *Torah*, whose pre-

sence at the local sanctuaries kept before the people the constant idea that Yahveh was a God of justice and order. "The righteous acts of Yahveh" should be the theme of common talk by the well-side, said the poet who sang of Sisera's overthrow, and that which was applied in great national crises to popular deliverances was taught by the priests of many a country high-place in reference to the details of domestic and tribal life.

In this way the religion of Yahveh was quietly prepared for loftier endeavours. The time of the Judges was a time of transition. It was exposed to the sudden infusion of many new influences, to the decline and decay of some of the old. Like all such periods, it is full of contradictions. Conflicting impulses struggle within it for mastery. It is not wholly clear whether the lower or the higher will at length win the day. Its crimes outrage our ideas of propriety and civilisation. We are horrified to find them in a book of religion. Under no circumstances would the assassin Ehud, the murderess Jael, be pleasant figures for contemplation; least of all when the one is raised up by Yahveh for his bloodthirsty deed, and on the other is invoked Yahveh's special blessing for her successful blow. Its tragical blunders, Jephthah sacrificing his daughter, Samson throwing away the secret of his strength, may hardly seem to do more than point the stale moral of sad mishaps and wasted opportunities. But beneath all this runs a deeper thread of social and religious evolution. Through the passions thus nakedly revealed, the primitive elements of human nature thus laid bare, great ideas are slowly making their way, great hopes are gathering strength. The period of the Judges gives birth at its close to two new forces. The monarchy is instituted, and the first prophetic guilds are formed. And so out of disorder and confusion on the soil of Yahveh, issue the thoughts and the powers which are ultimately to be shaped into the eternal conception of the "Kingdom of God."

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

THE TALMUD AND THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I.—GENERAL COMPARISON OF FORM AND SPIRIT.

IN the *Modern Review* for January, 1882, my friend the Rev. Philip H. Wicksteed called attention to a controversy about the Talmud in which I had been engaged, and thereupon the Editor did me the honour of requesting me "to contribute some of the fruits of my Talmudic studies" to his Review. To this flattering request I was anxious to accede, both from my own desire to do what I could to further the objects of the *Modern Review*, and on account of the intrinsic interest of the subject.

It is not without hesitation, however, that I approach my task, for I cannot really claim to be a Talmudist; and I must begin by a word of explanation, to show why, in spite of this disavowal, I feel justified in writing on the subject, and in hoping to escape the charge of either underestimating the task, or overestimating my own qualifications for it. I take this course all the more readily, inasmuch as the remarks I have to make will not only serve as a personal explanation but will lead up naturally enough to our subject itself.

A Christian by birth and education, I learned as good as nothing about the Talmud when a student, and it was only at a more advanced period of my life that the book itself came into my hands, nor did I even then enjoy any oral instruction in its lore. On hearing this avowal, any Rabbi would shrug his shoulders and declare with emphasis, "Then you know nothing about it now!" Up to a certain point I readily concede as much. A Jewish boy who had had a few years' instruction in the Mishna and Talmud

could no doubt put me to shame, and I question whether I could pass at all a creditable examination. If any champion of the Talmud, glancing at this essay, and thinking that I say too much ill and too little good of it, should consider it worth while to take up the cudgels, he may begin with a *habemus reum confitentem*.

Yet more. Even if I have many years of work before me I shall never, under any circumstances, become a genuine Talmudist. To do so involves not only years of study in the Talmud, but—if not exactly Jewish birth—yet the breathing from childhood of a Talmudic atmosphere, in the strictest Jewish surroundings, with the feelings of a Jew, the thoughts of a Jew. For the Talmud is a world so entirely foreign to our own that a child of the nineteenth century can hardly by any possibility transplant himself into it, and must even do himself violence to sojourn in it for a time.

And yet this book is indispensable to me for my special study. If the neglect of Talmudic lore is highly prejudicial to the study even of the New Testament, no one who is called on to investigate the life of ancient Israel can possibly escape the necessity of consulting it. For our knowledge of the pre-exilian Israel the Talmud may yield comparatively little fruit, though even here it must not be despised; but the post-exilian Judaism is simply unintelligible without it. Mishna and Tosephta must be diligently studied—and they will constantly lead us to the Talmuds.

Fortunately there are some very valuable helps for those who are not Talmudists. Many Jewish scholars, and many Christian scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, together with some few of the nineteenth, have cited and explained passages from the Talmud in treating of special subjects. Some of the treatises have been separately translated. There are no less than three such versions of the first treatise of the Babylonian Talmud, by Pinner, Chiarini, and Schwab respectively. F. C. Ewald translated *Aboda Ezara* from the same Talmud, Samwater translated *Baba mesia* and Rabbinowicz some of the other

treatises, with many abbreviations and omissions; while Moïse Schwab has already completed his French translation of sundry treatises of the Jerusalem Talmud. But in spite of all this the difficulties are still sufficiently great. Even with one or two translations at hand, it often requires no small effort to understand the text; for the style is such that, even when we know the meaning of all the words, we may still be at a loss to conceive how the translators could possibly find in them the sense which they have got out of them. In fact the meaning often appears to be extracted by guess work, and we cannot help asking whether the appearances do not sometimes at least indicate the reality. And besides, it is extremely difficult in any case to keep the thread of a Talmudic argument. But, with all these aids, any one who knows how to go about his work can, after all, manage to control the citations of the Jewish scholars, and even to read—or rather to decipher—continuous passages long enough to enable him to form an opinion of the whole; and this is what I have done.

But, it may be asked, is this fair? Can a few dozen consecutive folios be taken as an adequate specimen of so vast a whole? Suppose a man had read none of the New Testament except the Revelation of John, would not his idea of the whole be very one-sided? Granted. But, in the case of the Talmud we run no such danger. There is no lack of accounts of this work, and some of them are from the pens of its passionate admirers, but none of them mention any difference of spirit or character between one treatise and another. Any one who has read a few dozen pages of the Talmud can at any rate form as good an idea of the nature of the work as could be gathered of the Synoptic Gospels from a few chapters of Matthew, or of the Epistles in the New Testament from a few sections of the Romans.

And now, I have given a faithful account of the extent of my knowledge of the Talmud, the main characteristics of which I am about to describe, while comparing them with

those of the New Testament. It is for my readers to decide how much weight to allow my opinion.

Let me begin by trying to give those who are altogether unacquainted with the Talmud some conception of what it is.

There are two Talmuds. The Babylonian, which is held in highest honour by the Jews, is contained in 2,947 folio pages; but this includes the commentaries, the oldest of which are always printed and generally read with the text. The Jerusalem Talmud, without commentaries, reaches about a quarter the bulk of the Babylonian.

The foundation of both these Talmuds is the Mishna, a book of law in six divisions and sixty-seven treatises, each of which is in its turn divided into verses or mishnas. This Mishna contains a part of the Jewish law; but it does not deal with every subject nor exhaust the treatment of all that it handles. And indeed there is another collection of laws which to a great extent runs parallel with the Mishna and in a hundred points supplements, confirms or sometimes contradicts it. This is the Tosephta, in fifty-two treatises. Besides this there are other special books of law and numerous regulations scattered here and there which are called *boraitas*, to say nothing of the "apocryphal" mishnas. These regulations outside the Mishna are constantly cited and discussed in the Talmuds, but the Mishna alone (reduced to writing about 200 A.D.) has enjoyed the distinction of being accepted as the official law-book.

Now the Talmuds (or, as they are often called, the Gemaras) are discussions of the Mishna. Neither of them deals with the whole book. On some of the treatises we have two Gemaras, on others but one, and on some none at all. It is needless to go into details on this point.

Let us see what the contents of these books are like.

The Mishna is a collection of law-books, and consequently it contains precepts as to what the believing Jew must do and leave undone if he would be faithful to his duty, or as the expression goes "escape from the hands of

his duty." Of the sixty-seven treatises one only is occupied to some extent with what we should call moral precepts. It is the *Pirkê Abôth*, or "Sayings of the Fathers," and has often been separately edited, commented on and translated.* The other treatises are occupied almost exclusively with regulations as to outward religious duties, such as prayers, observance of feasts and of the Sabbath, temple service, holiness and so forth, together with what might be called criminal and civil law, in which special prominence is given to all that relates to marriage;—betrothal, marriage contract, divorce, levirate marriage, &c. In connection with all these questions of law moral ideas are of course constantly touched upon, and sometimes the line between what may and what may not be done is drawn with great precision, but almost always from a judicial point of view. It is only exceptionally that we find, amidst these legal definitions (the technical term for which is *halacha*), short stories intended to exemplify legal decisions, and moral reflections such as that the great day of Atonement brings no atonement where there is no repentance, or "this is indeed allowed, but the Scribes do not approve it."

The subjects are not systematically handled in the Mishna. Sometimes the succession is regular enough, but then all at once the thread is dropped. Very often the redactor allows himself to run off on a word he has happened to use. If he mentions a number, for instance, he will perhaps take occasion to string together all kinds of regulations in which that number is concerned; or if he is speaking of the difference between two kinds of offerings he may perhaps follow up the suggestion by dwelling on the differences between all kinds of other things, and sometimes he never gets back to his original subject at all.

There is not a trace of any methodical treatment, but everything seems to come up hap-hazard. Nor do we ever find introductions in which the law terms that are used in any treatise are explained; so that some passages are

* In England most recently, as far as I am aware, by Dr. C. Taylor, *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*. 1877.

altogether unintelligible unless we have previous information as to the terminology. The Mishna is intended for those whose lives are filled by the subjects with which it deals, and who have no need of instruction in its technical language—in a word it is intended for Scribes.

It follows from the nature of the case that the Mishna contains a great deal of casuistry; for every code must set forth the cases in which it prescribes what men are to do and leave undone, but whereas any practical legislation contents itself with putting the cases that often occur, or at any rate easily might occur, and confines itself to condemning such actions as are to some extent injurious to the state or the community for whom it is supposed to be in force, the Mishna goes much further. In respect to many subjects it puts not only all actual but all conceivable cases. It deals with the law of God, and therefore forbids not only what is hurtful to a state or a community but all that it conceives to be at variance with God's will. And this being so, even what seems a mere trifle, inasmuch as it can hardly be noticed in any case, injures no one, and is done unintentionally, nevertheless comes under consideration and is thought worthy to be the subject of a discussion and of a judicial decision.

It is almost incredible into what minutiae the teachers of the Mishna descend. To give an example: The treatise on the Sabbath begins thus: "The prohibition to take anything out of or into the house on the Sabbath is twofold for him who is within, and twofold for him who is without, and each one of these cases has two sub-cases." The words so rendered, be it understood, have been thrown into a generally comprehensible form. What really stands in the text is simply "Sabbath-outgoings two, giving four, for the in; and two, giving four, for the out." Then the Mishna goes on "How so? If the poor man is outside and the householder inside, and the poor man stretches his hand inside and puts anything (apparently meaning a cake of bread or anything of that kind) into the householder's hand or takes anything out of it,

then the poor man is guilty but not the householder. If the householder puts his hand outside and takes anything out of the hand of the poor man or puts anything into it and draws it back, then the householder is guilty and the poor man not. If the poor man reaches his hand in and the householder takes anything out or puts anything into it and (the poor man) draws it (his hand) out again, then they are neither of them guilty. If the householder reaches his hand out and the poor man takes anything out of it or puts anything into it and (the householder) draws it (his hand) back again, then neither of them is guilty."

Generally, as in this case, the decisions of the Scribes are simply given; but not unfrequently the several opinions of illustrious rabbis or the points on which the schools of Shammai and Hillel differed are specified, and in these cases the final decision of the majority is often added. Sometimes the grounds on which these opinions rested are given, but generally not.

The two Talmuds or Gemaras are collections of discussions on these Mishnas. Let us picture to ourselves a meeting of Rabbis, steeped in the knowledge of Scripture, Mishna and religious usage. The president or teacher reads out the first mishna of a chapter and asks a question on it: for instance, "on what does this *halacha* rest?" One of the audience names a text; a second says "or it might rest on . . .," and mentions another. A third says "It does not rest on a text of Scripture, but on a decision of the Scribes." A fourth cries "On this subject Rabbi Meir said . . .;" a fifth "Rabbi Akiba taught . . ." Here is matter enough for debate, under the president's guidance. Did R. Meir and R. Akiba in using different words really differ? And if so wherein? How does the *halacha* accord with the saying of each respectively? Hardly a dozen words have been exchanged on this point when another begins "The case of this commandment resembles . . .," and he turns to a quite different commandment. "No," replies his neighbour,

"this is a totally different case." Here another disciple falls in with the words "On this subject R. Juda taught . . ." "Listen," cries the president. "It once happened that R. Jose . . .," and hardly has he told the circumstance when one of his hearers asks "How could the Rabbi do that, when it conflicts with . . . ?" Then the president exclaims again "But what does the *halacha* rest upon?" And so we return to the original subject as suddenly as we had left it. But it frequently happens that we do not come back to it at all, but wander off perhaps from the Sabbath to thank-offerings, thence to marriage and who knows what! When no one has anything more to say, then the same piling up of notes, queries, remarks and so forth begins on the next mishna. Now imagine some one jotting down all these loose remarks, without any connection or transition, without even beginning a new line with a new subject, and all in a style so full of abbreviations that no one could possibly understand it unless he had himself been a hearer, or at least were so completely abreast of the matters in dispute as to be able to divine by a single word what it was all about—the style that is to say sometimes adopted amongst themselves by a group of specialists in the same subject,—imagine mishna following upon mishna in this style, sometimes dealt with concisely and without wandering from the subject, and sometimes with diffusive variety, page after page, covering every manner of subject; imagine all this continuing from chapter to chapter, from treatise to treatise, in wearying succession of disconnected notes stretching on over thousands of pages—and you have the Talmud!

This description is anything but attractive and may seem like a caricature, and yet no one who is acquainted with the Talmud can say that it is not true; and for the benefit of those who are not acquainted with it I may cite the words of its renowned panegyrist Emmanuel Deutsch,* who declares that the Talmud resembles a legal code much

* *Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1867. *Literary Remains*, pp. 1, sqq.

"as a primeval forest resembles a Dutch garden," and proceeds: *

Nothing indeed can equal the state of utter amazement into which the modern investigator finds himself plunged at the first sight of these luxuriant Talmudical wildernesses. Schooled in the harmonising, methodising systems of the West—systems that condense, and arrange, and classify, and give everything its fitting place and its fitting position in that place—we feel almost stupefied here. The language, the style, the method, the very sequence of things (a sequence that often appears as logical as our dreams), the amazingly varied nature of these things—everything seems tangled, confused, chaotic.

So much for the first impression! But do things improve afterwards? Deutsch goes on to say that it is some time before the student learns to distinguish two mighty currents which spring respectively from the analysing intellect and from the imagination, the *halacha* and the *haggada*. The distinction is doubtless just and was made at an early period by the Jews themselves. The *halacha*, i.e. *that which is current*, signifies a legal decision, and accordingly those portions of the Talmud which discuss regulations of the law are called halachic, whereas the *haggada* (i.e. *communication*) includes speculations, stories, allegories and exhortations. But although the contents of the Talmud may certainly be arranged under these two rubrics, this does not help us to bring order into the chaos. "The utter amazement" into which the modern investigator falls at first must of course disappear before the force of habit, and if he has read the Talmud for years, especially if he began as a child, he may perhaps come at last to regard this style of composition as quite natural. But it remains a chaos all the same, and to live in it is not without its prejudicial effect on the formation of the intellect and the character. For the value we set on order and method in the works we read is not the result of caprice or indolence, but is the demand of sound thought and an earnest desire to learn the truth.

Not only a Christian to whom the world of the Talmud

* *Literary Remains*, p. 16.

is strange, but even a Jew if he takes up his task seriously, must find the Talmud very difficult reading. In fact both form and contents are such that its only value is for purposes of study. In order to make this still more clear, let me give a specimen.

The opening of the treatise on the Passover runs as follows: *

"The evening before the 14th (of Nisan) a man makes thorough search by the light of a lamp for leavened bread. All the places into which leavened bread is not (usually) taken need not be thoroughly searched. And why did they say: Two rows in a store-room?—a place into which leavened bread is brought. The followers of Shammai said: Two rows all along the store-room. Those of Hillel: Three outmost rows, which are the uppermost."

This is something in the style of a telegram; but with a little ingenuity one may see that it is a question of searching a store-room with barrels piled up in it. The ancients had laid down directions as to how far this search must be carried. Here the rabbis found difficulties enough and to spare! The Jerusalem Talmud on this mishna, after discoursing upon all manner of things and discussing, at last, the cases in which one must search for leavened bread under a bed, proceeds as follows *àpropos* of these "two rows" in "a store-room."

"A store-room of wine must be searched, but not a store-room of oil. What difference is there between wine and oil? Wine has no measure; oil has. A loft, whether for wine or oil, need not be searched. What is a store-room? In the case of bread, it is anything that opens into a court. There is a store-room that resembles a loft, and a loft that resembles a store-room. A store-room in which one is ashamed to eat is a loft, and a loft in which one is not ashamed to eat is a store-room. There is a court that resembles an 'entrance,' and there is an entrance that resembles a court. A court into which many people come is the same as an

* The passages between () I have added for the sake of clearness.

entrance. An entrance into which but few people come is the same as a court. And suppose some one ventures to say : Perhaps the ox-drivers have brought leavened bread into it? No, but ox-drivers do not take leavened bread there, but all kinds of dainties, for they examine whether the wine is good. He who goes to sea thirty days before (the 14th Nisan) need not search (for leavened bread), but if it is less than thirty he must. This holds if he intends to come back, but if he does not intend to come back (in time) then he must search. So he must if he is doubtful. But if it is certain (that he will not return before 14th Nisan) then even from the beginning of the New Year. R. Aba says : Even if he intends to return he must search. Perhaps he will change his plans and not return. Every one may be trusted in removing leavened bread. Even women and slaves. R. Jeremia, following R. Zeira, said : These are not like them, even women. Women themselves may be trusted, because they are lazy and search just as it happens. (Of course this is nonsense. The meaning evidently is : women are not to be trusted because they are lazy.) Samaritans are to be trusted for removing leavened bread if they prepare the unleavened cakes at the same time as the Jews, but otherwise not. R. Jose said : In the case of houses they may, but in the case of courts they lie under suspicion, for they teach (after the letter of the Scripture) : it may not be found *in your houses*, instead of *in your courts*. R. Simeon ben Gamaliel taught : All the commands which the Samaritans observe, they observe far more scrupulously than the Israelites. R. Simeon said : That holds good of the former time when they lived in their villages, but now that they have no law, nor remnants of a law, they are subject to suspicion and deal lightly in the matter. Men must ask about the regulations of the Passover at the Passover, about those of Pentecost at Pentecost, about those of Tabernacles at Tabernacles. In the synagogue one must ask about them thirty days before. R. Simeon ben Gamaliel said : Two Sabbaths before.

R. . . .” and so forth. And all this *à propos* of the store-room. Some lines further down we come to the “two rows,” and are told the varying opinions held by the rabbis about them, and what search must be made if the barrels are piled up in pyramidal form, and so on.

Perhaps my readers will agree with me that a man with healthy tastes will find it a severe task to read such a passage as this, and the piece I have translated only takes up twenty-eight lines of a quarto page.

As a subject of study it is not without interest. Observe the remarks on the Samaritans, for instance, and what is said of women. Here, as in many other passages, misprints that destroy the sense have crept in. In the passage I have translated some obscurities remain; for instance the point of the remark that the ox-drivers examine whether the wine is good. Or is the meaning that the dainties referred to serve this purpose? And again what is the meaning of the contrast between the time when the Samaritans still lived in their villages and now that they have no law?

Such questions as these meet us on every page. In reading the very first page of the Babylonian Talmud we come upon some words, a few lines down, as to which the earliest commentators disputed whether they meant the rising or the setting of the sun. And these very words are the hinge on which an argument turns. For archæologists the Talmud may be a rich mine enough—but what can it be to a religious community?

Have I dwelt too long on the form of the Talmud, on its bulk, its style, and its want of order? I think not; for all this is of more than incidental importance, both in itself and as illustrating the difference between Talmud and New Testament. Let me explain why.

By the side of the heavy tomes of the Talmud, the New Testament cuts but a sorry figure! The twenty-seven writings and fly-leaves of which it is composed make up a little volume of a few hundred small pages that can be read through in a few hours. As a book of study it is hard

enough, and every genuine student must have been annoyed by the lofty assumptions of a certain class of men, who pronounce on the great historical problems it presents, just as if reading and re-reading the New Testament itself gave a man a title to be heard on the origin and earliest history of Christianity. And, even apart from historical questions, the contents of the New Testament are as various as they are full of difficulties. The first three Gospels and the Acts mingle history and miracle with exhortations and consolation, the fourth Gospel and the Johannine Epistles give us mystic speculations, the Pauline Epistles abound in profound and intricate argumentation, the Revelation is a fervid appeal to the imagination. What a variety in this one little book!

But the whole is capable of survey. Any one who has been brought up under religious influences, or has been led by inclination or curiosity to devote any attention to the New Testament, soon learns to find his way in it, to pick out what serves his need, and to abide by that. The child turns to the narratives, the man finds matter enough for dogmatic or ethical reflection, and there are aphorisms to make the simple wise. One may be a busy householder and yet draw strength from the New Testament; the student whose special researches have no direct connection with religion or the labourer who bears the heat of the day under the open sky or toils from morning to night in his workshop, can alike draw food for the soul from it, find in it stimulus to thought, comfort in trouble, and incentives to the higher life, that may save him from being swallowed up by his work and made its slave.

Now this the Talmud cannot do. He who wishes to enjoy it must live for it. It is not translated, and it hardly can be. Or rather, a translation is just as impossible as the original for the world at large to read. If you doubt it, you have only to try the experiment by undertaking to read one of the treatises that have been translated. You are hardly likely to finish it, even if you use a version like those of Moïse Schwab or F. C. Ewald, in which a single line is expanded into three, or even more, by

interpolated explanations, intended to make it at least approximately intelligible.

And accordingly the knowledge of the Talmud, even among the Jews, is extremely limited. Women do not attain to it,—an assertion which the few exceptional cases of which the Jewish world can boast do not practically invalidate. Simple folk cannot even master the principles on which it is read. Men with exacting social duties to perform forget all they may have learnt of the Talmud as children. There may be those who by virtue of a strong constitution and indefatigable industry, are able to combine bread-winning and Talmudic studies, but they are few. Whilst those who live for science or art, or who take a place in the industrial world that demands some breadth of view and scope of project cannot so much as think of plunging into the Talmud. For those only can enjoy the study who have lived in it from childhood, and have never ceased to devote themselves as far as possible to it. They must obey the ancient precept: “At five years old to the Scriptures, at ten years old to the Mishna, at thirteen membership, at fifteen the Talmud.” Then must those folios of the Babylonian Talmud be worked through patiently, with a festal gathering to celebrate the conclusion. Then back again to the beginning! Then, when the study is complete, every opportunity must be taken of discussing the subject matter, till it is known by heart.

And after all this toil the student does not really understand the Talmud at last! Jews who know what scholarship means themselves complain of the way in which the Talmud is usually read. Remember that no critical edition has as yet appeared, or in other words that the text, as actually read, teems with mistakes; remember that as yet no good grammar and no complete dictionary of the Talmud exist, so that Jewish scholars are at a loss as to the meaning of a great number of passages. The slovenly way in which even renowned Jewish doctors cite the Talmud, and the frequent blunders in the existing translations, show plainly how common it is to read these folios droning on

through text and comment, content with half understanding them.

A man who can accomplish so much as this, and is therefore reputed to know the Talmud, is a hero in Israel. In conversation with a Rabbi I once happened to mention a well-known Jewish scholar by his title of "Professor." "Professor indeed!" was the reply, "yes and Doctor too for that matter! But what of that? I tell you he is a Polish Jew!" What he meant was this: To take a degree at a University, to be known as a scholar, is nothing. But to have read the Talmud from childhood, to have grown up in it, is a guarantee of knowledge that must be accepted as final and conclusive. Those who possess this knowledge, with nothing else, look down upon the ignorant ones, who, as Hillel said, cannot be devout—the *ammê ha'äres*.

Amongst Christians too we are familiar with men of this stamp. They are the theologasters of humble life, the caricatures of theological scholarship. They know the New Testament by heart, and half the Old Testament to boot. They fling text upon text at your head in season and out of season. Paul and Isaiah, Genesis and Revelation in a breath! To argue with them is impossible, for they know everything, and understand well nigh nothing. To true scholarship they are almost impervious. That such men are to be found amongst Christians, as well as amongst Jews and Moslems, and wherever "sacred books" are held in honour, is enough to prove that this morbid form of intellectual activity cannot fairly be imputed to the influence of any one religious system, but has its origin in some general trait of humanity. But nevertheless it is more stimulated and less restrained in one religion than in another. The Jews themselves see clearly enough that a Talmudist who is without scholarly training must fall into this error. Loud complaints are at the present moment caused in Germany by the flood of Polish rabbis, who know the Talmud, and nothing but the Talmud, and consequently bring neither honour nor blessing to the communities. The

organs of the more or less liberal Jews are vehement in their warnings against this onesidedness, and insist upon the cultivation of other studies as well as that of the Talmud. But in so doing they are demanding what the majority even of rabbis must find it impossible to give. What, then, can we expect from those whom no ecclesiastical office puts into a position to live for study? Fransoz, Sacher Masoch, and others, show what a strange appearance genuine Talmud-Jews now make. In our modern society they are rare and out of place.

If a rigidly Talmudic Jew were to read these words—which he never will, for he reads nothing but the Talmud—he would turn the reproach into a crown. “Yes,” he would say, “it is true enough. In the world of the *gojim* we are, indeed, out of place. The Israelite who feels at home in it is no true brother. We live not for the world. We have nought to do with the wisdom of the heathen. In spite of the reproach and persecution, in spite of the pain and loss which our separation costs us, we live for our religion alone. Everything for God, for Israel, and for the Law!”

In a certain sense we must allow the force of this answer. In itself it is no disgrace not to be at home in the world. Let not the worldling, who knows not so much as what an earnest life means, look down upon the poor, narrow, Talmud-Jew! Who shall say whether the latter is not better in the eyes of God than the former, with all his wealth and culture and enlightenment and knowledge? And must not the Christian, who feels the truth of that saying once laid by the fourth Evangelist upon the lips of Jesus, “My kingdom is not of this world,” sympathise with those who for religion’s sake are estranged from the world? We should be no followers of a crucified master if we had no heart for all this. That the Jews refuse to be seduced by what they regard as heathenish and godless is noble. There is something grand, moreover, in this exaltation of the intellect. A poor and in other respects, ignorant Jew, who is familiar with the

Scripture and the Talmud, is more than the wealthiest, most learned, most respected of men—were he the High Priest himself! They who speak thus and act up to their professions, deserve our respect—perhaps our admiration—but, if they are mistaken, our pity likewise.

Our pity if they are mistaken! Self-denial and devotion are manifestations of a spiritual power above all price, but this only makes us lament it the more when they are wasted. Let us beware of the scepticism that pays no regard to the truth or falsehood of a man's conviction, so long as he is truly convinced. There is such a thing as objective truth, however imperfectly we may grasp it, and it makes all the difference whether we or others are moving towards it or away from it. God Himself, who requires His children to devote themselves without reserve to Him, is not more exacting than many an idol. And if any man gives up his soul to an idol, believing in all sincerity that he is serving God, we may admire his devotion, we may stand abashed at the thought that we ourselves display no such strength of spirit in the service of what we hold to be best, but none the less do we perceive that the man is wandering from the truth, and will perish unless he be converted—for his soul will grow poor and sickly, and his higher life will languish.

The Talmud, then, is open to the heavy charge of demanding the surrender of the whole man, and giving him stones instead of bread at last.

Let me substantiate this.

In the first place the Talmud often holds its readers to most uninteresting questions. "This is relative," it will be said, "for what inspires one man with the warmest interest leaves another unaffected, and *vice versa*, and yet both may be sound in heart and head." No doubt this is true within certain limits and it may therefore be better to express my meaning thus: The Talmud is, for the most part, busied with matters that can yield no nourishment whatever to the spiritual life, and can therefore bring no message to a sound head and a warm heart. It is full of casuistry, to

begin with, and casuistry is in its very nature barren. It is impossible accurately to define a command or a prohibition. If any one doubts it let him try. Take, for example, the idea of *writing*. Writing is forbidden on the Sabbath; and since even the smallest unintentional trespass renders a man guilty, the scribes felt it necessary to determine what movements of the hand, resulting in the formation of a letter, not only with pen and ink on paper, but with one of the fingers in sand, chalk, or liquids, should be held punishable. This is one of the thousands of subjects worked out in the Talmud. Can its discussion enrich any creature's soul?

But even this question may have a practical interest. It concerns actions which may make a man better or worse, in his own eyes and in those of his fellow-believers. Even this element of interest, however, is wanting in many questions elaborately discussed in the Talmud. They refer to the service of the Temple, which has been suspended for more than eighteen hundred years, and to the restoration of which, though the Jews pray for it every day, no one seriously looks forward; or they refer to a code of justice of which but few articles are in force. The Talmud discusses with equal care the extreme limits of time within which the evening and morning prayer may be said, or the kind of spit on which the passover lamb must be roasted, and the offences which are to be punished by stoning and burning, or the way in which the sentences are to be carried out. All this has its interest for the archæologist. But what spiritual nourishment does it give? By devoting himself exclusively to such questions, and, still worse, by reading nothing but folio after folio of such discussions, a man becomes a stranger to the world he lives in. He is not in the first instance rejected by the world, but on the other hand he himself ceases to take any interest in what is going on there; for his head is crammed with thousands of things which are out of all relation with reality, and the human head and heart are not infinitely elastic.

Moreover this kind of reading ultimately undermines the

powers of thought. The Jews often mention it amongst the recommendations of the Talmud that it sharpens the intellect of its readers so marvellously. It is no small thing to retain all these delicate distinctions in the mind, and to follow all these involved trains of argument. This is true, but the intellectual effort is not a healthy one. For the usual questions that are dealt with, and to the solution of which so much acuteness is devoted, are: Upon what text does this legal precept rest? How are we to harmonise these sayings of two renowned scribes? Why does this rabbi teach this? Now, in many cases the legal precept in question rests upon no text at all; the rabbinical dicta to be harmonised are in diametrical contradiction with each other, and no one knows why rabbi this or that taught the special thing in point. But the doctors will hardly confess as much! In particular it is held certain *a priori* that every *halacha*, even if not directly borrowed from a text of Scripture, may, at any rate, be implicitly derived from one in accordance with the recognised and legitimate canons of interpretation. What this results in a Christian theologian may easily understand, for he too knows something of harmonising, and of the dismal art of finding *loci probantes* for every dogma.

The Talmud takes its readers incredible lengths in the art of proving palpable impossibilities; and in this direction, as the Jews themselves admit, it sharpens the intellect marvellously. Some time ago I received a letter from an Israelite who, though he had had a Talmudic education, had dropped the study of the Talmud on the ground that it was incompatible with the study of science. Called to teach in this latter department, he had had amongst his pupils certain Jewish boys who were learning the Talmud; but experience constantly impressed on his mind afresh the incompatibility of the two studies. He had also noticed that there was no better school for advocates than the Talmud. He wrote all this in praise of the Talmud, but in our ears it sounds like censure. What we call special pleading in the bad sense, the defence of anything and everything that is

associated with one side of a question, is from a moral point of view highly injurious and the peculiar argumentative power it requires is far from being sound or healthy. Those who abide long in such a school must end by utterly losing their grip of truth. The man who habitually satisfies himself with proofs that are only proofs in semblance comes at last really to regard them as valid, and finally thinks less of what is true than of what he can prove.

The impression we constantly receive from the argumentation of the rabbis is that they are in point of fact not much or not at all concerned in really finding out the will of God. They remind us of Bacon's words: "Some in their discourse desire rather commendation of wit, in being able to hold all arguments, than of judgment, in discerning what is true; as if it were a praise to know what might be said, and not what should be thought." We often come upon the formula at the close of a demonstration: "Or if you choose I will maintain," which introduces a new argument. Now, if what followed were simply another proof of the same position it might be well enough. But we often find that the alternative argument is intended to prove the precise opposite. Thus in *Bera-chôth 4 b*, a point at issue between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua concerning the order in which the prescribed evening prayers are to be said is under discussion, and the question is raised: How did this difference of opinion arise? The answer is: If you like, I will prove that it rose from a difference of opinion, or if you prefer it I will prove that it sprang out of a text. Hereupon the two opinions and the two textual interpretations are given. Such arguments are nothing but intellectual tournaments. Where the formula "if you like, I will maintain," is in vogue we have lost the earnest spirit that asks: What is the truth?

That these halachic discussions fail to provide any wholesome spiritual food is admitted by all cultivated Jews; and this explains the powerful movement within Judaism itself which would break in great measure with the Talmud.

And even among the champions of the Talmud there are many who go with us so far. But then they turn to the haggadic element, and pronounce it to be the fruit of a true spiritual life, and fitted to nourish all that is good and fair in its readers. The *haggada* is glorified in choicest phrase and specimens of the eastern poetry to be found in the Talmud are collected in numerous works under the poetical designation of "palm-leaves" or "pearls." The Jewish panegyrists of the Talmud delight in referring to J. G. von Herder, that "most eminent judge of the 'Poetry of Peoples,'" and to the lofty terms in which he extolled the specimens of Talmudic poetry he had seen.*

It is an unpleasant and a thankless task to say to any set of enthusiasts: "The object of your praise is not so beautiful and good as you think it." But with respect to the panegyrists of the *haggada* this is no such brutal procedure after all; for we must remember that the *haggada* is, even by them, more praised than read. And again, before examining its character, we must remind ourselves that we are not at present discussing Judaism or Jewish literature as a whole, but simply the Talmud, in which the *haggada* holds but a subordinate place.

The actual proportion of the haggadic to the halachic element of the Talmud cannot be defined, for it is impossible to draw a sharp line between them. For instance, it often happens that a halachic discussion is interrupted by an account of the way in which this or that rabbi decided a difficult question on some special occasion. The very first mishna contains an example. In ascertaining the extreme limit within which evening prayers must be said, reference is made to Rabbi Gamaliel, who once allowed his sons, on their coming home late at night from a feast without having said their prayers, to make good the omission as long as the day had not broken. Such stories derive their interest exclusively from that of the *halacha* to which they are attached.

One may read folio after folio of the Talmud without

* Deutsch.

coming upon a single haggadic passage of any extent ; and though, on the other hand, we sometimes find whole pages full of *haggada*, yet the proper purpose of the Talmudic literature remains halachic. This fact is curiously illustrated by E. Deutsch,* when he says : " We had long pondered over the best way of illustrating to our readers the extraordinary manner in which the ' Haggada,' that second current of the Talmud, of which we spoke in the introduction, suddenly interrupts the course of the ' Halacha,'—when we bethought ourselves of the device of an old master. It was a hot eastern afternoon, and while he was expounding some intricate subtlety of the law, his hearers quietly fell away in drowsy slumbers. All of a sudden he burst out : ' There was once a woman in Egypt who brought forth at one birth six hundred thousand men.' And our readers may fancy how his audience started up at this remarkable tale of the prolific Egyptian woman. Her name, the master calmly proceeded, was Jochebed, and she was the mother of Moses, who was worth as much as all those six hundred thousand armed men together who went up from Egypt. The Professor then, after a short legendary digression, proceeded with his legal intricacies, and his hearers slept no more that afternoon." The Talmud might well cry, after this utterance of its fervent eulogist : " Preserve me from my friends ! " We drop asleep, we are startled from our slumbers by an unutterably silly remark, we hear an explanation, to which we may say with a smile, " Not so bad ! Though this be madness, yet there is method in it," and so are so allured to our casuistry again.

The haggadic passages " are constantly needed " to keep the current of the thoughts of an Eastern mind in motion ; " they are the playthings of the grown-up children of the Orient."† And accordingly the genuine Talmudist treats them with small respect. To be halachic is work for a man, while *haggada* is good for women and, when united with Scripture, is valuable food for children. The mass of

* Deutsch.

† Ibid.

Jews, who are unable to follow halachic reasonings, have always loved the *haggada*, but the books in which it is most abundantly found are the *Midrashim*, amongst which the *Rabbôth* take the foremost place. The Talmud has comparatively little of it. The only haggadic treatise of the Mishna, *Pirkê Abôth*, is not commented on in either Talmud. The influence of the Talmud is that of the *halacha*, but little tempered by the *haggada*.

But for all that *haggada* is there! It has been separately printed too; and it contributes a share, though but a small one, to the rabbinical anthologies which are so frequently issued in honour of Judaism. Is this *haggada*, then, so very beautiful, witty, profound, exalting, poetical, and moral? Whoever is inclined to think so had better study it, as best he may, in translations. A. Wünsche has already translated a great part of the *Rabbôth* in his *Bibliotheca Rabbinica*. The translation may leave something to be desired, but it is, at any rate, enough to give its readers an idea of the general character of the Jewish *haggada*. The Jewish papers vie one with another in their praises of the translator for the good work he has done in bringing the beautiful *haggada* within the reach of every one. Good luck to his readers, then!

There really are beautiful passages in the *haggada*—happily conceived fables, touching stories, pointed and pungent sayings, and earnest exhortations—but they have to be fished up out of a sea of nonsense. “They have dived into an ocean and brought up a potsherd,” says the Talmud (according to Emanuel Deutsch) of those who fish up some deformity out of a mass of fair things, and then judge the whole by this specimen. Truly no just or generous man would do the like. But what are we to say to the diver who fishes up one or two pearls with incredible labour, and then declares or implies that the sea is paved with them?

Is this parallel unfair? I think not. Even the witty or touching passages which the Talmud contains are generally spoiled by the subsequent treatment they have to submit to.

I do not know the "brief legendary digression" in which the teacher indulged after rousing his hearers by telling them of the woman with her six hundred thousand children, for though acquainted with the story, I have not been able to find the passage in which it occurs; but we may learn from the very first page of the Babylonian Talmud the character which these legendary digressions usually bear.

Apropos of the mishna concerning the hour up to which it is not too late to say evening prayers, we have all manner of involved arguments about the various regulations laid down in the matter by renowned teachers. We are deep in the question how Rabbi Eliezer distinguished the three portions into which he divided the night, and how God announces each of these night watches by a mighty lion's roar, whereat He cries woe upon his children, for whose sins He has laid waste the temple and sent Israel into exile, when we are surprised by a digression. The point to which it is attached is God's complaint against his children, and we read: Rabbi Jose said:—Once as I was travelling, I went into one of the ruins of Jerusalem to pray. Then Elijah of blessed memory came there. He waited for me at the door till I had finished my prayer. Then he said to me: Hail, my teacher! (Rabbi). I answered: Hail, my master and lord! He said: Why have you come into these ruins? I answered: To pray. *He*: You might have prayed in the way. *I*: I was afraid of being disturbed by the passers-by. *He*: You might have made your prayer short. Then I learned three things from him, viz., that one should not go into a ruin, that one may pray in the road, and that one should then make one's prayers short. He said to me: My son! what noise did you hear in these ruins? I answered: A voice of heaven (*bath kôl*), which made a sound like a dove, and said: Woe to the sons! for because of their sins have I laid waste my house, burned my temple, and exiled them amongst the peoples. He said: By your life, and by that of your head, it does not say that now only, but it says it three times every day. And more than that, whenever the Israelites enter their synagogues or teaching-

halls, and say, 'Praised be His great Name!' the Holy One, in whom be faith! shakes His head and says: 'Happy is the King whom men thus praise in his house! But what is left to the father who has sent his children into exile? And alas for the children who are banished from their father's table!'"

This story cannot, perhaps, be considered very profound, but it is something of a refreshment in between the halachic discussions, and there is real feeling in it. Why must we be instantly treated to a genuine bit of rabbinical commentary on the legend? "Our scribes teach," continues the Talmud, "that there are three reasons why we must not enter a ruin: to avoid suspicion (of having an appointment there with a woman), for fear of the ruin falling, and for fear of evil spirits. Why for fear of suspicion? Is not the chance of its falling reason enough? There is the case of a recent one (*i.e.*, if the ruin is recent, there is no danger of its falling in further). But is not the fear of evil spirits enough? But in case of two? (*i.e.*, when two men are together they need not be afraid of them). Well, in the case of two, does not the suspicion also vanish? Yes, but if they are two bad men? (there may still be suspicion). Why for fear of its falling? Are not the two other reasons of suspicion and evil spirits enough? There is the case of two good men (to whom these other reasons would not apply). Why because of evil spirits? Are not the fear of a fall and the suspicion enough? In the case of a recent ruin and two good men (they are not). But when two men are together they need not fear the spirits either. Yes! in the places where the spirits dwell they must fear them even so. If it please you I will maintain that a man need not fear in a recent ruin, in the open field, for there would not be a woman there. But 'because of the evil spirits' still holds."

We may find amusement, of a kind, in these justifications of terror, but arguments of this nature give the soul no nourishment, and this is an excellent specimen of the style of argument indulged in by the scribes when they give us

haggadas. The subject-matter is refined upon and discussed just as it is in case of *halachas*.

The Talmud returns, after this digression about ruins, to the subject from which it has strayed, viz., the division of the night watches. Are there three or four of them? The question is argued out from various texts. Amongst them is the 147th verse of Psalm cxix. : "I prevented the dawn," upon which the question rises, whether "the dawn of day" is meant (as the A. V. takes it), or the twilight of evening. This gives occasion to discuss the manner in which the poet (supposed, of course, to be David) spent the night. If (as certain rabbis knew by tradition (!) to be the fact) he never slept later than till midnight, the question was how he distinguished midnight. It appears that Moses could not distinguish it, for he said (Ex. xi. 4) that Yahveh would go out of Egypt *about* midnight. But this is a word of God's. Then did not He know? Yes! God had doubtless said *at* midnight, but Moses changed it into *about*. A certain rabbi was able to tell, on the authority of his teacher, how David determined midnight. Above his head hung a harp, and exactly at midnight the north wind blew upon it, and David waked at the sound. At once he rose, and proceeded to study in the Law. At dawn of day the scribes came to him for instruction, and so forth. Presently we find Achitophel and Joab there too, and at last we come back to the question whether Moses could not also tell when it was midnight.

Now whether we call this *halacha* or *haggada* is of no great consequence; but in neither case can heart or head derive much wholesome sustenance from it, and this is the almost universal character of the *haggada*.

A very large place is occupied in it by interpretation of the Scripture, for the *haggadist*, as much as the *halachist*, starts with the assumption that everything he says must be proved from Scripture. Everything is in the Bible. Not long ago I saw an account in one of the papers of a strict Moslem who was seen gazing earnestly at the shells from the artillery of the English ironclads. Some one asked

him, mockingly, whether *that* was in the Koran. He answered very seriously, "Everything is there, if one can but find it." This is exactly in the spirit of the Talmudic haggadists. Everything is in the Scripture, and *they* do understand the art of getting everything out of it. This art is laid down in no less than thirty-two rules. Philo's allegorical interpretations are nothing to the refinements of the haggadists. Every peculiar grammatical form, every more or less superfluous word, every letter that occupies an unusual position enables them to perform exegetical marvels! They turn words round, cut them into pieces, calculate the numerical value of the letters of a word and then substitute another word numerically equivalent to it. Contradictory texts are invaluable to them, for any supposition that can bring them into any kind of approach to agreement is justified, and we may think how many stories are thus produced!

Now if this fantastic method led to anything we might put up with it, though even then a healthy brain would protest against its unreality. But neither the subjects of discussion nor the way in which they are discussed, are often such as can interest a son of the nineteenth century. What does it avail us to fill in by such methods the history of the biblical characters, or to examine all the speculations in glorification of the Law, or on the names of God, or the nature of the Angels, or heaven or hell, or the fate of Israel and the heathens? Nor can even the Israelite feed his soul to much advantage on calculations of the degree of his superiority to the heathen!

The best known (and unquestionably the best) portion of the Talmudic *haggada* is Pirkê Abôth, which is, on account of its excellence, inserted in the Jewish prayer-books, and used formerly to be read every week in some districts in the synagogues. But any one who reads this collection for edification will probably be much disappointed.

Most assuredly it contains precious sayings of Antigonus, of Socho, Hillel, and others; but by their side are many

others of but little merit, expressions in fact of very commonplace morality, together with whole passages from which we, in our times, can get simply nothing. The fifth chapter is entirely devoted to speculations about certain numbers *ten*, *seven*, and *four*. The world was made by *ten* commands (in Gen. i. the expression, "God said," occurs ten times). Might it not have been made by one? Yes, but it was made in ten so as to justify the infliction of a severer punishment on the godless, who corrupt a world made with ten commands, and the giving of a higher reward to the righteous, who keep such a world in order. There were ten generations from Adam to Noah, to prove the patience of God. Then we go on to the ten generations between Noah's and Abraham's, Abraham's ten temptations, the ten miracles wrought on behalf of the Israelites in Egypt, the ten wrought at the Red Sea, the ten plagues of Egypt, &c., &c. All this is admirable subject-matter for fantastical disputations by which no single creature can be made either better or wiser!

Such are the haggadic oases in the halachic desert of the Talmud.

To avoid misunderstanding let me repeat once more that I judge neither Judaism nor its great heroes. There have been men of very noble character amongst its haggadists and halachists. The fact that the congregations made most use of the *Pirkê Abôth*, which is certainly the most ethical treatise of the Talmud, bears witness to their desire for spiritual food, for spiritual consolation, and for help in the performance of their moral duties. But the Talmud offers all this in small measure, and mingled with a mass of absolutely indigestible matter. It spoils those who live in it, and cannot fail to have a bad influence on the community that honours the Talmudists as its great ones and acts according to their words.

In speaking of the Talmud and the New Testament I have deliberately taken as the fair term of comparison

with the former, not the Gospel of Jesus,—in which all that we think truest and most precious in the New Testament is concentrated,—but the New Testament itself just as it stands. For Talmud and New Testament are both of them collections of writings which may be considered sequels to the Old Testament. The Talmud rests on it as on the word of God from which it ultimately derives its authority; and for the first Christian communities likewise it was the only Holy Scripture; to which the New Testament was but gradually added. The stream of Israel's religious life, of which the Old Testament bears witness, parts after the time of Jesus into two branches, one of which is represented by the Talmud and the other by the New Testament.

What a contrast! Since my readers know the New Testament, and for the most part doubtless love it, I may be brief. To recognise its beauty it is by no means necessary that we should agree with everything we find in it, that we should stand by every word of it, or even that we should take delight in every book of it. Even here there is chaff as well as wheat. Many a good Christian must find that he cannot read the Revelation of John with any pleasure; but its glowing pictures—with which only a few brief eschatological passages in other parts of the New Testament stand in line—occupy but a small part of the whole, and how many pithy sayings and vivid images do we not find even here! Paul's dogmatic argumentations are not only too difficult for most readers to follow, but are often impossible for them to accept. We of the nineteenth century do not argue so. But every man who is living in earnest comes again and again upon his own thoughts and experiences as he reads the words of Paul. May be he is perpetually losing the thread, but the fine observation, the concentrated exhortations, the expression of sound life, and the manifestation of deep feeling that he meets everywhere rouse, impress, carry him away, and reveal to him a man striving with all his power to unite the new and glorious life that he has found in

his Christ to his former religious convictions, and wrestling with language to put into words all that he feels. Many a profound thinker has devoted years to the investigation of Paul's teaching, and has not grudged the pains but has found himself the richer for having placed himself so long amidst the thoughts of the Apostle of the Gentiles. Our Gospels and the Book of Acts are full of stories—not always beautiful ones—of miracles. But for centuries many of these stories have supplied painters and poets almost without number with subjects for their pictures, their songs, and their narratives. Where shall we go to find a parallel in poetical conception and profundity of significance to the second chapter of Luke? Legend may have woven her web about the scenes of the suffering and death of Jesus, but has she not for the most part woven it in beauty? And with all this and so much more the New Testament gives us the parables and aphorisms of Jesus, which make a unique whole in which men and women, old and young, learned and unlearned find never-failing supplies for heart and head, and the more they learn to live in them, that is to say the more truly religious they grow, the more they find in them.

Is it impossible, then, to follow any perverse religious tendency if we have studied the New Testament? Certainly not! What book, what man, what church, what created thing can secure any such result? Fanatics have fed themselves on the Revelation and calculated when the millennium will begin. Dogmatists have constructed systems out of the letters of Paul and others, and have pronounced judgment upon all who would not accept them. The Christian church has had her school-men as well as her casuists. But if the representatives of such morbid tendencies have sought to justify themselves by texts from the New Testament, the same book provides the antidote in rich abundance. In every age, even in the midst of the most rigid dogmatism and the most fearful manifestations of fanatical and material religion, there have been many who, armed with texts from these Scriptures, have pressed for soberness of judgment, for childlike devoutness, for integrity of life, for love towards

God and man, as the one thing needful. And these were they who had best comprehended the spirit of the whole and taken it most to heart.

The spirit of the whole ! The leading principle that animates the whole, coming forth here and there unclouded, and though elsewhere mingled with baser elements, and thereby obscured, yet never wholly wanting ! To know what this spirit is, and to compare it with the spirit of the Talmud, to catch the essential nature of the religions which respectively brought forth the New Testament and the Talmud, and were in their turn acted upon by them—this would be to reach the heart of the great question on which we are now engaged.

H. OORT.

Leiden.

ERNEST RENAN'S RECOLLECTIONS.*

"REASON is an interior and permanent revelation, the light enlightening every man who cometh into this world. Reason has guided toward God all the sages of antiquity. Of their salvation we need not doubt." Such were the words uttered toward the end of the fifteenth century by Abelard of Brittany, the interpreter of St. Anselm, the pupil and rival of William de Champeaux. Abelard, reared amidst the subtleties of the Scholastic Theology, fled from Provincial persecutions to the peaceful courts of the Sorbonne, then the asylum of the spirit of independence, destined to become the Sinai of European Theology. There welcomed with enthusiasm, he became the unconscious precursor of the great spiritual conflict of this age—the conflict wherein M. Renan now takes so distinguished a part; the conflict between unreasoning faith, and reverent reason, between absolutism and liberty, between Ecclesiasticism and Humanity. Again anathematised and forced to fly, Abelard founded, on the banks of the river Ardusson, the holy Retreat of the Paraclete. There with the mysticism of Plato, the grace of Cicero, the poetic audacity of Lucretius, the varied learning of Origen, he imparted to a smaller circle the accumulated treasures of his wisdom and experience. He taught that "men can be saved by Natural Religion," that "the heart is the test of goodness."

Again anathematised, abandoned, and proscribed, he

* *Souvenirs d'Enfance et de Jeunesse. Par ERNEST RENAN. Paris: Levy. 1883.*

Recollections of my Youth. By ERNEST RENAN. Translated from the Original French by C. B. Pitman, and Revised by Madame Renan. London: Chapman and Hall. 1883.

died a prisoner in a monastery. His cause survived ; it inspired Arnaud de Brescia, that mediæval martyr of Philosophy. In presence of the Cultured Rationalism of Thought, the Church began to quail. Then arose the Dominicans trained in the philosophies of Greece, Rome, and Arabia. They popularised to men of intelligence the accumulated stores of their learning ; whilst the Franciscans, the knights errant of poverty, legend, and nature, covered Europe with their strange Christian Democracy. And so the conflict went on till, in the sixteenth century, Luther and Ignatius Loyola divided Europe. Again the defenders of Ecclesiastical Christianity became its oppressors. Then, in the age of Louis Quatorze, the holy priest Olier, quietly eschewing all the ambitious designs, self-seeking, crooked ways of the Jesuits, gathered together friends and disciples desirous of nothing but union with God, for themselves and for all whom they could influence. Thus arose the great spiritual reform of the clergy, and the illustrious Séminaire de St. Sulpice at Paris and Issy, whence, during 200 years, have issued nearly all the men who have done honour to the Roman Catholic Church of France, and to the unassuming virtues and unaffected gentleness of their Sulpician " teachers,"—we must not say " Masters," for Sulpician humility rejects the word and the mode represented by the word.

Amidst many testimonies of love and esteem, none is more honourable to them than that offered by M. Renan in this interesting autobiography of his youth. Born in the year 1821, at Tréguier, in the Breton Province which had already produced Pelagius, Abelard, Descartes, La Mennais ; his early years were passed with a beloved mother amidst the not ungracious credulities of a believing people ruled by priests, kind, consistent, paternal, and profoundly ignorant of all the movements of modern thought. The boy studied at the Ecclesiastical College of his native town, and having, in 1836, won all the prizes of his class, was selected as worthy of admission into the " Petit Séminaire St. Nicolas du Chardonnet," at Paris, then presided over by Dupanloup,

afterwards Bishop of Orleans. Thus at the age of fifteen and a half commenced his life in Paris.

I was spending the holidays with a friend in a village near Tréguier, and in the afternoon of the 4th of September I was sent for in haste. I remember my returning home as well as if it was only yesterday. We had a league to travel through the country. The evening angelus, echoing from steeple to steeple, awoke with its soft cadence a sensation of gentle melancholy, the image of the life which I was about to abandon for ever. The next day I started for Paris ; upon the 7th I beheld sights which were as novel for me as if I had been suddenly landed in France from Tahiti or Timbuctoo.

That early life in Brittany, alternating between his mother's simple home and the college under the good Breton priests, has printed on his character an indelible impression and an abiding love. His mother taught him to love ; the priests taught him to be good. To them the death of Louis XVI. was the end of the world, Rollin's history was the end of knowledge.

My teachers rendered me so unfit for any secular work, that I was of necessity embarked upon a spiritual career. The intellectual life was the only one noble in my eyes ; mercenary cares seemed to me servile and unworthy. . . . I no longer believe Christianity to be the supernatural summary of all that men can know ; but I still believe that life is the most frivolous of things, unless it is regarded as one great and constant duty. Oh ! my beloved old teachers, now nearly all with the departed, whose image often rises before me in my dreams, not as a reproach, but as a grateful memory, I have not been so unfaithful to you as you believe ! Yes, I have said that your history was very limited, that your criticism had no existence, and that your natural philosophy fell far short of that which leads us to accept as a fundamental dogma :—there is no special supernatural ;—but in the main I am still your disciple. Life is only of value by devotion to what is true and good. Your conception of what is good was too narrow, your view of truth too material, still you were upon the whole in the right.

But two streams mingled, even in believing Brittany.

His mother, frank, cheerful and kind, was rather partial to the Revolution than the reverse. She would listen to the patriotic songs, and sing them. And in the "Chant du Départ" her voice was broken with emotion when she got to the words "De nos yeux maternels ne craignez point de larmes." She remembered the enthusiasm and wild delight which alternated with fear amidst scenes of philanthropy and of terror. Her pride in the Revolution has infused a few rays of light and warmth into the placid conservatism of her son. Thus it is refreshing to hear him say, "Among those whom I have to thank for being more a son of the Revolution than of the Crusaders, was a singular character who was long a puzzle to us." This was an elderly man who, in threadbare cloak, used to be seen going to buy a pennyworth of milk, which the girl who sold it poured into the tin he brought with him. He was poor, though not in actual want. He seldom spoke intimately to any one, but he had a very gentle look about the eyes, and those who happened to be brought in contact with him, spoke with enthusiasm of his affectionate good sense. He had passed through many vicissitudes; had at one time imparted his ideas to others, and spoken of his "system;" but finding himself ridiculed, he retired into a gentle silence. His face, tender, serious, but not melancholy, was "the very image of Spinoza, the holy man of Amsterdam." He was a model of charity and kindness, but reserved in his allusions to the past. He never went to Mass. The clergy were very unfavourable to him, and spoke of him with repugnance, though they never could lay hold on anything which could enable them to anathematise him from the pulpit. "It was only when my ideas upon philosophy were well consolidated, that I came to understand that I had been fortunate enough during my youth to contemplate a truly wise man." God in his eyes was the order of Nature, from which all things proceed. He loved humanity, as representing reason, and he hated superstition as the negation of reason. "Although he had not the poetic afflatus which the nineteenth century has given to these great truths, he

had very high and far-reaching views, and was quite in the right. So far from failing to appreciate the greatness of God, he looked with contempt upon those who believed that they could move Him. Lost in profound tranquillity and unaffected humility, he saw that human error was more to be pitied than hated. It was evident that he despised his age. The revival of superstition, which, he thought, had been buried by Voltaire and Rousseau, seemed to him a sign of utter imbecility in the rising generation." One morning he was found dead in his humble room; he was interred at night; the clergy purchased the whole of his little library at a nominal price, and destroyed it. His trunk was opened by the Commissary of Police; in one corner was found, carefully wrapped up, some faded flowers tied up with a tricoloured ribbon, and a small card on which was written "Bouquet which I wore at the Festival of the Supreme Being, 20 Prairial, year II. of the Republic." The touching memorial of a dead hope.

Other incidents during Renan's boyish days at the Breton College left their mark upon his mind and heart; and the record of this part of his life contains some romantic and characteristic pages.

Those Breton priests and people, for whom he retains so strong an affection, sometimes remind the present writer of the priests of Ushaw College, chiefly gathered out of Lancashire families, and the English Roman Catholics of those better days ere nature had yielded to direction, diplomacy, and ambition. The same perfect innocence, the same gentle bearing, the same integrity and simplicity of life, the same unhesitating belief, the same utter rejection of the critical faculty. In goodness and piety they resembled one another, and the truth about them is gladly uttered, though controversy may turn it roughly against the utterer. But the resemblance is not entire; amongst the old English Roman Catholics the leading characteristic was obligation; duty binding them to creed, sacrament and piety. Among the Celtic races in Brittany and elsewhere, the love of the ideal assumes the form of religion.

The sense of the supernatural causes a sentiment of life stronger than the obligations of duty. Hence the legends, miracles, and marvels which, with an effectual though half belief, permeate a Celtic race. Thus St. Renan, or Ronan, who lived in Cornwall, near the little town which bears his name, who gave his name to the well of St. Ronan in Wales, and his marvels to the peasantry of Brittany, was more a spirit of the earth than a saint, and in his power over the elements was like Ariel. These innumerable saints had chapels, often small solitary buildings, standing amidst the desolate moors or barren rocks. The wind whistling amid the heather, and the stunted vegetation, thrilled the village boy with terror, and he would take to his heels, thinking that the spirits of the past were pursuing him. At other times he would look through the half-ruined door of the chapel at the stained-glass, and the painted wooden images over the altar, plunged in endless reveries. "It was amid associations like these that I passed my childhood, and it gave a bent to my character, which has never been removed. The Cathedral, a masterpiece of airy lightness, a hopeless effort to realise in granite an impossible ideal, first of all warped my judgment. The long hours which I spent there, are responsible for my utter lack of practical knowledge." When absent, "I longed to be back in the sombre old place, over-shadowed by its Cathedral, but a living protest against all that is mean and commonplace. I felt myself again at ease, when I got back to the lofty steeple, the pointed nave, the cloisters, with their fifteen-century tombs, there in the company of the dead, by the side of the cavaliers and proud dames, sleeping peacefully with their hound at their feet, and a massive stone torch in their grasp."

During the month of Mary (May) there was one long round of processions; the different parishes, preceded by their crucifixes, met in the roads. The crucifixes were pressed one against the other in token of friendship. The people assembled in the church, and on the stroke of the midnight the local saint, represented by his image,

stretched out his arms to bless the kneeling congregation. "But if among them all there was one doubting soul who raised his eyes to see if the miracle really did take place, the Saint, taking just offence at such a suspicion, did not move, and through the misconduct of this incredulous person no benediction was given."

The clergy, though good, and meaning to be honest, contrived to steer a middle course between not doing anything to weaken these ideas and not compromising themselves. "Their every word was my law, and I had so much respect for them that I never thought to doubt anything they told me until I was sixteen years of age, when I came to Paris." Gradually he discovered how much of error is at the root of the most touching and heretofore sacred illusions; yet the memory of human virtue and simple-hearted piety ever remained to surround with a halo of beauty a past at once sacred and sad. After Orpheus, when he had lost his ideal, was torn to pieces by the Thracian women, his lyre still repeated Eurydice's name. "It took me six years of meditation and hard study to discover that my teachers were not infallible. What caused me more grief than anything else when I entered upon this new path was the thought of distressing my revered Masters; but I am absolutely certain that I was right, and that the sorrow which they felt was the consequence of their narrow views as to the nature of the universe."

Great was the change to the young ecclesiastic when moved from Brittany to Paris. The Séminaire St. Nicholas du Chardonnet, situated by the side of the church of that name, between the Rue St. Victor and the Rue de Pontoise, had since the Revolution been the Petit Séminaire for the Diocese of Paris. M. de Quélen, the Archbishop, was the type of an ecclesiastic under the old *régime*. Gracefully educated, with a perfect bearing, polished manners, and an almost feminine beauty, he discerned in M. Dupanloup a man after his own heart, one who as Superior would by his worldly and well-bred piety attract the sons of the gentry, interest them with his brilliant but shallow rhetoric,

whilst conquering their affections by the noble generousities of his heart. The whispered secret of his birth had advanced rather than retarded his prospects, by introducing him among the aristocratic families of the Faubourg St. Germain, amongst whom he was welcomed as a man of birth and of breeding. Protestants err, when they imagine that the sacred dignity of the priesthood renders all ecclesiastics welcome in aristocratic houses. Save in exceptional cases, it is only the priest of "good birth" who is received and exalted; others are seldom seen except in the churches and in the humbler homes. M. Dupanloup rose into still greater consideration after the diplomatic "reconciliation" of Talleyrand on his death-bed. He was selected as the priest most adapted to manage well the delicate business of "reconciling" the aged statesman, who was determined not to be "reconciled" till it was quite certain that he was on the point of death. It needed tact, lest the Sacraments should be given too soon or too late. M. Dupanloup was a man who always realised the respect due to rank. Talleyrand was a Bishop, an unbeliever, and married. These apparently incompatible conditions, combined with the transparent impenitence of the penitent, would have embarrassed a Breton priest or a Sulpician; but, to the mind of M. Dupanloup and Archbishop de Quélen, M. de Talleyrand was above all things a Prince; so the priest, with his Sacraments, waited patiently in the ante-room until Mademoiselle de Dino came to announce the exact moment. Though the Prince was vulgarly supposed to have broken most of the Commandments, his confession was not onerous; in a very few minutes all the Sacraments needful for salvation had been conferred, and thus a funeral *comme il faut* secured. More important to the dying man than his salvation was the paper, signed, "Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince de Bénévvent," with which the confessor returned to the ante-room. There was joy, if not in heaven, at all events in the Faubourgs St. Germain and St. Honoré. The victory won by female grace and clerical tact redounded to

the glory of each. "M. Dupanloup was from that day one of the first of French priests. Position, honours, and money were pressed upon him by the aristocratic classes in Paris. The money he accepted, but do not for a moment suppose that it was for himself; never was any one so unselfish as Dupanloup." He accepted it for his college, which he enlarged and almost rebuilt, attracting to it the sons of the gentry, so as to save the Church of God and the Faith of Christ by priests of good breeding, trained in classical literature and Christian piety, and kept profoundly ignorant of science. Such was the second home of Ernest Renan.

This was the gravest crisis in my life. The young Breton does not bear transplanting. The keen moral repulsion which I felt, superadded to a complete change in my habits and mode of life, brought on a very severe attack of home sickness. The confinement to the college was intolerable. The remembrance of the free and happy life which I had hitherto led with my mother went to my very heart. I was not the only sufferer. M. Dupanloup had not calculated all the consequences of his policy. Imperious as a military commander, he did not take into account the deaths and casualties which occurred among his young recruits. We confided our sorrows to one another. My most intimate friend, a young man from Coutances, who had been transported like myself from a happy home, brooded in solitary grief over the change, and died. The natives of Savoy were even less easily acclimatised. One of them, who was rather my senior, confessed to me that every evening he calculated the distance from his dormitory on the third floor to the pavement in the street below. I fell ill, and to all appearances was not likely to recover. The melancholy to which Bretons are so subject took hold of me. The memories of the last notes of the angelus which I had heard pealing over our dear hills, and of the last sunset upon our peaceful plains, filled me with inexpressible anguish. According to every rule of medicine I ought to have died.

Two friends, who had accompanied him from Brittany, died sadly the following year. Among two hundred students an obscure youth could not attract much attention. A casual

incident drew to him the notice of the superior, and formed a bond between them.

I had always lived alone with my mother. I could not tear myself away from the recollection of the peaceful, happy life which I had led year after year. I had been happy, and I had been poor with her. A thousand details of this very poverty, which absence made all the more touching, searched out my heart. At night I was always thinking of her, and I could get no sleep. My only consolation was to write her letters full of tender feeling and moist with tears. Our letters, as is the usage in ecclesiastical establishments, were read by one of the masters. He was so struck by the tone of deep affection which pervaded my boyish utterances that he showed one of them to M. Dupanloup, who was very much surprised when he read it. The noblest trait in M. Dupanloup's character was his affection for his mother. Though his birth was in one way the greatest trouble of his life, he worshipped his mother. She lived with him, and though we never saw her, we knew that he always spent so much time with her every day. He often said that a man's worth is to be measured by the respect he pays to his mother. He gave us excellent advice upon this head, which I never failed to follow; as, for instance, never to address her in the second person singular or to end a letter without using the word "respect." . . . From that moment M. Dupanloup recognised the fact of my existence, and I regarded him as a principle of life, a sort of god. One worship took the place of another, and the sentiment, inspired by my early teachers, gradually died out.

Ernest Renan was at St. Nicholas during its most brilliant period. Its intense life had one source, M. Dupanloup himself. All regulations, all persons centred in him. His fascinating personality did much to rectify the essential defects of seminary life. What Dr. Newsham was to Ushaw College, what Bishop Wiseman was to Oscott College, such was M. Dupanloup to St. Nicholas. Dr. Newsham breathed into all the intense spirituality of his own soul. Dr. Wiseman entranced all with the affectionate splendour of his culture. M. Dupanloup, disliked by his fellow-workers, worshipped by his pupils, made them desire

goodness and learning, if it were only for the sake of their master. Those who remember him as the Bishop of Orleans, and recall the winsome smile and loving word whereby he made his guests into his friends, can easily understand the enthusiasm of affection with which he inspired the students of St. Nicholas. Those were memorable evenings when instead of reading from the lives of Fathers in the Desert, he read the reports of the pupils, interlarding the reading with words of praise or blame, so joyous or so sad, that they seemed charged with life or death, and rendered punishment unnecessary, for no punishment could equal the pain of giving sorrow to such a master, no reward could surpass the glowing richness of his smile.

The lectures at St. Nicholas made Ernest Renan for the first time acquainted with some portions of modern literature. On one occasion the lecturer read several long passages from the fifth and sixth volumes of Michelet's "*Histoire de France*." These thrilled him "with intoxicating harmony."

So the germ began to sprout, and a style of education somewhat distasteful to him began to stir his mental life. The world of modern thought broke in upon him, through the fissures of an educational wall. "Despite its claim to be a refuge to which the stir of the outside world never penetrated, St. Nicholas was at that period the most brilliant and worldly house in Paris. The atmosphere of Paris—minus its corruptions—penetrated by door and window. My old Brittany priests knew more Latin and mathematics than my new masters; but they lived in the Catacombs, bereft of light and air!" It would be an error to suppose that immorality gravely affected these ecclesiastical seminaries in France. Those who, like the writer, have had means of forming a careful opinion, are convinced that the Lycées were worse than the Séminaires. The reason was (at that time and till the present year, when it is stated that an alteration has been made), the Government did not confer upon the Lycées the power of expulsion, except for

legal offences, whereas a student could be expelled from a Séminaire with absolute facility, and without assigning any reason; indeed, it was done in such a mode as not to expose and discourage the pupil. "Your son has many promising traits; but we do not find him exactly suitable to our system, he will probably get on better by a change elsewhere;" but then only a Lycée was open to him.

Ernest Renan, after completing his rhetoric at St. Nicholas, was transferred to Issy, the country branch of the Grand Séminaire de St. Sulpice. Issy is the house of study for physical and mental philosophy, one year for each, after which the student proceeds to St. Sulpice at Paris, for the four years' course of Theology. Each Thursday the students of Philosophy vacate Issy for a day's recreation in a forest, and then the pleasant gardens of Issy are occupied by the theological students from St. Sulpice. We have said the pleasant gardens, but we have heard with regret that those familiar grounds, consecrated to our memory by cheerful, kindly converse and holy words of prayer, have been laid waste during the siege of Paris and the reign of the Commune. We can still picture them to our mind as if it were but yesterday, peopled with gentle teachers who have for the most part passed away, and students scattered over the world or dead. They were the children of peace; may the peace of God be with them!

Whenever the time shall arrive, long as it must be after our changeful, anxious life has sunk into rest, when truth and reality, nature and mind, can be combined with the simplicity and unworldliness of the contemplative men of peace; then we shall have the Temple of the Universal Hope. "*Quia vidisti, credidisti; beati, qui non viderunt, et crediderunt.*" Blessed are they who believe in the future possibility, and prepare the high way for the Future that is to be. Would we do so, we must not defend error or practise it; we must not ignore goodness, though it may have gone side by side with error. Amidst the infinite pathos of human life, we shall not be too hard upon the error, we shall never be forgetful of the good. With Renan

we say, "I love the past, but I envy the future." "The worst state is the Theocratic state, in which dogma reigns supreme."

M. Renan, in passing from St. Nicholas to the seminary of the Sulpicians at Issy, entered on another spiritual world. "The first thing which I was taught at St. Sulpice was to regard as childish nonsense the very things which M. Dupanloup had told me to prize the most." The priests of St. Sulpice had perfectly simple ideas. Christianity is revealed truth; the Roman Catholic Church alone is Christianity; the only object of life is through the sacraments and prayer to obtain union with God in this life and in the life eternal; what we read in the Gospels and the Epistles, to strive in all simplicity to be and to enact. The one pervading lesson was—God is everything, man is nothing; God is sufficient, man must not appear. Thus all eloquence must be avoided; the reading must be in a monotone; the manners must be perfectly simple; the superiors must never command, yet the students must obey each one of them as God; all desire must be renounced; humiliation must be loved, not avoided; censure, however unjust, coveted as a privilege; no self-defence, no palliation, no self-exaltation; to be despised, is a joy; to be calumniated, is a privilege; to be a slave, is to be Christ's; to be crushed, is to be crowned. *O Jesu vivens in Maria, veni et vive in famulo tuo, in spiritu sanctitatis tuæ, in plenitudine virtutis tuæ, in perfectione viarum tuarum.* Such was the Sulpician idea: and this not, as with the Jesuits, for the selfish aggrandisement of their Order, for the convenience of superiors, to render the exercise of authority more easy; but simply because it was deemed the Gospel of Christ. And what they enjoined, they did. No one who has been at St. Sulpice will dispute that statement. Controversialists may claim our words, or may censure our words; having no object before us but truth, we speak what we have seen and known. The priests of St. Sulpice were perfect to the ideal they taught, and their pupils were willingly moulded by their example. It was a saintly error

perfectly acted out. We believe it to be, as a system, untrue to life, opposed to the ordinance of God, resting on error, and interwoven with error, injurious to the formation of character, and to the best and most enduring interests of man : but it was perfectly real, what they meant, they said ; what they said, they meant, and each they strove to accomplish.

At St. Sulpice, nothing is to be done without seeking the counsel of the Director. He never orders, but the slightest suggestion of his opinion is to be followed utterly ; it is the breathing of God's behest over the soul. The *Manuel de Piété* enforces the idea that the Director represents God, his gently whispered suggestion contains the Divine Word as certainly as did the "still small voice" which when it murmured past the prophet's cave, caused him to wrap his face in his mantle, and to go forth and obey it. Nothing to him had been "the great and strong wind, rending the mountains and breaking in pieces the rocks" : These represented the physical forces of a world despised ; but in the whispered voice, it was the Eternal who said "What doest thou here ?" "I have been very jealous for the Eternal, the God of Hosts, because the children of Thy Israel have forsaken Thy covenant and thrown down Thy altars."

This "direction," administered so obviously not for the sake of power, but for the sake of virtue, was obeyed as the pure in heart would obey the secret inspirations of God. It is sad to be compelled to add that the results are disastrous in the extreme, more disastrous than isolated acts of vice. The power of the will is broken, crushed, annihilated by the purest, the gentlest, the tenderest of men. The power of moral resistance is destroyed. M. Renan tries to speak no words but of praise : the fault of his book is through excess of kindness to his old teachers, and just appreciation of their intentions ; he has no word of warning ; he unconsciously fosters all the attractions which would draw victims into a visionary home of spiritual beauty and tranquillity. Perhaps he supposes the danger is past in France : perhaps he has not formu-

lated a spiritual and moral code which he deems adequate for any but souls cultured, pure, contemplative, and refined as his own; perhaps, as he never advanced beyond Minor Orders, and has only as a Roman Catholic seen the results of the system in the midst of the gardens of Issy and the enclosures of St. Sulpice, he has hardly realised how inexpressibly sad is the fact that the best-intentioned of men labour from youth to old age to divest man of what chiefly makes man—the independence of the Will, the independence of the Reason. He left St. Sulpice at the age of 23, having been only four years under direction, and yet he owns that his life has been one long application of their good qualities and their defects; that these qualities and defects, transferred to the world's stage, have brought out in him the gravest inconsistencies; have traversed his life, and been woven into the tissue of it; have rendered him in some things far above the average of men, whilst frequently plunged thereby into the most curious and embarrassing circumstances. "I should like to relate all the adventures which my Sulpician habits brought about, and the singular tricks which they played with me. If a comedy writer should ever be inclined to amuse the public by depicting my foibles, I would readily give my assent, if he agreed to let me join in the work, as I could relate things far more amusing than any which he could invent." The effect has been that "I have always been like a child in all worldly matters."

That keen observer, M. Challemeil-Lacour, says of M. Renan, "He thinks like a man, feels like a woman, and acts like a child." Renan accepts the description, attributes the latter to his Sulpician training, which fostered the tendency to yield to others, even to the hostile and less worthy, "often thus leading me into positions from which I have had great difficulty in extricating myself."

The fear of appearing pharisaical, the idea, evangelical in itself, that he who is immaculate has the right to be indulgent [has in later years] made my system of morality appear rather shaky. It is, in reality, as solid as the rock. These little

liberties which I have allowed myself are by way of a recompense for my strict adherence to the general code. So in politics I indulge in reactionary remarks, so that I may not have the appearance of a Liberal under-strapper. I don't want people to take me for being more of a dupe than I am in reality. Jesus has influenced me more in this respect than people may think, for he loved to show up and deride hypocrisy, and in his parable of the Prodigal Son he places morality upon its true footing—kindness of heart—while seeming to upset it altogether. To the same cause (the Sulpician training impressed on the character, whilst rectified in the reason) may be attributed another of my defects, a tendency to waver, which has almost neutralised my power of giving verbal expression to my thoughts in many matters. In the society of fashionable people I am utterly lost. I get into a muddle and flounder about, losing the thread of my ideas in some tissue of absurdity. . . . My attention, when I am conversing with any one, is engrossed in trying to guess at his ideas, and, from excess of deference, to anticipate him in the expression of them. My correspondence will be a disgrace to me if it should be published after my death. . . . In short, all my defects are those of the young ecclesiastical student. . . . Having never indulged in gaiety while young, and yet having a good deal of cheerfulness in my temperament, I have been compelled, at an age when we see how vain and empty it all is, to be very lenient as regards foibles which I had never indulged in myself, so much so that many persons who have not, perhaps, been as steady as I was, have been shocked at my easy-going indifference. . . . My early masters taught me to despise laymen, and inculcated the idea that the man who has not a mission in life is the scum of the earth. Thus it is that I have had a strong and unfair bias against the commercial classes. Upon the other hand I am very fond of the people, and especially of the poor. I am the only man of my time who has understood the characters of Jesus and of Francis of Assisi.

This utter subjection to a "Director" can be understood when we learn from M. Renan that he (like all Roman Catholics) had, from his childhood, been accustomed to regard the Priesthood as not only supreme but divine; "when you see a noble, salute him, for he represents the king; when you see a priest, salute him, for he represents God." M. Renan says, "According to my experience, all

the allegations against the morality of the clergy are devoid of foundation. I passed thirteen years of my life under the charge of priests, and I never saw anything approaching to a scandal; all the priests I have known have been good men." Unquestionably any one closing his eyes so as not to see Italy, Spain, Austria, South America, and other countries: closing his eyes also to many other indubitable facts, and looking solely at certain English, French, and Irish colleges, seminaries, and religious houses, would emphatically agree: but it is not equally possible to agree with the close of the sentence, "Confession may possibly be productive of evil in some countries, but I never saw anything of the sort during my ecclesiastical experience." This statement invites serious criticism. If the author alludes to conscious encouragement of foul sin, we would gladly emphasize the remark a thousand times. But the Confessional is the vehicle of unceasing attention to sins and temptations which experience shows that it is injurious habitually to recur to in detail, habitually to subject to examination, explanation, and discussion. It is meant well, but is proved to foster the evil, and in a refined way to be injurious even to the most innocent and saintly person. But the Confessional is also the chief mode of exercising "direction," and we think that M. Renan would have rendered a service, at least to young women and young men in England who now seek "direction," if he had distinctly unfolded the evil, instead of merely enabling us to gather it from his description of some derived features of his own character. He says enough to enable an observant and thoughtful reader to perceive that a person thus moulded by religious and excellent priests will be more gravely injured than if he had fallen into the hands of bad priests. He will have been rendered susceptible, perfectly trustful, utterly confiding, simple-hearted, yielding, very desirous of goodness, affectionate, tender, pious, and the almost certain victim of whoever is interesting, clever, designing, and apparently good. The person who is tender, reverent, docile, loving, yielding, may be enshrined in our affection; but it is not

the character best adapted to pursue a straight course amidst the moral difficulties of life.

M. Renan, in different passages, expresses with perfect precision the intellectual and critical errors essential to the Roman Catholic system; but an ordinary reader might almost infer that, though intellectually false, it is, in all respects, morally beautiful, kind, gentle, compassionate. Alas! it is so only within the charmed circle; it is the *esprit de corps*, not *l'esprit d'humanité*. The spiritual teaching of the Roman Catholic Church seems to us to deny spiritually and absolutely the most certain and conspicuous feature of the spirit and teaching of Christ—*universality*:—the Pervading Spirit of the Universe, Parental to *all*: the Father and the Mother of Gentile and of Jew, of the innocent and of the prodigal; and human sympathy, like the divine sympathy, universal, to those entangled in any form of error, as much as to those feeling upward, though ignorantly, to a higher truth. As we would understand the time-honoured word, Christian, it implies this universal sympathy, a symbol of that infinite pity we all need so much. O Roman Catholic brothers and sisters, you have fallen short of the great ideal! You are full of goodness and of tenderness, but you have shut it up within the brazen walls of the spiritual city of your Pope. To those outside, you express not sympathy but pity. Sympathy implies equality: pity implies superiority. But to those who have torn themselves from you in pursuit of the truth, the consideration of which you treat as a temptation, you express scorn, and in consequence of their intellectual convictions you treat them as the Christ whom the priests slew refused to treat the woman who was a sinner.

M. Renan has so spoken of the Roman Catholics of his knowledge, that their gratitude might be anticipated for words adapted for the best service of their Church. But, no! he has lost his rights. The Church is Humanity; and he is outside the Church, and therefore as one outside Humanity has he been outraged with all shameful calumnies and opprobrious epithets. Even when he visited England to lecture, cultured Roman Catholics in social circles insinuated what

might damage, and hinted reproaches. It is unfit to commend a spiritual system which encourages such inhuman tendencies. The sad fact remains that the men and women most devoted to the spiritual system are the least human towards those deemed heretics. In France the dominant spirit is happily so anti-clerical that perhaps M. Renan feels able to observe a reticence undesirable in the present tendency of that portion of the English public most likely to read his book and to be influenced by it, especially now that it is rendered acceptable to all by the excellent translation mentioned at the head of this article.

"St. Sulpice owes its origin to one whose name has not attained any great celebrity, for celebrity rarely seeks out those who make a point of avoiding notoriety, and whose predominant characteristic is modesty. . . . Olier occupies a place apart in the entire group of Catholic reformers. His mysticism is of a kind peculiar to himself. His *Catechisme Chrétien de la Vie Interieure*, which is scarcely ever read outside St. Sulpice, is a most remarkable book, full of poetry and austere philosophy, wavering ever between Louis de Leon and Spinoza." The ascetic and spiritual teaching of Olier and the priests of the congregation of St. Sulpice agrees, to a considerable extent, with that of the Sacred Books of the Buddhist Religion.

The soul ought to have but one effort,—the annihilation of the Will: the perfect life resembles death, but as even the corpse may be agitated, the perfect life is a burial: the buried body is forgotten and no longer ranks with men; noisome, horrible, bereft of all that attracts, trodden under foot, but in perfect peace. It is the Christian Nirvana; buried in the wounds of Christ, heedless alike of the ambitions, the hatreds, the calumnies, of men. As the Sulpician Catechism says: "There is no extremity of insult too great to be put up with and to be looked upon as deserved. Contempt, insult and calumny should never disturb our utter peace. We should behave like the saint of former days, who was led to the scaffold for a crime which he had not committed, and from which he would not attempt to exculpate himself, as he said to himself that

he should have been guilty of this crime and of many far worse but for the sustaining grace of God." We are so utterly unworthy that "men, angels, and God Himself ought to persecute us without ceasing." Thus did this inspired mystic dream his visions of repose whilst organising an institution which has survived three revolutions, and alone rendered the clergy of France worthy to survive at all. When the First Napoleon restored the Roman Catholic Church, the Superior of St. Sulpice was M. Emery, who obtained such a singular influence over the Emperor that an edict was issued that the Grand Séminaire should be constructed on a scale adapted for the whole of the Empire, and the entire training of the French priests be under the guidance of the Sulpicians. This was never carried into effect, but proceeded far enough to cause the erection of the ugly, barrack-like edifice, with its high walls, along one side of the Place St. Sulpice. The great church of the same name is now, as formerly, served by the priests and students of St. Sulpice. During the recreation hour behind those high walls, or in the pleasant gardens of Issy, the suburban palace of Marguerite de Valois, many are the Sulpician anecdotes and traditions floating about and recorded to the new-comers; and all illustrating the Buddhist-like indifference of this serene repose. It is told how, on one occasion, when a revolution was raging in Paris, and a fierce mob followed an excited demagogue, who pushed open the garden gate, the good Superior, quietly walking up and down in an absorbed state of mind, politely offered the leader a pinch of snuff, and entirely forgetting that there was a revolution going on, remarked, "I fear we shall hardly be able to find work for so many *chers bons enfants*." The absurdity of the contrast changed rancour into merriment, and the mob withdrew. On another occasion, when at Paris, a fearful tumult was heard raging outside the walls of the Paris Seminary whilst the students were at recreation, a young priest proposed that they should go across the Place to the church and die martyrs. "Let us finish our recreation first," replied an old Sulpician. He had obtained the Nirvana of perfect indifference.

Thus after the flight of Charles X., another Superior, having occasion to draw up a document for the Ecclesiastical Court, headed it with the name of the wrong king, having forgotten the accession of Louis Philippe. As can be conceived, this was not a frame of mind conducive to the reception of novelties, whether religious, scientific, or political. Therefore Ultramontaniam was unknown in St. Sulpice, and was only introduced, and then in a modified degree, by the vehement action of the late Pope, when the older men died off. At St. Sulpice we had the Gallican liturgy and office of Paris, devoid of many of the absurd legends of the Roman Breviary: we never genuflected to the Blessed Sacrament, only bowed the head profoundly: and in other modes preserved vestiges of older times.

M. Renan commends the veracity with which the Sulpicians presented the Roman Catholic teaching as it is really propounded by the Church, without any dishonest attempt to dress it up to suit the taste of modern times. The "theological buffooneries" and insincere evasions which, "by force of impudence and eloquence" extort the admiration of some, the adhesion of others, "had no such effect upon these serious-minded Christians." "They showed themselves deficient in the critical faculty in supposing that the catholicism of the theologians was the self-same religion as that of Jesus and the prophets; but they did not invent for the use of the worldly a Christianity revised and adapted to their ideas." "There is nothing so mischievous as the vague; it is even worse than what is false. Truth, as Bacon has well observed, is derived from error rather than from confusion."

The disciple of the Jesuits is to be subject to the orders of his Director, like a staff without feeling in his hand—it is for the greater success and glory of the "Society." The disciple of the Sulpicians is to be subject to the suggestions of his Director, so that he may be the more entirely annihilated before the Majesty of God. The Jesuit polity is the most complete organisation of deliberate selfishness existing in the world. The Sulpician polity is the annihilation of self in contemplation of its own foulness and littleness in

presence of the holiness and majesty of God : its origin is on the pages of the Gospel ; its only parallel is in Brahminical recluses and in Buddhist monks. Thus the Sulpician is averse to show, shrinks from display, dreads success. The Evangelical idea talked of glibly by people who never dream of any attempt to practise it, is the daily thought of the Sulpician life. It seems to us, to a considerable extent, false, misleading, and injurious ; but it has the supreme advantage of not being a sham. The Sulpician, guided entirely by the Gospel, never for a moment pretends that it can be made to harmonise with the exigencies, the conventionalisms, the comforts, or the ambitions of ordinary human life. Thus, as M. Renan elaborately proves, they were honest men, though mistaken men : and an error honestly held is better than an error dishonestly explained away into something convenient to defend and to do. The rule of the Sulpicians is to publish everything anonymously, and to write and to speak in the most unpretending way possible. Any attempt at fine writing, or fine reading, or fine speaking, is checked by example, and by the gentle suggestion of the " Director." They study because it is right to do so, but they attach no importance to literature or to learning ; they take no trouble to circulate their works, and are indifferent to their success, to the estimation in which they are held, and to the censure or criticism of any but ecclesiastical authority. This self-forgetfulness pervades the entire life. M. Renan says that he still finds himself, after the lapse of thirty-eight years, doing unusual things, getting into absurd difficulties, and yielding in a childish way in consequence of the impress of the system upon his character. It is unnecessary to say that competitive examinations were unknown at St. Sulpice. There were personal examinations to test progress and to aid the student ; nothing more. It must not be supposed that the Sulpicians were ignorant. " St. Sulpice has in our time turned out a theologian like M. Carrière, whose vast labours are in many respects remarkable for their depth ; men of erudition like M. Gosselin and M. Faillon, whose conscien-

tious researches are of great value, and philologists like M. Garnier, and especially M. Le Hir, the only eminent masters in the field of ecclesiastical investigations whom the Catholic school in France has produced."

M. Renan gives sketches of several of the priests; these sketches are always kindly, graphic, accurate, and appreciative. M. Gosselin, remarkable for his erudition: a safe critic within the limits of an orthodoxy which he never thought of questioning. His features engaging, wan, and delicate: his manners placid and affectionate. M. Pinault, Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy; a man of earnest mysticism, concentrated passion, and quaint originality; his physiognomy arrested attention. Eaten up by rheumatism, he seemed to embody in his person all the ways in which a body may be contorted from its proper shape. "His was a powerful individuality which faith kept under due control, but which ecclesiastical discipline had not crushed. He was a saint, but had very little of the priest and nothing of the Sulpician about him. He did violence to the prime rule of the Society, which is to renounce anything approaching talent and originality." It was a trial to our "recollection" to kneel behind him at meditation, and witness his shoulders alternately going up with a twinge, and his calotte lined with cotton wool, to protect him from neuralgia, continually falling off, and having to be looked for in the wrong direction. He did not make an effort to conceal his contempt for the sciences he taught, and for the human intelligence at large. At times he mused off during class, forgetting all about it. M. Gottofrey, with a countenance of extraordinary beauty, large, melancholy, candid eyes. An early romance had left on him an unceasing memory, he shrank from the past, he dreaded the future, he hated the incomparable fascination of his appearance: he longed for death, and at length found it whilst residing in a Sulpician house in Canada. He nursed the sick with eager joy and died.

The writer of these lines having entered St. Sulpice three years after M. Renan left it, can recall most of the

men so faithfully described, and many incidents illustrative of the mystical spirit taught. Each meal was to be regarded as a Feast of Love, a symbol of the Eucharist: an idea the more easy to realise, since at each of our three meals bread and wine formed part of the repast. One of the priests thus eating and drinking in peaceful recollection suddenly stopped, reverently laid down a long French roll, folded his hands in prayer, exclaiming, "Stop! it is all consecrated!" There was a momentary consternation, but the Superior, with rapid presence of mind, exclaimed, "Messieurs, go on and eat!" and they did so, thus dispelling the scruple of the priest, who fancied that he had used the four consecrating words with a true intention, and thus transubstantiated all the bread and wine on the table. They were truly men of faith and Nathaniels without guile. It was the custom to open and read our letters whilst kneeling around the image of the Blessed Virgin, and the writer can remember on the first day when he thus perused a letter, his "Director," M. Le Hir, raising himself (for he was the minutest of men) so as to be able to read it all over our shoulder. This was a gentle way of reminding that all letters ought to be seen. M. Renan gives many details of this remarkable man:—

He was very kind to me [unkindness was impossible to his gentle, tender, compassionate nature], and being a Breton like myself, there was much similarity of disposition between us. At the expiration of a few weeks I was almost his only pupil. His way of expounding the Hebrew grammar, with comparison of other Semitic idioms, was most excellent. His books were at my disposal and he had a very extensive library. Upon the days when we walked to Issy he went with me to the heights of La Solitude and there he taught me Syriac. We talked together over the Syriac New Testament of Guthier. M. Le Hir determined my career. I was by instinct a philologist, and I found in him the man best fitted to develop this aptitude. Whatever claim to the title of *savant* I may possess I owe to M. Le Hir. I often think, even, that whatever I have not learnt from him has been imperfectly acquired.

May the reviewer be permitted to place on record an

incident known but to few? Dr. Newsham, the President of Ushaw College, a man of remarkable ability, and perfect goodness, combining the spirituality of St. Theresa and her powers of organisation with characteristics entirely English, recognised the great gifts of M. Le Hir, and strove to obtain his invaluable services for Ushaw, the college of his predilection, and the monument of his genius. At his request—and his request was law to every one who knew him,—the writer went to Paris, and described the beautiful honest life of the Ushaw students amidst their Durham hills. The Pope's sanction was obtained. The Nuncio was interviewed. But the Sulpician Superior retained something of the old Gallican independence, and would not spare M. Le Hir: and so the gentle, pure-minded scholar died in the home he loved. One of his "penitents," compelled by truth to reject his mythology, offers to his memory this tribute of reverent affection. The cosmic faith he holds embraces in its universal unity all the sons of God, and therefore delights to point to those who under any sectional name have lifted up before his eyes the gracious memorials of piety and of goodness.

Controversialists may deem these admissions unsafe, but life is too short for controversy. Humanity is too large for limitation within any sect. It is better to love than to hate; it is better to revere than to despise. Of all the systems possible to intelligent Europeans, the Papal is unquestionably the most radically opposed not only to truth, but to the spiritual, moral, social, domestic, political, scientific, and philanthropic well-being of mankind—and therefore all the more earnestly let us render justice to the men and women pure, gentle, conscientious, and intelligent, who honestly foster what we believe to be detrimental.

We have now come to the parting of the ways. The story of the farewell to St. Sulpice, and of the changes that followed, must be reserved for another article.

R. RODOLPH SUFFIELD.

GEORGE RIPLEY.*

FEW books have reached us of late years, from America, more worthy of wide acceptance and earnest reading, among the scholars and critics, the social reformers and "seekers after God" in Great Britain, than this *Life*. For George Ripley,—by blending in rare harmony the tendencies of *all* these classes,—ranked among his compatriots, as unsurpassed for *many-sidedness*. The devoted disciple of Channing, from his youth upwards, he became also, in mature manhood, the animating guide of Theodore Parker, and shared the life-long confidence of each. The diligent co-student of German Transcendentalists with his friends, Convers Francis,—brother of that seeker after "The Religious Ideas of all Ages," Lydia Maria Child,—and James Walker, first the Professor of Philosophy, and afterwards the President of Harvard University, he was at the same time the lucid interpreter and translator, with the evangelical Caleb Henry, of the French Eclectics, Cousin and Jouffroy, as well as of Benjamin Constant. And having initiated Orestes Brownson, as a Liberal Christian, into the History of Philosophy and the Philosophy of History, he remained his trusted associate, during the transition whereby his eccentric yet earnest compeer was transformed into the ablest theologian of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States. Ripley is best known, probably, to the world, as the originator and patriarch of that brilliant "Utopia" of Brook Farm, the dawn of whose Idyl has been sketched with such picturesque humour by Hawthorne in his "Blithedale

* *George Ripley*. By OCTAVIUS BROOKS FROTHINGHAM. Boston and New York Houghton, Mifflin, and Co. 1882.

Romance." And yet he deserves to be more widely esteemed as co-editor with R. W. Emerson and Margaret Fuller of the *Dial*, and as the wisest, most equitable, and keenly discriminating while generous critic of his nation,—when, under the lead of Horace Greeley, he catered for the literary columns of the *New York Tribune*, during more than a quarter of a century, writing for *Putnam's Monthly*, *Harper's Weekly*, &c., at the same time. And his reputation should become cosmopolitan in the commonwealth of literature, as Editor in Chief, with Charles A. Dana, of Appleton's highly prized "American Encyclopædia,"—wherein his comprehensive, accurate, conscientious, and indefatigable scholarship was so conspicuously made manifest,—and in perfecting which he toiled on, with cheery persistence, till nearly his eightieth year.

Justly this Life must be welcomed by its readers, as a beautiful book, in every sense. It is beautiful in form, as printed by the famous "Riverside Press" of Cambridge, Mass., with an admirable portrait, and published by the well-known house of Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, of Boston and New York, in their promising series of "American Men of Letters." It is beautiful in its well-balanced and condensed, its moderate while ardent, its pure and graceful style, which would satisfy even the refined taste of the ripe scholar it so felicitously portrays. And above all is it beautiful in spirit, being at once reverently affectionate and impartially frank, modest while laudatory, sympathetic yet strictly sincere in temper,—while its chastened tone becomes the confidential pastor of George Ripley, during the last decade of his serene age, and his accredited literary trustee.

And now let us trace the growth to maturity of this Representative American, as presented in this charming volume, the aim of which is thus tersely indicated in Mr. Frothingham's opening words:—

The purpose of this Memoir is to recover the image and do justice to the character of a remarkable man, the pursuits of whose latter years gave him little opportunity to display his

deepest convictions, while his singular charm of manner and conversation concealed from all but those who knew him well the recesses of his feelings; a man of letters,—a man, too, of ideas and purposes, which left a broad mark on his age, and deserve to be gratefully kept in mind.

Born on the 3rd of October, 1802, amidst the picturesque landscapes and health-breathing uplands of the Connecticut valley in Greenfield, Mass., George Ripley was the youngest child but one in a family of ten. And from the atmosphere of happy home-love, in which from infancy he was embosomed, he doubtless drew in the hearty affectionateness that glowed in his genial smile and cordial courtesy. His father is described by the historian of Greenfield as a man "whose integrity was never suspected, and of whose virtue and uprightness a long course of years leaves no question; an eminent example of the beneficial effects of steady industry and perseverance in one calling." A merchant, and a Justice of the Peace for nearly fifty years, he became also a Representative in the State Legislature, and one of the Justices of the Court of Sessions. His mother was a typical New-England woman, stately, reserved, frugal, and precise, but kind and warm-hearted to the core, and fervently devout.

It was the felicitous lot of the reverent and loyal boy to be disciplined in spirit and conscience, under the combined influences of Liberal and Evangelical Christianity; for while the father was a zealous Unitarian, the mother was a pious member of an Orthodox congregation. So from early youth he was moulded in that form of *affirmative receptiveness*, which pre-eminently characterised his whole career. These buds of aspiration were brought to full flower in his early spring time, by the sunshine of ardent devotion, that pervaded at once the home-circle, and the community of free-minded, earnest farmers and tradesmen, whose families constituted the society of Greenfield.

Thus bred amidst beautiful scenes and a pure-toned township, which was distinguished already for its interest in the cause of education, George's schooldays were diligently

passed; and his characteristic concentration and comprehensiveness were manifested, even before he reached his "teens," in his avowed desire to "make a dictionary,"—a "curious anticipation of the labours of his closing years," as his biographer does well to note. From these primary schools George was transferred to the care of highly-cultivated relatives in Concord, to be prepared for entrance into Harvard College at the age of seventeen. There he at once took foremost rank for his proficiency, alike in the Classics and Mathematics, and twice won the Bowdoin prize for composition, graduating with the highest honours, in a class distinguished for ability, at the age of twenty-one. On that occasion—as it is interesting to recall—he delivered the "English Oration" on the subject of "Genius as affected by Moral Feeling," the very theme best fitted to call into play his complex spiritual and intellectual powers. Throughout his college course, he was highly respected by his classmates and trusted by the College Government; while he was much admired as a singularly handsome youth, with brilliant, hazel-grey eyes and thickly-clustered chestnut locks curled all over his largely-moulded head, and whose buoyant, radiant air won favour, as betokening a character at once dignified and generous.

A letter to his father, written during his Senior year, proves the ripened judgment and clear decision with which he recognised from the first his appointed vocation. He writes:—

If I were governed merely by the hope of success in life, and perhaps of some degree of eminence, I should by all means endeavour to perfect my education by an elaborate course of study, and a resolution to avoid all thoughts of engaging in the duties of a profession till after a laborious preparation of many years. This plan I am advised to adopt, by some in whose judgment I should place high confidence. . . . I know that my peculiar habits of mind, imperfect as they are, strongly impel me to the path of active intellectual effort. . . . By this I do not mean that any profession is desired but the one to which I have long been looking. . . . My wish is to enter that profession with all the enlargement of mind and extent of information, which

the best institution can command. . . . I wish to study my profession thoroughly, and I do not feel prepared to enter upon these important inquiries before a more accurate acquaintance is obtained with some subsidiary branches. For this purpose, my desire is to spend a year at Cambridge, in a course of study which I have prescribed for myself, unconnected with any department of the University.

Not being able to command the independent means for carrying out this eminently wise plan, however, he devoted the three years following his graduation to the study of "Divinity;" while he partially fulfilled his longing for the largest culture, by becoming a member of the College Faculty, representing the department of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. This double duty involved, of course, severe toil, but in a letter to a sister he writes:—

I am delightfully employed with responsible and difficult labour enough to keep me thoughtful and awake, and intervals of rest to show me that the relaxation purchased by fatigue is by far the best. . . . I rise two hours before the sun these cold mornings, and never sleep between. And I am very glad that I accepted the office I am in; as it does not interfere with my professional views and gives me the consciousness that, instead of being a burden to others, I am making myself useful; and instead of being dependent I am earning my bread actually by the sweat of my brow. And it gives me the prospect also, at the end of the year, of having laid up in this world's goods a handsome store, for a boy! Still, I had rather preach, which I hope I shall soon be able to do.

How profound was his interest in his professional pursuits appears in passages of various letters to his mother and sisters, as thus:—

"I feel perfectly satisfied that I have acted according to the Will of Providence, so far as I can ascertain it, in uniting myself to this School . . . and could say much of the emotions awakened by devoting myself to those studies, to which I have been looking long with fond anxiety and earnest hope. I feel that it is solemn indeed to take any step towards assuming an office involving such responsibility,—such infinite consequences! But God will use such instruments as He chooses to promote His truth in the world." . . . "I am not one of

those who can write or speak from the inspiration of genius, but all that I do must be the result of personal untiring efforts. If I am to be useful as a Christian Minister, which is the greatest object of my ambition, it is by laying a solid foundation of deep critical, theological knowledge, rather than by any attempt at popular eloquence or fine writing." . . . "I am plodding on very leisurely and very stupidly, trying to know a *little* of everything, and a *great deal* of Theology and Metaphysics, and gaining eke a bird's-eye view of History." . . . "Dr. Channing I place first in the list of Unitarian Ministers. . . . I wish I could give an idea of the solemnities of Mr. Gannett's ordination, but a description on paper would be so flat and inadequate, that I will not attempt it. It was a day of great joy for those who wish to see fervent piety connected with sound doctrine and liberal feelings. I would, but I cannot, enable you to form a conception of the infantine simplicity and apostolic meekness, united with the eloquence of an angel and spirituality of a sainted mind, which characterise Dr. Channing." . . . "I am no partisan of any sect, but I must rejoice in seeing any progress towards the conviction that Christianity is indeed *glad tidings of great joy*. . . . When shall we learn that without the Spirit of Christ we are none of His?" . . . "More and more grateful am I to a kind Providence, which directed me to Cambridge, where I have learned those views of religion, at once so attractive and lovely, so simple, Scriptural, and reasonable,—affording such motives to believers, such consolation in sorrow, such hope in death. . . . I have no prospects of life more inviting than that of preaching the Truth, with the humble hope of being instrumental in impressing it on the mind with force, purity, and effect. I feel bound to my profession."

Thus already distinguished in his Collegiate and Theological career, and with a bright future opening, wherein his teachers and associates anticipated for him brilliant usefulness and success, George Ripley, on leaving Cambridge in 1826 at the age of twenty-four, was at once ordained pastor of a Unitarian Society, gathered expressly for him, in what was still a respectable and even fashionable part of Boston, though in its vicinity were crowded streets of the working classes and the poor. His biographer thus describes the new meeting-house built for its use:—

It was a remarkably unattractive structure of stone, with a

small belfry on the top. The inside was as homely as the outside. It was capable of holding about 300 people. The corner stone was laid on the 7th of September, 1825. On that occasion Henry Ware, junior, delivered an address, in which he described the building to be erected as "not magnificent, but simple and unostentatious, like the Faith to which it is devoted;" spoke of the "great Principles of the Reformation," and of "the right of private judgment;" declared that "our platform is as wide and generous as the spirit of our Religion itself;" expressed his catholic desire and hope that if it were possible in this disturbed day, *there* might be neutral ground," and closed with a glowingly devout benediction for the growth and prosperity of the new congregation. . . . The dedication of the Church took place in August, 1826, and the ordination followed in November, on which occasion Dr. Kirkland, then President of Harvard University, preached the sermon. Dr. Lowell offered the prayer of ordination, and Dr. Ware, senior, gave the charge. So the young pastor began his career under brave though "*conservative*" auspices.

These were, as Mr. Frothingham truly says, "the palmy days of Unitarianism" in Boston. New societies were being formed, and meeting-houses built; money was freely raised; three chapels for the "Ministry at large," originated by the apostolic Joseph Tuckerman, were about to be established; and all the Liberal pulpits of the city and neighbouring towns were filled with earnest, learned, eloquent and energetic ministers. George Ripley found himself heartily welcomed, therefore, into a large fraternity of revered spiritual fathers and congenial companions, amidst fields white for the harvest, which called him cheerily to "put forth his sickle and reap." And how happy with exultant hope he was appears from letters to his mother:—

"I have become acquainted with several families in my society, and am better pleased even than I expected. They are chiefly from the middling classes of society, but I have not yet learned that intelligence and piety are confined to any one class. . . . My people are particularly kind to me and seem disposed to receive all my attempts to move them with real indulgence. I shall try not to be unworthy of their good will." . . . "My hands are full of labour, and my heart

with cares for my own people, who, although a little band, demand a good deal of my time and all of my attention. There is great devotion to religion at this moment throughout the city, and I feel it a bounden duty to do what I can to promote it and to direct the excitement into a proper channel. Yesterday I administered the Communion for the first time, and admitted nine members to our church, for some of whom I feel a peculiar interest, as they have been led to this step under the influence of my preaching. I am gratified at the serious impressions which I find produced, because they assure me of the adaptation of Rational religion to the needs and sorrows of all conditions of men. It has been reproached as a faith merely for men of intellect and taste. It is so; but it speaks loudly also to the uneducated and the poor, as I have had ample proof." . . . "My society is tranquilly growing. It is now quite an infant and needs gentle nursing, but I hope it will live and advance to the stature of a perfect man."

But though thus energetically devoted to his ministerial and pastoral labours, with his long-trained habits of intellectual aspiration, George Ripley found time for higher culture. He writes:—

I am well satisfied that I shall be happier in the city than I could ever be in the country. For I have access here to sources of improvement and enjoyment, which I could not have elsewhere, and without which I should feel that something important was wanting. . . . I am in a very central spot, not far from my church and in the midst of my people, and yet contiguous to all my haunts, such as the Athenæum, book-stores, &c. At the same time it is quiet and retired as the country, near indeed to the busy world but undisturbed by its noise. . . . My health too is excellent, and my hope is to preserve it without much difficulty. I find that preaching agrees with my constitution; and on Monday morning I am as free from fatigue, as if I had been idle the day before.

A singularly vivid, faithful and life-like portrait of the earnest young minister is thus presented by his biographer:—

No unbeliever, skeptic, innovator in matters of opinion or observance was he,—but a quiet student, a scholar and man of books, a calm, bright-minded, high-souled thinker; believing,

social, sunny, though absorbed in philosophical pursuits. Well does the writer of these lines recall the vision of a slender figure, wearing in summer-time the flowing silk robe, in winter the long dark-blue cloak of the profession, walking with measured step from his residence towards his meeting-house in Purchase Street. The face was shaven clean; the brown hair curled in close, crisp ringlets; the face was pale, as if with thought; golden-rimmed spectacles concealed the dark eyes; the head was alternately bent and raised. No one could have guessed that this man had in him the fund of humour in which his friends delighted, or the heroism in social reform which, a few years later, amazed the community. He seemed a sober, devoted minister of the Gospel, formal, punctilious, ascetic, a trifle forbidding to the stranger. But, even then, the new thoughts of the age were at work within him.

And now thus delightfully at home in his "Eden," George Ripley's hope grew intense that his Eve should come speedily to be his companion. For even while in the Theological School he had interchanged betrothal vows with a lady, the principal of an admirable school for girls, then residing with her mother in Cambridge, and of whom he thus speaks in confidence to his favourite sister:—

Yesterday our circle of dear friends were edified by the intelligence of a new engagement. And hereafter you shall know this being whose influence over me for the past year has so much elevated, strengthened and refined my character: . . . The whole affair meets with most surprising approbation and sympathy from the society of Cambridge. "The most just, proper, natural, fit, reasonable, delightful connection," say they, "that has been known for a long time." . . . This connection, which is founded not upon any romantic or sudden passion, but upon great respect for intellectual power, moral worth, deep and true Christian piety, and peculiar refinement and dignity of character, promises to advance me in the best way of life, and to aid me, above all, in the great end of life, the preparation for Heaven.

The beloved friend, thus portrayed with tender and grateful reverence, was Sophia Willard Dana, granddaughter, on the paternal side, of Chief Justice Dana, of Massachu-

setts, father of Richard H. Dana, the poet and eloquent essayist, and grandfather of R. H. Dana, jun., author of the popular "Two Years Before the Mast" and of "Important Treatises on International Law;"—she was granddaughter also, on her mother's side, of the scholarly President Willard, of Harvard University. And thus well-born and bred, she blended, in rare equipoise, the lofty aspirations and commanding intellectual and moral traits of both of her distinguished progenitors. This union was a true love-match, made harmonious at once by affinity and contrasts; and consummated in 1827, when George Ripley was twenty-five years of age, it preserved its fresh beauty unfaded for over thirty years, till his saintly companion passed from earth to heaven in 1861, as will be found related in Mr. Frothingham's pathetic narrative.

The sole shadow on their joy was that no children came to bless their home. But all the more, through this disappointment, they found outflow for their mutual affection in united studies and philanthropic efforts, as well as in the assiduous care of their congregation; while their boundless hospitality kept their domestic circle ever bright with friendly sympathy, brilliant talk and sparkling wit. And as each was an admirable conversationist, nowhere in Boston could have been found more entertaining and enlivening intercourse, than in the drawing-rooms or study of the genial pastor of Purchase Street and of his accomplished wife.

Thus in loving serenity passed swiftly by the first few years of George Ripley's ministry. . . . Meanwhile, with more intense ardour and insatiable thirst for truth than ever, he consecrated each free hour to profound study and meditation on the sublimest themes. On the fly-leaf of his commonplace book, Milton and Bacon are quoted in praise of Philosophy,—these words of Bacon being specially emphasized: "Life without pursuits is a vague and languid thing." "Cicero gives it as a high commendation to Cato *that he embraced philosophy*, not for the purpose of disputing, as most do, *but of living philosophically*." Thus the early

morning and late evening found him sitting pen in hand, with note-books open and heaps of volumes round him, in the well-arranged and amply supplied study.

The somewhat meagre sketch of his fine private library, which should be largely added to in Theology, especially in its later German developments, in Philosophy, History, Natural Philosophy, Mathematics, the Classics, and Belles-Lettres, will give an imperfect notion of his omnivorous reading, unless it is also stated that he had at his free command the Libraries of Harvard University and of the Boston Athenæum, as well as of many rich collections of scholarly brethren, in his own communion. For of all the men of his period he was the general "*referee*" for the best authorities, whenever a fellow-student was exploring new fields of inquiry; as he had the fortunate gift of a "*Magliabecchian*" memory, and rarely failed, in giving prompt response, with unstinted mental hospitality to every inquirer, who knocked at his study door.

It was about this period, that he started his then pupil in Philosophy, O. A. Brownson, upon his singularly eloquent expositions of French Eclecticism, in which School that enterprising hunter after truth at first, though for a short period only, found nutriment. At the same time, with his earnest co-worker, C. S. Henry, afterwards Professor of Philosophy in the University of New York, he engaged in the translation and exposition of the works of Victor Cousin and Theodore Jouffroy, intending to follow them with various selections from Royer-Collard, Maine de Biran, Benjamin Constant, &c., &c. This effort to stimulate his countrymen to a wider pursuit of philosophical and literary investigations at length led him to plan out a generous scheme of "*SPECIMENS OF FOREIGN LITERATURE*," which was brilliantly successful for a time, but prematurely cut short, to his intense regret, by the collapse of the Publishing Company who undertook the enterprise, after printing fourteen volumes. The same impulse led him also to publish, in 1839, his volume of "*Discourses on the Philosophy of Religion*."

And the mention of this book leads us, by an ascending step, up to a loftier stage of George Ripley's Speculative and Spiritual Convictions. "A child of Channing," as he liked to call himself, and believing with him that:—"All Minds are of One Family," and that "the Human mind is akin to that Intellectual Energy, which gave birth to Nature, and consequently contains within itself the seminal and prolific principles from which Nature sprung," he was with his friends, James Walker, Convers Francis, R. W. Emerson, F. H. Hedge, Caleb Stetson, J. F. Clarke, A. B. Alcott, J. S. Dwight, &c., a disciple of the "Intuitive Philosophy," then coming into authority among liberal scholars in Europe and America, that in Boston and New England was popularly called "Transcendentalism." In this movement, which outside cynics, with half-contemptuous yet good-natured banter, nick-named "The *Newness*," he found himself, to his surprise, ranked as one of the chief leaders. So, almost as a matter of course, when the "Transcendental Club" held its first meeting for organisation, they gathered in his cheerful rooms. And to quote from Mr. Frothingham, the tendencies of their talks can be readily anticipated. He writes:—

The Topics debated turned on a few central ideas : Law, Truth, Individuality, the Personality of God. The last point came up in connection with matters pertaining to Theology, Revelation, Inspiration, Providence. . . . Theodore Parker describes Mr. Ripley at this time as discussing with Dr. Channing the question of the Progress of Civilisation "with great power of thought and richness of eloquence." "Had the conversation of this evening," he records, "been written out by Plato, it would equal any of his beautiful dialogues." At a subsequent meeting, Mr. Ripley is instanced as taking exception to the impersonal conception of God put forth by Mr. Emerson. This was in 1838.

And this last record leads us one step further on and up to state that, although so enthusiastically expounding the *Synthetic* Philosophy, which he, with Brownson, logically deduced from the French Eclectics and from German Transcendentalism, he was becoming all the while a more

earnest—though a more spiritually-ideal—Christian, than ever before. This appears from Discourses of that period, quoted by his biographer. And,—in order to avoid friendly partiality on the part of the reviewer,—these shall be given in the words of O. B. Frothingham himself :—

These sermons, which were simple, clear, calm, systematic, are not eloquent, but pervaded by a keen, lambent light, and in passages animated by a singular intellectual glow. They breathe and convey the air of the new ideas, but are wholly destitute of controversial heat, and betray no sign of the existence of a philosophy different from his own. One of them on "Common Sense in the Affairs of Religion," preached in 1837, assumes the presence of a *Universal Sentiment*, which guides men through the devious ways of faith, and should deliver them from the dangers that lurk in their path ; securing to them unanimity of opinion, liberty of conscience, a spirit of progress and aspiration, and a prevailing interest in spiritual things. The discourse ends with a noble strain of appeal in behalf of freedom in thought and life. Another sermon on "Jesus Christ, the same Yesterday, To-day, and Forever," contends that the history of Man is a religious history ; that religious truths always have existed ; that "the religious Ideas, which were set forth by Jesus Christ, as they had been displayed before in other forms, still exert an efficient influence on the soul of Man ;" and that they will never cease to influence human souls. This was evidently a favourite sermon. First preached in 1834, it was delivered nine or ten times to other congregations, given twice on Christmas occasions, once at an installation, and once before O. A. Brownson's Society. It contains the *substance* of Theodore Parker's sermon on the "Transient and Permanent in Christianity," some years later, but stated so luminously, persuasively, and in such uncritical terms, as to awaken no dissent. It was the word of a hearty believer, unconcerned with the thankless task of denying. . . . George Ripley believed, without misgiving, in Religion as a *gift* from heaven, and in Christianity as a Divine communication to man. He says : "We can have no doubt that Religion will always be perpetuated by the same causes which first gave it existence. We regard it as an *emanation* from The Eternal Mind. . . . Eternity, unchangeableness, and similar attributes are applied to our Saviour, because his mind was so filled and penetrated with the power of religious truth as to be *identical* with it as existing

in the Divine Mind,—as to be the *Truth*, as well as the Way and the Life." He constantly calls Christ "The Saviour," speaking of him with deepest reverence as the highest of all the Lord's Prophets.

The same pure, fervent, spiritual faith appeared also in George Ripley's various writings, published at that period in the *Christian Register*, of which he was for the time the editor, in the *Liberal Preacher*, and in ten articles written between 1830 and 1837, for the *Christian Examiner*,—all foreshadowing his later conclusions. The subjects were "Degerando's Self-Education," "Religion in France," "Pestalozzi," "Mackintosh's Ethical Philosophy," and "Marsh's Translation of Herder." In this the reviewer praises Tholuck, and repels the charge that German Philosophy is irreligious in tendency. "A new reformation," he contends, "is started in Germany by men like Herder, Baumgarten, Semler, Ernesti, and Michaelis." A characteristic paper on Herder's theological opinions followed in 1835; and in the same year appeared, too, a most interesting article, containing full translations, on "Schleiermacher," whom he regarded as "without a representative in our theological progress." The most remarkable of these articles, however—as leading to momentous results—was one on James Martineau's "Rationale of Religious Inquiry." This caused a great sensation, especially when Professor Andrews Norton condemned its doctrines in the *Boston Daily Advertiser* as "leading towards infidelity," and severely rebuked the presumption of the young writer. Mr. Ripley the next day printed in the same paper his rejoinder. This slight skirmish served but to usher in the stern battle, that soon after was fought out to the end between the veteran theologian and his once favoured pupil. Well might Mr. Ripley have been astonished to find himself branded as an "infidel," when in this very article he had claimed Inspiration for the writers of the New Testament, as well as for the prophets and lawgivers of the Old Dispensation, though in "Christ alone was that Inspiration to be found in entire and absolute completeness." And how utterly

indiscriminate Mr. Norton's censure was may be proved by a quotation of the following glowing passage from a review of Furness's "Remarks on the Four Gospels," printed in the same year, where of Christ he writes:—

His Soul was a sea of light. All that was human in the Son of the Virgin; all that belonged to his personality as a Jewish teacher; all that marks the secondary, derived, and fallible in the nature of man, as distinguished from the primitive, the infallible, and Divine, was swallowed up, and, as it were, annihilated in the fulness of the Spirit, which dwelt in him,—in those kingly ideas of Truth and Good, which sustain the authority of the Eternal Throne, and authenticated the man of Nazareth as the Son of God,—the visible tabernacle of the Word, which was made flesh and dwelt among us.

When, therefore, in 1838, after R. W. Emerson's famous "Address to the Alumni of the Cambridge Divinity School" had, as Frothingham finely says, "discharged the electricity that was in the air;" and when, at the succeeding anniversary in 1839, Andrews Norton replied with his Address on "The Latest Form of Infidelity," attacking with unflinching scorn the Transcendental Philosophy, of which leading Liberal Divines throughout the country,—from Channing in Boston, to Nichols in Portland, Dewey in New Bedford, and Furness in Philadelphia—were the avowed advocates, George Ripley felt himself summoned by the Spirit to prepare and publish his full, luminous, logical and learned demonstration of Mr. Norton's prejudices, errors, shallow philosophy, and superficial criticism, in his grandly eloquent "Letters of an Alumnus." To our deep regret, the limits of this article preclude all quotations from these masterly essays, which have never been surpassed in America, for thoroughness of scholarship, massive argument and loftiness of appeal. And, indeed, it would be difficult, anywhere to find a more lucid exposition of the highest Spiritual Philosophy,—a more profound and penetrating while sympathetic interpretation of Spinoza's speculative and ethical System,—or a more touchingly reverent, while finely discriminating, analysis of Schleiermacher's inspiring doctrine,

than can be found in these admirably composed "Three Letters of an Alumnus," each of which in temper, thought, and style, might serve as a model of philosophical discussion, vitalised and sanctified by religious fervour and magnanimous humanity. These "Letters" clearly indicate that, if their writer had felt free in conscience to consecrate his life to scholarship, he would have found no superior and but few peers among his countrymen, as a Philosopher, a Theologian, or a Religious Historian and Critic. But, as will presently appear, conscience summoned him away from the serene alcoves of the Student's Library to the self-sacrificing toils and anxious struggles of the Social Reformer.

Before passing on to this new era of George Ripley's noble career, however, let us dwell for a few moments in passing, upon the beautiful episode of his friendship with Theodore Parker, which this very controversy with their former Professor, in regard to their revered compeer, Emerson, had served only to bind more closely with a golden clasp of mutual trust. Here again, to ensure impartiality, Frothingham shall tell the pleasant story:—

Theodore Parker was introduced to Mr. Ripley by his class-mate, George Ellis, in 1836, and an intimacy grew up till Parker's death, though their ministerial connection was short. The two were drawn together by a deeply-rooted sympathy in philosophical ideas, by a common philanthropical aim, and by an irrepressible buoyancy of spirit. They walked and talked by the day. In 1838, in the early part of Parker's ministry, Ripley and his wife spent a week with him at West Roxbury, and the visit was remembered many years afterwards, when, in a letter written in 1858, Ripley says:—"How I regret that I have no nice country house in which I could tempt you to spend the languid hours of convalescence, and return (not repay) your kindness to me on a like occasion, just twenty years ago. It was only the other day my wife was speaking of our enjoyment of that little episode, which was in fact the causal and immediate *antecedent of Brook Farm* with all its wondrous experiences." And of the visit Parker himself writes in his journal: "We were full of joy and laughter all the time of their visit." When he was lying ill, after a surgical operation in Boston, he wrote to Ripley: "Many

thanks for your friendship, *which never fails*. If we could lie under the great oak-tree, at West Roxbury, or ride about its wild lanes together, I should soon be entirely well, for the vigour of your mind would inspire strength even into my body. But I must do without that, only too thankful to have had it once." And almost a year later, on January 10th, 1859, the mortally ill man wrote in pencil from his bed in Exeter Place, "Many thanks, my dear George, to *you*. I never told you the service that you rendered me in 1836, and so on. Your words of advice, of profound philosophic thought, and still more of lofty cheer, did me great good. I count your friendship as one of the *brightest spots* in my life, which has had a deal of handsome sunshine. God bless you." And how Parker's love was reciprocated by Ripley is shown in this response: "Certain it is that, from my first acquaintance with you, my sympathy was won by your robust devotion to truth, and your cordial, overflowing geniality; but that you could have ever received encouragement in your lofty career from one so distant from your orbit, would be incredible to those who did not know that you combine a woman's softness of feeling with your manly 'heart of oak.' But let that be as it may, our friendship has weathered many a winter and summer, and grown only brighter from the test of time. And it is always a pleasant thought to me when reflecting on how little I have brought to pass for my day and generation, that at least I have been loyal to the principles of truth and freedom, which have ripened in you to such a bountiful harvest of accomplishment. Sincerely can I say, that I rejoice in your success as if it had been my own; and you will not deem it strange if I tell you how perpetually grateful I am to you for presenting to the world an example of a true Man, in the midst of the dwarfs, mountebanks, satyrs and monkeys, which make modern society so mean and false, so hollow and repulsive."

Such was the magnanimous and affectionate, the confiding and reverent friendship, which these two highly-gifted and accomplished men kept bright for over twenty years of intimate intercourse, undimmed by one shade even of misunderstanding or distrust. Most touchingly did this friendship close on earth to be renewed in the "World of Light," in these farewell words of Ripley, shortly before Parker's departure for the West Indies and Europe.

My dear Theodore,—You were very kind to write to me from your sick-bed, which I trust will soon be changed into the couch of convalescence. With your great fund of vitality I cannot but anticipate a speedy restoration to your usual labours. But I am sure that you cannot be anxious on this point, as you have already done such a day's work in the harvest of humanity, and even in the midst of life have gathered such a store of autumn sheaves. Whether you go to the West Indies or to Europe, or to some Ultima Thule yet more unknown, you will be followed by the benedictions and grateful sympathies of many loving hearts, who have received from you their first impulses to truly divine and beautiful things. My wife bids me to give you her kindest remembrances, and the assurance of ancient friendship, while I remain, dear Theodore, ever your faithful friend.

All the more beautiful was this relationship from the remarkable contrast between them—of which each was conscious—alike in character and methods, instinctive tendencies and acquired tastes, and even in central principles and aims. Their mutual friend thus compares them :—

They were very different men. One was engrossed in books; the other was full of action. One was contemplative, quiet, thoughtful; the other was impetuous. One was silent; the other was outspoken. One was cautious to the verge of timidity; the other was bold to the verge of rashness. One was a thinker, taking no part in agitation, political or social; the other was a reformer, eager to apply his ideas to laws and institutions. But their faith in one another was constant.

This comparison is brilliant in its terse and telling antitheses. Yet it does scant justice to Ripley, regarded as the fearless expounder of the "New Views," by unreserved and resolute declarations against an antagonist so highly favoured by age, prestige, and position, as Mr. Norton. And still less is it just to the self-sacrificing, heroic, and persistent Social Reformer, who is next to be presented, in his grand proportions and stalwart endeavours, as the organiser of Brook Farm. For it must be constantly borne in memory that Theodore Parker's early Ideal was to devote his life to study, in order that he might become the historian of

Humanity's search after "The Absolute Religion," and that only the terrible crisis of the "War between Freedom and Slavery" to save his Nation's Life, diverted him from his aim. And equally should it be remembered, that George Ripley consecrated his life and all he held dearest to a sublime endeavour to organise a small "Heaven on Earth," as a harbinger of a NEW ERA of hope, peace, and brotherhood for Christendom and Mankind; and that he reluctantly postponed—though he *never abandoned* this sublime endeavour,—only when Brook Farm suddenly fell in disastrous ruin, after the destruction by fire of the "Phalanstery." To this tragic yet inspiring story, then, let us next pass on.

Thus are we brought to consider the *Convictions* and *Motives*, which prompted this profound Theologian and fervent Seeker after brighter vision of the "Light of Life" to leave his serene study for the anxious cares and hard labour of Brook Farm. For, undeniably, by the stately and conventional "Good Society," as well as by the business common-sense of the "solid men" of Boston, this resolute step was regarded as eccentric to the verge of folly. As Mr. Frothingham picturesquely presents the facts, the enterprise could not but look chimerical to the worldly-wise:—

Sharply contrasting the two situations,—the dignity, leisure, elegance, respectability of the one with the democracy, toil, rudeness, unpopularity of the other; the quiet of the library with the tumult of affairs; the pursuit of high philosophy with the study of soils and crops; the works of Kant, Schelling, Cousin, with muck manuals; broadcloth and beaver with overalls and tarpauline; it seemed as if heroism of an exalted kind, not to say a rash enthusiasm—quite unaccountable in a cautious man,—must have stimulated so wild an enterprise. Heroism there certainly was. There was heroism in the brave preacher who, for nearly fifteen years, had proclaimed a Gospel, which was unwelcome to the staid Unitarian community, whereof he was a member. But Brook Farm was simply the logical completion of the pulpit ministration; a final proof of the preacher's sincerity.

Yes, it was "logically" consistent, heartily "sincere" to exchange Purchase Street pulpit for the sterile acres of West Roxbury. But none knew better than George and Sophia Ripley, how great were the personal and social sacrifices they cheerfully made in obedience to duty. As they were well aware, they staked their worldly all, and probably forfeited the tranquil comforts of their whole future lives, in thus pioneering the way to an unexplored "El Dorado" of hope for human advancement. But they acted in perfect unison together, with deliberate judgment and devout disinterestedness.

Their biographer writes with strict truth, that "the plunge from the pulpit to Brook Farm, though immediate, was not so headlong as was commonly supposed." It has been seen already, how from the very position of their Church in the midst of a district where the wealthy classes year by year were being driven out of their well-appointed homes by the resistless tides of trade—resigning their once-fashionable dwellings to crowds of "lodgers," composed of the working classes and the poor,—the faithful pastor and his wife found their sympathies and energies more and more directed towards philanthropic efforts. George Ripley moreover,—as a deeply-read student of History and of Political Economy,—and as an "Ideal Democrat,"—such as De Tocqueville had conceived in speculative thought, and as his friend George Bancroft, the historian, with other compeers, were then striving to become in deed,—clearly recognised that the time had arrived, in the development of the Western Republic, for attempts to embody in reality that conception of a "CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH,"—which had hovered in vision before the Puritan Fathers and the wisest politicians, alike of the Colonies and of the United States. And, finally, the Spirit of the Age, especially in New England, was quickening earnest souls on all sides with undefined yet urgent longings for "Social Reform." Everywhere eager inquirers after a purer and nobler style of human relations, were studying the writings of the earlier heralds of social freedom, like William Godwin and Mary

Woollstonecraft, or of Coleridge and Southey in their brief era of "Pantisocracy," and yet more the books and pamphlets of the later prophets of progress, like Dr. Arnold, of Rugby, F. D. Maurice, Charles Kingsley, Thomas Carlyle, George Combe, and his brother Andrew. The more hopefully energetic were importing also and lending to one another the suggestive books of Continental *Socialists*, both Catholic and Protestant,—such as Buchez, Ballanche, De Lamennais, Pierre Leroux, Cabet, and Charles Fourier. While the very failures of the brave and devoted Owens—father and son—in the Western States had but served to arouse fixed attention to the fundamental principles of Social Reorganisation. And to come yet nearer home to the inmost aims and aspirations of the Ripleys, the partial success only of Dr. Tuckerman's apostolic mission in founding his well-known "Ministry at large,"—with which they had from the first zealously co-operated,—had compelled them both to probe to the core the terrible problems of pauperism and crime, of intemperance and licentiousness, of popular ignorance, degradation and despair. At length,—after frequent consultations with his once disciple and then stalwart comrade, O. A. Brownson, who, after tantalising efforts in organising his "Society of Liberty and Progress" for the working men of Boston, was then suffering bitter disappointment and beginning to feel that attempts at political and social reform could hope for triumph only when springing from and guided by religious sanctions,—Ripley determined to carry his troubles, questionings, and doubts to one, who, from his youth upward, had been to him a spiritual father, and who was his wife's near relative, Dr. William Ellery Channing. So he sought the well-known study in Mount Vernon Street, for confidential conference. And there, at once,—so far as heartiest sympathy, swift recognition, and uncompromising encouragement could give relief,—his burdens were lifted. For to his delighted surprise, Dr. Channing informed him that *he* had never resigned the glorious hope of a "heavenly era of true Christian Society," which had so fired his young enthusiasm

on the banks of the James River in Richmond, and in his lonely strolls by the beaches of Newport. He went on to confess that the accumulated experiences of his prolonged ministry had served only to confirm him in similar conclusions,—at once speculative, moral, and practical,—to those which his consistent young disciple had arrived at; and in a word, he laid bare the convictions which were afterwards so frankly presented by his own avowals throughout his “Memoirs,” and especially in the chapters of his youthful life at “Richmond,” and of his zealous efforts for “Social Reform” in his maturest years.* He closed the conversation by saying that if “he himself could be renewed once more in youthful health and vigour, he would gladly consecrate his remaining years to the effort of organising a Real Christian Community, moulded from its corner-stone to its dome, into a ‘Living Temple,’ for the Heavenly Father’s indwelling with His Children, as in a Family made at one by that Spirit of Holiness, Truth, and Love, which was incarnate in the Beloved Son.” It is not meant that these are the *exact words*, in which Dr. Channing affirmed his cherished hopes and aims. But it is meant to declare, with emphatic unreserve, that this was the *substance* of his confidential response to his young brother’s confessions.

And how faithfully this statement reflects Dr. Channing’s maturest convictions is conclusively proved from a letter written by him to Adin Ballou, in February, 1841,—not long after this conversation with George Ripley,—in which he says: “I have for a *very long time* dreamed of an ASSOCIATION, in which the members, instead of preying upon one another, and seeking to put one another down, after the fashion of this world, should live together as Brothers, seeking one another’s elevation and spiritual growth.”

It can be well understood, with what a lightened heart George Ripley returned home to report to his wife the result of this momentous interview. They determined that the first step should be simply to unbosom himself to

* See Part I., Chap. iv.; and Part III., Chap. iii., of Channing’s *LIFE*.

his People,—who, though personally much attached to them, and most considerately kind and courteous,—had been not a little disturbed by their Pastor's "Transcendentalism" and "Socialism," as more and more distinctly unveiled in his sermons, and yet more by the criticisms brought to bear against him by conservative Unitarians. This step, therefore, he proceeded to take in a long letter, from which it would be interesting to give full extracts,—so nobly sincere, humane and magnanimous is the tone of this avowal of his Religious Principles and his Social Aims. We have room, however, for a few paragraphs only, which will clearly strike its key-note and its theme :—

The true followers of Jesus are a band of Brothers : they compose one Family ; they attach no importance to the petty distinctions of birth, rank, wealth, and station ; but feeling that they are one in the pursuit of truth, in the love of holiness, and in the hope of immortal life, they regard the common differences of the world, by which men are separated from each other, as lighter than the dust of the balance. They look at one another with mutual respect and honour ; they have no struggle for pre-eminence ; they have no desire for the chief seats in the synagogue, nor greetings in the streets and markets. . . . These ideas I have perhaps insisted on more strongly than any others, for they have been near my heart, and are a part of my life ; they seem to me to be the very *essence* of our Religion. The great fact of human equality before God is not one to let the heart remain cold. It is not a mere speculative abstraction. It is something more than a watchword for a political party to gain power with, and then do nothing to carry it into practical operation. It is a deep, solemn, vital *Truth*, written by the Almighty in the laws of our being, announced with terrible distinctness to the oppressors by His Beloved Son, and pleaded for by all that is just and noble in the promptings of our nature. Blame me for it, if you will ; but I cannot behold the degradation, the poverty, the vice, the ruin of the soul, which is everywhere displayed in the very bosom of Christian Society in our own city,—while men look coolly on,—without a shudder ! I cannot witness the glaring inequalities of condition, the hollow pretension of pride, the scornful apathy with which many urge the prostration of man, the burning zeal with which they run the race of selfish

competition, with no thought for the elevation of their brethren without the sad conviction, that the Spirit of Christ has well-nigh disappeared from our churches, and that the fearful doom awaits us: "Inasmuch as ye have not done it unto one of the *least* of these, ye have not done it unto Me." . . . There is another class of persons, who are devoted to the removal of the abuses, that prevail in modern society. They witness the oppressions that are done under the sun, and they cannot keep silence. They have faith that God governs men; they believe in a better future than the past. Their daily prayer is for the coming of the kingdom of righteousness, truth, and love; they look forward to a more pure, more lovely, more *divine State of Society*, than was ever yet realised on earth. And with these views, I rejoice to say that I strongly and entirely sympathise.

He concluded this Christian and manly letter by saying in brief:—

If you shall think that another's voice can be heard, here, with greater advantage than my own; if you shrink from one who comes before you laden with so many heresies; I shall claim no privilege. . . . But I can never be a different man from what God has made me. I must always speak with frankness the word that comes from my heart. . . . There is no difficulty, no misunderstanding between us. And never have I received greater proofs of confidence, attachment, and esteem. . . . I look on the walls of our church with inexpressible interest; every seat has a story to tell, which we cannot think of unmoved. We have sat in heavenly places here, with those who are now in heavenly places above; the venerable and beloved have been trained in our companionship; whatever may be the future, we have been blest in the past; and whether this pulpit shall be filled by another, who shall fill it more worthily, or by him, who now addresses you, he will never cease to call down upon it the choicest benedictions.

This letter was dated in October, 1840. George Ripley then foresaw that this practical resignation of his ministry would be accepted; and the result confirmed his foresight. So on March 28th, 1841, he delivered his farewell discourse and so closed with gracious dignity his ministry in Boston.

Meanwhile, during this winter season of 1840-41, Ripley

and his devoted helpmate had been corresponding and consulting with persons throughout New England, whom they knew to be more or less in sympathy with their views of Social Reform. And early in the year they invited a Conference of leading Social Reformers to meet at their house, to discuss plans of action, and to combine their efforts, if possible, in some common enterprise. In response to their summons, an influential council assembled. Chief among these leaders for age, mature experience, religious earnestness, and genuine Christian heroism, was the veteran Abolitionist and loyal friend of Garrison, the "Restorationist" Apostle, Adin Ballou, of Mendon,—a man of rare sagacity, disinterestedness, and self-sacrificing zeal,—who shortly after became the founder and patriarch of the "Hopedale Community of Practical Christians," and whose most instructive history of that generous movement will, let us hope, be published ere his serene sunset brightens into the morning of Heaven's new day. A second of these leaders was the illustrious compeer of Emerson, A. Bronson Alcott, who a few years later, with two of his English co-labourers,—the disciples of James Pierrepont Greaves,—tried their best, though in vain, to open a small "Paradise Regained" at "Fruitlands," near "Harvard," Massachusetts. And a third was David Mack, a devoted Teacher, whose longing was to combine in living harmony Moral and Industrial with Intellectual Education, and who with a company of earnest co-labourers, established an Association at Northampton, in the Connecticut Valley—the survivors of which still worship together in a Society once ministered to for many years by the eloquent and uncompromising reformer, Charles Burleigh. These and several other high intellectual and humane persons were at one in their desire for a Reorganisation of Society. But after several consultations, it became apparent, that they could not, without sacrificing some of their most cherished convictions, unite together in one ample scheme, with adequate resources and well-assorted companies of skilled workers, as proposed by George Ripley. And so with reciprocated benedictions they

parted company. Contenting themselves, then, as they best could with their reduced plans, he and his friends took immediate steps to organise their comparatively simple enterprise in West Roxbury, to which they gave the pleasant name of "Brook Farm," from a stream running through their grounds, little foreseeing the world-wide celebrity which their modest effort to lead a healthful, useful, kindly, refined and elevating life of "Christian Fraternity" was destined to attain. The full Title of the Association, finally adopted, was "THE BROOK FARM INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE AND EDUCATION."

And thus are we brought to that play-work and picnic season for onlookers, that strenuous and tantalising transition period for the energetic leaders, which has been so graphically sketched, with his characteristic half-weird sadness and half-comic irony, by Hawthorne. But let readers of his fascinating "Blithedale Romance" constantly bear in mind, that "Miles Coverdale"—otherwise Hawthorne himself—heard only the prelude and opening bars of the "*Allegro*" of the "Brook Farm Symphony," and had withdrawn into the distance long before the opening of its profoundly pathetic "*ANDANTE*" movement. Be it also heedfully remembered that the characters in that "Fancy Fair" are "compositions," "studies," "drawings of picturesque bits" only, and in no single instance a portraiture from life. Especially should it be made known,—from the distinct assurances of Hawthorne himself, repeated again and again to intimate friends—that he never dreamed of sketching his friend Margaret Fuller—as has been so carelessly said—under the form of "Zenobia." On the contrary, that brilliant heroine is a *combination* of commanding and attractive, yet dangerous traits drawn from two ladies,—of totally different type, alike in spiritual tendencies and outward appearance, from Miss Fuller—whom the author of "The Scarlet Letter" met at Brook Farm, during the summer of 1841.

The temptation becomes here very strong for the writer of this review to tell *his own* story of the Brook Farm

Association! But he was so intimately related, from first to last, with George and Sophia Ripley, by sharing their personal confidence, and so involved with the whole enterprise from its inception to its dissolution, that he *cannot* give such a narrative with impartial equity—even if room could be afforded for so long a tale of vital interest. The more satisfactory and honest way, therefore, of dealing with this rich topic, is to quote a few significantly illustrative extracts from this Life of Ripley, and then to refer all readers to Mr. Frothingham's Third and Fourth Chapters, which contain the truest, fullest, justest, and in every way most trustworthy record of this brave and beautiful attempt to organise a "Heaven-in-Leasts,"—to use Swedenborg's fine phrase—ever yet given.

And first let us present George Ripley's own IDEAL,—as revealed in several letters written during the long period of forty years, from 1840 to 1880,—in order to prove how brightly this vision shone before him, as "the Light of all his seeing," from the noontide to the sunset of his energetic life. This will be found set forth with admirable lucidity and largeness in passages from a letter to Emerson, dated November, 1840:—

Our conversation in Concord was of such a general nature, that I do not feel as if you were in complete possession of the IDEA of the Association, which I wish to see established. And as we have now a prospect of carrying it into effect, at an early period, I wish to submit the plan to your judgment, that you may decide whether it is one, that can have the benefit of your aid and co-operation. Our objects are, as you know, to insure a more natural *union* between Intellectual and Manual labour than now exists; to combine the Thinker and the Worker, as far as possible, in the same individual; to guarantee the highest mental freedom, by providing all with labour, adapted to their taste and talent, and securing to them the fruit of their industry; to do away with the necessity of menial services, by opening the advantages of education and the profit of work for all; and thus to prepare a society of liberal, intelligent, and cultivated persons; whose relations with each other would permit a more simple and wholesome life, than can be had amidst the pressure of our

competitive institutions. . . . Our farm would be a place for improving the race of men, that lived on it; thought would preside over the operations of labour, and labour would contribute to the expansion of thought; we should have industry without drudgery, and true equality without vulgarity. . . . I can imagine no plan which is suited to carry into effect so many "*divine ideas*" as this. If wisely prosecuted, it will be a light over the country and this age. If not the sunrise, it will be a MORNING STAR. As a practical man I see clearly that we *must* have some such arrangement, or all changes, less radical, will be nugatory. I believe in the divinity of labour. . . . I wish to see a Society of Educated Friends, working, thinking, and living together, with no strife, except that of each to contribute the most to the benefit of all. Personally, my tastes and habits would lead me in another direction. For I have a passion for being independent of the world, and of every man in it. This I could easily do, on the estate now offered, where I could have a "City of God" on a *small scale* of my own. . . . But I feel bound to sacrifice this private feeling in the hope of a great social good. I shall be anxious to hear from you. Your decision will do much towards settling the question with me, whether the true time has come for the fulfilment of a high hope, or whether the work will belong to a future generation. All omens are favourable; a singular union of diverse talents is ready for the enterprise; everything indicates that we ought to arise and build. And if we let slip this occasion, the unsleeping Nemesis will deprive us of the boon we ask. For myself I am sure, that I can never give so much thought to it again; my mind must act on other objects and I shall acquiesce in the course of fate with grief that so fair a light is put out.

Again, in 1845, after four years of Brook Farm experiences, he wrote as follows to one of the friends of the "Community" at Skeneateles in New York:—

Although my present strong convictions are in favour of "*Co. operative Association*" rather than of "*Community of Property*," I look with an indescribable interest on every attempt to redeem Society from its corruptions. The evils arising from Trade and Money, it appears to me, grow out of our Social Organisation, not from an intrinsic vice in the things themselves. And the *abolition of private property* would so far destroy the *independence of the individual*, as to interfere with the great object of all

Social Reform,—namely, the development of humanity,—the substitution of a race of free, noble, holy men and women instead of the dwarfish and mutilated spectres which now cover the earth. The great problem is to guarantee Individualism against the masses on the one hand, and the Masses against the individual on the other. . . . In our own little "Association" we practically adopt many "Community" elements. We are eclectics and learners. But day by day increases our faith and joy in the Principle of "COMBINED INDUSTRY," and of bearing each other's burdens instead of seeking every man his own. . . . One danger proceeds from the growing interest in the subject; and that is, the crowd of converts who desire to help themselves rather than to help the movement. It is as true now as it was of old, that he who would follow this new "Messiah," must "deny himself and take up his cross daily," or he cannot "enter the kingdom." The path of transition is always covered with thorns, and marked with the bleeding feet of the faithful. We must drink the water of Marah, that others may feed on the grapes of Eschol. We must depend on the power of self-sacrifice in man, not on appeals to his selfish nature, for the success of our efforts. This truth must not be covered up in describing the Paradise for which we hope.

Finally,—as one slight indication that the garland of friendship which bound the heart of the veteran scholar and reformer to his Brook Farm children and associates was kept perennially fresh—comes this bright blossom of grateful memory and ever-young hope, from a letter dated in the spring of 1880 a few weeks only before his New Birth:—

Never can I think of you under any other name than that which so deeply interested me in your childhood. . . . Your charming letter gave me a thrill of pleasure, recalling so vividly the bygone days, when a child in appearance but a woman in thought and feeling, your original and racy character awakened in me a "real affection," as you justly called it, which has never for one moment been dimmed from that time to the present. I rejoice, more than I can tell you, in the kindly and beautiful remembrances which I am *constantly receiving* from my old pupils and associates of the Brook Farm life, which was then only a name for an enthusiastic endeavour to organise a purer

and better social state, but which has since become celebrated in romance and history. . . . I have reached nearly the limit of four-score years, but I find that age thus far makes little difference in my attachment to early friends, in my enjoyment of life, or in my intellectual activity.

And he might well have added:—"Neither has prolonged existence dimmed my Ideal of a Heavenly Era of Human Society." For in the very last interview held with the sunny and smiling, white-haired octogenarian, by the writer of this article in 1880, a *month* only before his departure, he talked as enthusiastically over his dear old Brook Farm aspirations, as he was wont to do in his eloquent prime. His "Morning-Star," as he called it, in his letter to Emerson, had only become his Evening Star, as he was about to join the Blessed Societies of the "Just made perfect" in the "City of Peace."

Such was George Ripley's Ideal. And now how far was this made real in the "Brook Farm Institute of Agriculture and Education"? An extract or two from its "Articles of Association, executed" on September 29, 1841, will sufficiently indicate the *first form* of the newly-organised society.

The Object of the Association is to purchase such estates as may be required for the establishment and continuance of an Agricultural, Literary, and Scientific School or College, and to provide such lands and houses, animals, libraries, and apparatus, as may be found advantageous to the main purpose of the Association.

The whole property of the Association, real and personal, shall be vested in and held by Four Trustees, elected annually by the Association; and all persons, who shall hold one or more Shares of the Stock of the Association, shall be members; and every member shall be entitled to one vote on all matters relating to the funds of the Association.

No Shareholder shall be liable to any assessment whatever on the Shares held by him; nor shall he be held responsible in his private property, on account of this Association; nor shall the Trustees or any officer or agent of the Association have any authority to do anything which shall impose personal responsibility on any Shareholder, by making any contracts or incurring

any debts, for which the Shareholders shall be individually or personally responsible.

The Association guarantees to each Shareholder the interest of five per cent. annually, on the amount of Stock held by him in the Association, and this interest may be paid in Certificates of Stock and credited on the books of the Association ; provided, however, that each Shareholder may at the time of the annual settlement draw on the funds of the Association, not otherwise appropriated, to an amount not exceeding that of the interest credited in his favour.

In the annual settlement with individual members, each member shall be allowed board in proportion to the time employed for the Association ; that is, one year's board for one year's labour ; one half-year's board for one half-year's labour, &c.

Three hundred days' labour shall be considered equal to *one year's* labour, and shall entitle a person to one Share of the annual dividend ; and no allowance shall be made for a greater amount of labour.

The " Brook Farm Institute of Agriculture and Education " was therefore a JOINT STOCK ASSOCIATION for combined Industry, and *not a Community*. The Capital Stock of the Association was divided into Shares of Five Hundred Dollars each, and might be increased to any amount at the pleasure of the Association. It was provided, also, that no Share should be transferred from one person to another without the consent of the Trustees, and that no such transfer should be valid without *their* signature. Each Shareholder, moreover, was allowed to withdraw his amount of Stock and whatever interest was due thereon, by giving twelve months' notice to the Trustees of the Association. And under this form the Society began its operations. With the subscriptions actually paid in, a farm of two hundred acres was bought, for ten thousand five hundred dollars, in West Roxbury, about nine miles from Boston. The site was a pleasant one, in close vicinity to some of the most wealthy, capable and zealous friends of the enterprise, such as Mr. and Mrs. George Russell, whose generosity was equal with their prosperity and practical

energy, and their relatives, Francis George Shaw, an accomplished scholar and large-hearted philanthropist, and his lovely and like-spirited wife. The estate was charmingly diversified with hill and hollow, meadow and upland, with a pine and fir-grove on its border. It was hallowed, moreover, by touching historical associations,—as it was the spot where the “Apostle to the Indians, Eliot,” had ministered to his “red-skinned” brothers, and the grave of the devoted missionary was near by. Later experience proved indeed that the soil was unfit for lucrative tillage without costly manuring; and it lacked unfortunately all water power for manufactures, and varied forms of industry. But for the purposes of an “Agricultural and Educational Institute,” it in a measure sufficed; while in an æsthetic and sanitary point of view it was most attractive.

At first, the difficulties of “housing” the large Family were considerable, as only *one* large gable-roofed, long-spreading homestead, with its sheds, outbuildings and barns, stood ready to welcome them,—over whose front branching old trees spread an arcade, which was called the “Hive.” But as soon as possible the Ripleys built an ample mansion, on the highest ridge of the domain, with drawing-rooms,—which would serve for musical entertainments, festive assemblies, educational purposes, and as a chapel for worship on the lower floors, with dormitories for families and single persons above. This was named the “Eyrie.” Then, in due season, were erected the spacious “Pilgrim House,” and two “Villas” for single families. And so gradually the growing company found more or less commodious habitation, and were peacefully gathered in their “Associated Home.” The central kitchen, dining-room, laundry, &c., were established at the “Hive.” And then, made comparatively comfortable and contented with their simple style of life, the “Brook Farmers” were ready to carry on their agricultural operations and organise their school.

The farm, garden, orchard, horses, cattle, cows, &c., were placed under the charge of their most experienced leaders; and all members were welcomed to take any part in out-

ward labours or in household avocations, to which their inclinations prompted them, and for which their past training and habits had given a befitting preparation. All work was *freely* open for the energetic, cheerful, good-tempered, and patient ; and shiftless idlers or meddlesome busy-bodies alone were unwelcome. Thus in spirit and in deed the Golden Rules were loyally obeyed : " Let him that would be greatest among you be most the servant of all," and " Never ask nor permit any fellow being to do for you what you would not gladly, without loss of self-respect or sense of shame, do in turn for them." All associations with "*menial* service" were thus utterly banished ; and on every side were seen and heard only the smiling faces, cheery voices, merry laughter, or gay songs of heartily co-working friends, intent in pursuit of the common good. The presiding spirit of universal refinement that overruled and animated all found fit expression in Ripley's own words :—

This community aims to be rich, not in the metallic *representation* of wealth, but in the *WEALTH* itself, which money should represent, namely, *leisure to live in all the faculties of the soul*. . . . In the end, it hopes to be enabled to provide not only all the necessities, but all the elegances desirable for bodily and spiritual health,—Books, Apparatus, collections for Science, works of Art, and means of Beautiful Amusement. These are to be *common* to all. And thus the object, which alone refines the passion for individual accumulation, will no longer exist for desire ; and, whenever the sordid passion appears, it will be seen in its naked selfishness. . . . Every one must labour for the community, in a reasonable degree, or not taste its benefits. The Principles of the organisation, therefore, will determine its members. These Principles are Co-operation in social matters, instead of Competition or balance of interests ; and Individual Self-unfolding, in the faith that the whole soul of humanity is in each man and woman. The former of these is the *application* of the Love of Man, the latter of the Love of God to *LIFE*.

Thus the whole of earthly existence was, in hope, transformed into a High School and University for moulding human beings into the image of the Universal Father, and fitting them for truly heavenly communion, here and here—

after. Thus are we led to glance next at Brook Farm regarded as an "Educational Institute." And certainly few schools in New England were ever organised with a better staff of Instructors. Mr. Ripley himself taught Intellectual and Moral Philosophy and Mathematics; Mrs. Ripley gave lessons in History and Modern Languages; George P. Bradford took the department of Belles-Lettres; Charles A. Dana had classes in Greek and German, and John S. Dwight in Latin and Music. Others were employed in the primary and infant schools. There was also a teacher in Drawing and Painting, and another in theoretical and practical Agriculture. And, as Mr. Frothingham well says:—

The teaching was of a high order, not so much by reason of the undeniably high accomplishments of the instructors, as in consequence of the singular enthusiasm which animated all concerned in the school, pupils no less than preceptors. Especially in music was the standard of taste exacting. The boys and girls of Brook Farm were familiar with the compositions of Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Mendelssohn, Schubert, before the initiation began elsewhere. There was a genuine passion for improvement in intellectual arts, a thirst for knowledge, a hunger for mental stimulus of a powerful kind.

Having thus briefly sketched in outline the two chief aspects of this "Agricultural and Educational Institute," let us next try to behold the living Association as it presented itself to the eyes of the crowds of visitors, drawn to Brook Farm incessantly by motives of cordial sympathy or of amused criticism,—who were invariably greeted with gracious courtesy, however ill-timed or intrusive might be their visits. For in the words of Mr. Frothingham:—

The undertaking was so interesting, that few people who had at heart the condition of society remained wholly aloof. The public curiosity was insatiable. During one year there were more than four thousand visitors. Every fine day brought a crowd. The multitude became occasionally an incumbrance, so that the time of the members was uncomfortably encroached on, and their occupations disturbed. . . . The well-to-do people of the world, the contented, the comfortable, the ambitious . . .

regarded it as a Utopia, visionary, chimerical, notional, absurd—a butt for ridicule. But the hungry of heart, the democratic, the aspiring, the poor in spirit or in purse, those who sought a refuge or a place of rest . . . knocked for admission at its doors.

O. A. Brownson, in an article written for the *Democratic Review*, after describing the “originator and leader of Brook Farm as a man of rare attainments, one of our best scholars, and as a metaphysician second to none in the country,” goes on to say: “A few men and women of like views and feelings grouped themselves around him, not as their master, but as their friend and brother;” and continues: “This Association essentially breaks the family *caste*, while it preserves the FAMILY inviolate. Individual property is recognised and held sacred.” He concludes by dwelling on “the Christian Democracy of the establishment, the goodwill, the admirable teaching, the cheerful toil, the happiness of the children, the serviceableness of the women, the diligence in the farm, garden and fruit culture, the cordial humanity, the glad self-sacrifice, the extraordinary combination of religious enthusiasm with æsthetic taste” of Brook Farm.

Hawthorne always, to the end of his career, spoke of “his old and affectionately-remembered home at Brook Farm as certainly the most romantic episode in his life.” He had at an earlier period testified to its healthful gladness and genial courtesy. He remarks: “The household, being composed in great measure of children and young people, is generally a cheerful one enough, even in gloomy weather. It would be difficult to conceive beforehand how much can be added to the enjoyment of a home by mere sunniness of temper and liveliness of disposition.”

A writer in the *Atlantic Monthly*, of October, 1878, recalling her happy memories of Brook Farm—a lady of much refinement, a good observer, and a frank narrator—sums up her experience by saying: “Naturally exclusive and fastidious, a spell was woven round me, which entered into my very heart, and led me to nobler and higher

thoughts than the world ever gave me." Margaret Fuller—whose insight was all but infallible—after bearing her friendly tribute to the consistent dignity of Mr. and Mrs. Ripley, records :—" I find the tone of society much sweeter. There is a pervading spirit of mutual tolerance with great sincerity. There is no longer a passion for grotesque freaks of liberty, but a disposition, rather, to study and enjoy the liberty of law." And to quote one more out of countless testimonies to the unique charm of the Brook Farm Society in its prime, the editor of the *New York Sun*, one of the earliest, ablest, most constant and influential friends of the enterprise, C. A. Dana, in a eulogistic tribute to George Ripley, immediately after his friend's decease in 1880, wrote: "It is not too much to say, that every person who was at Brook Farm for any length of time, has ever looked back upon it with a feeling of satisfaction. The healthy mixture of manual and intellectual labour, the kindly and unaffected social relations, the absence of everything like assumption or servility, the amusements, the discussions, the friendships, the ideal and poetical atmosphere, which gave a charm to life—all these combine to create a picture, towards which the mind turns back with pleasure as to something distant and beautiful, not elsewhere to be met with in the routine of this world."

And finally, to crown the picture of this singular combination of practical energy, intellectual refinement, poetic aspiration, æsthetic grace and social courtesy, with high-toned mutual reverence, let Octavius Frothingham,—unsurpassed as he is among his compeers for pure and lofty idealism and spiritual largeness and freedom,—bear his impartial testimony to the *religious* character and tendencies of Brook Farm :—

The Institution, though far from being "religious," in the usual sense of the word, was enthusiastically religious in spirit and purpose. Faith in the divinity of natural impulse may have been excessive; but emphasis was so strongly laid on the *divinity* that the common dangers of following *impulse* were avoided. Confidence in *freedom* may have been exaggerated;

but inasmuch as the freedom was interpreted as liberty to become wise and good, simple and self-sacrificing, gentle and kind, its earthward tendency was no cause of anxiety. There was no theological creed, no ecclesiastical form, no inquisition into opinions. . . . The thoughts of all were heartily respected; and while some listened with sympathy to Theodore Parker . . . at the funeral of one who died in the Episcopal faith, the services were conducted in accordance with *that* Ritual. There were many Swedenborgians in the company; in fact, there was a decided leaning towards the views of the Swedish mystic; but no attempt was made to fashion opinion in that or in any other mould. The spirit of hope in the Association was too elevated for that. Its aim was practical, not theoretical, not transcendental. In the same breath, it must be added, it was in a high sense spiritual, and practical because it was spiritual; that while it aimed at the physical and mental elevation of the poorer classes, it did so because it believed in their natural capacity for elevation as Children of God. The leaders trusted in the power of light and love, in natural truth and justice, and were persuaded that the world could be helped by nothing else. They *believed*; therefore they toiled. More than this, they felt themselves to be CHRISTIANS. The name of Jesus was always spoken with earnest reverence. Their discussions were always within the limits of the Christian dispensation, and never conducted in the interest of denial or scepticism.

And here, after watching the brightening of George Ripley's orb of day from the spring dawn to its summer solstice noon, let us bid him "Good-bye" amidst its glow. The culminating hour of his human blessedness was when, with his enthusiastic wife beside him, they beheld the long-hoped-for "Associated Home" successfully organised, and gathered around them the bright-eyed companies of youths, maidens and little children, whom they fondly dreamed were to grow up as co-heirs in their earthly Eden.

To follow on under the disastrous eclipse, that dimmed though it never darkened in utter gloom their bright Ideal, in the downfall of Brook Farm,—and thence to trace the pilgrimage of the exiles, as with weary feet and wasted strength they trod their thorn-strewn path through debt and poverty, struggle and illness, till the saintly Sophia lay

down to sleep, clad in the robes of the "Benedictine Sisters of Mercy," which with his own loving hands, aided by a silver-haired patriarch of the Order, the reverent husband wrapped her in, as winding sheet; and then to do the least justice to the calm submission, the unfaltering courage, the steadfast fidelity, and ever-smiling good-cheer, with which he took up, once more, life's burdens and bravely bore them, till he had won his way to honourable competence, and when in his serene age he was recognised as the first Critic in the United States, and had gained universal applause, as Editor in Chief of the thoroughly scholarly American Encyclopædia, would need another article as long as this, which has already trespassed beyond its appointed bounds. Enough, however, has been said, let us trust, to prompt readers to order this beautiful biography from its Boston and New York publishers. And henceforth may his British brethren in the realm of Letters, Social Reform, and Religious Unity rank beside Bryant, Dana, Longfellow, Emerson, Dewey, Bellows, Garfield, and Cooper, with other contemporaries,—whose stars now make so bright a constellation in the sky of the Western Republic,—the name of GEORGE RIPLEY.

WILLIAM HENRY CHANNING.

SCIENCE TEACHING AS A RELIEF FROM THE OVERSTRAIN IN EDUCATION.

IN the April number of this *Review* the Rev. R. A. Armstrong brought a very heavy indictment against the modern system of education, more especially with regard to elementary schools under Government inspection, but not excepting from his general criticism the Grammar Schools and Girls' High Schools. After pointing out how the method of "payment by results" dominates the whole system of our State-aided elementary education, he showed that the livelihood of the teacher depends directly or indirectly upon the percentage of children he can push through the ordeal of examination, and the number of subjects he can crowd into their brains. As a consequence of this, it followed that "the question how far the nervous systems of the teaching fraternity are affected by the pressure of successive Codes," was one of extremely grave moment in estimating our national education. When, in addition, the effects of this excessive strain upon the children themselves were considered, we were, in Mr. Armstrong's opinion, obliged "to face the fact of terrible physical evil in our national system of education,—a wholesale undermining of health which must tell with redoubled power in the second generation."

The intention of this article—the object of which is sufficiently indicated by its title—is not to controvert the position assumed by Mr. Armstrong, since it is a very strong one, and in some points, perhaps, practically unsailable; and the purpose of the present writer would be served equally well, if not better, if the situation were even

worse than it is, or, at any rate, worse than it is admitted to be by the defenders of the present system. It may sound almost paradoxical to assert that any relief to overstrained children and teachers can be given by the introduction of fresh subjects of instruction, and additional claims upon their already overtaxed attention; but, as I shall presently show, this remarkable result has actually been attained for some years in the Board Schools of Liverpool and of Birmingham, by the introduction of a wisely conceived and admirably carried out system of instruction in Elementary Science.

Less than fifty years ago, a Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, gave as his opinion on the education of the people that "it were best they should be left alone;" while the Bishop of Durham added that "education was not likely to make its way among the poor." It is possible that people still exist who hold these opinions, but they seldom or never venture to express them openly; and yet it is difficult, on any other hypothesis, to account for some of the attempts to restrict and hinder progress which are occasionally met with. If, however, the spirit of these two remarks be confined to the education of the poor in elementary science, they may be accepted as expressing the openly avowed opinions of a much larger number of people than it is at all pleasant to contemplate, and the concealed convictions of at least as many more. The great importance of Science as one of the instruments of the higher education, would probably be admitted by all readers of the *Modern Review*, although there might be differences of opinion among them as to the relative value to be assigned to it as compared with other modes of culture. It may be well to remind those who would be disposed to place it somewhat low down in the scale, of the very greatly increased recognition which it has obtained during the last ten years, from those whose special business it is to study the educational value of various methods of instruction. To go no farther at present than the two largest public schools in England, Eton, and Clifton College;—at Eton, the

governing body of the school has recently caused to be erected a set of new "schools" devoted entirely to the teaching of Science, where Physics, Chemistry, and even Biology can be not merely taught to, but practically studied by, the boys; while at Clifton College, the whole curriculum was, a few years ago, arranged by the then headmaster, Rev. Dr. Percival (himself an ardent classic, but an educationalist first, and a classic after), in such a way that the attendance upon a certain amount of Science-teaching per week was compulsory upon every boy. The traditions brought thence from Rugby by the present headmaster, Rev. J. M. Wilson, are quite a sufficient guarantee that the claims of Science will not be disregarded under the new *régime*.

It may be urged, however, with some force, that while it may be all very well to give an insight into scientific methods and aims to young gentlemen, some of whom are going to the Universities, while others are intended for a professional or business life in which a smattering of scientific knowledge may eventually be turned to some practical account, it is quite another thing in the case of young people of the poorer classes, since they have only a limited time at school, and their whole attention while there is at present absorbed by the necessity for passing certain specified examinations, upon their success in which not only the credit, but the actual livelihood, of their teachers depend. My main purpose, however, is to show that even if a small fraction of the time now devoted in such schools to the mechanical grinding in the "three R's," be appropriated to instruction in elementary science by methods and in a manner to be hereafter described, the actual effect will be (for the experiment has been repeatedly tried upon a large scale) that the general intelligence of the children is quickened to such an extent, that even under the present system of "payment by results," a larger percentage of "passes" is obtained than in corresponding schools where the whole available time is occupied in the usual way.

Probably no one would be disposed now to dispute the

beneficial influence upon the mind of *variety in occupation*, whether bodily or mental; the only instance that it is, perhaps, worth while to allege in this connection, is that of the "Half-timers" in the cotton manufacturing districts. When Government first interfered to protect these poor children, it was found as a matter of fact that if their time was divided between the factory and the schoolroom, the progress made in each case by any given child was nearly as great as though his or her whole time had been devoted to either separately. It is quite conceivable, therefore, that with at any rate the lower classes in elementary schools, better results than are now attained might be secured by a more judicious appropriation of the time at present occupied.

It has been remarked, and with great justice, that the *best* elementary schools of twenty years ago were nearly, if not quite, equal to those of to-day, and that the improvement in the intervening period, of which so much has been said, has been in the direction of the *quantity* of the work (by a multiplication of good schools of one pattern) rather than in its *quality*. Now it will probably be admitted by all whose experience enables them to judge, that one of the great shortcomings of the present system is the *mechanical nature of the work done*, which reduces the children to the state of machines rather than of thinking individuals. The Government Inspectors complain unceasingly of the monotony, want of ease and power, and lack of "general intelligence" exhibited by the children. They read correctly, but the *words* represent or convey *no ideas* to their minds. "They can" (to quote an official utterance) "usually work 'straightforward' sums with quickness and precision, but they rarely succeed in solving the easiest problem." Some of Mr. Armstrong's correspondents bore striking testimony to this state of things, one saying, "There is not time to train children to think," and another remarking that "what will pass, not what will educate, is the incentive."

Let us now inquire in a little more tail into the pro-

bable effect of science lessons upon the mental constitutions of young people. During the first year or two of the life of an ordinary child the amount of positive information obtained regarding the external world is, indeed, remarkable; as the late Dr. Whewell said, in congratulating a friend famous for his knowledge and ability, on the birth of a son, "Young as he is, he will learn more than you in the next twelve months." And, in the words of Professor Tyndall, "As the child grows he is still an experimenter; he grasps at the moon, and his failure teaches him to respect distance. At length his little fingers acquire sufficient mechanical tact to lay hold of a spoon; he thrusts the instrument into his mouth, hurts his gums, and thus learns the impenetrability of matter. He lets the spoon fall, and jumps with delight to hear it rattle against the table. The experiment made by accident is repeated with intention, and thus the young student receives his first lessons upon sound and gravitation. There are pains and penalties, however, in the path of the inquirer; he is sure to go wrong, and Nature is just as sure to inform him of the fact. He falls downstairs, burns his fingers, cuts his hand, scalds his tongue, and in this way learns the conditions of his physical well-being. This is Nature's way of proceeding, and it is wonderful what progress her pupil makes."

The difficulty of thoroughly entering into the mental condition of young children will probably be admitted by most thoughtful minds. A very interesting contribution to the subject, from the pen of Mr. G. Stanley Hall, has lately appeared in the *Princeton Review*, entitled "The Contents of Children's Minds." It is substantially a summary and analysis of the answers given to a series of 134 questions which were put privately (*i.e.*, not in classes) to upwards of 200 Boston (U.S.A.) school children, with the view of "determining the individuality of the children so far as conditioned by the concepts arising from their immediate environment." Tables are given showing the percentage of children of various kinds, and with different previous training, ignorant of several common objects or concepts. For example,

55 per cent. did not know that wooden things came from trees; 69 per cent. were ignorant of the origin of woollen things; 75·5 per cent. did not know what season it was; to 61 per cent. the words "growing potatoes," "a snail," or "a spade" conveyed no idea. Of 48 children questioned, 20 believed sun, moon, or stars to live; 15 thought a doll, and 16 thought flowers, would suffer pain if burned. Of all the children questioned, 48 per cent. thought that at night the sun "goes, or rolls, or flies, is blown, or walks, or God pulls it up higher out of sight. He takes it to heaven, and perhaps puts it to bed, or even takes off its clothes and puts them on in the morning, or, again, it lies under the trees, where the angels mind it. It may stay where it is, only we cannot see it, for it is dark, or the dark rains down so, and it comes out when it gets light so it can see." So also the moon comes around when people forget to light lamps; sometimes a piece is cut off, and it is only half stuck or buttoned into the sky. "God lights the stars with matches, and blows them out and opens the door and calls them in in the morning. Lightning is when God strikes many matches at once; He makes rain up in heaven out of nothing, keeps it in a big tub, and lets it down with a water-hose through a sieve." We commend this remarkable and suggestive article to the serious attention of all who have to do with young people.

Does it not follow, then, that in any rational system of education (using that much-abused word in its etymological sense of drawing out the faculties of the learner), Nature's method should be followed? If so, then Science, which has to do especially with man's relations to the animate and inanimate objects around him, should be taught, not by the dry reading of lessons upon the subject from a printed page (too often under the supervision of an already overworked pupil-teacher, who has, by dint of much labour, obtained a superficial acquaintance with the subject), but by actual demonstrations upon the objects treated of, by teachers thoroughly conversant with their subject, and impressed with a deep sense of its importance both for its own sake and as an

instrument of education. Surely this is the only true Science-teaching worthy of the name, and the only way in which young people should be instructed in elementary science; it is strictly in this sense that the terms Science-teaching or Science-lessons are used in this article.

Bearing in mind, then, the beneficial effects of variety of mental occupation in school-work, and the extraordinary influence (as to which testimony will presently be adduced) of good Science-teaching upon young minds, especially in the overworked condition so graphically described by Mr. Armstrong, it will not be difficult to understand how great a relief from this overstrain, both to pupils and teachers, may be found in the appropriation of even an hour or two in each week to a "Science demonstration."

But it will not unnaturally be asked, How is teaching of such a character to be obtained, and in what way is the system to be worked? Such questions are best answered by an examination of the system which has been in operation for some years with the happiest results in the Board schools of Liverpool and Birmingham. Its origin is thus described by Mr. Hance, Clerk to the School Board of Liverpool, in a paper read at a conference of school managers, and published in the *School Board Chronicle* for Nov. 1st, 1879.

However important, I might say essential, may have been the system of payment by results introduced by the Revised Code, I think that there can be little doubt that the effect of it, as first applied—and, to a modified extent, the same still holds good—was to reduce education in, I might say, the majority of Government-aided schools to a monotonous "grind" at reading, writing, and arithmetic, of which the ultimate aim appeared to be the attainment of mechanical accuracy. This not only did very little, if anything, to develop the intelligence in the children, but was directly calculated to defeat that object, by generating, in a large proportion of cases, a positive distaste for intellectual attainments. The Liverpool School Board, as soon as they had any schools of their own to manage, were, like most other School Boards, greatly impressed with the necessity of providing a somewhat more varied curriculum. They also felt

strongly the importance of introducing some subject specially calculated to awaken and exercise the observing faculties of the children, and by making this subject common to all their schools, to render it a distinctive feature in their educational system. With this object they sought and obtained the valuable advice of Professor Huxley, Colonel Donelley, and other gentlemen of eminence in the world of science. The result would, if they had felt themselves entirely free, have probably been the adoption of elementary physics, for both boys and girls; but, in view of the provisions of the New Code as to Government grants, and of the importance of having the work tested by independent examination, it was decided not to go outside of the subjects provided for by the Code. Under these circumstances the Board, at the suggestion of the gentlemen before mentioned, ultimately selected "Mechanics" for boys, and "Domestic Economy" for girls,* as the subjects most suitable for their purpose—the definition of these subjects given in the New Code being of such a nature as to allow of the instruction being considerably expanded in the one case in the direction of elementary physics, and in the other in that of elementary chemistry, physics, and physiology. In reference to the system of instruction, it was, by the same advice, decided to absolutely abandon the use of text-books by the scholars, and to rely upon oral instruction, accompanied by, or rather explaining, appropriate illustrations and experiments.

The general idea of the scheme thus suggested was first worked out in detail in Liverpool, but was speedily adopted by the Birmingham School Board, and by it still further developed. When in Birmingham some weeks ago, I had the very great advantage of practically studying the system there under the guidance of Rev. H. W. Crosskey, Chairman of the School Management Committee, and of Mr. Davis, the energetic Clerk to the Board. The special feature of the scheme, and one which is of the very highest importance in connection with it, is, that these Science-demonstrations are given, not by the ordinary staff of the school, but by a specially appointed expert, whose sole duty

* These being two of the ten "specific subjects" in which an extra grant is made for each child, above Standard IV., who passes a satisfactory examination in any of them.—W. L. C.

it is to go round from school to school, giving practically the same lesson in each one, until all have been visited. The apparatus necessary is kept, and the experiments are prepared, at a central laboratory, built at one of the schools, and whatever is needed for a given lesson is carefully packed in neatly-partitioned boxes and transported from one school to another in a hand-cart. In this way the Birmingham demonstrator, Mr. W. Jerome Harrison, F.G.S. (formerly curator of the Museum at Leicester), is able during school-hours to give four lessons per day in as many different schools; and at present sixty-two school departments are thus receiving such instruction, which is given to about 1,500 boys and 1,000 girls. Mr. Harrison has two assistants, and it occasionally happens, as was the case at the time of my "surprise" visit, that he may be teaching physics to boys while one of his assistants is expounding domestic economy to girls in different rooms of the same school at the same time, carriage of apparatus thus being saved. "In Liverpool the number of children under this instruction last year was 5,008, of whom 3,407 were examined by H.M. Inspector; more than one-half of these were in Standard IV., a standard which for the future will be excluded from examination," as Mr. Hance, the Clerk to the Liverpool School Board, writes to me.

In Birmingham the lessons are given fortnightly; one of the regular staff of the school is always present, and it is his or her duty in the intervening week to go over the lesson again to the class (without the illustrations) and drive it home. After this each child writes out notes of the lesson, often in reply to questions set, and these notes are revised by the demonstrator himself before he next visits the school. I looked over several of these, selected at hazard, and was much surprised at the ability displayed in some of the answers; the differences between various sets of notes in the wording and phrases showed conclusively that the children were grasping ideas, and not merely repeating a parrot-lesson. Prof. Poynting, who holds the Chair of Physics in Mason College, Birmingham, had occasion to examine several boys

for a scholarship offered in connection with the system, and he spoke to me in very strong terms of the excellent results noticeable throughout the examination. In his official report upon it he says :—

Hardly any of the questions in my paper could have been answered without independent thought on the part of the candidates, and I had but very few answers showing a want of such thought. The boys showed that they had seen and understood the experiments which they described, that they had been taught to reason for themselves upon them, and that they were not merely using forms of words which they had learnt, without attaching physical ideas to them.

The practice of having one or more of the ordinary teachers present at the demonstration is fraught with more important consequences than at first sight appear. Their attention is thus drawn to Science, and to Science *well taught*, as the following quotation from a teacher's letter to Mr. Harrison will show. The writer is one of the hardest working assistant-teachers in Birmingham, and his testimony is spontaneous :—

I have attended eight or ten science classes, and gained several certificates, but from them all I have not gained so much knowledge as by listening to your lessons.

The duties of the Birmingham demonstrators, however, are by no means confined to the day lessons given to the boys and girls ; for on two evenings in the week four classes are held, in which one hundred and eighty pupil teachers, exhibitioners, &c., are receiving practical instruction in Chemistry, Electricity, Magnetism, Physiology, and Physiography. Further, Mr. Harrison, the chief demonstrator, devotes at least one evening per week in the winter months to giving elementary popular scientific lectures at the various schools, illustrated with lantern photographs, &c., and of this work he says : “ The effect in improving the general intelligence of the children, in attracting them to school, and in improving the regularity of the attendance is, I believe, unquestioned.”

Although no child is permitted to attend the special Science demonstrations until he or she has passed what is technically known as the fourth standard, the Birmingham Board, acting upon a suggestion from one of H.M. Inspectors, has issued a very carefully prepared series of "Suggestions regarding the preparation of progressive schemes of object lessons in boys', girls', and infants' schools," in order to help the teachers to prepare the scholars of the first four standards for the Science course upon which they enter when the highest of these is passed. The number of new lessons in any one year is fixed at thirty-six, and their aim is to place the child in intelligent connection with the phenomena by which it is surrounded. These lessons, however, are confined to "objects"—*i.e.*, *matter*—those which need reference to *force* being left until the fifth standard is passed.

To enter more in detail into the courses of instruction would be beyond the scope of the present article; but it is important to bear in mind that under the system which has been thus briefly outlined, instruction is given in elementary science, by a teacher who is an "expert" in every sense, to *every child* above the fourth standard, as long as he remains in the school; and also that each child below that standard is, by a series of well-prepared object lessons, being gradually trained to take advantage of this higher instruction. In many of our schools, lessons, called by courtesy "object lessons," are already given; and the unsatisfactory results often attributed to them are due chiefly to the disconnected and "scrappy" choice of subjects, so that we find a lesson on flint succeeded by one on a pin, and this again by one on an oyster, and so on. Moreover, they are seldom prepared with sufficient care, and are often altogether deficient in the all-important point of illustration by tangible objects. One of H.M. Inspectors in London told me, for example, that he was present once at a lesson upon honey, the only illustration of which was an hermetically sealed specimen tube, containing a few grains of that substance!

The value of instruction in Science mainly depends upon the manner in which it is given ; and that this should be done by actual demonstration and experiment, it has been the object of the preceding pages to show. In a paper read by the present writer to the Physical Society of London on April 14 (and published in the *Journal of Education*), a more detailed description of the Liverpool and Birmingham system was given, and the opinion of several eminent men of science who were present was asked. In the discussion which followed, Dr. J. H. Gladstone (of the London School Board), Professor G. C. Foster, Professor Guthrie, Professor W. Chandler Roberts, and others, bore strong testimony to the thorough value and efficacy of the system, while Dr. W. B. Carpenter stated in addition that the scheme appeared to him exactly to realise an ideal which he had worked out in his own mind, and that he had long been waiting for some opportunity to bring it before the public, in ignorance of the fact that it was already a *fait accompli*. So much importance, however, is attached by scientific men to the *method of teaching*, that even the most earnest friends of scientific education would deprecate the introduction into any kind of schools of Science-lessons which did not possess the practical characteristics previously insisted on. For the mere reading of books on elementary science (however well written) under a teacher who cares but little for the subject, although it may convey a certain amount of actual information, must necessarily fail to give that mental training which is specially claimed as the particular advantage of Science—viz., accurate observation, and close reasoning upon observed facts. In a very valuable document recently issued by the United States Commissioner of Education, the great desirability of the employment of well-trained teachers, especially in the case of scientific knowledge, is strongly urged : “ Such knowledge finds its application in all arts and industries, and in all measures for the preservation of health and life ; and it offers the only means of dissipating the fears and superstitions, and correcting the

foolish practices arising from ignorance of the phenomena and laws of Nature."

It may be urged as a matter of detail, that although large towns like Liverpool and Birmingham can occupy the whole time of one or more Science demonstrators, there are practical difficulties in the way of smaller towns obtaining these advantages. I venture to think that the objection is more apparent than real, and that the only thing needed is a little concerted action. By a slight extension of the system described above, several towns and villages within a moderate distance of each other could combine to employ a demonstrator who might go from one to another with his apparatus, in the manner adopted by many lecturers, and worked out in some detail by the Gilchrist Educational Trustees, who always group together, usually in fives, for five consecutive nights per week, the towns to which their lecturers are sent.

The results of the system here advocated, which have been incidentally alluded to, are thus summed up by those who have watched it from the commencement:—

(1) The general quickening of the intellectual life of the school.

(2) The sending of a large number of lads to Science classes after leaving school.

(3) The finding out of lads of exceptional scientific ability, and setting them on their road.

(4) The attracting the attention of the ordinary teachers to Science, and to the results of teaching it.

A great deal of the evidence that Mr. Armstrong brought as to overstrain in education, appears to me to show conclusively, that, in the majority of cases, this overstrain arises from utter weariness and distaste at the monotonous "grind" necessary, apparently, to drive home information which had to be acquired by what might be termed mechanical methods. The "driving," and the "rule of grind" cause children to leave school with an utter distaste for study. "To a dull child," says Mr. Sykes, the able President of the Teachers' Union, "our present system of

cram and mechanical drill must make the school-room appear as a place of cruel mental torture." Contrast this with the relief afforded by such Science-teaching as I have described above, as testified by those who have watched it. "The interest displayed by the children," writes one, "is in the highest degree pleasurable to witness. It is pleasant, too, sometimes, to see a half-timer, who has stolen in from his work for this one lesson, standing by the side of the class, with grimy arms and rolled-up apron; or a little knot of girls released temporarily from 'minding the baby,' and waiting outside the locked door in order to obtain admission to the Science lesson." Dr. Crosskey writes: "It is a wonderful thing to see the power of experimental science over the roughest lads. My own belief is that in our young blackguards we have a most amazing reserve power of scientific research; they are *alive* in every sense, and I have watched them at the Science-lessons as keenly interested as if they were up to mischief in the streets." At the public presentation of degrees of the University of London, in May last, Sir John Lubbock (M.P. for the University), in speaking upon this very subject, related, amid much laughter, how many mothers in various districts in Birmingham had found it necessary to change their washing-days, because it was quite impossible to keep their girls at home to help them when there was a Science lesson to be given at the school. Mr. Hance, the able and obliging Clerk to the Liverpool School Board, a man of very wide experience in these matters, writes, "There can be little doubt that there is a large class of minds whose activity is more easily promoted, and whose imagination is more readily fired, by Physical Science than by Literature, especially of the class most met with in elementary schools." To this testimony I may perhaps be permitted to add my own, as that of an amateur teacher or demonstrator of Science in the intervals of business for the last twenty years, who has never yet failed to interest in the glorious facts and truths of Science children of all ages, and often of the roughest class, such as the street arabs gathered into the Ragged Schools of Bristol.

The late Prof. Henslow, in his village school in Essex, showed what an admirable influence the task of observing, discriminating, and classifying plants, had upon the uncouth children whom he at first found there. It was not so much the positive use of the information gained, as the discipline of the mind produced in gaining it, which made the work of value.

Testimony such as this might be multiplied to any desired extent, but it will probably be more satisfactory to our readers to take the results of the influence of Science teaching, as shown by the reports of H. M. Inspectors, in support of our assertion that elementary instruction in Science so quickens a child's mental life, as to render him more generally intelligent. The returns of the Liverpool Board Schools afford the clearest testimony on this point. The "passes" as compared with the numbers presented for examination in ordinary subjects were:—

In 1873-4	74.4 per cent.	
„ 1874-5	74.5 „	
„ 1875-6	74.4 „	
„ 1876-7	79.1 „	{ Year in which class subjects were first examined.
„ 1877-8	85.6 „	
„ 1878-9	87.1 „	{ Year in which the system of Science demonstrations was introduced.
„ 1879-80	88.4 „	
„ 1880-1	89.7 „	
„ 1881-2	88.5 „	

From this it appears that while the average percentage of passes in ordinary subjects for the three years prior to the introduction of this particular form of Science teaching, was 74.4, the average percentage in the same subjects in the five years succeeding its introduction was 87.8, an actual increase of $13\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and an increase on the quantity under consideration of 18 per cent., or nearly one-fifth.

Moreover, the figures for the year 1876-7 show that the introduction of the teaching of (some of) the ten specific class subjects allowed under the Revised Code, was at once followed by a rise of 5 per cent. in the general passes. This strongly confirms our opinion of the good effect of *variety*

in subjects taught. Of these ten subjects, six are strictly scientific, and four are literary—viz., English, German, French, and Latin. According to the returns of the Education Department for 1881-2 (omitting fractions, &c.), 131,000 children were presented for examination in the literary subjects, of whom 127,000 took English, while 127,000 also were presented in the six scientific subjects. An analysis of the returns for the years 1878-9 and 1879-80, which was prepared in the office of the Liverpool School Board, completely justifies the conclusion that the success of the various classes of schools recognised by the Department in the ordinary subjects, and in the standards which alone are examined in specific subjects (viz., IV. V., and VI.), varies in the same ratio as does their success in specific subjects. It must surely be admitted that these figures afford a powerful argument in favour of the element of variety in subjects of instruction ; and when it is borne in mind that more than half of these subjects are scientific, and are taken up by nearly half those children who go in for any extra instruction at all, and when due consideration is at the same time given to the figures previously quoted, showing the direct influence of scientific demonstrations, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, if the object of education really be the development of faculty, a place much more prominent than hitherto ought to be given to the *proper* teaching of Science in schools of all kinds, and more particularly in elementary schools. We do not advocate the appropriation of more time, but we assert that a more judicious distribution of the time now employed—or even of less—would in all probability be followed by much better results of all kinds than at present. Striking testimony on this point is afforded by the experience of the Birmingham schools. The clerk to that Board writes :—
“ Our head teachers unite in saying that the Science lessons do the children so much good, that although they have to afford time for them which used to be devoted to the ordinary work for the Government examinations, they nevertheless gain in results, and they would feel it to be a

loss if they were to be deprived of such lessons. This is even the case in the girls' schools, where they are so heavily handicapped by the time that has to be devoted to needlework, that they can ill afford time for any extra lessons whatever."

In this age, most educated persons are keenly—in some cases perhaps too keenly—alive to solecisms and other errors of grammar, considered from the literary point of view. Let us hope that the day is not far distant when ignorance of the Grammar of Nature will be held in equal aversion! In that good time to come, such a picture as No. 255 in the present Royal Academy Exhibition (which represents a rainbow with the violet streak in the centre of the spectrum) will be as sternly rejected for contravening the laws of physical science as other pictures now are for disregard of the laws of art; such answers, too, as that of the Eton boy who assigned as a reason for the greater length of day in summer, the expansion of all bodies by heat, will be considered as disgraceful as a false quantity in a Latin quotation or a slight error in syntax is now. The attainment of such a result is a noble object to strive for, and if this work can be set moving it will, I am persuaded, end in an intellectual revolution for the mass of our people, and the national results of it will be great.

WM. LANT CARPENTER.

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN SOCIAL ECONOMY.

THE first School Board for London was composed largely of persons of special distinction and capacity. Men and women of thought, culture, literary ability, educational knowledge, and general governmental experience, like the late Lord Lawrence, Professor Huxley, Miss Emily Davies, Mr. W. H. Smith, Canon Miller, Mr. Hepworth Dixon, and Lord Sandon, were among its members. The conclusions at which they arrived were in every case the result of long and careful deliberation, during which the views of men of very diverse political and philosophical opinions were given and considered. The decision to which they ultimately came, therefore, will always be worthy of remembrance; and especially in any discussion about the subjects of instruction, the conclusions arrived at by the Committee on that matter of which Professor Huxley was chairman, should be recalled with respect.

“In junior and senior schools,” says the Code of Regulations of the London School Board, “the following subjects are *essential* :—

“(a) The Bible, and the principles of Religion and Morality. . . .

“(b) Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic, English Grammar. Book-keeping in senior schools, with Mensuration in boys’ schools.

“(c) Systematised object-lessons, forming a course of introduction to science.

“(d) The History of England.

“(e) Elementary Geography.

“(f) Elementary Social Economy.

“(g) Elementary Drawing.

“(h) Music ; and Drill.

“(i) In Girls' Schools, Needlework and Cutting Out.”

This curriculum is surely not too ambitious. But if we inquire what has actually been done in our London Board Schools in teaching the subjects here enumerated as essential, we find that Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic, Grammar, Geography, History, Singing, and Drill have been generally and fairly taught, but that object-lessons have seldom been given, and that Social Economy has been entirely neglected—probably it has never been taught in a single school. The real reason for this practical refusal on the part of the teachers to teach object-lessons and Social Economy has been that the Government Code has not hitherto included these subjects. The Government Inspectors have not examined in them, and no grant has been paid for teaching them. By the most natural and obvious process in the world, the subjects which brought the teachers no return, either in money or in credit with their employers, have been neglected in favour of those from which emolument and professional reputation might accrue.

The London School Board Code is thus not followed even in London, and is only worth referring to as embodying the results of the careful deliberations of a body of eminent educationists. It is found practically that even in London the curriculum of the schools is regulated by the Code of the Education Department ; and if this is true of London schools, *a fortiori* it is so of schools elsewhere. The Code of the Department, then, is responsible for the scheme of our national elementary education ; and if there be any omissions and defects in the elementary school curriculum, the most effective point at which to introduce reform is through the Education Department.

The New Code makes English (grammar, repetition, and composition), Geography, and History semi-compulsory subjects. It provides for a systematised course of science ;

and it allows children above Standard IV. to be taught any two of the following "specific subjects":—"Algebra, Euclid, Mechanics, Latin, French, Animal Physiology, Botany, Agriculture, Chemistry, Physics, Domestic Economy."

Thus, every subject laid down by the first London Board as essential is now included in the Code, with one notable exception; that is, *Social Economy*. The only provision for teaching this subject is the permissive one which may be found in Article 16, as follows:—"Any other subject sanctioned by the department may be taken as a specific subject, provided that a graduated scheme of teaching it is submitted to and approved by the Inspector." That is to say, any teacher who happens to desire to teach Social Economy in preference to any one of the twelve specific subjects with a scheme for which the Code supplies him, may draw out a scheme for himself, and, if his Inspector will consent, may give his course and earn a grant on the children who pass a written examination in that subject.

The division of opinion among professed educationists as to what are the most essential subjects to teach in elementary schools after the rudiments of the "three R's" have been acquired, may well bewilder the mind of that public which does not theorise, but which desires to obtain some practical result from the large expenditure of rates and taxes on schools and teachers. The general public is careless regarding the comparative strength of arguments as to the influence of philological and physico-scientific studies upon mental development. But if it can be shown that one subject is of practical value in after life, the common-sense of the mass of electors will combine with the psychological analysis of the educationist, in saying that such a subject should be selected for elementary school teaching.

There are sciences which are of use to everybody, and even a smattering of which may preserve from mischief and error. These are the *sciences of daily conduct*; the reasons why certain things should be done and certain other things avoided in daily life:—*Physiology*, upon which the laws of *physical health* are founded; and *Social Economy*, which

teaches what conduct is conducive to, and what destructive of, *social well-being*. The physical science is recognised in the Code, and, happily, is very popular in schools. Is the moral science of less importance? No, surely! Indirect social benefit must come from any kind of popular education, however vague its aims, however mistaken its method; experience shows that (malformations of brain apart) increase in intelligence tends to improvement in morality. But error and evil are too potent to be sufficiently fought by indirect means. The highest moral benefit attainable through general elementary education must be sought, and the consequent lessening of crime and pauperism must be looked for, from direct effort, guided by science, on the part of the teachers. The object must be striven for, as was well said by the late William Ellis, the apostle of such education, through a course of school lessons "specially aiming at teaching what good conduct is, and how it is to be attained; and at training so as to inspire a desire and love for good conduct—and at teaching what bad conduct is, and how it is to be avoided; and at training so as to inspire a horror of bad conduct."

It is the realisation of the immense importance of giving such teaching and training that has led many persons to warmly uphold the continuance of theological instruction in our schools. But the vast differences of opinion which exist upon doctrinal points, and the fact that teachers are but human beings with individual opinions upon such points, make it necessary to hedge round theological teachings with so many precautions against exposition and deduction, that the Scripture lesson loses whatever value it might possibly possess as a vehicle for moral training. There is, besides, this advantage for teaching the right conduct through Social Science—that the *reason* is thereby appealed to, and called into play not only to *recognise* what is *right*, but also to fortify the *desire* to be a doer of the right class of actions.

What are the right class of actions in daily industrial life admits of no contention. In a civilised and industrial country, at least, all sects of parents and teachers are agreed

that Industry, Thrift, Forethought, Temperance in the use of all good things, Trustworthiness, Kindliness, and Truthfulness, are good qualities and habits; and conversely that Laziness, Wastefulness, Intemperance, Falsehood, Recklessness, Untrustworthiness, Cruelty, are immoral and wrong. The good results of the former, the evil consequences of the latter, are as obvious upon the most cursory examination of the social state, as the influence of sun and atmosphere upon vegetable growth. The pangs and misery of mankind—Crime, Poverty, and Sorrow—depend, and can be seen by children to depend, upon the conduct of the individuals who make up society. The study of the elements of Social Science leads as directly to the practical inference that moral conduct produces happiness and well-being, as a study of physiology leads to a perception of the sanitary observances which regulate health. Social Economy shows that society is founded on the general prevalence of morality, and that the more moral conduct prevails the more will the well-being of society increase, while every bad man diminishes by the measure of his vice the good effect of the arrangement of social affairs. The teacher can easily prove to demonstration that the whole elaborate arrangements of society for the production and distribution of wealth, in all the minutiae of manufacturing and using, of buying and selling, borrowing and lending, division of labour and security of property, &c., hinge upon the good conduct of the individuals who compose society, of whom the children before him form part. Morals thus taught can never be forgotten, never misapprehended: and the efforts of the teacher being simultaneously directed to securing a good tone in his school, his children will be trained to desire to follow what they see to be right, and to eschew what they know to be wrong actions, opposed to the general well-being. There is hardly a child, however evil his home influences, who, if asked by an earnest teacher whether he desires to be one of the helpers of the Social Economy, or one of the pests of his kind who spoil the harmonious working of the whole, but will reply that he desires to be honourable, and respected,

and useful. And he will mean it, too, and will retain the wish and stand by it in life, so far as natural capacity and adult surroundings will permit. The mind of the young child is pliable and tender, and the moulding influences brought to bear upon it will give it a form to be retained through many adverse circumstances in after life, up to the hour of its dissolution.

This view of the practical value of the study is presented first, because of the obvious importance of seizing the only opportunity which school life affords for systematic moral training. But turning to the consideration of Social Economy merely as a subject of instruction, it is difficult to see that any other "extra subject" is of equal practical utility in application to daily life.

"What can be more important for a labouring man to know," asked the Commissioners on the State of National Education in 1861, "than the causes which regulate the amount of his wages, the hours of his work, the regularity of his employment, and the prices of what he consumes? The want of such knowledge," they truly added, "leads him constantly into error and violence, destructive to himself and his family, oppressive to his fellow-workmen, injurious to his employers, and mischievous to society."

These wise words have tenfold the force now that they had then, for now the working man is a voter. The franchise is the fulcrum upon which he can rest the lever of his strength—the strength numerical, and the strength of an intense and bitter earnestness, which grows out of the hard conditions of his daily life—and so move the world. Of what infinite importance it is that the working class should be rightly instructed in the elementary truths of Social Science! To those who know the world into which the babes of that class are born—to those who know even a little about the squalor, the fatigue, the hopelessness, of the daily life of even the more hard-working and respectable men and women of the poorer class—to those who have penetrated deeper into the wordless depths, and seen the privation, the struggle, the suffering of existence to myriads

of human creatures—the marvel is not that there are criminals, and drunkards, and roughs, but that there are so many who toil patiently on, under conditions which they do not understand, to their graves: the wonder is not that sometimes the revolutionary element breaks out, but that our civilised society exists so long, with its fair, smiling, upper layer, and its vast masses of deep misery seething beneath, without a convulsion. When I think of the dens in which I have stood by the side of suffering, single small rooms in which herded a whole family, without furniture, save a few filthy sticks, without clothing, save a few rags for decency, without food, save a few mouthfuls to maintain a stunted existence—and when I think of the wealthy homes that I know, with satin and velvet for their soft seats, and luxurious warm carpets and hangings, and wasteful profusion of food, and fires, and bright lights, with books, and pictures, and perfumes, and air, and water, and cleanliness, and all that the others lack—oh! I cannot but wonder that misery does not rush wildly into the homes of plenty, and insist upon sharing the too-lavish luxury which the wealthy flaunt before the poor.

And if thus the contrast comes home to me, who have seen both, but have never felt the bitterness of poverty, what must it do to those who share the pain? Rely upon it that the social question is the question of the future. The working-man has the vote; and he sees the wretchedness of those who work, contrasted with the ease of the wealthy; will he not seek to ameliorate his condition, by whatever seem the nearest means? And will not those nearest means in all probability be very mistaken ones, calculated, not to elevate the poor, but to reduce rich and poor alike to a low level of insecurity and privation? It is to be expected that the working-classes will, if uninstructed, seek relief by legislation in such directions as fixing minimum wages, limiting profits, prohibiting free credit, enacting rates in aid of wages, protecting native industry, and the like fallacious and ruinous expedients for the momentary relief of the grinding miseries of poverty. Surely they should be taught how

and why these things are errors, and be led to look in the right direction for the coming reform? Surely they should be shown that permanent improvement must be expected, not from ill-considered legislative changes, but mainly from the spread of knowledge, and the increase of good habits and of wisdom of action among us?

Let them recognise that the duty of the rich towards the poor is not to give them eleemosynary aid, or even to supply them with work at a fixed rate ; and do not fear their seeing plainly, also, what they cannot possibly long be blinded to, that a wealthy man who is dishonest, or lazy, or foolish, or a spendthrift, or a drunkard, is as injurious to the State as a poor man who is similarly faulty. The duty of the poor to the rich is exactly synonymous with the duty of the rich to the poor. Equality of moral responsibilities is the true equality of democracy. It will be a great gain to well-being when it is universally recognised that the possession of a store of wealth does not relieve a man from the universal social obligation to work, and to increase the capital of the country as it may be in his power. Social economy teaches this to the rich, as well as to the poor. It is not only the poor who need to learn its lessons. But it is in the elementary schools that the lessons are most needed, both because it is the labourer who suffers most from ignorance, and because the working-classes have the most mighty potential force over the future of society, and the increase of human well-being.

Happily for the future of mankind, it is futile, or else it would be mischievous, to preach patience to the poor. We ought not to wish them to be patient, and contented with their misery, for if they are so, they will never improve. One of the first steps upwards for that class is to have a high standard of comfort ; and every improvement in the condition below which they will not live, is, by its reaction upon the population, a step gained in their progress. But let them be taught the elements of social science, that they may seek to elevate their condition in ways which will be of permanent service to that end. Let them be shown how utterly false are the mischievous notions that capital is the enemy of labour,

that private property is the root of all evil, and that profits are regulated by the greediness of masters. Let them see that their future is mainly with themselves. Show them that upon their own increase in industrial virtues, and their own prudence and foresight, the future almost wholly depends for them and for their children. Above all, let them know that social arrangements are not an inexplicable riddle, and let them learn to apply reason to the solution of social, just as they would do to arithmetical, problems. Then is the future tolerably safe; but if the great new power of democracy be left groping in utter ignorance of the rules which should be applied to solving social questions, while at the same time the problems press them to death like sphinx riddles unsolved, and the power of legislation in their hands makes them the masters of the State, truly the condition of civilisation presents an awful prospect for the future. The gigantic force which should be our saviour will crush and ruin us.

It may be thought that I speak too seriously. But, in truth, it is no subject for light discussion. The facts are there—the misery of the masses—their growing power—the apparently easy, but mistaken and wrong ways, the slow and less obvious but only sure ways, to improve their condition—and the science which would teach them how to act wisely and rightly, excluded from our educational system!

The “specific subjects” in Schedule IV. are all divided into three stages, for three successive school years. The natural divisions of Social Economy would adapt themselves to this arrangement. The syllabus for the three years might be as follows:—

First Stage.—Production of Wealth. The Share of Labour; industry, skill, and intelligence. The Share of Capital; what capital is, and how it is obtained. Economy. Security for Private Property necessary for the accumulation of wealth.

Second Stage.—Distribution of Wealth. The share of the labourers; relation between the Demand for and Supply

of Labour. The share of the capitalist ; the nature of interest, and the proper uses of credit ; how profits are regulated. Employment of small capitals ; savings-banks and partnerships.

Third Stage.—Exchange of Wealth. Division of labour dependent upon exchange of commodities ; advantages of division of labour. Money. Development of Credit, Bills of Exchange, Banking, etc. Payments to a Government in exchange for protection. Direct and Indirect taxation.

To those unacquainted with the subject, it may seem that too much is claimed to hang upon teaching such facts as are here indicated. But to those who fully understand it, the bare skeleton of a course given above suggests the breathing, living world from which its subjects come. Social science is nothing but the science of daily life. Illustration and exemplification of its truths are around in every passing event. The topics it treats are those which must be considered by everybody ; the problems studied are those which must be faced by all who live. There is no real possibility of evading the facts of social science, for they are the facts of commonplace existence. The young may be allowed to grow up to face them in utter ignorance of their nature and their relations ; to incur by their ignorance mental pain and physical suffering for themselves and their children, and to entail mischief on society by their blind groping amidst the bye-ways of industry and the miry paths of poverty. But the opportunities offered by compulsory National Education may be so utilised for teaching and training, and for the formation of intelligence and character, that our social difficulties may be diminished, our common errors may be largely avoided, and the social mistakes which now bring misery upon mankind may be mitigated in future generations. It is assuredly both our duty and our interest to give such attention to the formation of character and habits, as will lessen the necessity for providing machinery for their reformation.

No attempt can be made in a paper so short as this to survey the whole field of political economy, to point out

what portions of it are suitable for the study of children in the upper standards,* or to argue upon the utility of various branches of it as moral training. Two things have here been attempted; the one to show that social science should not be neglected during school life—the other to show that Education in this subject is really Education in the science of conduct. In support of these propositions, the authority of the Royal Commission and of the first London School Board has already been cited; and to these influential testimonies may be added, in conclusion, that of a Committee of the Social Science Association which sat in 1868, and of which Mr. Gladstone was chairman :—"That, considering how important it is that a knowledge of some of the simpler laws of political economy, on the practical application of which such momentous interests depend, should be acquired before the mind becomes biassed and the passions aroused, this meeting is of opinion that, however elementary the school, such instruction should always form part of the Education."

F. FENWICK MILLER.

* This has been attempted in the writer's recent work, "*Readings in Social Economy*," published by Messrs. Longmans and Co., 1883.

THE LAW RELATING TO HERESY AND BLASPHEMY.

THE recent revival of prosecutions for blasphemous libel has not unnaturally provoked an agitation for the repeal of the "Blasphemy Laws" as they are called. I have endeavoured in the following pages to state as accurately as I can the existing law on the subject : as it is undesirable that it should be represented as worse than it actually is. But it is necessary in the first place to clearly distinguish Blasphemy from Heresy ; as it has unfortunately been too much the custom to treat them as practically identical.

Heresy and Blasphemy are entirely distinct and different things, both in their essence and in their legal aspect. Formerly both were ecclesiastical offences not cognizable in the secular courts. Now heresy is an ecclesiastical offence punishable only in a clergyman ; while blasphemy is the technical name for a particular crime against the State.

Heresy (*αἵρεσις*, from *αἰρέομαι* "I choose for myself"), is the deliberate selection and adoption of a particular set of views or opinions which the Church considers erroneous. To persist in the tenet of your choice after its error and its injurious tendency have been pointed out to you was regarded as a sin, and the obstinate heretic who refused to recant was bidden to do penance for the good of his soul. This was at first purely an ecclesiastical matter. At common law heresy was no crime. The secular courts took no cognizance of any man's religious opinions ; and indeed before the days of Wicklif heretics were scarce. Towards the end

of the fourteenth century, however, heresy came to be regarded as a crime, punishable with death; and Acts were passed in the reigns of Henry IV. and Henry V., which gave the clergy the power of defining heresy just as they pleased, and condemned all heretics to be burnt alive. This state of things lasted till the reign of Henry VIII., when the law was rendered in some particulars less severe. Under Edward VI. there were but two executions for heresy. Mary restored the old system for a short period, during which about 300 persons were burnt.

But by the 1 Eliz. c. 1, s. 6, all statutes relating to heresy were repealed, though two men were somehow burnt in her reign, and two under James I. "At this day," says Sir Edward Coke, "no person can be indicted or impeached for heresy before any temporal judge, or other that hath temporal jurisdiction" (12 Rep. 57). By the 29 Car. II. c. 9, s. 1, the writ *de haeretico comburendo* was abolished; but s. 2 of the same Act expressly provides "that nothing in this Act shall extend, or be construed to take away or abridge the jurisdiction of Protestant archbishops or bishops, or any other judges of any ecclesiastical courts, in cases of atheism, blasphemy, heresy, or schism, and other damnable doctrines and opinions, but that they may proceed to punish the same according to His Majesty's ecclesiastical laws, by excommunication, deprivation, degradation, and other ecclesiastical censures, not extending to death, in such sort, and no other, as they might have done before the making of this Act, anything in this law contained to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding." By the 53 Geo. III. c. 127, s. 3, it is enacted that "no person who shall be pronounced or declared excommunicate, shall incur any Civil Penalty or Incapacity whatever, in consequence of such Excommunication, save such Imprisonment, not exceeding Six Months, as the Court pronouncing or declaring such Person Excommunicate shall direct."

These sections appear to occasion Mr. Justice Stephen some anxiety. While he admits in his latest work on "The History of the Criminal Law of England" (Vol. II. p. 468),

that the present law as to heresy is "practically inoperative," he adds:—

As a mere matter of legal theory, however, I know of no legal reason why to this day any layman who is guilty of "atheism, blasphemy, heresy, schism, or other damnable doctrine or opinion," should not be prosecuted in any ecclesiastical court, and have penance enjoined upon him—for instance, the public recantation of his heretical opinions. If he refused to recant, he might be excommunicated, the effect of which would be that the court pronouncing him excommunicate, might direct him to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding six months. I do not believe, however, that any prosecution for heresy has taken place since the year 1640.

But with all deference to that learned writer, there seems to be strong authority for holding that at the present day the Ecclesiastical Courts possess no criminal jurisdiction over *laymen*, for heresy or any other ecclesiastical offence. In *Burder v. —*, (3 Curteis, 827, May 31st, 1844), Sir H. Jenner Fust says: "As against laymen, whatever may be the nature of the charge, undoubtedly the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a criminal suit." And though four years earlier a criminal suit was commenced against a layman for an incestuous marriage, Dr. Lushington contented himself with pronouncing the marriage null and void, which was clearly within his power, and did not impose any punishment or penance on the defendant (*Woods v. Woods* 2 Curt. 516, July 18th, 1840).

An attempt to revive the criminal jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Court was made so recently as 1876. A man who was anxious to marry Miss Mary Ann D— applied to a surrogate at Lincoln for a licence. In order to obtain it, it was necessary for him to swear, and he did swear, an affidavit that the said Mary Ann had had her usual place of abode for the space of fifteen days then last past within the parish of St. Botolph, in the City of Lincoln. This was untrue. For this falsehood the Chancellor of the Consistory Court of the Diocese of Lincoln cited him to appear before the Dean of Arches and answer certain articles touching his

soul's health. He appeared under protest, and objected to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Dean of Arches held that the objection was good, and that the Ecclesiastical Court had no jurisdiction in such causes. To take a false oath before a surrogate is perjury by statute, and the man could have been tried at the Assizes. This alone would oust the jurisdiction of the spiritual court. But Lord Penzance did not limit his remarks to this. He says:—

Speaking generally, and setting aside for the moment all questions as to the clergy, it cannot, I think, be doubted that a recurrence to the punishment of the laity for the good of their souls by ecclesiastical courts, would not be in harmony with modern ideas, or the position which ecclesiastical authority now occupies in the country. Nor do I think that the enforcement of such powers, where they still exist, *if they do exist*, is likely to benefit the community. . . . I can only express my surprise that any person should have thought it worth while to make this experiment for the revival of a jurisdiction which, if it has not expired, has so long slumbered in peace" (*Phillimore v. Machon* 1 P. D. 481, 487, 489).

This much is quite clear at all events—that no ecclesiastical court can any longer proceed against a layman for mere *nonconformity*. By the 4th section of the Toleration Act (1 William and Mary, c. 18), no Dissenter shall be prosecuted in any ecclesiastical court for or by reason of his nonconformity to the Church of England. And although by s. 17 it was provided that the benefits of the Act should not extend to Unitarians, this exception was repealed in 1813 by the statute 53 Geo. III., c. 160.

So much for HERESY. We pass to the law of BLASPHEMY or more accurately of BLASPHEMOUS LIBEL.

It is a misdemeanour at common law to speak, or write and publish, any profane words vilifying or ridiculing God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the Old or New Testament, or Christianity in general, *if done with intent* to corrupt the public morals, to shock and insult believers, or to bring the established religion into hatred and contempt. Proceedings may be taken against the offender either by

indictment or by criminal information; and on conviction he is liable to fine and imprisonment to any extent in the discretion of the Court. Formerly he was liable also to be banished or put in the pillory, while in Scotland until 1813 the punishment was in certain circumstances death.

The intent to corrupt the public morals, to shock and insult believers, or to bring the established religion into hatred and contempt, is an essential element in the crime. *Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.* The existence of such an intent is a question of fact for the jury, and the *onus* of proving it lies on the prosecution. The best evidence of such an intention is usually to be found in the work itself. If it is full of scurrilous and opprobrious language, if sacred subjects are treated with offensive levity, if indiscriminate abuse is employed instead of argument, then a malicious design to wound the religious sensibilities of others may be readily inferred. If, however, the author abstains from ribaldry and licentious reproach, a similar design may still be inferred if it be found that he has deliberately had resort to sophistical arguments, that he has wilfully misrepresented facts within his knowledge, or has indulged in sneers and scoffs against all that is good and noble; for then it is clear that he does not write from conscientious conviction, but desires to pervert and mislead the ignorant; or at all events that he is criminally indifferent to the distinctions between right and wrong. But where the work is free from all offensive levity, scoffing and sophistry, and is in fact the honest and temperate expression of the religious opinions conscientiously held and avowed, the author is entitled to be acquitted, for his work is not a blasphemous libel.

And mere vehemence or even virulence of argument must not be taken as evidence of an intent to injure. Sarcasm and ridicule are fair weapons, even in heterodox hands, so long as they do not degenerate into profane scoffing or irreverent levity. "If the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked without a person being guilty of blasphemous libel."

But it will be said, by thus punishing the *manner* and not the *matter* of a publication, you convert bad taste and discourtesy into a crime. It is not, however, bad taste that is punished; it is the malicious intent to insult the religious feelings of others by profanely scoffing at all they hold sacred, which deserves and receives punishment. No doubt such an intent cannot be manifested without also displaying bad taste and discourtesy. But in nearly every libel ever penned bad taste and discourtesy are displayed; their presence cannot fail, of course, to influence the jury to some extent, but as a matter of law their presence without more is immaterial. The bad taste is only an incident; it is not on this that the law lays stress. The mere want of refinement is but one of the circumstances from which the criminal intent may be inferred.

On the other hand it may be said, "Are you not laying too much stress on the criminal intent? Surely it is the *matter*, of the libel, and not its tone or style which is criminal." I answer, No. "There can be no doubt as to the general right of inquiry and discussion, even upon the most sacred subjects, provided the licence be exercised in the spirit of temperance, moderation, and fairness, without any intention to injure or affront. . . . The law visits not the honest errors but the malice of mankind."* Or to quote the words of Lord Mansfield in the great case of *Evans v. The Chamberlain of London*: "The common law of England which is only common reason or usage, knows of no prosecution for mere opinions."

But some lawyer may urge, and with much force, "Are there no cases in which malice will be implied from the matter of the libel, although its tone and style be unexceptionable?" There is a maxim in law that "Every man must be taken to have intended the natural and necessary consequences of his act." If I set fire to some gorse on a dry day in August and a wind springs up and carries the fire to a rick and barn 200 yards off I am liable to the owner of the

* *Starkie on Libel*, 2nd edition, pp. 145—147.

rick and barn, though I never knew of their existence.* If I publish a book which is, in fact, obscene, though my object is merely to expose the evils inseparable from the Roman Catholic Confessional, I am guilty of publishing an obscene libel.† So with Blasphemy, though a man may honestly desire to arrive at the truth, and though he may have expressed his objectionable arguments with no more profanity than their statement necessarily involved, still will it not be the duty of both judge and jury to consider the effect of a general dissemination of those opinions? If the doctrines maintained are so monstrous that their direct tendency is to subvert religion, to destroy morality, and “to dissolve all the bonds and obligations of civil society,” does not the maxim apply? Must not the author be taken to have intended the natural and necessary consequences of his act? If so, the judge must direct a conviction, for the necessary malice is *presumed*.

Now every one would naturally be reluctant to construe into a crime the fair and temperate expression of opinions sincerely entertained, merely in obedience to a legal presumption. And I doubt whether the free discussion of any doctrines, however heretical, can in any case tend to subvert the Truth. “For, if we be sure we are in the right,” says Milton in his *Areopagitica*, “and do not hold the truth guiltily, which becomes not, . . . what can be more fair than when a man judicious, learned, and of a conscience for aught we know as good as theirs that taught us what we know, shall . . . openly by writing publish to the world what his opinion is, what his reasons, and wherefore that which is now taught cannot be sound?” *Magna est veritas et prævalebit*. It is to the public interest that heretical opinions should be freely advanced, if this be done without unnecessary irreverence. It will then be for the orthodox to confute them in fair argument, instead of relying upon the strong arm of the law to stifle discussion

* *Smith v. London and South Western Railway Company*, L. R. 5 C. P. 98; 6 C. P. 14.

† *E. v. Hicklin*, L. R. 7 C. P., 261.

by a foregone conclusion drawn in favour of the creeds of the Establishment. Whenever it becomes right in the interests of society that a man should publish his opinions to the world, and he does so *bonâ fide* in the honest belief in the truth of his assertions, then, however mistaken he may be, his publication is privileged, and cannot be punished as a libel either in a civil or criminal court.

It is precisely on this point that the recent address of the Lord Chief Justice of England to the jury in the case of *Reg. v. Foote and others* is so pre-eminently valuable—an address which is distinguished throughout for its dignity and impartiality, and which will in future be always referred to as the leading authority on the law of Blasphemy, for it states in the most clear and masterly manner the principles that are truly to be deduced from the early authorities on the subject. The great value of so liberal an exposition of a somewhat antiquated branch of our law by one so well qualified to interpret it correctly, is clear to every one who reads this summing-up. But it seems to me especially valuable on this very point of *Matter v. Manner*, on which there has hitherto been some difference of opinion among lawyers. For there are no decisions precisely on the point. The infidel publications which came before our criminal courts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are full of foul and offensive language, and were written, as a rule, by uneducated and immoral men, who were deservedly punished; both matter and manner being equally objectionable. But now heretical opinions are advanced by men of culture and refinement who instinctively avoid giving wanton offence to their more orthodox fellow-citizens. If, however, prosecutions for blasphemy are again to become common, we shall before long have the question formally raised—Whether in any case the malicious intent to corrupt the public morals and to shock and insult believers (which as we have seen must be proved somehow to secure a conviction) can be presumed merely from the nature of the doctrines advanced, when

the tone and style of the argument is temperate, grave, and earnest, and when it is clear that the author is honestly desirous of arriving at the truth.

As the law at present stands, this question could only arise on the trial of an atheist, or of a deist, who denied *in toto* the truth of Christianity. For it is quite clear that all Dissenters, Arians, Unitarians, and Jews, are protected in the advocacy of their respective doctrines, and may preach freely, without fear of prosecution. But if a man without more profanity than is necessarily involved in the proposition, were seriously to maintain that there was no God, or that he was not all-wise and all-good, then clearly he is as much entitled to state his views as any Unitarian or Jew. And if the law be otherwise, which I do not admit, it should be altered at once. But in olden times it would have been held, I have little doubt, that to deny the existence or goodness of God, must necessarily tend to subvert all law and all morality, to deprave the public morals, and to destroy the peace and good order of society; and the jury would probably have been directed that a criminal intent must be presumed, although it was clear that the author's purpose was the *bonâ fide* dissemination of his peculiar views.

In the future, however, should the question ever be raised, the clear and convincing language of the Lord Chief Justice will be of incalculable assistance to the cause of free religious discussion :—

If the law, as I have laid it down to you, is correct—and I believe it has always been so—if the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked without a person being guilty of blasphemous libel. There are many great and grave writers who have attacked the foundations of Christianity. Mr. Mill undoubtedly did so; some great writers now alive have done so too; but no one can read their writings without seeing a difference between them and the incriminated publications, which I am obliged to say is a difference, not of degree but of kind. There is a grave, an earnest, a reverent, I am almost tempted to say, a religious tone in the

very attacks on Christianity itself, which shows that what is aimed at is not insult to the opinions of the majority of Christians, but a real, quiet, honest pursuit of truth. If the truth at which these writers have arrived is not the truth we have been taught, and which, if we had not been taught it, we might have discovered, yet because these conclusions differ from ours, they are not to be exposed to a criminal indictment. With regard to these persons, therefore, I should say they are within the protection of the law, as I understand it.

Such is the law as to Blasphemy. It is not, I think, so harsh and illiberal as many imagine. To one charge at all events which has been brought against it, it is not amenable. It does not "take the Deity under its protection." It does not attempt to "avenge the insult done to God." The offender is punished for his offence against his fellow-subjects, not for his offence against God.

No doubt in ordinary language, Blasphemy denotes "reviling or reproaching God," and this is the sense in which the word was formerly used in the Ecclesiastical Courts. But it is not the sense in which the word is used when we speak of the *crime* of Blasphemy. An offence against God is a *sin*: whereas a *crime* is an offence against the State, that is, against our fellow-citizens. A crime is an act which affects other men perniciously, which destroys the peace and harmony of the community. The interests of society require that the repetition of any such act should be prevented, and to secure that end the law steps in to punish the offender. With the *sin*, which is a matter between the prisoner and his God, the State has no concern. No judge and jury ever tried a man for a mere sin; though, of course, the same act may be at once both a sin and a crime.*

* It was otherwise in the Ecclesiastical Courts; their jurisdiction was expressly over sins as such. They accordingly cited an offender in the mildest language "to appear and answer to certain articles touching and concerning his soul's health": and if he was found guilty he was sentenced to do penance or to undergo some other punishment *pro salute animæ*, for the good of his soul: not for the good of the State. Over the sin of blasphemy the Ecclesiastical Courts formerly exercised jurisdiction, just as they did over heresy. But now their whole criminal jurisdiction, over laymen, at all events, is entirely obsolete and can never be revived.

To give an instance. If a man in the solitude of his chamber used the most reproachful and impious language towards God, but no one heard him, his *sin* would be as great as if he had shouted it from the housetop: but he could not be prosecuted in a court of law: for none of his fellow-men were shocked or pained. So if he wrote a blasphemous libel and kept it locked in his desk for years, so that no eye but his ever saw it, his offence against God would be the same; but he has committed no crime, for the libel has never been published, and has therefore injured no citizen of the State.

There is abundant authority for this proposition, both in the text-books and in the recorded utterances of our judges. The late Mr. Starkie says in his *Law of Slander and Libel* (Vol. II., p. 130, 2nd Ed., 1830):—

Blasphemies against God and religion may be regarded spiritually, as acts of imbecile and impious hostility against the Almighty, or temporally, as they affect the peace and good order of civil society. It is in the latter relation only that such offences are properly cognizable by municipal laws. To attempt to redress or avenge insults to a supreme and omnipotent Creator, would be absurd; but when it is considered that such impieties not only tend to weaken and undermine the very foundation on which all human laws must rest, and to dissolve those moral and religious obligations, without the aid of which mere positive laws and penal restraints would be inefficacious, but also immediately tend to acts of outrage and violence, being, for the most part, gross insults to those who believe in the doctrines which are held up to scorn and contempt, they necessarily become an important subject of municipal coercion and restraint.

Precisely the same law had been laid down more than a century before by Hawkins, in his *Pleas of the Crown*, Book I., c. 5. (1716):—

Offences of this nature, because they tend to subvert all religion and morality, which are the foundation of government, are punishable by the temporal judges with fine and imprisonment.

Erskine, J., in sentencing Holyoake, in 1842, said:—

The arm of the law is not stretched out to protect the character

of the Almighty; we do not assume to be the protectors of our God, but to protect the *people* from such indecent language.

Very similar words were spoken by Mr. Justice Ashurst, in passing sentence upon Williams who was tried in 1797 for publishing Paine's *Age of Reason* :—

Although the Almighty does not stand in need of the feeble aid of mortals, to vindicate his honour and law, it is, nevertheless, fit that we should show our abhorrence of such infamous and wicked books. Indeed, all offences of this kind are not only offences to God, but, crimes against the law of the land, and are punishable as such, inasmuch as they tend to destroy those obligations whereby civil society is bound together. And it is upon this ground that the Christian religion constitutes part of the law of England.

This extract, it will be observed, also makes clear to us the true meaning of that much-quoted observation of Sir Matthew Hale's—"Christianity is parcel of the laws of England." This has constantly been misconstrued, as though the Chief Justice had said, in syllogistic form :

To disparage any part of the law of England is a crime.

Christianity is a part of the law of England.

Therefore to disparage Christianity is a crime.

But he would himself have been the first to deny the major proposition. Look at the facts of the case which was before him when he spoke : for it is most unfair to judges to seize on one line of a judgment, force it from its context, and treat it as a general proposition of abstract law to be pushed to all extremes.

Taylor was proved to have preached aloud and persistently in the market-place at Guildford :—

Christ is a Bastard, and Religion is a Cheat, and Profession is a Cloak, and they are both cheats. . . All the Earth is mine, and I am a King's Son; my Father sent me hither, and made me a Fisherman to take Vipers, and I neither fear God, Devil nor Man; I am a Younger Brother to Christ, an Angel of God. . . No Man fears God but an Hypocrite. . . God damn and confound all your Gods, &c.

The information, which is set out in full in Tremayne's

Entries, p. 226, alleged among other things that these words tended to destroy Christian government and society. It was no doubt argued on behalf of Taylor (as it was in the earlier case of Atwood) that the offence was punishable only in the spiritual court. But "Hale said that such kind of wicked, blasphemous words were not only an offence to God and religion, but a crime against the laws, state, and government, and therefore punishable in this Court; for to say Religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby the civil societies are preserved; and Christianity is parcel of the laws of England and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of the law." Or, as his words are more briefly given in the report in 3 Keble, at p. 607:—"Hale, C. J. These words though of ecclesiastical cognizance yet that 'Religion is a cheat' tends to dissolution of all Government, and therefore punishable here, and so of contumelious reproaches of God or the Religion established."

When we consider the date at which this judgment was delivered (1676), and remember how mighty a part religious fanaticism had played in the social disturbances of the earlier part of the century, it cannot, I think, be said that the decision in Taylor's case was wrong either in fact or in law. The concluding sentence, as reported in Ventris, is undoubtedly too wide. It should have been limited (and probably was by the Chief Justice) to "*such* kind of blasphemous words" as the prisoner was charged with uttering. The earlier part of the judgment is expressly so limited. But is it not clear that the point that the Court intended to decide was simply this:—"These words are not only a sin, but a crime. It may be they are punishable in the Ecclesiastical Court; but they are also punishable in a temporal court: for they tend to subvert the established order of things, of which Christianity is a part, and are therefore dangerous to the State. They are in fact seditious." And as though to make the grounds of their decision clear beyond all doubt the Court condemned Taylor, as part of his punishment, to stand in the pillory,

both at Westminster Palace-yard and also at Guildford where he spoke the words, with a paper fixed to his head with these words written on it in large letters:—"For Blasphemous Words tending to the Subversion of all Government" (Tremayne 226, 3 Keble 621).

Precisely the same point had been decided in Atwood's case in 1618. There the language complained of was much milder than in Taylor's case and was aimed chiefly at the prevailing mode of worship:—"The religion now professed is but fifty years old: preaching is but prating; prayer once a day is more edifying." The Court at first (in Easter Term) doubted if they had jurisdiction: as the words did not clearly tend to a breach of the peace. The Attorney-General, Sir Henry Yelverton, thought the case ought to go before the Ecclesiastical Court of High Commission (Croke, Jac. 421). But the King's Bench in Michaelmas Term decided that the indictment lay; "for these words are seditious words against the State of our Church and against the peace of the Realm, and although they are spiritual words, still they draw after them a temporal consequence,—viz., the disturbance of the peace" (2 Rolle's Abridgment, 78).

Similarly in 1708 when a man called Read was indicted for publishing an obscene libel, Chief Justice Holt expressed a strong opinion that such a publication was a purely ecclesiastical offence not punishable in the temporal courts (Fortescue, 98; 11 Mod. 142). But afterwards in *Curl's Case* (1714: 1 Barnard, 29; 2 Strange, 788) the Court of Queen's Bench decided that such a book was "punishable at common law, as an offence against the peace, intending to weaken the bonds of civil society, virtue, or morality."

But I shall no doubt be reminded that Lord Coleridge's view of the law is not universally accepted. Of course, no one pays any heed to the strictures passed on this summing-up in the House of Commons by the member for Woodstock; nor to the audacious and utterly unfounded calumny

which accompanied those strictures. But Mr. Justice Stephen in his History cited above (Vol. II., p. 474) undoubtedly inclines to the view that "the true legal doctrine upon the subject is that blasphemy consists in the character of the matter published and not in the manner in which it is stated"; though he admits that "there is no doubt some authority in favour of a different view of the law." But in a former work, "The Digest of Criminal Law" (p. 97), Mr. Justice Stephen placed his present definition of the law and that given by Lord Coleridge in parallel columns as equally good law, adding in a note:—"There is authority for each of these views, as may be seen from a collection of all the cases on the subject in Folkard's Edition of Starkie on Libel (pp. 593—603). Most of the cases are old, and I do not think that, in fact, any one has been convicted of blasphemy in modern times for a mere decent expression of disbelief in Christianity."

Moreover, while I have the greatest respect for Mr. Justice Stephen as an exponent of the Criminal Law, it may not be inappropriate, when contrasting his written opinion with the formal judgment of Lord Coleridge given from the Bench, to quote a passage from the Preface to Lord Justice Fry's new edition of his great work on Specific Performance:—"There is one notion often expressed with regard to works written or revised by authors on the Bench, which seems to me in part at least erroneous, the notion I mean that they possess a quasi-judicial authority. It is hardly enough remembered how different are the circumstances under which a book is written and a judgment pronounced, or how much the weight and value of the latter are due to the discussions at the bar which precede the judgment."

It is no new law that the Lord Chief Justice has laid down. Precisely the same view was held by his father, Mr. Justice Coleridge, and stated to the jury in what was till this year the last trial for blasphemy, *R. v. Pooley*, tried at Bodmin Summer Assizes in 1857. Mr. Justice Erskine, in sentencing Adams at Gloucester in 1842 for selling

No. 25 of the "Oracle of Reason," said: "By the law of this country every man has a right to express his sentiments in decent language." The same judge at the same Assizes tried George Jacob Holyoake for oral blasphemy. It appeared that he had been lecturing on Emigration and the Poor Laws, and at the close a man, said to have been sent on purpose to entrap him, rose and said: "The lecturer has been speaking of our duty to man; has he nothing to tell us as to our duty to God?" Holyoake, being thus challenged, replied, "I do not believe there is such a thing as a God. . . . I flee the Bible as a viper. . . . I would have the Deity served as they serve the subalterns—place him on half-pay." Now, considering the circumstances, I do not see any evidence of malice or of criminal intent in this frank avowal of atheism in answer to a question put by one of the audience. The prosecution laid great stress on the expression about half-pay. The judge told the jury: "If you are convinced that he uttered the words with levity for the purpose of treating with contempt the majesty of the Almighty God, he is guilty of the offence. If you think he made use of these words in the heat of argument without any such intent, you will give him the benefit of the doubt." But Holyoake was known to be a writer in the "Oracle of Reason," and a friend of Southwell's, who had been convicted of blasphemy in the preceding January; and he was convicted and sentenced to six months' imprisonment.

But the *dicta* no doubt, if not the decision, in Woolston's case are against the more lenient view of the law. Woolston, who had been a Fellow of Sidney College, Cambridge, published six "Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour," urging that they were not to be taken literally, but allegorically or mystically. His trenchant arguments, which were conveyed in most forcible language, gave great offence to the bishops, and Woolston was prosecuted and found guilty. His counsel, Dr. Worley, moved in arrest of judgment that these discourses did not amount to a libel upon Christianity, since the Scriptures were not denied;

that the offence was of ecclesiastical cognizance; that the defendant should have been proceeded against upon the Stat. 10 William III., c. 32; and he was prepared to go further and argue that even though the book was a libel upon Christianity, yet the common law had not cognizance of such an offence, when he was stopped by the Court, Raymond, C.J., declaring, on the authority of Taylor's case, that

Christianity in general is Parcel of the Common Law of England, and, therefore, to be protected by it. Now whatever strikes at the very root of Christianity tends manifestly to a dissolution of the Civil Government. So that to say, an attempt to subvert the established religion is not punishable by those laws upon which it is established is an absurdity. I would have it taken notice of, that we do not meddle with any differences in opinion, and that we interpose only where the very root of Christianity itself is struck at, as it plainly is by this allegorical scheme, the New Testament, and the whole relation of the Life and Miracles of Christ being denied; and who can find this Allegory? *

Now it must be remembered that before this matter came before the Court, the jury had already found as a fact that these discourses were published "with an intent to vilify and subvert the Christian religion."† I have procured a copy of the Discourses, and read some of them, and I think the jury were wrong in so finding; Woolston seems to me to have honestly entertained the strange views he advocates, and to have been a genuine Christian.‡ Then the Court,

* *R. v. Woolston*, Fitzg., 64; I. Barnard. 162, 266; 2 Strange, 832.

† See the report in Fitzgibbons.

‡ I subjoin an extract from the first discourse, p. 31, which is, I think, a fair sample both of his matter and his manner; he is dealing with Christ's permitting the devils to enter into the herd of swine:—"But then it's unlikely (without better reason than at present we are apprised of) that our Saviour would permit the Devils to enter into a herd of swine to their destruction. Where was the goodness and justice of his so doing? Let our Divines account for it, if they can. It is commonly said of our Saviour, and I believe it, that his life was entirely innocent, that his miracles were all useful and beneficial to mankind, and that he did no wrong to any one. But how can this be rightly said of him, if this story be literally true? The proprietors of the swine were great losers and sufferers; and we don't

we know now, were wrong in assuming that thus to attack the miracles was to strike at the very roots of Christianity; we have seen that Christianity and Civil Government too can withstand attacks far worse than Woolston's. Was, then, Lord Coleridge bound by these *dicta*? I think not. It is in no way the duty of a judge to accept all the *dicta* of his predecessors without regard to the circumstances in which they were uttered and apply them literally in a different age and in other circumstances. Still less is this the duty of a judge when those *dicta* are avowedly based on considerations of public policy which in the interval have been declared erroneous by Parliament in the successive Acts of Toleration.

Lastly, there is one case in which both *dicta* and decision are entirely opposed, in my opinion, to Lord Coleridge's view of the law. And this is *Cowan v. Milbourn*.* In this case, which is as recent as 1867, the Court of Exchequer† decided that a person was justified in refusing to carry out a contract to let certain rooms because the plaintiff proposed to deliver in them lectures, the titles of two of which were advertised as follows:—"The Character and Teachings of Christ; the former defective, the latter mis-

read that *Jesus* made them amends, or that they deserv'd such usage from him. The proprietors of the swine, it seems, upon this damage done them by *Jesus*, desire him to depart out of their coasts, to prevent further mischief, which was gentler resentment than we can imagine any others would have made of the like injury. I know not what our divines think of this part of the story, nor wherefore *Jesus* escaped so well; but if any *exorcist* in this our age and nation had pretended to expel the Devil out of one possess'd, and permitted him to enter into a flock of sheep, the people would have said, that he had bewitch'd both; and our laws and judges too of the last age, would have made him swing for it.

"Without offence, I hope, I have argued against the letter of this strange story of the Holy *Jesus*; I should not have dared to have said so much against it, but upon the encouragement of *Origen* and other fathers, who say we ought to expose the absurdities of the letter, as much as may be, to turn men's heads to the mystical and true meaning. Let's hear then, what the fathers say to this miracle." And then follow quotations, genuine, I presume, from Hilary, and Augustine, and St. Jerome, showing not indeed that they did not believe the literal story, but that they preferred to lay stress on its spiritual application.

* L. R. 2 Ex. 230; 36 L. J., Ex. 124; 15 W. R. 750; 16 L. T. 290.

† Kelly, C.B., Martin and Bramwell, BB.

leading;” “The Bible shown to be no more inspired than any other book.” The lectures never were delivered, and the propositions intended to be maintained in them could hardly have been expressed on the placards in less offensive language. Yet Kelly, C.B., and Martin, B., held that it was clear from the advertisements that the lecturer was going to attack Christianity in general, and that to do this publicly was clearly blasphemy at common law. Baron Bramwell (I prefer to retain the old title by which we knew him) on the other hand relied on the Statute 9 and 10 Will. III., c. 32, s. 1, making the quite gratuitous assumption that the plaintiff had been educated in, or made profession of, the Christian religion. But at the end of his judgment he seems to abandon this ground, and to admit that possibly the lecture was not positively criminal, in the sense that the law would punish it, while maintaining that it still was unlawful as being *contra bonos mores*. With all submission to the learned Baron, this is a solid distinction we know in many cases; but I venture to doubt if there can be such a distinction in slander and libel. Either the words are criminal or they are innocent. The right of free speech applies the instant the veto of law is removed: there can be no *tertium quid*, no debatable ground of language not criminal, yet reprobated by the law. This decision, if Lord Coleridge is right, is clearly bad law: it was however only a civil case, and the Court seem not to have been aware of the necessity of a criminal intent being proved.

In aid of the common law, many statutes have at different times been passed to punish particular species of blasphemy. Of these the following appear to be still unrepealed:—

Whatsoever person or persons shall deprave, despise, or condemn the most blessed Sacrament in contempt thereof by any contemptuous words or by any words of depraving, despising, or reviling, or what person or persons shall advisedly in any other wise condemn, despise, or revile the said most blessed Sacrament, shall suffer imprisonment of his or their bodies and make fine

and ransom at the king's will and pleasure (1 Edw. VI. c. 1, s. 1).

"Any vicar or other minister whatsoever that shall preach, declare, or speak anything in the derogation or depraving of the Book of Common Prayer, or anything therein contained, or of any part thereof," shall on conviction for the first offence suffer forfeiture of one year's profit of benefices and six months' imprisonment, and for the second offence, one year's imprisonment and deprivation, and for the third offence, deprivation and imprisonment for life: or, if not beneficed, for the first offence imprisonment for one year, and for the second offence imprisonment for life (2 and 3 Edw. VI. c. 1, s. 2; 1 Eliz. c. 2, s. 2).

Any person whatsoever, lay or clerical, who "shall in any interludes, plays, songs, rhymes, or by other open words, declare or speak anything in the derogation, depraving, or despising of the same book, or of anything therein contained, or any part thereof," shall for the first offence forfeit one hundred marks, for the second offence four hundred marks, and for the third offence shall forfeit all his goods and chattels to the Queen and be imprisoned for life (2 and 3 Edw. VI. c. 1, s. 3; and Eliz. c. 2, s. 3).

If any person, having been educated in, or at any time having made profession of, the Christian religion within this realm, shall by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking, assert or maintain that there are more gods than one, or shall deny the Christian religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be of Divine authority, he shall, on conviction by the oath of two or more credible witnesses, be deprived of all offices, civil, ecclesiastical, and military, unless he renounces his errors within four months from the date of his conviction; and for a second offence he shall be declared unable to sue in any court of law or equity, to be a guardian, an executor or administrator, to take any legacy, or to hold any office, and shall also suffer imprisonment for three years. But information must be given on oath to a magistrate within four days after such words were spoken, and the prosecution must be within three months after such information (9 Wm. III. c. 35 [c. 32 in the Statutes at Large], as amended by 53 Geo. III. c. 160).

This Act it will be seen is aimed rather at apostasy than at blasphemy. There appears never to have been any

prosecution under it; owing, I presume, to the difficulty in proving that the prisoner was educated in, or ever made profession of the Christian religion. All these statutes are entirely obsolete, and the sooner they are repealed the better. They did not affect or alter the Common Law; * nor will their repeal.†

By the Burial Laws Amendment Act, 1880, 43 and 44 Vic. c. 51, s. 7, any person who shall at any burial under the Act, “under colour of any religious service or otherwise, in any churchyard or graveyard, wilfully endeavour to bring into contempt or obloquy the Christian religion, or the belief or worship of any church or denomination of Christians, or the members or any minister of any such church or denomination, or any other person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.”

So much for the Law of Blasphemy as it is. Is it what it ought to be?

I for one do not see much to complain of in the present law; or at least I should not, if it could be ensured that Lord Coleridge would always try prisoners charged with this offence. But as that cannot be ensured, and as there is an undoubted difference of opinion now between the Chief Justice and Sir James Stephen, it would be well to have all doubt set at rest for ever; and we shall all so far approve of the proposed clause in the Criminal Code Bill, s. 141, which has hitherto passed through Committee unamended:

Every one shall be guilty of an indictable offence, and shall be liable upon conviction thereof, to one year's imprisonment, who publishes any blasphemous libel.

It shall be a question of fact whether any particular published matter is or is not a blasphemous libel: Provided that no one shall be liable to be convicted upon any indictment for a blasphemous libel only for expressing in good faith and in decent language, or attempting to establish by arguments used in good faith and conveyed in decent language, any opinion whatever upon any religious subject.

* *R. v. Carlile*, 3 B. and Ald. 661; *R. v. Williams*, 26 Howell's St. Tr. 656.

† *R. v. Waddington*, 1 B. and C. 26.

Oral blasphemy, apparently, is to be no longer a crime. But many desire to go further, and to abolish the law relating to Blasphemy altogether. More harm than good is done, they say, by such prosecutions, which only serve to advertise and bring into prominence the books or papers condemned, and to create a false sympathy with the offenders.

I feel that there is much force in this argument. But at the same time I distrust propositions to abolish anything entirely. It is so easy. It saves all the trouble of picking out what is good from what is bad, what is still a useful preventative from what is antiquated and obstructive. Moreover, I cannot reconcile it with my conscience that there should be no law against wantonly offending the religious feelings of others by unnecessarily exhibiting gross and offensive caricatures of religion. I am confident that but few of those who are now agitating for the release of Foote, Ramsey, and Kemp have ever seen the Christmas Number of the *Freethinker*. It was a blasphemous libel if there ever can be one. And the defendants undoubtedly published it. They were indicted, not under any statute, but for the common law offence of publishing a blasphemous libel; and of this they were clearly guilty. They could not have been indicted for anything else; there was no other provision applicable to the case. The intent to outrage the religious feelings of others was manifest. To take one of the less offensive drawings, what possible good to the cause of truth can be done by a picture representing Jesus, with a brandy bottle sticking out of his pocket, being "run in," as they express it, by a policeman in modern costume? I am sorry to have to describe such a picture; but it is right that those who never saw that publication should know what things it is they would shield from punishment. This caricature is no argument. No one is the wiser, or better, or happier for having looked at it. It is simply a gratuitous insult to the religious feelings of the immense majority of us. It could do no good. It certainly did harm to thousands of young people, who gazed at it when exhibited

in shop-windows in the public streets, whilst it must have pained and wounded tens of thousands more.

Such a picture appears to me to stand on the same footing as an obscene or immoral picture ; and should be treated in the same way. Our religious feelings surely demand from the law as much protection as our moral sense. The spirit of irreverence is already far too prevalent in our age.

There is a provision in the Indian Penal Code, s. 298, "Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person, utters any word, or makes any sound in the hearing of that person, or makes any gesture in the sight of that person, or places any object in the sight of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description, for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."

I myself see but little ground for being dissatisfied with the law, as stated in the Criminal Code Bill above. But perhaps it would be safer to abolish altogether the words blasphemy and blasphemous libel from our Statute Book, so that we may live no longer under the shadow of such cases as *R. v. Woolston*, and *R. v. Holyoake*, and *Cowan v. Milbourn*, but may be set free entirely from the traditions of former severity and intolerance. But if this be done, if blasphemy ceases to be an indictable offence, then certainly our magistrates should be armed with power to deal summarily with offenders such as Kemp, Ramsey, and Foote : some enactment similar to that in the Indian Penal Code should be made ; so that while on the one hand free liberty should be given to all serious and reverent discussion on religious matters, there yet should be adequate provision for the prevention of libels which tend to a breach of the peace, and which give wanton and unnecessary offence to the highest and noblest instincts of our nature.

W. BLAKE ODGERS.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

DENOMINATIONAL TRAINING COLLEGES.

THE purpose of the present note is solely to call attention, in as few words as may be, to an anomaly, preposterous in principle and pernicious in practice, in our national machinery for the training of teachers.*

The Training Colleges of England and Wales provide accommodation for 3,255 students; but only one-seventh of this accommodation is unsectarian. Of the rest, about one-sixtieth is Congregational, one-thirteenth is Wesleyan, one-thirteenth is Catholic, and seven-tenths are Church of England.

The income of the denominational colleges is derived from three main sources. In 1881-2 their total revenue was more than £150,000. Of this great sum rather more than one-eighth was drawn from past or present voluntary contributions, a little over another eighth from students' payments, and almost three-fourths from the public funds of the nation.

But this vast preponderance of the taxpayers' money indicates no parallel preponderance of national control. On the contrary, these seminaries are essentially private institutions, uncontrolled by public regulation, impenetrable by the wholesome breezes of public opinion.

Every candidate for admission to these or to the undenominational colleges established by the British and Foreign School Society sits for an examination approved by the State. But though failure in that examination incapacitates the aspirant to receive the training sought, success does not secure to him a place in any of these establishments. Nor is this merely to say that of those nominally successful, such as figure at the bottom of the pass-list, must expect to give place to their more

* See, for a full statement of the facts, the Hon. E. LYULPH STANLEY'S sixpenny pamphlet, *Denominational Training Colleges and Board Schools*, published by Messrs. James Clarke and Co. 1883.

distinguished rivals. On the contrary, the youth who scrapes through in the third division of the second class, only saving himself from a "pluck" by some lucky "fluke," if only he be, or be willing to pretend to be, a Churchman or a Wesleyan, has fair hope of being preferred to a competitor who has gone decently through a grade or two higher on the list. For the colleges connected with particular sects are governed in the interests of those sects first, and only secondly in the interests of education; and so the moneys of the people are used in a manner that is intended to promote a particular theology and does promote a particular conformity.

Let us illustrate this by the cases of two or three of the Training Colleges in different parts of the country. No one will be surprised that the Roman Catholic Colleges are very stringent in the terms they prescribe for admission. The Wesleyans who control the institutions at Southlands and at Westminster ask candidates for admission these among other questions:—"Do you cordially approve of the doctrine and discipline of the Wesleyan Methodist Society?" "If admitted, will you faithfully observe its rules?" They ~~examine~~ examine applicants in the Old and New Testaments and the Conference Catechism, but reserve liberty to admit non-Wesleyans *if all vacancies are not filled up by Wesleyans*. Turning to the Establishment, we have five "National Society's Colleges," three "Church of England Training Colleges," and twenty "Diocesan Colleges." Let us take an example from each group. To the first group belongs the Female College at Whitelands. Here the candidate is asked, "Have you been confirmed? Are you a communicant, or do you propose to be?" She is informed that after training she will be supposed to *educate children in the principles of the Church of England*. She is also examined, and must pass in the Old and New Testaments and the *Prayer-Book*. At the Peterborough College, in the next group, pretty much the same regulations obtain. In all the Diocesan Colleges which made returns to the recent inquiries of the London School Board, candidates are examined in Bible and *Prayer-Book*. At Culham, they make declaration that they will follow the profession of Church teacher in Elementary Schools. At Durham, they *must* be communicants. At Norwich, a certificate must be produced that the applicant is *a constant communicant*. All down the list we have inquiries concerning baptism, confirmation, and communion; and though in some instances the answer does not

positively determine the eligibility of the candidate, an enormous preponderance of favour accrues to the observer of all the rites of the Church.

Once admitted within the sacred walls, the pressure of the Church system is constant upon the student. In some cases the life assumes so extraordinary an ecclesiastical type as to be more like a Roman monastery than an English training-school. Early chapel, frequent communion, rigid conformity, perpetual drill in obedient churchmanship, become a burden, heavy to be borne, to the jaded student. And all the while the free people of England are taxing themselves to pay three shillings in every four which this conventual discipline costs.

But it may be said that this is only a case of that concurrent endowment which, whether we like it or not, enters into so many of our English social arrangements. These young men and women, it may be thought, of free choice accept the bondage, and it is not for the public to interfere. That, however, is not so. To the majority of young people anxious to enter the honourable profession of the Elementary Teacher, these Colleges are *the only avenue of admission*. Only one-seventh of those in training *can* receive a training free from this ecclesiastical surveillance. The nation subscribes £112,000 a-year to these close seminaries; but it does nothing to provide adequate accommodation independently of sectarian dictation for those who seek to be trained for the great national work of education. And so hundreds who are not in their hearts members of the Church of England at all are tempted to a false conformity. At the outset of life, when principles of truthfulness and sincerity should be fostered by every available means, we bribe hundreds of boys and girls to go through the farce of a confirmation which is a means, not of grace, but of bread-winning, and to go through the mockery of a communion which is the condition, not of the peace of Christ, but of *favour* with a board of managers; and we subject them to a daily and hourly training from year to year which inures them to an untruthful conformity and all the deterioration of character and principle which such a conformity involves. There are at this moment numbers of young men and women within the walls of these colleges, from whom the daily pledge of religious observance is exacted, who, as soon as they are once more emancipated, will enter Board or British Schools and fling their churchmanship to the winds. Mr. Mundella asks for instances of persons

"willing to go to a Church or Wesleyan training college, and *willing to conform to the religious observances*," who have been refused admission. But he seems singularly blind to the deepest significance of the evil—a significance hardly brought out even by Mr. Lyulph Stanley himself. He little dreams of the painful struggle between conscience and interest, sincerity and ambition, in many a young and undisciplined mind; appears little to realise the loss to our national integrity, or the damage to the purity of the subsequent influence of the trainer of children, involved in this terrible choice which he permits to be put before the pupil teacher of unorthodox antecedents.

Mr. Mundella says that we "cannot have a variety of people differing in their religious views brought together" in these seminaries; that we cannot ask the managers to "admit persons of all faiths or of no faith into the family life of those colleges." If that be so, no reason appears why we should be compelled to subscribe three-fourths of their maintenance; but every reason appears why we should devote this money and more to setting up some system or other for the due training of our national teachers without asking the aid or counsels of those who make theological supremacy the condition of their help. That this is easy enough to do is clear on the face of it. The form it should take is matter for further debate. I believe, for my own part, that a broadening and liberalising of the whole system would be an immense boon to education. The attachment of chairs of education and normal schools to the old Universities; and the facilitation of the entrance of the pupil teachers into the existing male and female colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, though it might cause a spasm to our "old nobility," would be one more step in the great work of shaping the Universities to the real needs of the English people and a grand advance in the true education of our teachers.

But it is not any particular solution of the dilemma, but the dilemma itself, that I would press upon the attention of the reader. At the twenty-fifth clause of Mr. Forster's Education Act a great outcry was made, and the Liberal Government of the day never recovered from the effect of it. Here is an ecclesiastical wrong immeasurably exceeding that twenty-fifth clause in magnitude and practical importance. Surely it is time we rescued National Education from its perverse and mischievous effects.

RICHARD A. ARMSTRONG.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

SAMUEL JOHNSON, OF SALEM.*

TO many of our readers the name of Samuel Johnson, of Salem, Massachusetts, cannot be unfamiliar in connection either with his two books, of high interest and significance, on the Religions of India and of China, or possibly with certain fine poetical hymns which have found their way into some recent collections. These appeared in the *Hymns of the Spirit*, on the title-page of which Mr. Johnson's name is associated with that of Mr. Samuel Longfellow, brother of the poet. It is to this intimate and devoted friend that we owe the graceful and deeply-interesting sketch of Mr. Johnson's life and character which occupies nearly a third of the attractive volume before us.

The two young men became class-mates at Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1842, when the subject of the memoir was twenty years of age; and they were connected in close, brotherly relations from that time forth. Samuel Johnson began his divinity studies as a "conservative Unitarian," under the direction and influence of Henry Ware, jun., and Dr. Walker. But he was by nature "a transcendentalist and a born idealist; the cast of his mind intuitive rather than logical." The gentle, devout mysticism in which these tendencies showed themselves is expressed in several striking and beautiful passages given from his earlier letters and diaries. They belong to a phase which, he said, "lasted but a short time;" but they point to a further clearing and settling of conviction, which was not long delayed. In his twenty-fourth year he travelled in Europe, and with leisure and new food for thought, his deeper spiritual life was refreshed and confirmed, and he returned with a more vigorous faith and a quickened enthusiasm to finish his college work and then settle down to the duties of his ministry. It was just when he was on the threshold of his own independent career, that the exciting controversies broke out which were caused by Theodore Parker's celebrated discourse on the Transient and Permanent in Christianity. We might be sure that he would take Parker's side, and would feel strongly and act decisively. His own

* *Lectures, Essays, and Sermons.* By SAMUEL JOHNSON, Author of "Oriental Religions." With a Memoir by SAMUEL LONGFELLOW. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co. 1888.

religious position, from the time that it most clearly defined itself to him, may be said to have been essentially that of Theodore Parker. Mr. Johnson did not escape misrepresentation and prejudice originating in a fundamental incapacity to understand his position, or to tolerate it when it was understood. He was looked at askance as a "Deist," reproached for bringing politics into the pulpit, and accused of going about "breaking up churches." But he held on his way with perfect simplicity of purpose and faithfulness to conviction, and if he had less commanding power and eloquent speech than Parker, he had also less aptness to provoke or alarm his theological opponents. For seventeen years he was minister to a church at Lynn, near Salem, which had been at first called Unitarian, but which, on his urgent representations, was re-constituted as a "Free Church." Mr. Longfellow has put on record, in many interesting pages, the faithfulness and efficiency with which Mr. Johnson did his work as a preacher and lecturer, a student always intent on progress, and a pastor devoted to his people. One of his chief delights and recreations was in travel, at home or abroad, and we are given frequent pages from his letters which are full of vivid description and intense appreciation of the scenes he visited. There are many other selections from his correspondence, in which he writes his opinions on the things which most interested him in his work, his reading, and his general life-experience, or communes tenderly with friends in sorrow and trouble. The impression is always of a singularly sweet and gracious nature, a character original and cultivated on the intellectual side, and very devout and earnest on the spiritual side. And no one can read these interesting letters, without being the better both for the pleasure they give and the example of high thought and purpose which they set forth.

For the last six years of Mr. Johnson's life he retired to the ancestral farm, at North Andover, which had descended to him. Here he divided his time between his books and his out-door occupations, occasionally also preaching or lecturing when he was wanted. His chief business in his study was the completion of his great work on *The Oriental Religions in their Relations to the Religion of Humanity*; but death came before he had finished the concluding volume, which was to have given a view of the religions of Persia. He died at the age of sixty, after a week's illness, February 13, 1882; and at the funeral services, held at "the Unitarian church in the village, which he had been wont to attend, rejoicing to find there an independent ministry of breadth kindred to his own," the addresses given by various friends bore witness to the impression which the many noble qualities of his character had made on all who knew him. We must find room for the tribute to the memory of his friend with which Mr. Longfellow concludes his deeply-interesting sketch:—

With us who knew him, and with the world, remain his work and his character. With us abides, as a memory and an inspiration, the genuine nobility of soul. With us remains, a sacred and secure possession, the profound and elevated thought; the absolute faith in God; the clear, spiritual sight of things divine, ideal, invisible, as the realities; the keen moral judg-

ment of men and events, untinged with bitterness; the reverent sensibility to all truly sacred things, equalled only by the prompt rejection of all that only pretended to be sacred; the absolute sincerity and sturdy independence in thought, speech, and methods of action, which, while respecting the freedom of others, may not always have been able to do justice to methods different from his own; the devotion to liberty in all its forms; the unwearied search for truth, and the steady-working industry under the burden of bodily infirmity; the sensitive love of beauty in nature and in art; the kindly sympathies and warm attachments; the too modest estimate of himself and the cordial recognition of the good work and worth of others; the bright mirth that lightened out his habitual seriousness, all these things abide with us, now that the voice is stilled and the hand lifeless. Those who have had the privilege of his friendship must be ever grateful for what it has been, and is, to them.

Of the thirteen Lectures, Sermons and Addresses, which are collected in the volume, we cannot attempt here to give any critical account. We can only say that they are full of earnest thought on the problems of faith and duty, wise counsel and devout religious feeling; and they are quite in harmony with the eulogium which we have just quoted. There are studies of nature and of art in the papers on Florence, Switzerland, and the Symbolism of the Sea; lessons in social and political duty—Labour Parties and Labour Reform, Equal Opportunity for Woman; and discourses on religion, both in its intellectual and its spiritual relations and in its practical issues, in such subjects as The Search for God, Living by Faith, The Law of the Blessed Life, Gain in Loss, The Duty of Delight, Fate. The list is completed by an essay on Transcendentalism, reprinted from the *Radical Review*. We would gladly have attempted to do justice to the varied interest and value of these thoughtful and original papers; but we have desired to devote what space we had at our disposal to a brief account of Mr. Longfellow's memorial of his friend's life; and we must be contented now with warmly recommending to our readers a book which they will find in many ways inspiring and helpful. It can be obtained through Messrs. Trübner, of Ludgate Hill; but it is well worthy of being made more easily accessible and more generally known by being re-published in England. If this should be done, we hope it will be in the same admirable form in which it has come to us from Boston.

PROFESSOR CAIRD'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL.*

PROFESSOR CAIRD'S sketch of the life and philosophy of Hegel is certainly not inferior in interest and importance to any of its predecessors in this excellent series of "Philosophical Classics." Hegelian ideas are a living and growing power in our present literature, so that the book we are noticing possesses far more than a simply historical value. Since Dr. J. H. Stirling, in 1865, introduced Hegel to English

* *Hegel*. By EDWARD CAIRD, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy University of Glasgow. William Blackwood and Sons. 1883.

readers, there has been a steadily-increasing group of able and earnest students both in this country and in America who enthusiastically recognise in the fundamental principle of the Hegelian logic both the true key to the past history of thought and also a method of philosophising which will lead in the future not to hopeless agnosticism, but to a satisfying solution of the deepest questions which now weigh so heavily on the human mind. In regard to the existing conflict between scientific and theological thought, this modified Hegelianism, which has taken firm root amongst us, professes to furnish a rational ground of reconciliation which does ample justice to the claims both of evolution and of faith; and whatever we may think of the competency of this philosophy to satisfy fully the demands of our religious consciousness, there can be no doubt that its adherents have already done a great negative service to religious belief by clearly indicating the fatal logical defects of the current unspiritual theories which such idealists as J. S. Mill and such realists as Mr. Herbert Spencer have popularised in this country. The late Professor Green's clear demonstration that a natural history of man as a product of evolution is intrinsically impossible and inconceivable has not been refuted, and does not, we think, admit of refutation; and if, as our Hegelians say, it is spirit which explains evolution and not evolution which explains spirit, then there is nothing in recent scientific discoveries which can unfavourably affect the fundamental truths of Theism.

Hegelianism is essentially a philosophy of religion, and while it does not, we think, furnish a complete *rationalis* of the facts of man's religious experience, it has many most interesting and vital points of contact both with the teachings of Jesus and with what is most profound in the Johannine and Pauline writings. Like Christianity, Hegelianism teaches that we must "die to live," that self-renunciation is the condition of self-realisation; and the saying of Jesus that "he that saveth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life shall save it," is accepted by Hegel as the first distinct expression of the exact truth as to the nature of spirit. The writings of this philosopher are evidently destined to play an important part in healing the breach between Christianity and modern thought, and hence to the theologian they are of especial interest. What estimate Professor Caird forms of their present influence will appear from the following passage with which his treatise closes:—

For any one whose view is not limited by words or superficial appearances it is not difficult to see that in the scientific life of Germany, as of other countries, there is no greater power at present than Hegelianism, especially in all that relates to metaphysics and ethics, to the philosophy of history and of religion. It is, however, a necessary part of the greatness of such spiritual force that it is not like a definite scientific discovery, whose influence we can exactly measure. Rather is it so inextricably entangled with the whole culture of the time, and so closely identified with the general movement of thought, that we are increasingly unable to say what specially belongs to it alone. If we cannot estimate how much the poetical culture of modern times owes to Dante or to Shakespeare, much less can we precisely determine what, in the speculative development to which they all

contribute, is respectively due to earlier philosophers, to Hegel, and to those who, since his day, have attempted to supersede, to criticise, or to complete his work. The only important question now is, not whether we are disciples of Hegel—the days of discipleship are past—but whether we recognise the existence of a living development of philosophy, and especially of that spiritual or idealistic view of things in which philosophy culminates—a development which begins in the earliest dawn of speculation, and in which Kant and Hegel are, not indeed the last names, but the last names in the highest order of speculative genius, i *Maestri di color che sanno*.

The special inspiration which modern thought derives from Hegel is the idea that nature is not an independent reality over against spirit which may resist and baffle the energies of the spirit, but is, on the contrary, the product of spirit, for the ultimate fact of being is self-consciousness, which constitutes at once the nature of man and the nature of things. The duality which we feel of self and not self is not the final truth.

Beneath this opposition there is an unconscious unity, which reveals itself in the fact that the whole life of our intelligence is an effort to overcome its own dualism—in *knowledge* to find itself, in *action* to realise itself in an object or world of objects, which at first presents itself as a stranger and even as an enemy. . . . The whole theoretical and practical movement of self-consciousness thus culminates in what Hegel calls "the absolute idea,"—i.e., in the idea of a self-consciousness which manifests itself in the difference of self and not self, that through this difference and by overcoming it, it may attain the highest unity with itself.

Hence it would seem that Hegelianism aspires to perform in reference to the sensationalism and materialism of the present day a similar function to that of Bishop Berkeley's idealism in reference to the scepticism and atheism of the last century. Both systems deny the substantial reality of matter or nature, and show that substance and causality have their being in *spirit* alone. Professor Caird points out the inconsistency of Kant in maintaining the independent existence of "the thing in itself," and by a very lucid exposition of the views of Fichte and Schelling, he endeavours to make it clear that these great thinkers imperfectly apprehended the grand idea of the unity of mind and nature which found for the first time adequate expression in Hegel's absolute idealism.

Hegel's change of attitude in respect to Christianity, as his philosophy advanced, is very graphically described. In his early student years he was strongly captivated by the Greek type of character and culture, and he thought that Christianity produces, or indicates, an unhealthy division between religion and life. Greek life presented itself to him as the practical solution of the problem of combining the universal and the particular, the reason and the feelings. The distinction between the self and the not-self was unconsciously overcome by the Greek, for to him "the idea of his father-land, his State, was the invisible, the higher reality, for which he laboured and which formed his persistent motive. In comparison with this idea his own individuality was as nothing; it was *its* endurance—*its* continued life—that he sought, and this he was him-

self able to realise." Later on, however, as Hegel grasped the idea of Spirit as the unity of all differences, his view of the relative importance of the Greek and the Christian idea underwent an entire change. He saw that the Greek reconciliation of man with the world was only superficial, and that this reconciliation could not become thorough till man had passed through the consciousness of the antagonism of the inner and outer life. The reconciliation of this antagonism is furnished by Christianity, for "in the central moral principle of Christianity, the principle of self-realisation through self-sacrifice, Hegel found just that movement through negation to affirmation, through opposition to reconciliation, which he was seeking." Professor Caird's exposition shows that he warmly admires the main features of the philosophy he is describing, and he occasionally turns aside to anticipate objections which may be urged against it, but to the main difficulty which has constantly suggested itself to us during the reading of the treatise, namely, how Hegelianism can be harmonised with man's clear consciousness of sin, he never so much as alludes. We are constantly told that man becomes free in proportion as he dies to his natural self, and is actuated by his higher self, the reason. But the question which needs answering is, Is man free to choose between yielding to the self-indulgent cravings of his natural self, and obeying the dictates of his higher self? To this fundamental ethical question which Christianity answers with an emphatic affirmative, Hegelianism seems to give a negative reply, and hence we do not see how in this matter it can be essentially distinguished from Spinoza's Pantheism.

As an appropriate appendix to this notice of Professor Caird's Hegel, we may just call attention to a volume of philosophical essays * dedicated to the memory of the late Professor T. H. Green, and introduced by a Preface from the pen of Professor Caird. These very thoughtful essays are the work of the younger members of the school of English Hegelians, and they are intended to show how Kantian and Hegelian principles may be advantageously applied to the problems of physical science, of ethics, of sociology and of religion which now press on our attention. In the words of Professor Caird:—"The writers of this volume agree in believing that the line of investigation which philosophy must follow, or in which it may be expected to make most important contributions to the intellectual life of man is that which was opened up by Kant, and for the successful prosecution of which no one has done so much as Hegel."

It is not meant by this that the writers of these essays lack originality, and have merely imported German ideas into the English tongue. Far from it; nearly every one of the nine essays bears clear marks of creative thought, and though they are all constructed more or less on Hegelian lines, there is still room for considerable variety of opinion. The subjects treated of cover nearly the whole range of speculative thought, and clearly

* *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*. Edited by ANDREW SETH and R. B. HALDANE, with a Preface by Edward Caird. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1883.

testify to the vast work of reconstruction which Hegelianism sets up in the minds which it has captivated. It would far exceed our limits to describe and criticise these papers, and we can only say that while we often feel unable to follow the writers in their positive doctrines, we have found their criticism of the dominant theories concerning the evolution of intellectual and ethical ideas most sound and suggestive. Especially instructive is the paper by Mr. W. R. Sorley on "The Historical Method." We may mention also a profound essay by Mr. Andrew Seth, a late Hibbert Travelling Scholar, on "Philosophy as a Criticism of Categories," and one by Mr. J. B. Kilpatrick, on "Pessimism and the Religious Consciousness." But perhaps the most attractive and precious feature in the volume is Professor Caird's touching and eloquent testimony to the noble and beautiful character of his friend Professor Green.

C. B. U.

DR. FAIRBAIRN'S 'THE CITY OF GOD.'*

THIS volume by the President of the Congregational Union for the present year, though described as a series of discussions, is evidently a selection of sermons, dealing with more or less logical sequence with one great theme. The occasions on which several of them were delivered are stated, and with respect to the others, the general style as well as the Scripture heading marks them off as pulpit utterances. Not, however, that Dr. Fairbairn is an ordinary preacher, or that the congregations he has addressed are ordinary congregations; they either were brought together on special occasions or else probably contained a large academical element. For these "discussions" are rather what are generally known as "pulpit essays" than either "lyrical expressions of the soul" or exhortations to the conscience. People who like smart and "telling" sermons might find these a trifle dry; those who think that no man (in the pulpit) can talk sense for more than twenty minutes at one time would, if they kept awake, be referring to their watches a long time before the last head was reached; but they who think that the day is not yet past in which preachers may discuss great subjects with grave and earnest speech will find their opinion confirmed by Dr. Fairbairn's volume.

It is, however, as readers and not as listeners that we have here to do with the book. Its author is a recognised leader among the Congregationalists. His position as Principal of one of their Colleges at once implies that confidence is felt in him, and that influence is being exercised by him over the present and future thought of the Congregational Churches. Under these circumstances, we are specially glad to find so much largeness of thought and openness to new ideas as are displayed throughout this volume.

The first "discussion"—an address delivered at the opening of a

* *The City of God: a Series of Discussions.* By A. M. FAIRBAIRN, D.D., London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1883.

Session at Airedale College—fairly states the question at issue between "Faith and Modern Thought," and incidentally characterises and contrasts the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in a way which turns to good account the results of wide reading. Dr. Fairbairn at once assumes the "Liberal" or "rationalist" "standpoint" (to use a doubtful word, for which he has an affection), when he says, "No man or church has any right to ask men to believe what they cannot rationally conceive, or what contradicts ascertained and certain truths." "Authority cannot keep alive what the intellect dooms to death. To be authoritative authority must be rational, and an age of faith simply means an age when faith satisfies reason." Dr. Fairbairn is for giving up the apologetic attitude in favour of aggression, and does not shrink from meeting the antagonists to faith on their own ground—that of pure intellect. "The thinker when he needs to be answered must be answered by thought, not by being prayed at or preached at, not by a command to believe, or an exhortation to repentance, or an admonition that broadly hints that a place too hot to be comfortable is prepared for him, but, to use Cudworth's fine phrase, by 'an intellectual system of the universe,' a system that shall show not only that the religious idea can be expounded into an intellectual theory of things, but that it is the theory that can give the best reason for the existence alike of itself and the universe" (p. 24). All this is well said, and is in refreshing contrast to what was said not very long ago by orthodox champions in scorn of "carnal reason."

Starting from this position our author sees that the traditional beliefs must be revised and modified. Instead of regarding Christianity as a scheme to redeem man from the curse under which he was born, he believes that it "can make us conscious of much in ourselves that deserves reverence, of a nature full of Divine affinities, of a being capable of immortal progress along all the sublimest paths of knowledge, feeling, and action" (p. 29). Moreover he pleads on behalf of the ethical element in religion. "Christian teachers have never done even common justice to Christian ethics." "The Churches have been more concerned about doctrine than about ethics, about polity than about conduct." This will be truth familiar enough to most readers of the *Modern Review*; what is noteworthy is the quarter in which it is now declared. Verily "the world moves."

In the second "discussion"—a sermon delivered during the Jubilee Meeting of the British Association at York, Dr. Fairbairn comes into close quarters with the apostles of what he aptly calls "scientific metaphysics," practically taking up Dr. Martineau's contention in his celebrated encounter with Professor Tyndall, and in his papers "God in Nature," published in the American Magazine *Old and New*. He appears frankly to accept the evolution theory, and even welcomes it, because "in making the doctrine of the Divine immanence a necessity to our idea of nature (it) has made the Doctrine of the Divine presence a new reality in religion and a new inspiration for the soul" (p. 57). He insists, however, with just enapnasis that Evolution, while reforming our ideas of the

creative method, does not in the slightest degree enable us to dispense with the belief in a creative cause. The theory has absolutely no place until the primordial germ and the conditions favourable to its growth are provided.

We imagine that Dr. Fairbairn's studies have been in the department of religious philosophy rather than of Biblical criticism, though the latter has not been neglected. For example, in speaking of the Hebrew prophets he admits "we have been too anxious to find them seers of the future, to prove their words predictions; and too indifferent to what they were and said as preachers, speaking for the living God to living men" (p. 80). Again, in regard to miracles, "to identify God with the supernatural is to undeify Him. . . . The only supernatural I can conceive is the cessation of the Divine action; the absolute miracle were the inactivity of God" (p. 56). Though a small matter in itself, it is not, perhaps, without significance that our author adopts the "advanced" spelling of the Divine Name, Jahveh.

We find Dr. Fairbairn least satisfactory and least stimulating in the latter parts of the book, where he deals with such questions as "The Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith," "Christ in History," "The riches of Christ's poverty." Whilst heartily sympathising with his profound reverence for the grandeur of the Prophet of Nazareth, we cannot allow that he vindicates the validity of the process by which the actual Jesus of History has been "arrayed in the attributes of metaphysical Divinity." Our author has no patience with Strauss, Baur or Renan, and says not a word about the critical grounds for discriminating between the fourth and the synoptical gospels. Naturally enough, therefore, he makes a good deal of the claims which Jesus is represented as putting forth for himself in the Fourth Gospel. Again, he declares Jesus to be "a miracle in the sphere of morals and personality," on the ground that he could not otherwise have succeeded as he did, in opposition to the spirit of his age. The individuality of Jesus was undoubtedly remarkable; but it is not to be forgotten that the dominant Pharisaic spirit was qualified by other elements, and that a preparation had long been going forward, so that the way for the new Gospel was to some extent prepared.

Some of the other discussions are interesting, but do not call for special remark in a short notice. Altogether the book is worthy of the reputation its author enjoys as one of the leaders of Congregational Liberalism.

JAMES HARWOOD.

PREFENDARY REYNOLDS ON THE SUPERNATURAL.*

THE object of Mr. Reynolds in his treatise, 'The Supernatural in Nature,' has been to meet the case of men filled with an ardent love of scientific study, who are "in danger of being

* *The Supernatural in Nature*: a verification by free use of Science. By JOSEPH WILLIAM REYNOLDS, M.A. Third Edition. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1893.

beguiled by the sophisms of an imperfect science." In order to attain this object he applies himself to the task of reconciling the account, or rather accounts, of creation in Genesis with scientific facts. It is no discredit to Mr. Reynolds that he does not achieve the impossible, and our only surprise is that with his apparently extensive scientific knowledge he should make the attempt. Of course he has to adopt the device of accommodating Scripture language, and making words mean anything that is required. "Those difficulties in the Holy Word which appear contrarieties . . . are like knots in the oak which strengthen it" (p. 15). The position taken is that the Bible "is a mystery, the origin is Divine, the diction is by inspiration, the substance is of God." Not only does he assert the Mosaic authorship of Genesis, but also that Moses claimed to have received from God what he wrote. After this we need not wonder that our author is untroubled about the Creation in six days and the Sabbath rest that followed; that he finds the doctrine of the Trinity in the plural form Elohim; that he attributes to "a want of sufficient critical skill" the belief that the two accounts of Creation in Genesis proceed from different writers; and that the conclusion he draws from the genealogies in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke is that chronology "only exists in Holy Scripture for genealogical! not scientific purposes." These specimens will be sufficient to indicate the value of our author's Biblical criticism. He is more satisfactory in vindicating a place for mind in Nature; and the illustrations which he draws so copiously from the facts and theories of modern science are often interesting and suggestive, even when we are not able to follow him in the particular use he makes of them in his argument. Unfortunately he indiscriminately classes together as Materialists all who do not conform to his type of orthodoxy. An instance of this occurs in what we believe is a reference to Dr. Carpenter as one who "writes flippantly, as if glad to announce his belief that Christianity is false" (p. 452). The book is certainly not light reading as regards either its matter or its style, yet we observe it has reached a third edition.

We cannot say that Mr. Reynolds' other work, 'The Mystery of Miracles,'* throws much light on the mystery its author undertakes to investigate in a scientific and philosophic spirit. The quotations which make up far too large a part of the 480 pp. which the book contains, and the "fragments of science" scattered throughout, certainly testify to a wide range of reading, but we would willingly part with what often strikes us as pedantic elaboration in exchange for greater clearness and strength of thought. There is an appearance of logical method about the work, without any corresponding reality, for after reading through the twenty-nine chapters, characteristically called "Thoughts," we have not met with any definition of miracle to which the author consistently adheres, nor do we know on what principle he would

* *The Mystery of Miracles: a Scientific and Philosophical Investigation.* By JOSEPH WM. REYNOLDS, M.A. Third Edition. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co.

accept the narratives of some miracles as true and reject the narratives of others as false. It is true, indeed, that he admits, by implication at any rate, that miracles must be supported by historical proof, and states that for "asserted miracles we should not credit any evidence that is less than intellectually irresistible" (p. 375). Very good; but what constitutes "intellectually irresistible" evidence? Our author is certainly not exacting in his requirements, for he, apparently without discrimination, accepts all the miracles of the Old and New Testament without the slightest attempt at forming a critical estimate of the records which narrate them. We venture to think it would have been much more to the purpose to undertake this task than to quote from Jeremy Taylor and a number of other writers their belief in the importance of miracles as an essential element of Christianity, or to vindicate Jesus, the apostles and the Scripture writers from the purely imaginary charge of being impostors. Mr. Reynolds is consistent in not refusing credence to modern miracles, though the illustrations which he gives of them do not bear on the belief in physical miracles. For instance, he declares that a sacrament is "a continual miracle;" "apostolic succession believed in by practical laymen (is) surely almost, if not quite, a miracle" (p. 368). "Every Regeneration, every Conversion, is a miracle or . . . nothing at all."

It will be seen that our author uses words in a misleading way, and this is particularly the case with the word "supernatural," the double sense of which is employed quite promiscuously. At one time it denotes the existence of mind as well as matter in the universe; at another it denotes the suspension of the ordinary course of nature through the intervention of the Supreme Mind. One would suppose from this book that the two meanings were identical, and that all Theists must be believers in miracles as generally understood. We should thus be driven to the alternative of saying, on the one hand, that all causes and antecedents are material, and that all being and existence are comprised in matter, force, and space (not in the transcendental sense of these words); or, on the other, that the sun obeyed the command of Joshua, and that Jesus turned the devils into the swine. The inconsistency with which Mr. Reynolds charges Theists, who reject miracles, not on *a priori* grounds, but for want of satisfactory evidence, is one which he himself creates through his ambiguous use of words.

We are not concerned to defend those who call in question the great spiritual realities on which man's faith depends, but we think Mr. Reynolds will certainly not promote the cause he has at heart by saying that "evolution, as an atheistic system, is a dreary, sinful delusion," and by speaking of those who adopt it as "men, not spiritually constituted, of a peculiarly animal mind" (p. 311). Such language, we hope, is becoming rare even in the pulpit, and ought to have no place in "a scientific and philosophical investigation," which our author—a City Rector and Prebendary of St. Paul's—aspires to conduct.

JAMES HARWOOD.



THE PULPIT COMMENTARY ON JEREMIAH.*

THOSE of us who had to write Latin verses when at school have a keen appreciation of the value of the "Gradus ad Parnassum." This inestimable work told us all the different names we could call any person or thing, all the epithets we might suitably apply to him, all the circumlocutions we could substitute for any verb or adjective, and so forth. It likewise gave us tags of verses that might come in well. It might have been called "Every man his own poet," and it exhibited every stage of the poetising process beginning with the raw material and ending with the manufactured article. If we were at liberty to choose our own subject we had only to take any word at random, and hexameters would at once germinate from it! Look out "Ajax," for instance, and you find that you may call him "Tēlāmōniūs hērōs," which at once sets you up in the last half of a verse. Then you may also call him "aūdāx māgnānimūs, or fērōx," and if you call him all three at once there is the other half of your verse! And you have "clypei dominus septemplicis" in reserve for the next hexameter.

The want of some similar manual for the equally important and elegant art of homiletics has long been felt, and finds pathetic utterance and illustration in the words of a "great preacher," quoted on pp. 325-6 of the work before us. This preacher had read and studied all day in vain. He could not get a text. He had prayed and meditated and turned from verse to verse—but "the mind would not take hold." Providentially he saw a bird getting persecuted by its companions just in time and it occurred to him that "mine heritage is unto me as a speckled bird; the birds round about are against her" would make a capital text—which it did. Now this great preacher might have been spared all his pain and might have rendered himself independent of providential arrangements which can scarcely be permanently relied on had he invested in the "Pulpit Commentary." He might then have taken any text at random, and he would have learned from the "exposition" what the text meant, from the "homiletics" what he might suitably tell his congregation it meant, and from the "homilies" how he might tell it effectively—and not too concisely. *E.g.*, he opens his Bible and lights on Jeremiah i. 18, "I see a seething pot," and he learns from Mr. Cheyne that the word used for "pot" probably signifies a large iron vessel, and that a "seething pot" is a symbol of war with the ancient Arab poets (p. 2). No sign of the sermon yet. But presently Mr. Adeney reminds our preacher that the seething pot is a fit symbol of approaching doom, which is severest on the most favoured, which is gradual (slowly heated to boiling point), and

* *The Pulpit Commentary*. Edited by the Rev. Canon H. D. M. SPENCE, M.A., &c., and by the Rev. JOSEPH J. EXELL, M.A.—*Jeremiah*: Exposition by Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M.A., &c., Homiletics by Rev. W. F. Adeney, M.A., Homilies by various authors: Rev. D. Young, B.A., Rev. J. Waite, B.A., Rev. S. Conway, B.A., Rev. A. F. Muir, M.A. Vol. I. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1888.

often comes from the least expected quarter (p. 8). Finally Mr. Young gives the finishing touch—"A pot boiling over with the vehemence of the fire under it, is an excellent emblem of how God can stir up His destroying wrath against the rebellious. What can be quieter than the water as it lies in the pot? What quieter than the fuel before it is kindled? And yet the light touch of a very small flame sends fuel and water into activity, and that activity soon rises into fury. The water that only a few minutes ago was still and cold is now turbulent and scalding. Just in the same way," &c., &c. (p. 17). Enough of homiletics! "You see the trick on't, though, and can yourself Continue the discourse *ad libitum*."

Mr. Conway remarks (*apropos* of the speckled bird) "But while the use here made of the text is a legitimate one, it certainly is not its meaning. [And we may remark in passing that although the sentence here quoted is intelligible, it certainly is not grammatical.] That, therefore, as in all cases, has the priority of claim to be considered." And this, we may suppose, is why Mr. Cheyne is called in to occupy a very modest fraction of the 598 closely-printed pages of this volume in expounding "that." It could hardly be expected, under these circumstances, that Mr. Cheyne would give us quite his best work; but it is impossible, under any circumstances, for him to give us work that is not good. A profound and minute acquaintance with the Old Testament literature, and a rare quality of Hebrew scholarship, fortified by a singularly wide and varied study of commentators and critics of every school, makes it comparatively easy for Mr. Cheyne to throw off work which few men, either in England or elsewhere, could do at all; but at the same time he has far too keen a sense of the fitness of things to bury any very considerable amount of strictly original matter in this ocean of homiletics—into which he probably suspects that few divers who know a pearl when they see it will think it worth while to plunge. The archæological notes are models of lucidity and conciseness. Philological questions are dealt with briefly but adequately. The most obscure or corrupt passages Mr. Cheyne is content to note as such, perhaps adding some conjectural emendation which has been suggested, without committing himself for or against it. The wider questions of the higher criticism are neither ignored nor discussed but referred to in an incidental and reassuring manner, while an elastic theory of "inspiration" covers a multitude of alternatives. We should add that from time to time a note, such as that on Dante's use of Jer. v. 6 (p. 118), or an analogy such as that between Jeremiah's and Savonarola's preaching (p. vi.) vindicates the right and duty of giving the prophets their due place in the line of the world's general literary and historical development, and shows that whatever we are to understand by "inspiration," at any rate "God's spirit is not tied to countries or to centuries, and there is nothing wonderful if mountain-moving faith were blessed in Florence as it was in Jerusalem" (p. vi.). In the note on Jer. vii. 22, Mr. Cheyne's deliberate principle of attempting on the one hand to disarm the so-called rationalistic criticism of its sting by showing that its results are

after all compatible with orthodox belief, and on the other hand offering the reader an alternative interpretation which will fall in more easily with his preconceived ideas, is carried to its farthest limits. "Our object has been to separate the exegesis of our passage from a still doubtful controversy," he says (p. 186). But the exegesis of the passage is really inseparable from the controversy in question. Mr. Cheyne's laboured attempt to show that when Jeremiah says "Jehovah never commanded our fathers to sacrifice," he only means (or may only mean) that he will not accept "the mere outward forms of the ritual, divorced from the sentiment and practice of piety" will probably satisfy his clerical readers; but it is difficult to understand how it can satisfy himself. In a word, if Mr. Cheyne's commentary were published separately, it would be extremely valuable as by far the best (so far as we know) existing in the English language; and, in spite of its many defects, there would be few Englishmen capable of superseding it—but Mr. Cheyne would be one of them.

P. H. W.

THE REV. HEBER NEWTON ON THE RIGHT AND WRONG USES OF THE BIBLE.

IT is a singular evidence of the blindness and perversity of orthodox bigotry that this little work should have been made the object of denunciation and prosecution. It is throughout a warm and even passionate plea for a more constant, a more devout, and a more intelligent study of the Bible. But no assiduity or devoutness apparently will atone for the clear and uncompromising demand for *intelligence* in the study of the Bible, which the leading Episcopalian clergyman of New York has made. This is his unpardonable sin. Apart from the sensation it has caused this small volume of sermons would deserve a most hearty welcome, but would not call for any lengthened notice in these pages. As a critical work it makes no claims to originality. The author himself is evidently not a close critical student of the Bible, as appears *e.g.* from the way in which he quotes from the Authorised Version, and without misgiving, Job xix. 25, *sqq.*, ("I know that my Redeemer liveth," &c.); but he has assimilated, with a vigorous and individual realisation, the main results of constructive historical criticism, and he gives them clearly and simply to his congregation. Lecture VI., "On the Right Historical Use of the Bible," is, perhaps, the most powerful of the series. With rapid and graphic touches the preacher puts before his congregation a series of pictures of the growth of Israelite religion, from its earliest and crudest beginnings, which leads up to the fine passage:—

Plainly, by every sign, Israel's long gestation of religion was nearing its appointed term. All the elements had been developed, one after another, for a universal religion, and there was nothing more to be done but to await

* *The Right and Wrong Uses of the Bible.* By Rev. B. HEBER NEWTON. New York: John W. Lovell and Company. 1883.

the coming to the birth. As plainly, by every sign, the world-conditions were at length found for a safe issue of the "holy thing," which Israel so long had carried within her bosom. There was needed a man to body these scattered elements, to fuse the forces of the nation into a personality, to live the dreams which a race had visioned. Religion is never a code nor a theory, it is always a life. The ideal religion awaited the ideal man. He came! As the nation held the holy child Jesus in her arms, joying that a MAN was born into the world, she might have been overheard saying:—

"Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace,
According to thy word:
For mine eyes have seen thy salvation,
Which thou hast prepared before the face of all people;
A light to lighten the Gentiles,
And the glory of thy people Israel." (P. 210.)

The Rev. Heber Newton is known as a friend and admirer of Henry George; and, besides a direct allusion to "Progress and Poverty," by way of illustration (pp. 120—1), his lectures contain a glowing description of Isaiah's polemic against the "enclosers" of his day, in which we can hear more than an echo of Mr. George's voice. Perhaps these social heresies will not make Mr. Newton's free though reverent and loving treatment of the Bible any more palatable to his opponents.

P. H. W.

THE REV. J. A. CROSS'S HINTS TO READERS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.*

THIS volume "does not pretend to contribute anything new or original to the literature of the subject with which it deals," and is interesting chiefly as an indication of the growing feeling that children when taught the Bible, should not be kept in absolute ignorance of all the questions and all the conclusions of criticism concerning it. The "Hints" comprise abstracts and summaries of the works as we have them, and short statements of some of the critical questions that rise concerning them. Those who desire to familiarise children with the thought that many different opinions are held about the age, composition, and historical character of the books of the Bible, but who think that even a provisional presentation of positive results would, in almost every case, be premature, may find this work useful. The paraphrastic analyses and summaries of the Prophetic writings appear, so far as our examination has gone, to be especially likely to prove helpful. The style is throughout clear, simple, and attractive.

P. H. W.

PREBENDARY ROW ON REVELATION AND MODERN THEOLOGY.

FOR a Bampton Lecturer and Prebendary of St. Paul's to write such a book as we have before us† is a noteworthy indication of the drift of modern thought. The value of the book depends on the right

* *Introductory Hints to English Readers of the Old Testament.* By the Rev. JOHN A. CROSS, M.A. London: Longmans. 1882.

† *Revelation and Modern Theology contrasted; or, the Simplicity of the Apostolic Gospel demonstrated.* By the Rev. C. A. ROW, M.A., Prebendary of St. Paul's. London: Frederick Norgate. 1888.

people reading it; and of this there should be a good chance when it comes to them from an honoured champion of Christian evidences. Mr. Row is profoundly impressed with the impossibility either of converting some 600,000,000 of the human race to Christianity, or of retaining the leading thinkers of the age within Christianity, so long as the established theology is allowed to usurp the place once held by the simple primitive Gospel. He takes up the position that Christianity "consists of a few simple principles which really constitute its essence as a revelation;" and to maintain it, institutes the inquiry "What is that Christianity which the New Testament invites us to accept as a revelation from God?" This inquiry traverses the old familiar ground, and reaches the conclusion that Christianity consists essentially in love to God and love to man, including the new commandment "that ye love one another even as I have loved you. By this shall all men know that ye are My disciples, if ye have love one to another." Mr. Row says, "Let us never overlook the all-important fact that the legislator of the kingdom of heaven has not defined the right of citizenship in it by the profession of a formal creed, which ends in barren orthodoxy (such a creed can be found neither in the Gospels, nor in the Epistles), but by union with and imitation of Himself." And our author elaborates at considerable length an argument showing that the conception of the kingdom of heaven was the central feature of Christ's teaching, and sums up its chief characteristics in twenty propositions, of which we may quote the following:—
 "1. The kingdom of heaven is the Church of Jesus Christ, from the time of its first erection as a visible community, until it has fully realised the purposes of its institution. 4. It was designed to form a mixed society of imperfect men during the period of its gradual development. 5. At a later period of its history, a separation is to be effected between its good and its evil members, when the holy will be put in exclusive possession of it. 6. The only lawful means by which its boundaries can be extended is persuasion. 8. It has been founded exclusively for religious and moral ends; and moral means constitute the sole instrumentality by which it is intended to exert an influence on mankind. 10. Its coming, growth, and various developments are not spasmodic or attended with outward display, but continuous and gradual, analogous to the operation of God in nature. 11—14. The only distinction it recognises is that of holiness in its members. It seeks to bring all men into voluntary subjection to its King, to educate its members in holiness, and to leaven the entire mass of humanity with its principles. 16. The state of moral and spiritual feeling which will render men worthy members of it is the opposite of Pharisaic exclusiveness, self-righteousness, ritualism, pride, legalism, and casuistic morality. 17. It is a community which readily admits even the most degraded of mankind, when truly penitent; in whose recovery to holiness its King takes a special interest. 20. Of this kingdom, Jesus Christ claims to be the King."

Here we have the same ideas which formed the burden of all the teaching of the late F. D. Maurice. They appeared also in *Ecce Homo* and

other works of the English Broad Church School. To a large extent they command our full sympathy. Our chief charge against them would be that they do not sufficiently rest on the results of a free and careful historical inquiry. But this defect, which will one day sweep all these liberally conceived theories into oblivion, might well make them at present more acceptable to the great mass of liberal-minded Christians who are prepared to accept whatever is in the Bible, but will not have the Bible itself fairly criticised. But we should like to know when English Broad Churchmen will do something besides write books like this, when they will organise a society which will show their real strength and enable them to act with the power which comes from the union of those who have common aims and principles. Why do not Mr. Row, and those who agree with him that Christianity is this simple, practical religion, form an association within the Church of England, something like the *Protestanten Verein* in Germany? There are High and Low Societies; why is there none for the Broad Church? They will never exercise the influence to which they are entitled while they remain mere individuals, chiefs without an acknowledged following. And they ought to receive a great deal of support from the present state of religious feeling in England.

H. S. S.

THE THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION FUND LIBRARY.

THE sixth and last volume of the translation of Keim's *History of Jesus of Nazara** is now at length in print. The translator deeply regrets "the unavoidable delay that has occurred" in completing it; but adds that "that delay is largely due to the copiousness of the notes and to the general difficulties of the author's style." It is not intended here to offer any criticism of the contents of this volume, but when it is mentioned that they embrace the Arrest and pseudo-trial, the Death, the Burial and Resurrection of Jesus, as well as a discussion on the Messiah's place in history, enough has been said to induce the reader to turn to it with interested curiosity. If Keim's great work cannot be called "epoch-making" in the same sense, or to the same extent, as Strauss's first "*Life of Jesus*," it must nevertheless, for literary power, picturesque detail, depth of religious insight and critical acumen, be considered one of the most noteworthy, if not the most noteworthy, of recent attempts to reconstruct the history of the wonderful Life; and the English reader may be congratulated on now possessing this important work in a translation which may be relied on for its fidelity, and which, from a literary point of view, may be regarded as at least fairly successful.

* *The History of Jesus of Nazara, freely investigated in its Connection with the National Life of Israel, and Related in Detail.* By THEODORE KEIM. Translated by Arthur Ransom. Vol. VI. (T. T. F. L. 30.) Williams and Norgate: London and Edinburgh. 1883.

The second volume of the Short Protestant Commentary on the Books of the New Testament* contains, by way of general introduction to the Pauline Epistles, a rapid sketch of the apostle's life and teaching, in which it is remarked that "it was he (Paul) who first completed the emancipation of Christianity, as a new religion, from the Mosaic law and the Jewish national community. This work of his life," it is added, "endures independently of his peculiar theology, which to its full extent was adopted by but few even of his contemporaries, and which since then still fewer have so much as understood." The doctrine is farther expounded in the special introduction to this epistle by the same writer, and in that to Galatians by Professor Holsten. The commentary on the Epistle to the Romans is full and searching, and traces carefully the logical development of the apostle's thought. The same thing may be said of that on the Galatians, which concludes the present volume; but the commentary on the two important epistles to the Corinthians, by Pastor Lang, is disproportionately meagre. It is hardly necessary to add that the method of interpretation followed throughout is independent of theological prepossessions; and this volume, accordingly, will not fail to be acceptable to all who are interested in diffusing a knowledge of the results of the scientific criticism of the New Testament.

R. B. D.

PROF. PÜNJER'S "THEOLOGISCHER JAHRESBERICHT."†

THE second volume of this annual review of theological literature, a welcome publication the general features of which were indicated in our notice of the first volume,‡ appears increased in bulk by nearly 100 pp., which we interpret as a sign of the success of the undertaking, while it is an unmistakable proof of the determination of the editor and his collaborators to make their review of the publications of the year as complete as possible. As regards German literature completeness has already been practically attained, and though the difficulties in the way of equal success as regards the literature of other countries are immense and in the case of some of the reviewers insuperable, we still hope that the endeavour will not be abated, and that authors and publishers outside of Germany will find it to their interest to do their part to facilitate it. The value of a work of this kind is greatly increased when it not only gives its judgments of books with authority, but also leaves no

* *A Short Protestant Commentary on the Books of the New Testament*: with General and Special Introductions. Edited by Professor P. W. SCHMIDT and Professor FRANZ VON HOLENDORFF. Translated from the third edition of the German by Francis Henry Jones, B.A. Vol. II. (T. T. F. L. 29.) London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1883.

† *Theologischer Jahresbericht*. Unter Mitwirkung von BASSELMANN, BENRATH, BÖHRINGER, DREYER, GASS, HOLTZMANN, LIPSINS, LÜDEMANN, SEYERLEN, SINGFRIED, WERNER, Herausgegeben von B. PÜNJER. Zweiter Band enthaltend die Literatur des Jahres, 1882. Leipzig: J. A. Barth. 1883.

‡ *Modern Review*, 1882, p. 870.

works of importance outside the range of its survey. In this second volume Siegfried, Holtzmann, Ludemann, Böhringer, Benrath, Werner, Pünjer, Gass, and Bassermann, have paid considerable attention to English works, for instance, while Lipsius, Seyerlen, and Dreyer pass them over, or at most only give their titles. In his department—Old Testament literature—Siegfried has taken great pains to make his survey of the English literature as complete as the means at his disposal allowed. We find not only notices of works by W. Wright, F. W. Madden, G. W. Collins, Ginsburg, Robertson Smith, Cheyne, and a large number of other authors, but also mention, and even examination, of many articles in encyclopædias and periodicals, the *Modern Review* finding a place amongst the latter. Holtzmann also—New Testament literature—notices carefully a considerable number of the more important contributions of our countrymen to his subject. Davidson, Westcott, E. A. Abbott, amongst others receive special attention. Of course American, and other European theological literature receives its share of notice. This universal and cosmopolitan character of the review is a very valuable feature of it. At the same time, it is by no means its principal excellence. This lies rather in the fact that it forms a convenient and exceedingly competent critical review of the theological literature of that country which is at present greatly in advance of all others in the field of theological science. If a student is kept duly informed with regard to all the important German publications in the various branches of theology, he may rest assured that if he is left behind in the march of progress, it is not because he had no means of knowing what position had been abandoned or taken. The *Theologischer Jahresbericht* is a very useful compendium of such information already, and promises to become a complete indicator of the position of theological science in the world at large.

J. F. S.

PROFESSOR ALLEN'S STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN HISTORY.*

PROFESSOR ALLEN possesses in an eminent degree two great gifts that go to make a good historian. His painting of incident and portraiture of persons are graphic: his perception of the important characteristics of large movements is sure and strong. These admirable qualities find ample illustration in the present volume. His *Christian History*, when complete, promises to be a delightful and most informing compendium on a vast subject. In this middle period, while avoiding the tedium of the minute annalist, with bold and sure hand he seizes and brings out the combinations that really made history and prepared for that latest period which he has yet to treat. It would be impossible to find any sketches at once more vivid and more truly philosophical

* *Christian History in its Three Great Periods. Second Period: The Middle Age.* By JOSEPH HENRY ALLEN. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1893.

than his portrayals of Feudalism, of the Crusades, of Chivalry, or of the Scholastic Theology. The working of each of these mighty political, social, or intellectual energies in the bosom of the mediæval Church is exposed with rare and most attractive skill; their action and reaction are balanced with much philosophical insight; and all the while the reader is carried on from chapter to chapter, as in some delightful romance.

A fine example of Professor Allen's powers presents itself in his exposition of the corrective influence of the Church on Feudal society. The latter was profoundly separative, breaking up the solid Empire of Charlemagne till princeling was differentiated against princeling and lordling against lordling. At the same time, Feudalism accented to the last degree differences of rank and station. These disintegrating tendencies the Church met with its incessant proclamation and exemplification of unity and peace. "Its creed was one for all. Its ritual was the same everywhere. Its moral code was uniform through all local diversities." Its ideal unity had in the sovereign Pontiff its visible type, recognised alike by all classes, nationalities, and estates. The Feudal lord said, "My man is mine, to boil or roast him, if I will." The Church declared the absolute equality of prince and peasant. The family pride of the great baron met its rebuke and counterpoise in the rule of the consecrated priesthood, whose celibacy cut off all possibility of piling up great family estates.

Professor Allen well insists that, miserable as was the failure of the Crusades from a military point of view, they did achieve great ends of the most vital import in the after-development of European civilisation. They shifted the battle-ground of Christian and Moslem from Europe to Asia, and so turned back the great wave of destructive conquest which had already flowed over Spain, South Italy, and Greece. The Crusades put off for 860 years the capture of Constantinople by the Turk. They perhaps saved vast European realms from the permanent occupancy of the Saracen. At any rate, "they saved the civilisation of Europe from the storm which blasted that of Asia."

With very happy knack, Professor Allen illumines the dreary controversies of Realists and Nominalists. With one touch he sets before us the main philosophical issue in the persons of "William of Champeaux, whose realism was so pronounced that his pupils 'thought they could see universals with their eye, and touch them with their finger;' and Roscellin, the nominalist, whom Anselm could never pardon for declaring that colour exists not in itself, but only in the object." He then proceeds to draw out in a striking way the practical issues of the great dispute in relation to the very essentials of faith and religion.

Altogether we have to thank Professor Allen for a volume singularly adapted to lure the young and the busy to an important study, of which they are for the most part profoundly ignorant, and chiefly so through the absence of manuals at once brief and luminous like this. On our side of the Atlantic we are sometimes inclined to suspect the solidity and accuracy of the scholarship which our American brethren clothe in such

brilliant colours. The reader of this "Christian History" will soon dismiss such suspicions from his mind.

R. A. A.

SCHÄFFER ON IMMORTALITY.*

IN this excellent translation of Schäffer's *Au Déclin de la Vie*, by Mr. F. A. Freer, English readers have a fresh contribution to the literature of the fascinating but "cruel" problem of the future life. The method adopted by Pasteur Schäffer for the illustration of his views is the Socratic. Instead of a pedantic treatment of the arguments in favour of a future life, we have a description of Progress from Doubt to Faith as recorded in the journal of an old man. In early manhood he is a pessimist, not however in the sense of the philosophy of the Unconscious, but in that of a painful materialism. And here we see the author's wisdom in casting his lot with the simple and lowly, whose gentle love and trust win him, ere long, to idealism, so that he is ready to say with *Thorndale*: "It would stand alone in nature, if a thinking being should be born into this great scheme of things, where all is fit and harmonious, with one burning question for ever in his heart, which was *never* to be solved. If I ever touched for a moment the borders of complete scepticism, I felt at that moment the impossibility that I could altogether die—that I could become extinct with this unremoved ignorance upon my soul."

The progress from doubt to faith is made by his being led to see that, "divine truths must enter from the heart into the mind and not from the mind into the heart." "Hence," says Pascal, "in speaking of human affairs, we say that it is necessary to know them before we can love them; the saints, on the other hand, say, in speaking of divine things, that it is necessary to love them in order to know them, and that we only arrive at truth by love."

H. M. B.

MR. STANLEY LANE-POOLE'S STUDIES IN A MOSQUE.†

THE "general reader," whom the author of these essays had in view when he wrote them for the different publications in which they originally appeared, will be much indebted to him for having republished them in this handsome and most readable volume. "They all treat of Islam in its manifold phases, from its birth at Mekka to its apotheosis in the Persian Miracle Play," of which latter dreary production, and the strange enthusiasm excited by its performance, a curious and interesting account is given. The first part of the book consists of three chapters, giving a very clear and comprehensive view of the circumstances under

* *Sunset Gleams; or, Progress from Doubt to Faith*. From the French *Au Déclin de la Vie*, par AD. SCHÄFFER. London: Elliot Stock. 1883.

† *Studies in a Mosque*. By STANLEY LANE-POOLE, Lauréat de l'Institut de France. London: Allen, 1883.

which Islām took its rise, the life and character of Mohammad, and the religious and social system he established. They are reprinted by Mr. Poole from his Introduction to Lane's "Selections from the Kur-ān." We could hardly have a better digest of the leading facts of the case, in its personal and historical connection, and in its moral significance, or one more likely to stimulate the intelligent curiosity of the reader and lead him on to a closer study of the subject. The interesting article on the Koran, which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review*, we recommend, together with the author's charming little volume of *The Speeches and Table-Talk of Mohammad*, to any who are vexed at their inability to interest themselves in a book of such significance in the history of religion. With Mr. Rodwell's admirable translation, by which for the first time the English reader was enabled to study the chapters of the Koran in chronological order, and under Mr. Lane-Poole's pleasant and trustworthy guidance, it would be difficult any longer to feel lost in the maze. The next study, *An Eastern Reformation*, is a sketch, rather provokingly slight, of the prophet El Ash'ary and his work. It was a mere article in the *Saturday Review*, and its slenderness throws it out of proportion with the other essays. It is a pity the author did not take the opportunity of giving it a more substantial value. The one essay which has not appeared before contains an interesting account of The Brotherhood of Purity, a society of earnest and enthusiastic men who gathered together at El-Basra, near the end of the tenth century of our era, within the circle of Islām, but apart both from its orthodoxy and its political and moral corruptions. The eclectic system which they formed from a study of all the philosophies and religions is characterised, and some idea given of the extraordinary learning and genius which resulted in an encyclopedic system of science and philosophy, the chief heads of which are concisely stated. The concluding study is concerned with the Sabians and Christians of St. John, showing how a problem has been solved which had been a standing puzzle to students of the Eastern sects. The creed, or rather the "combination of wholly diverse creeds," which Mr. Lane-Poole has attempted to make intelligible to the Western mind,—a curious development of Gnosticism saturated with superstition,—certainly deserves to be called "one of the strangest religions that the world has seen." Mr. Lane-Poole's style is always clear and to the point, and his assured scholarship and sobriety of judgment are happily associated with a strong interest in the religious and ethical aspects of the questions he discusses.

DEAN STANLEY'S AMERICAN ADDRESSES AND SERMONS.*

DEAN BRADLEY, in his "Recollections of Arthur Penrhyn Stanley," says, "If the volume of 'Addresses and Sermons in America' were the only relic left of his literary labours, if all else, from

* *Addresses and Sermons*. Delivered during a Visit to the United States and Canada in 1878. By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY. London: Macmillan. 1888.

the biography of Arnold to the 'Christian Institutions,' were swept away you might find in that one volume almost everything characteristic of the man, and some gems of a kind not to be found in his earlier writings." This volume, published in America several years ago, has now for the first time been put within our reach in an English edition. The nine Addresses delivered, for the most part if not altogether, extemporaneously at friendly receptions, clerical or academical gatherings and the like, are what they could not help being, genial, bright, and full of brotherly feeling, and always happily suited to the occasion. We know how Dean Stanley would enjoy talking about Our Old Homes, Liberal Theology, or the Prospects of the Church of England, and how, in addressing the students of the Union Seminary, at New York, he would extol the "Biblical Researches" of its former Professor, Dr. Robinson, how he would speak of Robert Hall and Havelock to the Baptists, or of John Wesley to the members of the Methodist Episcopal Church. We have an impression that he also received and acknowledged some Unitarian greetings; but as there is no mention of this, perhaps our impression is wrong. The Sermons are eight in number, with a preface on the Conditions of Religious Inquiry. At Boston the Dean dwelt on some characteristics of the religions of the East and of the West, combined in Christianity. At New York he urged his plea for the true Christian Unity in Diversity, and preached also on "The Nature of Man" and "The Nature of God." Two very fine and eloquent sermons are on "The Uses of Conflict" and "The Perplexities of Life." The teaching throughout—it could not else be Stanley's—is based on the broadest principles of liberal theology, and is penetrated by the tender devout feeling and the sweet spirit of an all-embracing charity which were to the good Dean the essence of Christianity. His representatives, who are responsible for the republication of the volume here, may be sure that "it will be welcomed by many as a characteristic memorial of ARTHUR STANLEY."

MR. GELDART'S UNSECTARIAN ADDRESSES TO THE YOUNG.*

IN one of the addresses to the juvenile members of his congregation, which Mr. Geldart has printed under the title of *Sunday for Our Little Ones*, he tells his young hearers, "If I see that you are looking straight at me with bright and beaming eyes, then I see that I have caught your attention. If I see your eyes winking very much, or little by little closing altogether, then I see that you are getting tired, perhaps are going to sleep, because I am talking of something you do not understand or you do not care to hear, or find it hard to follow." We may safely say that this latter case was a purely hypothetical one, and the last thing any child would say of these addresses is that they are difficult to understand or that they contain an uninteresting page. Mr. Geldart has

* *Sunday for Our Little Ones*. Unsectarian Addresses to the Young. By E. M. GELDART, M.A. London: W. S. Sonnenschein. 1888.

the art of enlisting his hearers' attention, and he brings his subject home both by explanation and illustration, and by direct appeal to the child's heart and conscience. Perhaps, in some cases, there is a danger that the side allusions and illustrations associated with the text may distract the attention from the religious and ethical lesson which is presently to be enforced. Thus the text from the Parable of the Talents suggests a discussion about the legitimacy of the word "talented"; and then we are reminded how many words in common use have come from the Bible. *Apropos* further of a talent of silver, we are told how cattle were "the earliest sort of money," and that "fee" is connected with the German "Vieh," as "pecunia" with "pecus." Some of these bits of information might chance to stick faster in the juvenile mind than the moral lesson that follows. No doubt, however, it all helps to keep the present interest alive, and Mr. Geldart is at any rate never open to the fatal charge of being dull. He puts sooner or later, with admirable directness and clearness, the practical lesson he wants to enforce, showing a knowledge of children's ways of thinking, and the things which most concern them in their actual every-day life, and a sympathy with their difficulties and wants, their pleasures and their troubles, which cannot fail to win their confidence, and make them eager to listen to him. Mr. Geldart does not hesitate to touch on some of the questions of "advanced criticism" and "radical theology," in relation to the Bible, to the life of Jesus, the miracles, &c.; while he is always intent on the positive truth which the "negative" method helps to clear and set free; his purpose being, as he says in the Preface, "to anticipate the best and most assured results of a fair and fearless dealing with the Bible, while shunning as far as may be the thorny paths of controversy." His young hearers are warned that when they go out into the world they will not be known among other people as Christians by reason of many of the things they are likely to learn to believe or disbelieve. It is a question whether it is necessary or desirable to bring this before the minds of children who are young enough to have the fable of the Old Man and his Ass, or of the Ox and the Frog, told them in graphic and humorous style. However, a congregation of children is almost as much a "mixed" one as a congregation of grown-up people, and there is the same difficulty in adapting the sermon to different ages and capacities. Both elder and younger children will take to themselves what specially suits their case in these bright, vigorous and earnest addresses. The younger ones seem to have been kept more especially in view; and on the whole perhaps they will fare the best.

MR. CLULOW'S 'SKETCHES OF THOUGHT.'*

IT appears that the germ of the present collection of Mr. Clulow's Thoughts in Religion and Philosophy, appeared just half a century ago in the form of a small volume entitled "*Horæ Otiosæ*," which in the

* *Sunshine and Shadows*; or, Sketches of Thought—Philosophic and Religious. By WILLIAM BENTON CLULOW. A New Edition revised and enlarged. London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1888.

course of twelve years of revision and expansion grew into a larger book of "Aphorisms and Reflections," and twenty years later again expanded into two volumes under the titles respectively of "Traces of Thought, Literature, and Fancy" and "Sketches of Thought, Philosophic and Religious." The latter volume is now reissued with an Appendix of the author's latest additions and corrections, under the not very appropriate name of "Sunshine and Shadows." There are few of the contrasts of mood which this would seem to imply. The book might rather be said to be pervaded by a steady diffused daylight.

Mr. Clulow has given evidence, on every page, of sober judgment, breadth and candour of mind, and a faculty of clear insight into the essence of the questions he discusses. He has not only thought the matter over but thought it out; and few readers who take an intelligent interest in the current controversies on faith and morals, and the rivalries of the different schemes of philosophy and of theology, can fail to learn something from this clear-headed thinker. Writing on such subjects as Mind in its Physical Relations, Progress and Limitation, the Phenomena of Churches and Sects, the Question of Miracle, Theories of Human Nature, Theological Petrification, Scripture Criticism and Interpretation, the author is always on the side of a spiritual philosophy and a rational and progressive theology. Whether he sets down his thoughts on controverted questions, or meditates on Youth and Age, the Ethics of Adversity, and other matters which enter into the common experience of humanity, he is always candid and independent; and if he is never very original, he is never wanting in that faculty of common sense which, as applied especially to many of the topics he discusses, is often chiefly conspicuous by its uncommonness. We do not say that the author never declines to the level of the trite and commonplace, but he very seldom does so; and if his style might be a little more compact and sententious, it is serious and unaffected, and well fitted to the thought. To turn to the book on almost any page is to be brought at once into friendly relations with a gentle, thoughtful and devout mind, and such intercourse is both pleasant and profitable.

LETTERS AND MEMORIALS OF JANE WELSH CARLYLE.*

THE circumstances under which Mrs. Carlyle's letters and other memorials were collected together by her husband, and the conditions on which they were handed over to Mr. Froude, as his literary trustee and biographer, have been very distinctly stated in the preface to the *Reminiscences*, where the editor gave a brief description of the Carlyle papers for which he had been made responsible. With regard to the Letters, the publication of which has raised as much painful personal

* *Letters and Memorials of Jane Welsh Carlyle*. Prepared for publication by THOMAS CARLYLE. Edited by J. A. FROUDE. In three volumes. London: Longmans. 1888.

discussion as the Reminiscences themselves did, we were told that they "had been partially prepared for the press by short separate introductions and explanatory notes. But," says Mr. Froude, "Carlyle warned me that before they were published they would require anxious revision. Written with the unreserve of confidential communications, they contained anecdotes, allusions, reflections, expressions of opinion and feeling, which were intended obviously for no eye save that of the person to whom they were addressed. He believed, at the time I speak of, that his own life was near its end, and seeing the difficulty in which I might be placed, he left me at last with discretion to destroy the whole of them, should I find the task of discriminating too intricate a problem."

It further appears that, a few months before Carlyle died, it was finally agreed that the Letters were to see the light; and Carlyle himself having distinctly sanctioned their publication, and, indeed, strongly desired it, it was certainly no duty of Mr. Froude's to suppress them, indeed he would hardly have had any longer the right to do so. We have, however, nowhere discovered any evidence of his having been released from that obligation of "anxious revision," and that "task of discriminating," on which such stress had been laid. Some of Mrs. Carlyle's sayings about her friends and acquaintance may possibly have been omitted, out of regard to feelings which would have been wounded by them: but the editorial discretion certainly extended to the things which concerned herself and her husband alone, and in respect to these we can only say that if it has been exercised at all it has been sadly ineffective. If we never could have reconciled ourselves to the alternative originally suggested of destroying the whole collection, it is because we feel how easy it would have been for an editor, with plenary powers such as Mr. Froude possessed, to have avoided the causes of just offence in the breaches of confidence, the profanation of private sorrows and sufferings, which have made it a pain and almost a shame to read some of the pages in these volumes. No doubt the blame lies ultimately with Carlyle himself. He had no right to put it in any one's power to publish to the world those most private expressions of feeling which his wife, perhaps, had more wisely refrained from making at all, but which assuredly would have filled her with remorse if she had known that they were destined to be proclaimed upon the housetops. Carlyle, it appears, thought that he was doing his wife's memory justice by collecting and anxiously elucidating these records of her inner life; and in his self-condemnation for the sufferings which his own gloomy self-absorption and bluntness of perceptions had caused, and of which he had become vividly conscious when it was too late, he would not spare himself any reproach. But it is passing strange that neither he, nor the friend on whose judgment he relied more than on his own, should have seen that it was not justice but injustice that would inevitably be done both to husband and wife. The letters written in hours of bodily suffering, of loneliness and depression, or of over-wrought feeling, when a dark cloud of misery seemed to darken the

whole world, are emphasized by the notes and comments which accompany them, and produce an impression which is certainly disproportionate to the actual relation they bear to the whole correspondence. Their publication has called forth strong protests from those who well knew both Mr. and Mrs. Carlyle, and who have shown how untrue to life are some of the features of the picture which has been produced by the virtuous determination of the editor to soften none of the darker shades and to leave no weakness unexposed. But even if the impression produced could be justified by a judicious use of Mrs. Carlyle's confidences and her husband's remorse over them, if we were compelled to believe that their married life was a failure, and their home was no home, we should still say, perhaps more emphatically, that it was an inner history that ought never to have been divulged, and made the subject of popular comment and discussion. It is a shame to be listening to those cries of pain, or anger, or reproach. It is an ugly and cruel curiosity that would pry into these secrets of a woman's life, read aloud the letters she has cried over, and rifle her desk to find out why she was angry or unhappy. And as to the *justice* of it! To any one who reluctantly (or otherwise) concludes that the claims of justice and fidelity to the truth demanded that nothing should be suppressed, we recommend a perusal of Mrs. Oliphant's article on Mrs. Carlyle in the *Contemporary Review*; and we ask, with her, "Which of us could bear that pitiless revelation? To have all the secrets of our closest relationships laid bare, all the hasty words we have ever said, and repented, of those most dear to us; all the complaints and repinings which have burst from our lips when the burdens of life have been too many for us—all set forth that he who runs may read, which of us could bear it? Let him or her who has never been anything but amiable and just, never said an ill-advised word, never indulged a bitter thought, never fancied him or herself neglected, unappreciated, unloved, throw the first stone at the Carlyles."

It is true, no doubt, that Carlyle and his wife had larger capacities than most people for tormenting themselves and one another. "Alas, dear!" writes Mrs. Carlyle, "I am very sorry for you. You, as well as I, are 'too vivid;' to you as well as to me, has a skin been given much too thin for the rough purposes of human life." If life was intended only for comfort and ease, then we may safely say that these two were not meant for each other. Carlyle might have got on very well with a respectable old housekeeper, devoid of "nerves" and incapable of being offended; and Jane Welsh—well, we can hardly picture her to ourselves as happy and contented in that leisurely, comfortable, well-to-do life which her kind, well-meaning friend, Francis Jeffrey, wished for her. Her husband, with all the pressure of his own burdens and the exactions of his genius, might have made her life brighter and better for her, and ought to have done so. But the essential truth concerning their life together is certainly not contained in those darker and more melancholy pages which have been so pertinaciously obtruded on us. The shadow does not appear at all till we are far on in the correspondence; and

before the end came there is abundant evidence that it had passed away. And yet one of the latest of their censors, who has thought fit to draw a moral from the story under a heading meant to be cruelly ironical, has had the baseness to speak of Mrs. Carlyle as dying "injured and neglected," "unforgiving and uncaring."

It is impossible to avoid vexing ourselves with these personal questions, which rise up to spoil our enjoyment of all the cleverness, the humour, the pathos, the picturesqueness and vividness of these unique letters. Criticism and description of the letters themselves would be out of date now, after three months of reviewing. There can be few of our readers who, by this time, have not heard almost all that could be said about them. We note in many of them a certain want of reverence, a scornful air, an occasional roughness of feeling, which jars on us, even when it is carried off by the extreme cleverness and irresistible humour. But the shrewdness and judgment, the energy, the keen vision, the intensity of life, keep our attention always on the stretch. And it is all so original and characteristic, from the first page to the last. Whether this liveliest of correspondents is describing her experiences of house-cleaning, an adventure with a lost child, a call from a Yankee interviewer, or her first visit to her old home after her mother's death, her skilful pen adapts itself exactly to her subject, and we are put into the right key for enjoying the fun, the picturesqueness, or the pathos. And we come very soon to expect and, in large measure, to allow for the things which have a note of discord in them—that glance of scorn which she will sometimes cast on other people's lives and faiths, that failure to recognise all the sacredness and mystery of life, a deeper sense of which might have enriched her own nature, and have helped her to find recompense and healing in the sufferings which embittered her spirit and broke her down in helpless misery. With all these qualifications to the pleasure of reading these letters, to which must be added the feeling that we had no right to have had some of them given us to read at all, the book is one of those few recent additions to our literature which have the mark of a very vivid and striking personality. It may be read with mixed feelings, but few readers will be able to resist its fascination.

PROFESSOR KNIGHT'S EDITION OF WORDSWORTH'S POEMS.*

THE third volume of Professor Knight's beautiful edition of Wordsworth (the general plan of which we described in a Notice of the first two volumes, *M.R.*, Oct., 1882) has two-thirds of its pages occupied by "The Prelude." In this there were of course no various readings to register; and the notes have been confined to "the explanation of local, historical and chronological allusions, or to references to Wordsworth's

* *The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth.* Edited by WILLIAM KNIGHT, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, St. Andrew's. Vol. III. Edinburgh: W. Paterson, 1888.

own career that are not obvious without them." To have added any detailed commentary on the main subject of the poem would have been, as the editor remarks, to have written a large part of Wordsworth's *Life*; and he has wisely left the "Prelude" to tell its own story of the growth of a poet's mind, deferring all biographical illustration to take its place in the memoir which is to follow in due course, and to which we look forward with much expectation. Some of the notes explaining the historical, mythological, and other allusions, might, no doubt, be dispensed with by any educated reader, but probably Dr. Knight was well advised in not attempting to decide which would be superfluous, and he thought it best to "err on the right side." The identification of the localities described or referred to by Wordsworth, and inseparably associated with moods or incidents of his life, adds greatly to the interest of the poem, for those to whom the mountains and vales of Cumberland and Westmoreland are already familiar and dear, or for those who may hereafter seek the poet's guidance in his own country. Dr. Knight is an acknowledged expert in this pleasant lore. He has shown a zealous care to leave no point of interest unnoticed, while refraining, with commendable tact, from pronouncing his own literary and critical opinions, or interfering between the poet and his readers.

Of the shorter poems, the lines to the Cuckoo, with which the volume opens, afford a good instance of the pains which Wordsworth would take in perfecting a stanza or a single phrase which had not satisfied him. It was published in 1807, and before it was finally settled, in its present form, the second stanza had been altered five times, and several other changes had been made. Our readers will be interested in comparing this stanza as they know it with the original version. There can be no doubt here (as in the large majority of cases) that the poet's later touches are improvements.

ORIGINAL VERSION, 1807.

While I am lying on the grass,
I hear thy restless shout;
From hill to hill it seems to pass
About, and all about!

FINAL VERSION, 1845.

While I am lying on the grass,
Thy two-fold shout I hear,
From hill to hill it seems to pass
At once far off, and near.

Among the other variations are "Thy loud note smites my ear," "It seems to fill the whole air's space," "As loud far off as near." But we must not be tempted to dwell on such details, and must turn over more quickly the pages of this delightful volume. There are "The Daffodils," with a long passage from Miss Wordsworth's journal, in which she had described the pretty scene two years before it was enshrined in her brother's exquisite verses, and there is the Ode to Duty, growing in dignity and strength of expression in each revision. There are the lines about "Louisa," who at first was boldly pictured as "*ruddy*, fleet, and strong," but afterwards was "nymph-like," and, at the same time, the poet, who must have been in an unpropitious mood, unaccountably sacrificed the beautiful stanza beginning "And she hath smiles to earth

unknown," which will be found in all the editions previous to 1845. "The Waggoner" appears with a large number of various readings, the text being, in about a dozen cases, ultimately restored as it stood at first. Dr. Knight, in his note on this poem, which is so closely associated with Grasmere and the road from there to Keswick, has furnished us with an analysis of the poem, with a clue to all the localities described. There is a very pleasant account of Wordsworth's friend, Thomas Wilkinson, whose spade is made to appear not unworthy of a poetical tribute. In an Appendix are several matters of personal and topographical interest, the latter being discussed by Mr. Rawnsley, of Wray Vicarage, who has apparently succeeded in identifying the spots described in certain lines in the Prelude, about which there had been some doubt.

Dr. Knight's pleasant but laborious task is taking rather more time than we were at first led to reckon upon; but we hope that the matter for the five volumes yet to come is accumulating and getting itself arranged, and that if the whole work is not completed within two years, as at first intended, the next year will at any rate be one of good progress.

MR. ALCOTT ON THE CHARACTER AND GENIUS OF EMERSON.*

MR. ALCOTT'S study of the character and genius of Emerson has something less in it of original and personal interest than we should have expected at the hand of so intimate and long tried a friend. As far as its substance is concerned it might have been written by a student of his writings, and an occasional hearer, who had no very intimate personal acquaintance with him; at least, there are but few passages which necessarily imply a close friendship and constant interchange of thought. The essay was written eight years ago, and, after being read in the School of Philosophy at Concord, was presented to Emerson on his seventieth birthday. It is now published in a limited edition, the short document, which would occupy about sixteen pages of a review article, being, by the device of large type, spacious margins, thick paper and substantial binding, expanded into a handsome volume. Mr. Alcott is a man of strong originality of mind, and he holds our attention by much that he has to say about his friend, albeit he provokes us sometimes by a certain oracular tone which makes us the more critical as to the substance of what he has got to say. While we commend the writer's delicate avoidance of any indiscreet and unjustifiable publication to the world of matters of private and personal concern, as between himself and his friend, we feel that in re-publishing his essay he might, without any breach of faith, have enriched it with the record of some of his more intimate impressions and recollections, which would have given it a dis-

* *Ralph Waldo Emerson: An Estimate of his Character and Genius, in Prose and Verse.* By A. BRONSON ALCOTT. Boston: Williams, 1882.

tineter place among the numerous studies which have appeared. We may apply to his book what he says of Emerson :

I know of but one subtraction from the pleasure the reading his books—shall I say his conversation?—gives me, his pains to be impersonal or discrete, as if he feared any the least intrusion of himself were an offence offered to self-respect, the courtesy due to intercourse and authorship ; thus depriving his page, his company, of attractions the great masters of both knew how to insinuate into their text and talk, without overstepping the bounds of social or literary decorum.

We cannot say much for the "photographs hitherto unpublished," which were promised as one of the attractions of the book. For frontispiece there is a good autotype (or some other "type") of one of the portraits which Mr. Ireland reproduced in his "Biographical Sketch"; and there are small photographic copies of not very artistic drawings of Emerson's house and summer-house, and of a bridge, the Emersonian association of which we have not yet discovered. Add to these a photograph of the School of Philosophy, with some minute and indistinct students of philosophy assembled outside; and an interesting little picture of Mr. Alcott, in his study. Appended to the essay are two memorial tributes in verse—one by Mr. Alcott, the other by Mr. L. B. Sanborn. The latter, entitled "The Poet's Countersign," has much genuine poetic beauty, both in feeling and expression ; so has Mr. Alcott's "Ion," which, however, is not free from a certain artificiality of manner, while the love and regret it expresses is as true and tender as that of the younger disciple.

A STUDY OF GOETHE'S 'FAUST.'*

IT is seldom that we have met more sterling matter, compressed into narrower limits, than is contained in the eighty pages of Herr Wyszard's little pamphlet. These eighty pages are a condensation of a course of extempore lectures delivered originally to a German audience and in the German language. One of these lectures it was the privilege of the present writer to hear, and we cannot here forbear expressing the hope, that they may yet be published in their native tongue. Men say that the style of German writers is obscure, but it has always seemed to us that German thought is infinitely more lucid in a German than in an English dress. To those who object that on these principles persons ignorant of the German language must be for ever debarred from the treasure-house of German literature, we should simply reply that the intellectual effort required to master German is less than the mental labour involved in attempting to fathom the German mind through the medium of even the best English translations. Of course this applies in very various degrees to different classes of literature. It applies to Lessing in a lower degree than to Schiller, to Schiller sometimes in a

* *The Intellectual and Moral Problem of Goethe's Faust.* Parts I. and II. By A. WYSZARD, Professor of German Literature at the Anglo-German Schools, Brixton and Denmark-hill, S.E. Trübner and Co. 1898.

higher, sometimes in a lower, degree than to Goethe. A good version would give a very fair idea of Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell*, or of Goethe's *Egmont* or *Hermann and Dorothea*; but where is the version that could adequately render the *Kleinere Gedichte* of the one, or the *Faust* of the other? And if to translate the best and deepest things in German literature is well-nigh impossible, so to expound in English the drift of the noblest creations of German genius is almost equally hard. For faithful exposition is a kind of paraphrase, and in every such honest attempt the initial difficulties that beset the translator return in an altered shape upon the interpreter. Every word and turn of expression in proportion as it is idiomatic carries with it its own associations in each of the languages concerned, and these never or hardly ever precisely correspond as between one nation and another. For example, when Herr Wysard introduces us to "Pater Seraphicus and the blessed boys," we in England are forcibly reminded even against our will that when—not Pater Seraphicus, but Paterfamilias, disturbed in his study or his afternoon nap by a sudden tumult overhead exclaims against "those blessed boys!" it is anything rather than the "Selige Knaben" of Goethe's celestial vision that is present to his mind. With regard to the version adopted for the purpose of illustrative extracts, Herr Wysard tells us that he has followed Bayard Taylor, and we know not that on the whole he could have chosen a better guide; but the mere fact of the composite character of the English language, and the necessity of adopting words of French or Latin derivation in order to fill out the metre, deprives some of the noblest lines of that statuesque simplicity which they possess in the original, and reminds us of the "fillings in" by which classical sculptures are "restored" in the Vatican or Florentine galleries. Let the reader, for example, compare

Der gute Man in seinem dunklen Drange
Ist sich des rechten Weges wohl bewusst,

with

A good man through obscurest aspirations
Has still an instinct of the one true way,—

and he will understand what we mean.

In spite, however, of all inevitable drawbacks, we are grateful to Herr Wysard for having enabled us to enter into the noble spirit and purpose of Goethe's masterpiece as we had never done before. What these are we can hardly do better than state in the words of the summary with which our author concludes his dissertation:—

And now what is the leading thought of this earth-and-heaven encompassing poem?

It is the eternal struggle between the ideal godly [godlike] nature of man, and his sensuous, selfish, cynical being, the unavoidable guilt he is ensnared in by the struggle, and the, therefore, absolutely necessary redemption of man, the proof and pledge of the immortality of the eternal better nature of man in spite of the heaven-obscuring sin and guilt, through defeating and overpowering of which man alone can rise to the highest degree of his moral and intellectual development to the victory of [over] the ideal world of sin and evil. And what is the fountain of life and bliss in which the aspiring soul can quench hunger and thirst after real bliss and happiness?

Is it *science, knowledge*? No! Man will never be able to detect the inmost force which binds the world and guides his [its] courses; we can recognise it only in his [its] reflex in Nature, history, and our own mind.

Is it *sensuous enjoyment*, quenching the fervours of glowing passions, by plunging in depths of sensual pleasures? No! Sensuous enjoyment debases, degrades, leads from fall to fall, from guilt to guilt.

Are they [Is it the] starbright meteors of ambition's heaven? The splendours of high life, influence and power over the minds of mighty ones? No! We are always deceived, and at last disgusted by a world whose principle is egoism and frivolity, to which wealth is but the means of frivolous indulgence, and by which art and poetry are degraded, by being taken but for an object of mere stage exhibition, and shallow, frivolous amusement. Is it *art and poetry*? Is it the realisation of the ideal of beauty in it [Helen]? No! To the active man, in the strength of his manhood, the pursuit of the beautiful is not a final goal, but an educational process, which, if it is healthy and sound, has to determinate in raising men from the æsthetic world into the world of moral feeling and action.

Is it *power and estate*? No and yes. As long as a man wields power and possesses real wealth but to satisfy his own selfish inclinations, or to win glory, he is always in danger of being unjust and hard, and of being beguiled into guilt [Philemon and Baucis]; but as soon as he rises to the height of Christian morals, realised in Christ's life and proclaimed in His word (Mark x. 45); the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve and to give His life for many; then power and wealth are the highest blessings as means to do good, not to himself, but to his fellow-creatures and to unborn generations. . . . This is real bliss—this satisfaction in life and death.

E. M. G.

THE REV. CHARLES BEARD'S HIBBERT LECTURES.*

THE delivery of the sixth course of the Hibbert Lectures in London and Oxford has been followed, with commendable promptness, by their publication. They have, however, appeared too late for review with any detailed criticism or description; and, as we are unwilling to delay our notice of them till the next quarter, we must be content to give now a mere outline of the plan and topics of the Lectures, and to send our readers to the book itself, which both from the intrinsic interest and importance of the subject, and the knowledge and insight and literary skill with which it has been treated, cannot fail to prove one of the most attractive in the series in which it appears.

Mr. Beard explains, to begin with, that he has not tried to write, even within the smallest compass, a history of the Reformation; but only to show the relation in which its results stand to modern knowledge and modern thought. His object has been to show that "if theology in this age is to keep abreast of advancing science, and to continue to answer to the inexhaustible wants of men, a new Reformation is needed." He inquires what were the forces which produced the Reformation of the sixteenth century; and why the repeated attempts at reform had previously failed. And again, whence originated the transfer of religion from the objective to the subjective side of things, which marks the transition

* *The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, in its Relation to Modern Thought and Knowledge.* By CHARLES BEARD, B.A. London: Williams and Norgate. 1883.

from Catholicism to Protestantism. And this leads to the consideration of the question whether the Reformation was a finished process, or whether its principles still ask to be carried to a further logical development.

The first Lecture is chiefly occupied with an account of "Reform before the Reformation," the efforts at amendment, classified as the Catholic, the Mystic, and the Biblical, having been all doomed to failure, chiefly because the fulness of time had not yet come; the Reformation being "part of a mightier movement than itself—the manifestation upon religious ground of the intellectual forces which inspire the speculation and have given us the science of to-day." In the second Lecture a brief but pregnant sketch of this Revival of Letters is given, with special regard to the movements of thought which most affected religion and theology. Then we are introduced, in the third Lecture, to the chief actors in the Reformation, and we have firmly drawn portraits of Luther and Melancthon, the former being shown not only as the stronger, but as the tenderer and more human of the two; and, on the other side, are Charles V. and the contemporary Popes. In the next Lecture Mr. Beard considers what were the Principles of the Reformation; adopting and explaining the statement that Protestantism is a subjective form of religion, as contrasted with Catholicism, which may be represented as an objective form. Of the two great Churches, the one "interposes a machinery of mediation—sacraments, priesthoods, discipline, ritual—between the soul and its infinite object; while the other, denying the reality or the efficacy of these things, is content to leave the spirit face to face with God." The Reformers' doctrine of the authority of Scripture is shown to have been based upon the concurrent witness of the Holy Spirit and the written word in the believer's soul; and the significance and effect of Luther's central doctrine of justification by faith are dwelt upon, with his doctrine of the priesthood of every Christian believer. The fifth Lecture is on the Reformation in Relation to Reason and Liberty. Here we are shown the working of new forces which were liberated by the Reformation, but were imperfectly recognised, and in some directions were feared and withstood by the Reformers themselves. There are curious contrasts between Luther's invectives against human reason, and his own practice, especially in the matter of Biblical criticism; while, with regard to religious liberty and the rights of conscience, the rapid growth of intolerable ecclesiastical tyrannies, and the appearance of new and more savage hatreds to replace the old, illustrate the truth that "it is unhappily one thing to claim liberty for oneself, another to accord it to others." The next Lecture treats of the Sects of the Reformation, presenting some of the various phases of belief which were covered by the name Anabaptist; while three dissidents of the Reformation are selected for special description, Denck, Schwenkfeld, and Sebastian Franck. Lecture seven, is on the Reformation in Switzerland. The origin and course of the independent movement of Reform under Zwingli at Zürich are shown,

with its continuation by the great Genevan Reformer, by whose commanding intellectual power, stern genius for government and discipline, and unbending will, the forces of the Reformation were concentrated and directed. Mr. Beard does justice to the elements of vital strength which have always been witnessed in the history of the Reformed Church; and at the same time he gives a very clear view of the influences, political, social, and theological, under which the system and theory were developed, of which the terrible tragedy of Servetus was but a logical outcome. This is followed by a Lecture on the Rise of the Protestant Scholasticism, which was animated by the same spirit as that of the mediæval Schoolmen; but based on the Bible alone, instead of the triple foundation, the Bible, the Fathers, and Tradition. The origin and course of the three distinct developments of systematic theology—the Lutheran, Calvinistic, and Socinian—are reviewed, comprising an account of Faustus Socinus and his work, in which the rationalism of the Reformation for the first time took definite shape; the formation of the Lutheran Confessions under the leading influence of Melancthon, and those of the Reformed Church, starting from Calvin's "Institution of the Christian Religion." The ninth Lecture treats the Reformation in England as, "both in its method and in its result, a thing by itself, taking its place in no historical succession, and altogether refusing to be classified." It "followed no precedents, and was obedient only to its own law of development."

The three remaining lectures are concerned chiefly with the effects produced by the growth of the critical spirit on the fundamental assumption of the Reformers' theology, that the Bible is an infallible authority in religion, and contains a minutely elaborate system of revealed truth. The tenth is concerned with literary and historical criticism and the change which it has wrought in our conception of the Bible; the eleventh shows the results of the Development of Philosophic Method and Scientific Investigation. These two lectures are of high interest and importance, as is the concluding one, in which the main thesis of the whole course is re-stated; the necessity is urged for a new Reformation, carrying out, under the altered conditions of knowledge and thought, the essential principles of the great revival; and the attitude of the different Churches with regard to the new movements is criticised. An earnest plea is made for a bolder policy, for a revision of formularies and relaxation of bonds, and the reconciliation of theology with new knowledge. In this last lecture, but not in this only, are many eloquent and impressive pages, setting forth the lessons for the day which the whole history teaches, and the better future to which it has been leading.

We only hope that the book will be read as widely and pondered as thoughtfully as it deserves to be. There has not been a more weighty contribution, of late years, towards the solution of the vital questions with which it deals; and it must itself be reckoned as no unimportant factor in that New Reformation the need of which it so eloquently and conclusively demonstrates.

SOME PUBLICATIONS OF MESSRS. W. SWAN SONNENSCHN.

MR. SONNENSCHN has made for his firm a distinguished place among the providers of the best kind of educational literature, and their imprint is of itself a guarantee that a manual for school or college is up to the high standard of scholarship, combined with other, and often rarer, qualifications, now happily required in modern methods of education. The following "samples" from their stock deserve each some special description and criticism, but we are obliged to limit ourselves to little more than a bare mention of their titles. They have all some characteristic merits, and have a claim to be kept in mind by any teacher who has to decide on the manuals to be used by his or her pupils.—*The Students' Manual of German Literature*. By E. NICHOLSON. A useful and interesting *résumé*, chiefly from Kurz, Vilmar, and Koenig, with a very full and carefully arranged Chronological Table.—*Select Poems of Goethe*. Edited by E. A. SONNENSCHN and A. POGATSCHE. To be followed by other "Annotated German Classics," designed primarily for school use, but taking account also of the more mature reader.—*The Musician*. A Guide for Pianoforte Students. By RIDLEY PRENTICE. The first and simplest of a series, in six grades, is designed as a help towards "the better understanding of beautiful music." An excellent plan very well carried out.—*Locke on Words*. A separate imprint of "the immortal third book" of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*; with Introduction and Notes by F. RYLAND, intended for "the average reader, who as a rule knows little Logic and less Metaphysics."—*Problems and Exercises in Political Economy*: Collected, arranged, and edited by ALFRED MILNES, B.A., will be noticed later, in connection with some other recent works on Political Economy.

We have also received: *Sermons on the Lord's Prayer*. By AUG. W. HARE (Smith, Elder, and Co.).—*Illustrations and Meditations: or, Flowers from a Puritan's Garden*. Distilled and dispensed by C. H. SPURGEON (Passmore and Alabaster)—quaint and pithy sayings from Thomas Manton's discourses on Psalm cxix., with meditations added by Mr. Spurgeon.—*The Standard of Value*. By W. L. JORDAN. Third edition (David Bogue).

We are compelled to defer reviews of the following books:—*Jesus, his Opinions and Character*. By a Layman (Boston: G. H. Ellis).—*The Works of Frederick Huidkoper*. In two vols.—*Samuel Sharpe, Egyptologist and Translator of the Bible*. By P. W. CLAYDEN (Kegan Paul).—*The Creed of a Modern Agnostic*. By R. BITHELL (Routledge).—*Emerson as a Poet*. By JOEL BENTON (New York: Holbrook).—*Natural Law in the Spiritual World*. By HENRY DRUMMOND (Hodder and Stoughton).—*The Bastilles of England: or, the Lunacy Laws at Work*. By LOUISA LOW (Crookenden).

THE MODERN REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1883.

THE PROPHETS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

FEW phenomena in human history are more worthy of study, or more deeply interesting, than those presented by the prophets of the Old Testament, whether we look at these men as heroic characters, as inspired messengers of God, as public speakers, as sacred writers, or as the earliest preachers of eternal religious truth, and of the noblest life for man. An Elijah and a Jeremiah have been for more than two thousand years to progressive humanity the types of fearless and faithful devotion to the cause of God. In the nineteenth century we still think of our most inspired men as having received the mantle of the Prophets, though, like Elisha, they inherit but "two-thirds" * of the spirit of their greater prototypes. Echoes of the eloquence of an Isaiah form not only the most powerful passages of the princes of pulpit orators, but lend force and majesty to the noblest outbursts of such great prophet-reformers as Savonarola and Luther and of such tribunes of the people as John Bright. The works of those prophets which have been preserved in the Old Testament may without any exaggeration be pronounced the weightiest and most influential pieces of writing which the world possesses; for

* 2 Kings ii. 9, 10. Comp. Ewald's *History of Israel*, iv. p. 81.

without them Christianity would have been an entirely different thing, or, rather, wholly impossible, and the New Testament would not have been written. As the representatives of the religion of Yahveh, and being therefore men who could not rest save in its progressive development and final consummation and victory, the prophets were the heralds of Christianity as the perfect religion and the noblest ideal of life. As the Hebrew Prophets were all this, and indeed more than this, it follows that to get an intimate acquaintance with them and their work, must not only be a most instructive study in every way, and exercise a most elevating influence on the student, but must also be indispensable as the preliminary to a true appreciation of Christianity itself. Unfortunately, false ideas of the nature of Hebrew prophecy had until recently quite concealed the true character, greatness, and import of these noble heroes of the race. One of the most invaluable contributions of modern Biblical research to a rediscovery and correct appreciation of Hebrew history, and thereby to the preparation for Christianity, has been the resuscitation of the prophets and their works; and all schools of critics admit that it is Ewald above all other scholars to whom this resuscitation is due.*

The Old Testament itself supplies us with the names, and, in some instances, with accounts of the lives of upwards of twenty Hebrew prophets and prophetesses from whom no writings have been preserved. The Hebrew Bible contains sixteen prophetic books, long supposed to have been all written by the men whose names they now bear; but critical examination has shown that in those sixteen books we have really the works, or fragments of works, of nearly

* This article is therefore based mainly upon his great work, *Die Propheten des Alten Bundes*, which is referred to in the English edition (London, 1875—1882), and his latest treatment of the subject in his last work, *Die Lehre der Bibel von Gott*. Vol. I. (1871). Dr. Robertson Smith's excellent work, *The Prophets of Israel and their Place in History to the Close of the Eighth Century B.C.* (Edinburgh, 1882), has also been used, as well as Reuss's *Die Geschichte der Heiligen Schriften Alten Testaments*. (Braunschweig, 1881.)

thirty prophets. But these prophets, some fifty in number, whose names or writings have thus been preserved from oblivion, were but a few distinguished individuals from an incomparably more numerous class. It was a constitutional principle in Israel that every man and woman had the right to come forward publicly as prophet or prophetess, should he or she feel the divine call (Amos vii. 14, 15; Num. xi. 25—29; Deut. xviii. 15—21), and the fact that they had always had a large number of prophets, was regarded as one of Israel's great privileges (Hos. xii. 10). We meet with guilds of prophets in the eleventh century, in the time of Samuel (1 Sam. x. 5 sq.; xix. 20 sq.), and two centuries later, in the time of Elijah (2 Kings ii. 3—5; iv. 1, 38 sq.), and again probably, a century later still, in the time of the prophet Amos (vii. 14). We find Isaiah gathering a circle of prophetic disciples around him (viii. 16). As time went on we see the faithful prophets of Yahveh increasingly in bitter conflict with overwhelming numbers of unfaithful brethren.* The historical books also refer to facts which imply that they were always a numerous profession. At last Jeremiah and Ezekiel bitterly complain of the excessive number and the degeneration of the prophets and prophetesses of their times (Jer. xxiii. 9—40; Ezek. xiii.).

In this paper we are concerned solely with those few distinguished prophets from whom writings have been preserved, and we need not enter upon the difficult, and as yet unsettled question of the points of difference between them and the pseudo-prophets. We have ample reason for regarding the authors of the prophetic writings in the Old Testament as the truest and noblest representatives of the Hebrew prophets, and for finding in their preserved writings the most authentic and faithful records of their character and work.

The Greek word *prophet*, by which this distinguished class of Hebrew speakers and writers has been introduced

* Hos. ix. 7, 8; Isa. iii. 2, viii. 19, xxviii. 7; Mic. ii. 11, iii. 5, 11; Jer. xxiii. 14 sq., xxviii. 15, v. 31, vi. 13, viii. 10, xxvi. 7, 8.

† 1 Kings xviii. 4; 2 Kings xxi. 16; Neh. ix. 26; comp. Jer. ii. 30.

to the European and western world, represents fairly enough, when properly understood, the generic Hebrew and Eastern name *nābî*. That is, both words denote a man whose mission it is to speak and proclaim the Word of God,* to make known the divine mind and will to men. In addition to this generic term, several others occur in the Old Testament, and they all describe characteristic features of the prophet's relation to God and his work amongst men. Thus he is "the man of the spirit" (Hos. ix. 7), or the inspired man; he is the "seer" who has the purest and highest views of God, and beholds things hidden from the common eye (Amos vii. 12); he is "the man of God" as nearer to Him than ordinary men (Jer. xxxv. 4; comp. 1 Sam. ii. 27, ix. 6 sq.; 1 Kings xiii.); he is the "messenger of Yahveh" (Hag. i. 13) who must run on the errand of his God; he is in a spiritual sense "the servant of God" ("Isa." xlii. 26, l. 10); he is the "watchman" and the "outlooker," who must be constantly, night and day, watching the course of human affairs and looking out for the first indication of the divine will ("Isa." xxi. 11, 12, lii. 8; Mic. vii. 4; Jer. vi. 17; Ezek. iii. 17, xxxiii. 2—7; Hab. i. 3); or again the "shepherd," who must carefully and unweariedly guard his flock (Zech. xi. 5 sq.); and, finally, he is the "interpreter" of Yahveh ("Isa." xliii. 27), and as such naturally the mediator between God and his people (Jer. xiv. 11 sq., Zech. xiii. 5 sq.).

The utterances of the Hebrew prophets were delivered by themselves and received by their hearers as oracles and words of God. They are introduced with the standing *formulae*, "thus saith Yahveh," "Yahveh saith unto me," "the word of Yahveh," "the word which the prophet beheld," or "oracle of Yahveh." In the utterances themselves the prophet's own personality at times almost disappears, and the God in whose name he speaks is alone

* The *πρὸ* in *προφήτης* does not originally refer to time, as if the prophet were primarily a predictor of coming events, but indicates the publicity and clearness of the utterance. Comp. *pronunciare, proclamare*. See Ewald, *Lehre der Bibel*, &c. I. p. 96.

heard. Generally it is Yahveh only who is heard speaking directly either to the prophet or to the prophet's hearers, though the Hebrew, unlike the Greek, prophet, for instance, never loses his own self-consciousness, and often stoops to the lower level of personal colloquy with his audience (e.g., Isa. vii. 10, 25; viii. 9, 22). The prophet speaks as sent by his God, and under the irresistible compulsion of His *hand upon him* (Isa. viii. 11; Ezek. iii. 14). When Yahveh speaks, he can but prophecy (Amos iii. 8); and he stands in such close relation to his God that he knows "He will do nothing without revealing His secret to him" (Amos iii. 7). Accordingly, there is no greater sin than that a man should be a prophet after his own heart, running without being sent, and speaking his own words instead of those of his God (Jer. xiv. 14; xxiii. 16; Ezek. xiii. 2 sq.). To the extent to which the people were faithful and obedient to Yahveh, they listened with reverence to His messengers the prophets. As a fact the word of Samuel, Elisha, Isaiah, and other prophets "plucked up and pulled down, ruined and destroyed, built up and planted nations and kingdoms" (Jer. i. 10). Prophets of this magnitude ought to have been regarded as the inviolable representatives of Yahveh (Deut. xviii. 15, sq.; Jer. xxvi. 1—19), but frequently they met with perilous opposition and persecution in the discharge of their mission (Jer. ii. 30). It was then they displayed that fearless heroism which has made them the great prototypes of dauntless faithfulness in the cause of truth and righteousness.* They then, in their best moments, represent the simple majesty and spiritual power of divine truth as divested of all adventitious aids and influences. The great prophets with whom we are concerned were for the most part unconnected with powerful guilds, though some of them may have received their education in them. Amos was not even a prophet by profession, but a humble shepherd from the bare mountain of Tekoa, who comes forward but once in his life, and in a distant

* Amos vii. 10—17; Isa. vii. 10—25; Jer. i. 7, 8; xxvi.; Ezek. ii. 3—8; iii. 1—11.

land, with his prophetic message (vii. 14, 15). Though Hosea's messages had to be delivered during a series of years, he was probably as little as Amos connected with any prophetic society or party, and was compelled almost as a solitary man to lift up his warning voice against all the leaders of his people.* During the first part of his prophetic life Isaiah had likewise to contend almost alone against his king, the ruling party, false prophets and priests, and the nation led by them. It was only gradually that he gathered around him a circle of sympathetic disciples and helpful friends, and it was only after more than thirty years of dangerous and apparently fruitless testimony that his prophetic word became a recognised power in Jerusalem. This almost solitary protestation, with its heroic grandeur and its stern perils, is a characteristic feature of the work of nearly all our prophets. Micah (iii. 7, 8; vii. 1, 2); Jeremiah (ix. 1, 2; xii. 10, 17; xv. 15—18; xx. 7—10, &c.); Ezekiel (ii. 3—7; iii. 7—11, 24—27), no less than Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah, are occasionally almost ready to complain, with Elijah of earlier times, that they alone are left to bear witness for Yahveh. As the few and often solitary witnesses for divine truth, they can use no other instrument for enforcing it than the simple word by which it is conveyed. But occasionally they appeal to miracles and signs in attestation of their authority, and often they employ expressive symbols to set it forth more tellingly before the eyes of men.† The earliest prophets, whose names and deeds are preserved in the Old Testament, left no writings behind them, and the greatest of those from whom we have written oracles, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Jeremiah, made use of the pen only as a subsidiary means of giving permanent influence to their words. The greatest prophets, that is, were in the first instance speakers, and only secondarily writers. They come forward publicly to deliver in fiery harangues the messages which Yahveh

* See Smith's *Prophets of Israel*, pp. 154—159.

† Hos. i.—iii.; Isa. vii. 11—16; xx. 1, 2; xxxvii. 30; Amos vii. 16, 17; Jer. xix.

has committed to them. Like Jesus and his Apostles in later days, they appear frequently near the Temple amidst the assembled populace (Jer. vii. 2; xix. 14; xxvi. 2) in public squares and market-gates (Amos v. 10; Isa. xxix. 21); or they suddenly present themselves at unexpected places (Isa. vii. 3), and in the palaces of kings and magnates (Isa. xxii. 15). It was only after the public life of the nation had undergone great changes and free public speech was impossible, or in the entirely different circumstances of the Exile, that the prophets resorted in the first instance to the use of the pen. Moreover, this late change from spoken to written, from oral to literary prophecy, was itself one of the features of its declining days. We have, however, every reason to suppose that the written reproductions of the spoken orations are very far from being anything like verbatim reports. While they most likely preserve the substance of what had been spoken in public, they evidently not only greatly curtail the speeches, but also recast them after a more literary fashion. As in the case of some of Isaiah's prophetic utterances (viii. 16), the reproduction of them in writing was sometimes the work of sympathetic disciples and friends rather than of the prophet himself (Jer. xxxvi.). Nor can we suppose that this reproduction gave by any means always the substance of each oracle in the order in which it was uttered. We find that some of Isaiah's published prophecies contain in a short compass the substance of the teaching of several years.* Compare the instructive narrative in Jer. xxxvi.

Having taken this brief general glance at the characteristic features and public work of the Hebrew prophets, we must now select a few of the most important points in the general description for closer inspection. Many points which would have to be treated in anything like a complete review of the subject, must be passed over in this short paper without notice. We can touch upon those questions only a correct understanding of which is indispensable for

* See Smith's *Prophets of Israel*, pp. 235 sq., and particularly Ewald's chapter on *The Prophets as Writers*, Vol. I., pp. 59 sq.

even a partial appreciation of the character, the work, and the writings of those great heroes of antiquity. We may most conveniently begin with a short account of the great ideas which made them what they were and formed the basis of their work and influence.

The prophets of the ninth and following centuries with whom we have here to do, inherited from the past a great religion and a great history. They were not the founders of the religion of Yahveh, but its heirs and preachers; they were not simply men of the present and the future, but sons of a marvellous and glorious national history. In Yahvism they lived and moved and had their being, and particularly the memory of the great deliverance from Egypt and of the glorious days of the undivided Davidic kingdom moulded all their thought and aspiration. Moreover, the earliest of them had been preceded by others whose words they, above all men, regarded as the messages of Yahveh (Hos. xii. 10, 11; Amos ii. 12, iii. 7, 8).^{*} In the religion of Yahveh they received a number of fundamental ideas, and from these ideas they were compelled to draw great prophetic inferences, which again demanded realisation in actual history. We shall do well in studying the prophets to keep these three constituent elements of their thought apart.

The fundamental ideas of Yahvism, when stated generally, without reference to minor modification and clearer or less distinct presentations of them, were substantially, that Yahveh is the almighty God of righteousness, mercy, faithfulness, and holiness; † that He is the one true God, the Creator and the Lord of the world and all mankind; ‡ that Israel is His chosen nation, with whom He has entered into a mutual covenant, with obligations on Israel's part of faithful allegiance to Him. § These ideas constitute the religious faith, the spiritual life, and the animating soul of the

^{*} See Ewald, *Prophets of the Old Testament*. I. pp. 85 sq.

† Amos ix. 1—6, Hos. ii. 14—23, Mic. vii. 14—20, Isa. vi. 1—4.

‡ Amos iv. 13, Isa. vi. 3, ii. 2—4, xix.

§ Amos iii. 2, Hos. vi. 7, viii. 1, xi., Jer. xxxi. 11 sq.

great prophets of Israel. They are the underlying principles of all their further thought, the deepest sources of all their highest hopes and profoundest fears, and the strength and stay of their heroic lives. For as a religious faith, firmly held, passionately loved, and incorporated into their spiritual being, these principles involved consequences which followed from them with the certainty of divine truth. The very idea of such a God as Yahveh involves the necessity of His sole and exclusive worship, and of a worship suited to His moral nature (Amos v. 21—27). As the God of love and righteousness, He must be the enemy of cruelty and wrong throughout the earth (Hab. i. 12—17), and as the covenant God of Israel He must be doubly hostile to Israel's unfaithfulness, injustice, and sensuality (Amos iii., Jer. xxv. 29). Nor is it possible that His authority and rule in the earth should for ever be resisted and defied as is actually the case at present (Isa. ii. 10—22, v. 16; Hab. i. 12, 13). Israel, His chosen nation, must love and serve Him perfectly, and He must be known and honoured throughout the earth (Mic. iv.). To believe less would be to doubt and dishonour Him. Nor is it conceivable that there should be a final and permanent separation between righteousness and prosperity, between the rule of justice and the blessings of peace, between the true worship and service of Yahveh and the rewards of kindly skies, fruitful fields, prosperous cities, and happy youth and hale and honoured age (Isa. xi., xxxii., lxxv. 17—25). Nor to many can it be conceivable that the God of Israel and of David should ever abandon His beloved city of Zion, and this must be especially difficult of belief in the case of those who remember how marvellously it was delivered from Sennacherib (Isa. iv., xxxvii. 22—35). Once more, if such certain inferences had of necessity to be drawn by the prophets from the fundamental principles of their religious faith, the very intensity and realism of their belief compelled them further to look for and expect an actual, and indeed speedy, realisation of its demands and ideals. Of all faiths in the world that of the Hebrew prophets is furthest from a patient and idle poetic

idealism. Israel's religion is a theocracy; its kingdom of God is present and on the earth; its day of judgment may be to-morrow, and its future life is this side the grave. Its prophets therefore can do no other than look out for the signs of Yahveh's advancing work in Israel and the earth. They must hear and declare by what means and in what way He will realise His purposes. He would cease to be Yahveh did He suffer His work to rest, and He would be unfaithful to His whole relation to Israel if He did not "reveal His secret to His servants the prophets." However, while Yahveh's nature and purposes remain unchangeable, the methods by which He accomplishes His designs may naturally vary with the changed attitude and necessities of men. Consequently, while the general inferences of the prophets' utterances from the fundamental principles of their religion scarcely vary at all, their announcements with regard to the means by which Yahveh is about to realise His necessary purposes must be to a considerable extent conditional and alternative. Thus a prophet may feel the absolute necessity of a day of judgment with its purifying fires as the condition of the return of Israel to Yahveh, and may proclaim it as impending. Yet by the speedy repentance of the people it may be averted (Book of Jonah); or though it come, the people may prove too obdurate to profit by it. Again, at one time it may be expected that the restoration and salvation of Israel, and through it the conversion of the nation, will be effected by a revival of the power of the Davidic royal house (Isaiah, Micah, Amos, &c.), while, at another, circumstances may have so changed that this means of realising an indestructible hope will appear impossible (Isa. xl.—lxvi.). In one age even a heathen king like Cyrus (Isa. xlv.) may be the prophetic hope, the agent of Yahveh's great deliverance, or His Messiah; and in another the return of a great prophet like Moses (Deut. xviii. 15—19), or again, of Elijah himself (Mal. iii.), may seem the best means of effecting a salvation which must surely come.* Or, again,

* See Ewald's chapter on the History of the Messianic hope, *History of Israel*, Vol. VI., pp. 103 sq.

one prophet connects the restoration of Israel with the overthrow of the Hebrew state by the Assyrians, and another with a second exposure to the perils and hardships of the desert (Amos and Hosea). It lay therefore in the very nature of the case that the prophet's views of the means to be used by Yahveh in the accomplishment of His unflinching purposes could not have the certainty and fixity which attached to either their religious faith or the necessary inferences which they drew from it. Still less could the prophets have that certainty with regard to times and seasons which a greater than they, we know, declared to be placed in the Father's own authority (Acts i. 7). There was, indeed, strong temptation to fix the periods for judgment and salvation, and but few of the prophets had the wisdom and patience which enabled Christ completely to overcome it; and we shall now have to see that it was in this respect especially that they showed themselves to be fallible and erring men.

This brings us to the next point which requires special consideration in even the briefest account of the work of the Hebrew prophets—namely, to their *predictions*.

It is man's high prerogative to "see before and after," and the object he has in view in studying the past is to read the future. And above all the believer in an eternal kingdom of righteousness and true blessedness must look beyond the past and the present, and expect and proclaim the advancing work of his God. As great men, and still more as great lovers and preachers of Yahveh's rule in the earth, the Hebrew prophets were necessarily forecasters and foretellers of the future. Indeed, in proportion to the intensity, the enthusiasm, and the realism of their faith in Yahveh and His work, prediction could not fail to occupy a prominent and a large place in their thought, discourses and writings. Accordingly, we find the remains of their orations and books preserved in the Old Testament are very largely made up of predictive utterances—threats of judgment, promises of a better time. And though the idea of the *prophet* is by no means primarily, and still less solely,

that of a foreteller of future events, at least one of the names by which the Hebrew prophets are designated in the Old Testament, gives prominence to this feature of their work as particularly characteristic of it. This is the name *watchman*; to which perhaps *seer* (that is, seer of visions of the future) may be added. The expression of Amos, "Surely, Yahveh doeth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets" (iii. 7), represents a relationship between the prophets and the Judge and Hope of Israel which involved particularly the communication to them of higher light with regard to the future. At the same time the work of the prophets as witnesses for Yahveh and preachers of righteousness was by no means primarily that of anticipating the morrow. They had above all things to influence the living present. Consequently not a few of their discourses are denunciations of the prevailing vices of the time and exhortations to amendment, or descriptions of Yahveh's greatness and his righteous acts in the past, and not predictions.

If we examine more closely the nature of this part of the prophet's work as represented in the prophetic writings of the Old Testament, we find it marked by two characteristics which distinguish it from the magical divination of the heathen. In the first place the predictions of these prophets are concerned solely with the realisation of the fundamental ideas of Yahvism, and in the second place the form in which they were conceived and are delivered is that of concrete, national, local, and temporal pictures of a general scope within those limits. It was not their function to forecast the issue of any merely worldly enterprise. Such things were beneath their notice as the servants of Yahveh, as well as beyond their ken as men. They left them to the guardians of priestly oracles (Judges xviii. 1-6), or to the magicians (Lev. xix. 26, 31; xx. 6). Take, for instance, the prophecies of Amos as illustrating the first of these points. The little book consists of three parts, and the one fundamental prophetic thought which pervades them all and compels the shepherd of the bare hills of Tekoa to lift

up his threatening voice is, that Yahveh the universal and righteous Ruler is about to punish the sins of Israel, Juda and the surrounding nations by the invading armies of Assyria. In the first part (i. 2—vi. 14) the thunder of Yahveh's judgment is heard in the first chapters (i. ii.) against Damascus, against the Philistines, against Tyre, against Edom, against Ammon, against Moab, and against Israel, on account of the sins of those nations—sins which no believer in the fundamental thought of the book could regard as other than appeals to Heaven for vengeance. The sins denounced are flagrant and crying national and social crimes, which the great righteous Ruler of the nations could not suffer to go unpunished. The occasion of the threatened approaching judgment was of a publicity and vast historical importance such as might well 'call for Yahveh's speedy interference. Indeed, if He were to suffer such infamous crimes to go unpunished, His rule and glory would be compromised, and the fundamental postulate of His religion would be shaken. In the next chapters (iii. iv.) of this part we have a specific establishment of the accusations made against Israel in particular—of its unrighteousness, its luxuriousness, and idolatry, and its impenitence, ending in a final call to the nation to meet its God in judgment. It is again the same vast, general, moral and religious subject-matter—a nation's crimes and the righteous Creator's righteous and awful judgments, or the realisation of Yahvism in the great world of human affairs and national life. In the next two chapters (v. vi.) we find the prophet simply varying the one sublime, awful, and simple theme of the former ones, lifting up a lamentation over Israel's fall, reiterating the catalogue of its sins, describing in stronger colours the terrors of its approaching judgment, and the hopelessness of escape from them. The second part of the book (vii. 1—ix. 6) intensifies and deepens the terrible interest of the prophet's announcement of coming judgment on Israel particularly. A series of visions—characteristic forms of prophetic experience and utterance—show that Yahveh's judgment is at last inevit-

able and no more to be averted. A chapter from the prophet's personal history (vii. 10—17), in which we find him uttering a prediction against the priest Amaziah, creates an effective episode in the midst of the terrible proclamation of coming doom. But the prediction itself is really not a new one. It is only the application of the general threat of the approaching invasion of the country by the Assyrians to the faithless and ungodly priest in particular, for encouraging the king and the magnates in their sins, and resisting the word and will of Yahveh. The general judgment Amos proclaims is, "Israel must be invaded and punished for its sins by the Assyrians," and when the priest of Bethel bids the prophet in insulting terms to flee to his own land, Amos with direct and telling force replies, "Yahveh's threat remains, and thou wilt personally fall under it." The final part of the book (the few verses, ix. 7—15) reiterates the burden of Amos, but at the same time it adds the hope which necessarily relieves the gloom and darkness of all prophetic discourses. If Israel must be punished for its sins because Yahveh is just, it must also be redeemed, or at all events a remnant of it, because Yahveh is merciful and holy. The fallen tent of David will after the judgment be set up again, and the prosperous days of old under the great king of idealised memory will once more return for Israel. With regard to the form of this and similar predictions we shall have to say a word immediately; but it is obvious that the contents of it are only the other side of the one general postulate of the prophecy of the book—the realisation of the reign of Yahveh in His righteousness. In the same way an examination of the other prophetic writings shows that that portion of the prophets' preaching which referred to the future was occupied with the one great idea which underlies and sustains their entire thought and work—the realisation of Yahveh's purpose with Israel, in other words, the revelation of righteousness, the coming of the kingdom of God. We do not find the prophets anywhere giving auguries with regard to special or general events which form no necessary

element in their purely ethical conception of God's work and reign. It is the moral world only, with its laws, inspirations, postulates, and eternal necessities with which their expectations, threats and promises are concerned. When they are directed specially to a particular person, or place, as for instance, the priest Amaziah, the minister Shebna, the fortress Tyre, or the city of Zion, the special application finds its justification and necessity in the representative or decisive position which the man or the place occupies in the development of the eternal moral purpose and work of Yahveh. The special predictions regarding them are called for by the religious principles and the moral instincts of the zealous servant of Yahveh. We shall soon see that this is not only the source of them and their justification, but also the measure of their predictive infallibility.

We must now briefly consider the form of the predictions. The soul and meaning of them is, as we have seen, as wide and general as the great ideas of Yahvism, but the form they assume in the prophet's mind and speech is intensely concrete, their body is national, local, temporal. The universal laws of righteousness, the demands and postulates of a wide-sweeping ideal, become in the prophet's intensely zealous and eager soul, under the influence of his powerfully realistic Hebrew imagination, living, breathing, tangible pictures of the Divine necessities of his heart and conscience. The revelation of righteousness which he expects shapes itself before his imagination as taking place close at hand amid existing circumstances and in the living present before his generation has passed away. His ideal world is in this respect unlike that of the poet, who dreams his dream and holds it true whether it be realised on the earth or in the skies, now or in the coming age. For the prophet God's kingdom is a present reality, to be revealed in Israel, in Moab, either in judgment against living enemies, or in salvation by the co-operation of living servants of God. As Ewald puts it,

The presentment or anticipation of the future advances at once to the general scope and ultimate issue. Before the prophet

who is justified in foreboding evil there arises forthwith the vision of destruction in the form of the final ruin ; yet the latter sometimes does not come to pass immediately, and only partially, although the essential truth of the threat, whether it be executed soon or later, remains so long as the sins which provoked it continue. In the same way, when the gaze of the prophet, eager from joyous hope or sacred longing, dwells on the consideration of the so-called Messianic age, the latter appears before him as coming soon, as coming with haste, and what he so clearly sees seems to him not to be far off. But the development of events shows how many hindrances still stand in the way of the longed-for and surmised Consummation, which again and again vanishes from the face of the present. *

It is part of the same mental necessity which leads the prophets so generally to describe the future judgment or salvation under the forms of past judgments and past prosperity. The fires of Sodom, recollections of earthquakes, of plagues of locusts, and of hostile invasions, for instance, supply the realistic colouring for pictures of coming doom, while the great days of old when God led his people by the hand of Moses, or ruled over them by his chosen king David, furnish the outlines for the enchanting sketches of the approaching Messianic times. Examples illustrative of these peculiarities of the form of our prophets' predictions are abundant. Thus Amos expects the general judgment of Heaven to fall immediately, through the instrumentality of the Assyrians, upon Israel, Judah, and the neighbouring nations, and he expects as the immediate effect of it the restoration of the Davidic prosperity of Israel. The judgment is conceived by him under the form of the Assyrian invasion, and the consequent reformation and prosperity of the nation under that of the restoration of the power and unity which Israel possessed under David, together with the attendant blessings of prosperous cities and fruitful fields. The famous Messianic prediction of Isaiah (vii. 10—17, viii. 23—ix. 6) illustrates still more strikingly these peculiarities. The prophet foretells three vast successive phases of the revelation of

* *Prophets*, Vol. I., p. 86.

Yahveh's judgments and salvation, which are, in his view, all crowded into the brief period of the youth and the manhood of the Messianic child which is immediately to be born. These successive phases are, first, the devastation of Damascus and Samaria, then leagued against Judah, by Assyria, which must take place before the young woman just then of marriageable age could bear the child, that is, within a year or so ; second, the great and terrible judgment of the invasion of the land, with its purifying effects, to take place during the youth of the marvellous child of Messianic hope ; and thirdly, the time of deliverance, the Messianic age, to follow with his full manhood and accession to the throne, with his great name, Wonderful Counsellor, Hero-God, Eternal Father, Prince of Peace. It is really startling to see with what magnificent boldness, gigantic realism, and heaven-storming impatience the most spiritual and evangelistic of the prophets welds together his eternal religious faith and his national and temporal surroundings. But this particular instance simply illustrates forcibly the general prophetic habit, and only strikingly shows how essential it is to separate in the prophetic predictions the universal and essential truth from the limited and accidental form in which it was conceived and expressed.

This brings us to the question of the fulfilment of the prophets' predictions. It is obvious enough to every unprejudiced reader of the Hebrew prophets that there is a very large number of their predictions which were never fulfilled in their natural and literal sense. Israel was never driven a second time into the desert as Hosea foretold (ii. 14—20), the expectations of Amos and Isaiah of decisive moral and religious effects from the Assyrian invasion were never fulfilled, the faithful " remnant " was not separated from the general mass, the Messianic king did not come, and the world did not gather around Mount Zion as the city of Yahveh. Egypt and Assyria were never converted to Yahvism, as Isaiah anticipated when his lofty prophetic spirit rose to its purest and serenest height (xix). The city of Tyre was not so completely destroyed by the Assyrians in

the eighth century as Isaiah, and a contemporary of his, anticipated (Isa. xxiii. 1—14), neither did the impending destruction of it by Nebuchadnezzar, foretold by Jeremiah and Ezekiel (Isa. xlvii. 4, Ezek. xxvi. 11—21, xxvii. 26—36, xxviii. 1—19), strictly speaking, follow, as Ezekiel himself seems, indeed, to confess (xxix. 18). Jerusalem was not destroyed by the Assyrians as Micah anticipated (iii. 12), while, on the other hand it did not remain finally inviolate, as Micah's older contemporary Isaiah had expected (xxviii. 16). These instances are sufficient to show the fallibility of the prophets in predicting the future. We may further notice that there is the greatest diversity, almost amounting to discordance, in their expectations with regard to the instruments by which Yahveh will bring to pass the future Messianic glory, as was above indicated. It is obvious that their views in this respect could not have varied so much according to the necessities of different ages had not the precise form and the hope of one period been found unsuited to another. The great prophet of the Exile, for instance, could pass over unnoticed the Messianic hope of Isaiah only because the time presented to him Cyrus as the great deliverer rather than a scion of the house of David, and the author of the Book of Daniel was driven to expect a Messiah coming in the clouds of heaven, without doubt for the reason that the earlier expectation of a second David was no longer possible.*

* Professor Robertson Smith's remarks (pp. 336-7) may be quoted as excellently illustrating this point :

" If the vindicating of the Divine mission of the prophets of Israel must be sought in the precision of detail with which they related beforehand the course of coming events, the hopes which Isaiah continued to preach during the victorious advance of Sennacherib must be reckoned as vain imaginations. The great decision which shall call back the earth to the service of the true God is still an object of faith, and not an accomplished reality. The Assyrians passed away, and new powers rose upon the ruins of their greatness to repeat in other forms the battle for earthly empire against the Kingdom of God. As Babylonia and Persia, Greece and Rome, successively rose and fell, the sphere of the great movements of history continually enlarged, till at length a new world went forth from the dissolution of ancient society, the centre of human history was shifted to lands unknown to the Hebrews, and its fortunes were committed to nations still unborn

However, it will be seen that, after all, the element of error and fallibility in these predictions reaches no further than their outward form, and does not touch the essential and divine inner reality. After all, the judgments which the prophets foretold followed, though not all in the manner and at the time they had expected; things corresponding to their visions of a Messianic age came to pass, though it subsequently appeared that the blessings of Yahveh's reign could not be realised according to the imagery of a particular nation, or even of a particular race; and the religion of Yahveh won its triumphs and established itself in the midst of the earth, though neither Egyptian nor Assyrian hastened to worship in the Temple at Jerusalem, or in Temples of Yahveh in their own countries. In the case of all the nations of their time against whom the prophets proclaimed judgment the truth of Schiller's great sentence—*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*—was sooner or later, in one form or another, strikingly exemplified. Sorely tried as the prophets' faith in the eternal law which Goethe embodies in his line *Alle Schuld rächt sich auf Erden* was by the apparent contradiction it met with in the triumphs of such nations as the Assyrians, their faithful and believing

when Isaiah preached. Not only have Isaiah's predictions received no literal fulfilment, but it is impossible that the evolution of the Divine purpose can ever again be narrowed within the limits of the petty world of which Judah was the centre and Egypt and Assyria the extremes. Fanciful theorists who use the Old Testament as a book of curious mysteries, and profane its grandeur by adapting it to their idle visions at the sacrifice of every law of sound hermeneutics and sober historical judgment, may still dream of future political conjunctions which shall restore Palestine to the position of central importance which it once held as the meeting-place of the lands of ancient civilisation; but no sane thinker can seriously imagine for a moment that Tyre will again become the emporium of the world's commerce or Jerusalem the seat of universal sovereignty. The forms in which Isaiah enshrined his spiritual hopes are broken, and cannot be restored; they belong to an epoch of history that can never return, and the same line of argument which leads us reverently to admire the Divine wisdom that chose the mountains of Palestine as the cradle of true religion at a time when Palestine was, in a very real sense, the physical centre of those movements of history from which the modern world has grown, refutes the idea that the kingdom of the living God can again in any special sense be identified with the nation of the Jews and the land of Canaan."

proclamations of it were in the end abundantly justified, and the result showed that it was due to its light that they did not misread history. Though Isaiah's hope of seeing a purified remnant of Israel the heir of the promises and the agent of Yahveh's work in the earth was never fulfilled in the history of the Judean state, the eternal truth and fact underlying it—that the religion of Yahveh and the community which lives in harmony with it are alike imperishable—have been exemplified in the subsequent history of religion in such a way as to make us feel how divine a light the hope cast into the prophet's future. It is certainly not too much to say, that without the light of that hope the religion of Israel would have perished with Israel centuries before the dawn of our era, and that then Christianity would not have arisen on the earth. It was the form of the prophets' predictions only that was, like so many other highest human conceptions and utterances, the creation of local and temporal circumstances, and therefore so often fallible and erroneous. The underlying and sustaining idea and faith—the sacred light and conviction which shone and burned behind the form—were infallible and eternally true, and they were a divine and indispensable guidance through the dangers and difficulties of the present into the greater future and towards the destined goal of Israel's history.

The glance which we have now taken at the fundamental ideas of the Hebrew prophets and at the scope and nature of their predictions places us in a position which enables us to understand and appreciate that claim which they make, which is so characteristic of them, and which to men of recent times has appeared so staggering,—the claim to speak in the name of their God.

The mixed and complicated phenomenon which meets us in the oracular utterances of the Hebrew prophets is not, indeed, in its general nature singular. It is presented by all the higher and purer oracles of great religions. They all combine the three elements of universal and necessary moral and religious truth delivered as the direct and express utterances of a deity, and embodied in temporal, local and

often mistaken forms. The peculiarity of Hebrew oracles in this respect is that each of these elements appears in such wealth, strength and boldness that we get a combination that is almost staggering in its apparent incongruity. We are surprised that truths of such divine necessity and universality should be delivered as the restricted and direct utterance of the God of Israel, and we almost take offence that such a bright light should be enclosed within lamps of such local construction and such imperfect transparency. The word of divine and eternal truth, we are apt to think, should come to men as the light of inward and universal Reason, "that lighteth every man that cometh into the world," and above all, should be free of the errors of national and temporal limitations and personal impatience. In Hebrew history the time came when to the profounder religious spirits the characteristic formula of the prophets, "Thus saith the Lord" (Jer. xxiii. 31), grew obnoxious, and the most enlightened of the prophets themselves desired that in the future the order might wholly cease to exist (Zech. xiii. 3—6). And in our own time the humblest and devoutest religious spirits turn sadly, if not indignantly, from those who claim to have been in the counsel of Heaven and to speak in its name, while it is only those who cannot profit by the lessons of history and experience who heed forecastings of the future which require more than faith in general principles and deductions from observed facts to authenticate them. Consequently we find in the complicated web of Hebrew oracles much that at first sight prejudices us against them, and almost inclines us to think that they really do not contain the everlasting and infallible word of the true God. Further consideration, however, ought to remove our difficulties, and even make us glad to find that divine truth came to the Hebrew prophets also under conditions resembling those which universally fix the mode of its first most forcible communication to man.

This further consideration brings us, in the first place, to the obvious fact that the main burden and chief contents of

the oracles of the Hebrew prophets are precisely those profound moral and religious convictions which are to good men divine truths, "categorical imperatives," the very bases and foundations of all their hopes and fears, dearer and more certain to them than anything they can see or know. These convictions are therefore in the truest sense the voice of God within the soul; and when men speak of the conscience as the divine monitor within their breasts, they only express, in another form, the great fact that between the divine and the human spirit there is a sacred relationship. But, in the second place, the universal law of religious development is from the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the general, through the temporal to the eternal. As yet, there has never been a natural religion, or a universal religion, except in the imaginations of mistaken philosophers. Even the most purely spiritual religion—Christianity—entered the world under the conditions and limitations and errors of a particular country, age, and circle of ideas and aspirations. Christ himself, for instance, probably connected the Judgment of the world and the inauguration of the perfect Kingdom of God with the threatening ruin of the Judean nation, while the first apostles connected the coming of Christ's kingdom with his immediate advent from heaven in the clouds. We have therefore really no reason to be surprised that the Hebrew prophets experienced the necessity, imperative authority, and eternal validity of their moral and religious convictions as Yahveh's inspirations, commands, threats and promises. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive how they could come under the overpowering influence of moral and religious conviction as divine necessity in any other way. In like manner the forms which these convictions assumed when brought to bear upon the world around them and the conduct of men were necessarily determined by the mental characteristics and the national and temporal surroundings of the prophets. The revelations of Yahveh's righteousness which they expected they could do no other than imagine under the image pre-

sented by the state of the world and society with which they were acquainted. The sphere in which both Yahveh's judgments and His deliverances could be displayed was necessarily that lying within the horizon of their terrestrial and celestial vision and hope. They could not patiently await the punishments and rewards of another world, because none of the earlier prophets at all events knew the doctrine of the immortality of the soul in the proper sense. They naturally conceived of the inviolability of righteousness as evincing itself in national and social rather than in personal and mental history, inasmuch as Yahveh was to them pre-eminently the Lord of nations and the God of His people Israel. Even that impatient forecasting of the coming triumphs of righteousness which led them so frequently to antedate both judgments and deliverances, must be regarded as a concurrent necessity of the intensity of their conception of its divine supremacy. It is true that an exceptional prophet like Isaiah, or Habakkuk, learnt to live by his faith and to wait with some patience, and that the calmer spirits of New Testament times, in the full hope of immortality, were less eager to anticipate God's Kingdom. But even they were unable to conceive the possibility of an indefinite postponement of its approach, and it is difficult to understand how the earlier Hebrew prophets, with their views of God's way, and with the burning intensity of their conceptions of divine righteousness, should have been able to repress the eagerness of their prophetic vision. Moreover, in the third place, the peculiar prophetic mode of picturing and presenting the divine oracles is often distinctly figurative and symbolic, and not properly descriptive, in a literal sense, of the past, the present, or the future. The prophet is a man of "visions," who in the moment of inspiration and ecstasy sees what his God is about to do presented before him in sudden pictures of limited extent and exceedingly compressed and concentrated contents. Though this feature of prophetic conception and writing by no means by itself explains the obvious antedating and still less the undeniable non-fulfil-

ment of a large number of the predictions found in the Old Testament.

We are now in a position, in the last place, to perceive what is and what is not the real greatness and the undying glory of the Hebrew prophets as well as the imperishable value of their example and writings. Their peculiar excellence is plainly not to be found in any supposed illumination granted exclusively to them, of quite another kind than the moral and religious light enjoyed by other members of the Hebrew nation and also by moral and religious heathens, or in such a degree as to preserve them from common errors to which all other good men are liable. Still less does it consist, as was once thought, in a supernatural and infallible precognition of future events lying centuries beyond the prophet's own age. The one great light which the prophets lived and walked in was the religion of Yahveh, and this they inherited with their birth in Israel. All their thoughts, aspirations, feelings, resolves were quickened and illuminated by it. The inferences which they drew from its fundamental ideas and the applications they made of both to men and times, might involve some new and great advances, but, with minor exceptions, the prophets never claim to have been entrusted with new and unknown religious and moral truth,* and as a fact do not utter such. The Book of Job presents new truths, but then it is not a prophetic but a poetical work, and its author does not come before the world with the authoritative utterance, "Thus saith the Lord," or "It shall come to pass in those days." The greatness and value of the prophets lie in the fact that they had so entered into the life and spirit of Yahvism as to become living representatives and preachers of its few great but simple truths. They remain therefore the immortal heralds and apostles of divine righteousness in its imperative claims, its invincible progress, its glorious ideals. They lived and moved as before Yahveh with a grand simplicity of faith and conduct,

* See on this point the important remarks of Reuss, §§ 258-263, Maybaum, *Die Entwicklung des Israelitischen Prophetenthums* (Berlin, 1883) pp. 86-95.

such as only men of ancient, simpler, and stronger times could reach, and they embodied all their life and thought in words and books of a corresponding grandeur and force, such as no subsequent age could even poorly imitate. They lived at a period of religious history, too, when men could not fall under the weakening and misleading influence of an abuse of the great doctrine of personal religion and personal immortality. The Hebrew prophets were not much occupied with the smaller concerns of their own personal relation to God, and they were not acquainted with the later doctrine of a future life. Hence they were absorbed in the greater and more elevating affairs of Yahveh's work of righteousness in the earth, of the condition, duties, and prospects of His chosen people, of the conversion of the heathen nations to His eternal religion. They were likewise men who above all others lived, spoke, and wrote under the overpowering conviction of a Divine call and mission. Of all men whom the world has known and with whom later ages have been kept familiar, it is such prophets as Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, who appear as sublime representatives and types of absolute consecration to the cause of truth and righteousness. For the most part almost solitary heroes, they delivered their messages at the peril of their lives in the teeth of monarchs, aristocracies, priesthoods, prophetic schools, and ignorant, pampered, and infatuated mobs. They were men who had been called to their work by virtue of a baptism and anointing which had for ever won and ravished their hearts with glorious visions of truth and righteousness. They had been lifted into the seventh heaven of ideal splendour as enchanting as any that ever fired a poet's soul and changed and consecrated a good man's heart and life. And yet they were men whose lot was cast in times of terrible ungodliness and fiercely triumphant wrong; so that if ever souls in love with the ideal contended with black doubt and fear because the divine ideal and the devilish actual were divided by such a dizzy gulf, those souls were they. But nevertheless they remained faithful to their "consecration" and their "dream." So that for more than two thousand

years their lives and their words have fed the world's highest hope, checked its faint-hearted unbelief, condemned its false pursuits, its worldliness, its cruelties, its luxuriousness, and its false religion. It was from their pages that Jesus of Nazareth rose and began to preach "The kingdom of God is at hand." It was in communion with their profound humanity and tenderness that he learnt to say, "Come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy laden." He was their descendant when he cried in Jerusalem, "Woe unto you, scribes, Pharisees, and hypocrites." Through familiarity with their heroic history he doubtless also prepared himself to fulfil the highest sacrifice of the ideal "servant of God." We know he regarded his mission as simply the fulfilment of their teaching and the realisation of his idea of their Messianic hope, and it was precisely the ethical and social feature of their religion—its love of God shown in the love of men—which distinguished Christianity from ceremonial and legal Judaism—the same feature which constituted one of the great distinctions between the religion of the prophets and that of the priests and people of their time.

J. FREDERICK SMITH.

RECENT DEFENCES OF THE MOSAIC COSMOGONY.

THOSE who are commonly known as "Liberal Christians"—that is those who have delivered themselves from bondage to the letter of the Bible and appeal to the supreme authority of reason and conscience, but who yet retain their faith in the reality of Religion and cherish a great and loving reverence for the spirit of Christ—are living somewhat too contentedly in the happy Paradise of their own liberality. The battle, they believe, has been intellectually won and the defenders of ancient dogmas have been driven from the field by the united forces of Science and Scholarship.

They describe, with glowing hopefulness, the Spirit of the Age as working among all sorts and conditions of men, casting down the crumbling strongholds of Superstition and upbuilding a House of Prayer into which cultured and enlightened men may enter without dreading lest they should hear within their secret souls the prophet's terrible question, "Is there not a lie in my right hand?"

Pleasantly and gratefully satisfied with the general progress of modern thought, many liberal-minded men are becoming impatient of any teaching which they are able to call "negative." They declare themselves "tired of negations"; and almost angrily resent any clear, exact, definite discussion of the nature of the Bible, as though it were in itself unnecessary, and, in its influence, a hindrance to the growth of a devout religious faith.

Without doubt when we have once cleared for ourselves, through the wilderness of our doubts, a highway for our

God, it is folly to permit our thoughts constantly to dwell upon what we do *not* believe. To pass through life crying aloud "I do not believe this," and "I do not believe that," is a waste of time. What we *do* believe, is our chief concern. The settler is obliged to cut down the great trees and extract their tenaciously clinging roots—he must drain the morasses and make ruthless war upon the weeds—but the aim of his toil is to win fruit from the soil, and build a house in which he may dwell with wife and child. The clearance however must be complete before this object can be achieved.

The whole question with respect to the advisability of what is termed "negative" teaching about the Bible, hinges upon this point—is it true or not that, for this English community, the work has been done?

Until the Bible is known to be a collection of books, differing in value and recording various stages in the religious history of the Jewish race, it is hopeless to expect that any form of rational Christianity can be firmly established. Until this kind of knowledge is generally diffused, theological arguments will remain what to so large an extent they are, mere battles of texts; metaphors will be received as articles of faith; phrases torn from their context will be regarded as "scripture proofs"; the "word of God" will be confounded with speculations which have so completely vanished from the minds of men as to be unintelligible except to the scholar; the teachings of Christ, instead of being "spirit" and "life," will be resolved into "the letter that killeth."

A certain number of university men; a select band of clergymen of the "Broad" School attached to the Established Church; a considerable proportion of the ministers and members of one small group of Free Christian or Unitarian Churches; a few cultivated laymen scattered among our great towns, who exchange their religious thoughts chiefly with each other, hold clear opinions as to the composite character of the Bible, and look for the foundations of religion into the soul itself.

But to the great mass of our English Church and Chapel going population, the Bible is substantially the book it was before the great modern critical works were published.

So little indeed has the rational study of the Bible as yet penetrated our religious organizations, that no Englishman has produced an educational biblical manual, containing the ripest results of modern Science and Scholarship. Parents who are Christians, but at the same time cannot shut their eyes to the mythical element in their sacred books, have to depend upon a few translations from Dutch and German authors, and have no native literature to assist them in the religious education of their children.

Nearly three millions of scholars are, on an average, in daily attendance throughout the year in the public elementary schools of England and Wales. Almost the whole of these three millions of children are taught, on the authority of the Bible, that the world was made in six days or periods; that the ground labours under a curse because of man's disobedience; that death is a curse; that all the high hills were covered with water after forty days of rain, two of every sort of fowl, cattle and creeping thing being preserved in one small ark; and that the existence of many languages is due to the anger of God at the proud attempt of His creatures to erect a tower whose top might reach to Heaven.

A book called *The Teacher's Handbook of the Bible*,* by the Rev. Joseph Pulliblack, is largely used by one of the great School Boards of the country as a manual of so-called unsectarian Biblical instruction. In this book, the Teacher is directed to give the following lessons to his pupils. He is to teach them that in the Book of Genesis the history of creation "is divided into parts, each corresponding to the work of one day or one period of time;" but if geology be a science at all, it is absolutely certain

* *The Teacher's Handbook of the Bible*. By JOSEPH PULLIBLACK, M.A. Curate of Walton-on-the-Hill, Liverpool; formerly Scholar of St. John's College, Cambridge. 2nd ed. revised. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1879.

that grass, herbs yielding seeds, and fruit trees were *not* made during one day or period; fish and fowl during another; and cattle and creeping things during another. The various species of plants and animals now existing were introduced during many epochs; new plants and animals characterising each successive period. The scholars are to be informed that when "living things, whether plants or animals," are spoken of, and it is said that they were made "after their kind," these three words are very important indeed, "for they mean that God not only made the first specimens single plants or single animals of each sort, but also that He gave them power to produce others like themselves. For example, a grain of wheat produces an ear of wheat, and each grain in the ear will produce wheat, and nothing else; a hen's egg produces a chicken, and not any other bird. The wheat and the hen are after their kind." Young minds, that is, are to be prejudiced against the method of creation revealed by the researches of Darwin—the method by which the multiplication of slight inherited peculiarities gradually leads to specific differences—and to learn betimes to caricature one of the greatest discoveries ever made by the intellect of man.

Death is to be represented as "part of the punishment" of sin. "The body, which had been made by God's power out of the dust to be an instrument to serve Him, having been used as an instrument to disobey Him, was to turn to dust again." In this nineteenth century, our children are to be kept in ignorance of the fact that death is the natural result of our very creation as men and women, with bodies of flesh and blood, and must therefore be reverently accepted as a beneficent ordainment of our Father in Heaven.

The Teacher is further solemnly to inform his pupils that "violence and wickedness produced the flood"—that God has promised that no such flood shall happen again; and that whenever we see a rainbow, we should be thankful "for the long, long years during which God has kept His promises to Noah." But what are the facts? Not only do

the physical details of the flood involve a series of stupendous miracles (the necessity for which does not enter into the imagination of the writer of the Book of Genesis), but it is known beyond a doubt that all the high hills were not covered with water at one and the same time, that floods are acting to-day precisely in the same manner and in obedience to the same laws as those which prevailed in the past, and that rainbows were in the sky ages upon ages before Noah lived.

Mr. Pulliblack's Handbook represents the most moderate form of Biblical teaching given to three millions of children, largely at the expense and with the authority of the English nation.

I venture to say that there are not fifty public elementary schools throughout the whole country, in which a master would not be liable to summary dismissal should he plainly describe the simplest facts known to modern science, in their relation to the Hebrew legends.

Our national system of education is a vast propagandist institution; and its professed "unsectarianism" is an empty name whenever fundamental questions such as those directly connected with the Bible are involved. The seed of a thousand superstitions is being freely sown—seed which will undoubtedly bear fruit "after its kind" in days to come.

In how many Sunday-schools in this country are the discoveries of modern science, with respect to creation, really taught as divine revelations? In nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand Sunday-schools, the children of England are learning, as part of the "word of God," narratives which scientific men generally either reject or explain away so completely as to leave the language in which they are couched utterly meaningless.

The immense strength of the orthodox reaction provoked by the scepticism of the hour is overlooked by many liberal Christian thinkers. They rejoice in their own power of uniting reason and faith and naturally believe that the whole world is travelling in the direction they desire.

One tree of life is growing in England year by year, striking deeper roots and putting forth fresh branches—the tree of such life as there is in sacramental religion. Beneath the shadow of this tree, the intellectual atmosphere is close and the mind of man cannot breathe freely.

The genius of Sacramentalism is opposed to the exercise of independent judgment. It glorifies Authority; and submission to Authority is its virtue of virtues. It will accept nothing less than the unconditional surrender of mind and heart and conscience. Under its influence the study of the Bible and the performance of a religious service partake more or less of the nature of charms by which the favour of the Everlasting God may be secured. A Divinity hedges in the written word and the performed ceremony; and Criticism is dismissed from their sacred presences as a profane intruder.

The development of Sacramental Christianity can be checked by one force alone—the force of a direct appeal to the authority of the Spirit of God within the soul, as valid against any Church or Book by which it may be opposed. Should there be any timid shrinking from this appeal on the part of religious men, it is not difficult to foresee that England will have to pass through a period of bitter struggle between an aggressive Sacerdotalism and a fierce, angry, and determined Scepticism.

The increase of the agencies available for dogmatic teaching, and the revival of the Sacramental type of Christianity—so characteristic of recent years—have been accompanied by a new apologetic literature. The books issued from what is technically called “the religious press” have not, save in exceptional cases, many readers outside the circles to which they specially appeal; but their circulation within those circles is very large, and they are exercising a vast influence upon the great body of attendants at churches and chapels.

With respect even to the old questions at issue between Science and the Bible, a very general impression is being

created among the great mass of church and chapel frequenting people to whom I refer, that the critics have been answered; that the Book of Genesis has practically held its own against the assaults of Scientific enemies; and that the acceptance of the Mosaic cosmogony, "rightly understood," may still be made a condition of Christian discipleship.

One or two examples of this new apologetic literature on its scientific side are worth examining, not so much for their intrinsic merit, as on account of their extensive circulation and undoubted influence.

The fifth thousand of a work entitled *Moses and Geology, or the Harmony of the Bible with Science*,* by S. Kinns, Ph.D., is announced as "now ready." It has been published with much flourish of trumpets; quotations from favourable reviews in important papers and magazines are given; and the names of fifteen Bishops appear in the list of subscribers.

The author undertakes to show that "the most recent scientific facts, as well as the strata of the earth, accord exactly *with the order given*" by Moses; and concludes that "if so, it must be admitted beyond all question that he received such accurate information directly from God Himself."

Applying the ordinary arithmetical rule for determining the possible permutations of any number of things or events, it is shown that in a lock of fifteen levers, the levers can be varied in their order 1,307,674,368,000 times.

Having thus proved to you that the number of changes that can be made in the order of fifteen things is more than a billion, if Moses has placed *fifteen* important creative events in their proper order without the possibility of traditional help, as most

* *Moses and Geology, or the Harmony of the Bible with Science.* By SAMUEL KINNS, Ph.D.; Fellow of the Royal Astronomical Society; Member of the Biblical Archaeological Society; Principal of the College, Highbury New Park. 3rd Ed. Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co.; London, Paris, and New York. 1882.

of them happened millions of years before man was created, it is indeed a strong proof of his inspiration, for group them as you may, and take off a further percentage for any scientific knowledge possessed by him, still the chances, I think, must be reckoned by *hundreds of millions* against his giving the order correctly without a special revelation from God." (P. 12)

Dr. Kinns proceeds to give an "Order of fifteen creative events" which he imagines to be "taught by science" and to correspond with the Mosaic cosmogony.

It is almost impossible to treat Dr. Kinns' argument seriously. A more extraordinary version of the geological history of the Earth was never given; and the depth of meaning supposed to be contained in Lord Burleigh's famous nod is a trifle to the number of Scientific facts which are supposed to be involved in the few simple words attributed to Moses.

It is perfectly hopeless to attempt to reconcile the collection of geological facts contained in the body of the book itself with the summary of "Fifteen creative events."

A few salient examples of the method of argument will suffice. The creation of dry land is numbered as the fourth event. After the cooling of the earth great convulsions—it is said—took place which "heaved up the rocks and raised them above the universal sea, forming mountains, islands, and continents;" and it is maintained that this agrees with the words of Moses "and God said, Let the dry land appear." But Dr. Kinns' description does not in any way represent what is positively known of the method of formation of the dry land on which we live. The writer of Genesis is describing (it must be remembered) the making of the very *land on which man himself was placed by his Creator*. The land on which man lives was *not* formed as a whole by a series of primeval convulsions. It has been created by varied and marvellous processes extending over millions of years. It has been *built up* out of the wash of ancient rivers and the sands of vanished seas. Drifted sands and mud-charged estuaries have played their part. The busy coral-building inhabitants of the ocean have added

their share to the dry land. Chemical agencies have been active in solidifying the work of rivers, seas, and living creatures. Instead of being pushed up by mighty efforts *en masse*, our mountains themselves have been established by forces acting persistently and steadily over vast periods of time. Mountains, islands, and continents were *not* settled as we have them, at any one period of time. They represent the last results of a myriad complicated changes.

The verse "Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind" is supposed by Dr. Kinns to represent the history of the creation of plants from the Cryptogams to the Phænogams with a low order of fruit, as far as the Carboniferous period! The higher order of fruit trees, he informs us, appeared "when God planted a garden later on."

That is, in Genesis *the creation of the plants now upon earth is not described*, except so far as the higher order of fruit trees is concerned. What Moses does, according to Dr. Kinns, is this: he describes the formation of plants belonging to the Carboniferous and preceding epochs, very few if any species of which now exist or have been even seen by man until a geological collection was made. In the opinion of Dr. Kinns Moses was inspired to give an account of the creation of our museum specimens, and *not* of the mass of plants which were actually before men's eyes, the fruit trees only being excepted!

Plants are represented in Genesis as having been created before fish, birds, cattle, and creeping things. Dr. Kinns' argument, therefore, demands that there should have been no marine creatures in existence *before* the Carboniferous epoch—a point on which the geological facts are right in the teeth of his theory. He is, however, quite equal to the emergency. He boldly interprets the words "Let the waters bring forth abundantly" as meaning "After the Carboniferous period *many fresh* species of marine animals appeared, and the sea swarmed with life."

Any allusion to the first creation of marine animals—the

very thing of which Genesis professes to give an account—is thus quietly swept aside.

Dr. Kinns' further illustrations of the harmony between "Science" and "Moses" are equally remarkable, and may be quoted as curiosities of Biblical Criticism:—

X.—SCIENCE: In the New Red Sandstone [footprints of birds are found for the first time.

MOSES: "*And fowl that may fly above the earth.*"

XI.—SCIENCE: In the succeeding strata of the Lias monster Saurians, such as the Ichthyosaurus and Plesiosaurus, are found.

MOSES: "*And God created great whales*" (should have been translated sea monsters).

XII.—SCIENCE: Enormous beasts such as the Megalosaurus, Iguanodon, and Dinotherium, preceded the advent of cattle.

MOSES: "*And God made the beast of the earth after his kind.*"

SCIENCE: Cattle, such as oxen and deer, appeared before man; some of them in the Post Pliocene period.

MOSES: "*And cattle after their kind.*" (P. 15.)

Comment upon this extraordinary passage is almost superfluous. Just as Moses was practically credited by Dr. Kinns with a knowledge of a fossil flora, he is made to refer to the creation of fossil birds and fossil saurians; and to omit any account of the coming into the world of the birds and saurians that co-exist with man. Between the clauses of sentences perfectly complete in themselves, enormous periods of time are interposed in an entirely arbitrary way. In the simple enumeration of the different classes of living things as they were known to the writer—fowl, great whales (sea monsters), cattle—is imagined to be hidden a scientific knowledge of the ordered succession of forms of life. Dr. Kinns describes after the Carboniferous period, a period of "many fresh species of marine animals"—followed in succession by a New Red Sandstone period of birds—a Lias period of Saurians—a period of "enormous beasts"—a period of cattle; and imagines that this is the very

history a God of truth would give of the order of His creative work.

But nothing can be vaguer and cruder than this account of the succession of life upon earth. Fresh species of marine animals have constantly been created during every period; the occurrence of footprints of birds in the New Red Sandstone is extremely doubtful;* it is certain that true reptiles are found in the Carboniferous epoch itself; while intermediate forms of birds and mammalia occur with reptilian peculiarities.

Very great stress is laid, in the few defences of the Mosaic cosmogony written by Scientific men, on the supposed agreement between the geological order of animal life and that sketched by Moses. Dr. Dawson, for example, a scientific man of the highest rank, finds in the Scriptura record "great coincidences" with the discoveries of palæontology.†

From both records we learn that various ranks or gradations existed from the first introduction of animals; but that on the earlier stages only certain of the lower forms of animals were present; that these soon attained their highest point, and then gradually, on each succeeding platform, the variety of nature in its higher—the vertebrate—form increased, and the upper margin of animal life attained a more and more elevated point, culminating at length in man; while certain of the older forms were dropped as no longer required. (P. 346).

I submit that no one ignorant of geology could by any possibility learn that there has been a progressive development from lower to higher forms of life, from the single statement that on the fifth day fish and birds were created,

* It has been supposed that evidence of the existence of Triassic birds is furnished by the three-toed footprints just referred to. But probably these are mostly, if not entirely, the tracks of dinosaurs, the absence of two pairs of prints in each track being accounted for by the birdlike habit of the animals in the use of their hind feet in walking.—*Geikie's Text Book of Geology*, p. 763.

† *The Origin of the World according to Revelation and Science*. By J. W. Dawson, LL.D. Second Ed. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1890.

while on the sixth day beasts of the earth followed. Dr. Dawson puts his argument in the following tabular form :—

BIBLICAL ÆONS.	PERIODS DEDUCED FROM SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS.
Fifth day. — Invertebrates and fishes, and afterwards great reptiles and birds, created.	Paleozoic period—Reign of Invertebrates and Fishes. Mesozoic period—Reign of Reptiles.
Sixth day.—Introduction of mammals—creation of man and Edenic group of animals.	Tertiary period—Reign of mammals. Post Tertiary—Existing mammals and man.

This apparent parallelism is secured by quietly dropping out of the account in Genesis of everything which does not harmonise with science. Instead, however, of summing up "Biblical Æons" in this indefinite way, let us take the order of creation as it actually stands in Genesis.

Third Day—Creation of grass, herbs, fruit trees.

Fifth Day—Creation of fish and birds.

Sixth Day—Creation of all land animals.

It will be sufficient to place against this account the following established facts—

(1.) All the plants upon earth were *not* created before the fish and birds; all the fish in the sea and all the birds in the air were *not* created before all the living creatures upon earth.

New species of plants, fish, birds, and mammals have been created epoch after epoch.

(2.) The plants, fish, birds, and mammals, in the same stage of development, have not been created at one and the same time.

Dr. Geikie, in his admirable Text-Book of Geology, points out that while the same general succession of organic types has been observed over a large part of the world, though, of course, with important modifications in various countries, it does not follow that the groups of strata

characterised by a resemblance of organic remains were chronologically contemporaneous.

The grand march of life in its progress from lower to higher forms, has unquestionably been broadly alike in all quarters of the globe. But nothing seems more certain than that its rate of advance has not everywhere been the same. *It has moved unequally over the same region.* A certain stage of progress may have been reached in one quarter of the globe thousands of years before it was reached in another; though the same general succession of organic types might be found in each region. At the present day, for example, the higher fauna of Australia is more nearly akin to that which flourished in Europe far back in mesozoic time than to the living fauna of any other region of the globe. There seems also to be now scientific evidence to warrant the assertion that the progress of terrestrial vegetation has at some geological periods, and in some regions, been in advance of that of the marine fauna. (P. 619.)

Not only is the defender of the Mosaic cosmogony driven from the plea that the order of creation is literally correct; but when he takes refuge in the vague theory that the creation of general types is described, he is met by the fact *the creation of plants and animals of the same organic types has not taken place at the same period, all the world over.*

*The Pulpit Commentary** on Genesis has reached a 4th edition; and, edited as it is by careful and responsible scholars, it doubtless supplies the science for a thousand pulpits.

In the general introduction, Canon Farrar with great plainness of speech reminds the clergy that "in many thousands of instances in age after age" they have "conclusively proved their entire incompetence to decide upon points of science;" and he advises them to avoid controversies as to the relations between science and religion, and

* *The Pulpit Commentary*. Edited by the Rev. Canon H. D. M. SPENCE, M.A., Vicar and Rural Dean of St. Pancras, and Examining Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol; and by the Rev. JOSEPH S. EXELL, editor of the "Homiletic Quarterly." *Genesis*. 4th ed. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1881.

to rest on the certainty that "though exegesis may be erroneous, the scientific *results* which have rewarded centuries of labour have not in a single instance clashed with any truth of religion. How can they clash, seeing that truth must be truth, and that God reveals himself in the facts of nature no less surely than he revealed himself in his Word?"

Why, however, are ministers of Religion to be silent respecting the revelation of God in Nature? They believe in God as the Creator of the Heavens and the Earth, why are they to decline to unfold the glory of His works? The Psalmist of Israel—the Prophets—Christ himself—appeal to the marvel and the loveliness of Creation as a ground for adoring faith. Why are Christian ministers to utter no word of praise—to unfold no Law of the Lord's creative glory?

The plain meaning of Canon Farrar's advice is that the clergy had better not discuss the wonderful works of the God they serve—because they may get into trouble with the first chapters of the Book of Genesis! Their wisest plan therefore is—so practically runs this strange piece of counsel—to admit generally that these chapters are part of the Word of God, and say nothing as to what they mean or do not mean. Surely however the revelation of the Creator made in the very works of His Hand, cannot be neglected with honour by those who would teach His Will.

If the clergy are incompetent what has made them so? Canon Farrar's own words will guide to the answer:—*"They have been so repeatedly forced to modify their interpretation of Scripture in accordance with finally demonstrated and universally accepted truths."*

Why has this been the case? Because they have been afraid to look at facts lest a text in Genesis should be proved to be mistaken. The Book of Genesis has been their first care and the truth of Science a subordinate interest. The remedy is not to be found in abandoning a divine revelation by ignoring Science, but in escaping from mental bondage to an ancient cosmogony.

The Author of the "Exposition and Homiletics" in the *Pulpit Commentary* on the Book of Genesis does not follow the advice given by Canon Farrar in the Introduction, but enters upon an elaborate and daring attempt to maintain its Scientific accuracy.

"If the Mosaic cosmogony is true, it can only have been given by inspiration; and that it is true may be said to be with rapidly augmenting emphasis the verdict of Science."

Much use is made of the easy process of *reading into the text anything that is not contradicted by it*. It is almost taken for granted that whatever scientific fact is not denied, was present to the mind of Moses, and is virtually implied in the narrative. A considerable portion of the Commentary may therefore be dismissed as resting on absolute assumption. The Commentator, for instance, regards the Nebular Hypothesis of Laplace; the present form of the Earth as an oblate spheroid, such being the shape it must necessarily have assumed had its original condition been that of a liquid mass revolving round its own axis; and the fact that below a certain point of the earth's crust, the heat of the interior mass becomes greater in proportion to the depth below the surface; as furnishing "*direct corroborations*" of the verse "and the earth was without form and void and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." The extraordinary capacity of this author for this extremely unscientific kind of exposition may be judged from the fact that he finds in Psalm civ. 7 ("At Thy rebuke they fled; at the voice of Thy thunder they hasted away"), nothing less than a hint "*at electric agency* in connection with the elevation of the mountains and the sinking of the ocean beds."

In another part of the Commentary the same extraordinary course is taken as that which I have already criticised. The explanations given practically confine the Mosaic account to the creation of a fragmentary part of the fossil flora and fauna, entombed within the rocks. We are asked to believe—for example—that the writer of the

words "And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind;" did not refer to the grass, the herbs, the fruits before his eyes, but to an abundant fossil flora (*which has not even yet been discovered*) in the lowest sedimentary strata.

I am in no way exaggerating the purport of the *Pulpit Commentary*. The graphites of the oldest known fossiliferous rocks are seriously referred to, as furnishing traces of "the third day's vegetation." No notice is taken of the creation of plants over and over again, in every epoch of the Earth's history—new genera and species being perpetually introduced.

We are further asked to believe that the writer of the words "And God created great whales and every living creature that moveth which the waters brought forth abundantly," was not thinking of the creatures with which he was acquainted but of fossil forms, which only within the last century have been brought within human ken—of "the trilobites and molluscs of the Cambrian and Silurian systems," and the "ganoid fishes of the Devonian." Not a suspicion seems to cross the mind of the commentator that if the Bible really contains revelations which no mortal reader could by any possibility whatever gather from its written words it becomes the most unreliable of all the Books that have ever been written. To-morrow another set of discoveries may compel the compliant commentator to alter yet again his interpretation of the text—and so on *ad infinitum*.

On one point however the commentator does feel that he is treading on dangerous ground. It might seem, he admits, to be the teaching of the inspired writer that the great sea monsters—the creeping things—the birds "were created simultaneously and so were synchronous in their appearance," whereas

The testimony of the rocks rather points to a series of creative acts in which successive species of living creatures were summoned into being, as the necessary conditions of existence were prepared for their reception, and indeed with emphasis

asserts that the order of creation WAS NOT as in verse 21, first the great sea monsters, then the creepers, and then the birds." (P. 26).

The commentator regards this as an elucidation and not a contradiction of the "Word of God." It indicates, however, the precise point at which the account of the method of Creation given by modern science diverges from ancient speculative cosmogonies.

In the Book of Genesis, Creation is represented as a series of definite acts—each one being complete in itself. The dry land is formed and set down in its place. Grass, seed-bearing herbs, and fruit-trees, together with the tribes of living creatures, are fashioned separately by distinct efforts of creative power. The fundamental principle of geology however is that creation is neither a sudden act nor a succession of isolated acts, but a continuous process, in which the earth as it is at any one moment or at any one epoch is a modification of the earth as it was at the moment or the epoch immediately preceding. Not an acre of soil, not a fragment of stone, not a heap of sand, not a rock mass, not a plain, valley, or mountain, not a river, lake, or sea, was created exactly as we see it. It has become what it is through an elaborate series of processes, and has a history of its own stretching through vast ages. Of every portion of the earth's crust, the geologist asks by what processes has it been formed? What has been its history? What are its relationships to all other portions of the earth's crust both as they now exist and as they have existed?

Physically no single atom of matter has ever occupied twice precisely the same position. The geologist deals with processes, histories, and relationships through which new results are perpetually being produced.

The life-history of the world, like the history of its rock masses and continental areas, has been a series of continuous and connected changes among all forms of plants and animals. No plant or animal any more than any rock was originally created just as we see it or placed at the

precise spot on which we find it. At every epoch fresh forms of life,—related to forms doomed to pass away and yet differing from them,—have crept into being, gradually but persistently, until the vegetation clothing the earth and the animals inhabiting it, have been completely changed again and yet again. Not only is it true that “in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth,” but creation is a process that has always been going on, and is being continued in the nineteenth century of the Christian era as certainly as when the first ray of light appeared in the sky.

The Bishop of Edinburgh (Dr. Cotterill) in a recently published treatise entitled *Does Science Aid Faith in regard to Creation?** takes up entirely different ground from that occupied by the writers whose ambition it is to prove that Moses was supernaturally acquainted with the principles of modern geology.

Dr. Cotterill maintains that it is dangerous “to attempt to make the conclusions of science fit in with the language of Revelation in regard to creation.” He quotes a passage from an address delivered by the Bishop of Durham, on the occasion of the jubilee of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, in which the Church of Christ is directed to “understand and absorb” the truths of science and to learn by the lessons of the past to keep itself free from distrust and dismay.

Astronomy once menaced, or was thought to menace, Christianity. Long before we were born the menace had passed away. We found astronomy the sworn ally of religion. The heresy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had become the orthodoxy of the nineteenth. When, some years ago, an eminent man of science, himself a firm believer, wrote a work throwing doubt on the plurality of worlds, it was received with a storm of adverse criticism, chiefly from Christian teachers, because he ventured to question a theory which three centuries earlier it would have

* *Does Science Aid Faith in regard to Creation?* By the Right Rev. HENRY COTTERILL, D.D., F.R.S.E., Bishop of Edinburgh. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1883.

been a shocking heresy to maintain. Geology next entered the lists. We are old enough, many of us, to remember the anxiety and distrust with which its startling announcements were received. This scare, like the other, has passed away. We admire the providential design which through myriads of years prepared the earth by successive gradations of animal and vegetable life, for its ultimate destination as the abode of men. (P. 4.)

Dr. Cotterill perceives that other interpretations of this constant adaptation of the language of the Bible to the discovery of science may be given. The adversaries of orthodox Christianity may urge that it "*is a proof that the religion itself is changing its form as mankind becomes more enlightened,*" while some of its adherents may regard it as a sufficient reason for distrusting science itself.

Although it may be true that, as science has made its discoveries, theologians have contrived to adjust their belief to the new views which have been forced upon them much against their own will, and thus to satisfy themselves, though they have not satisfied the world in general; at all events, they have never effected such adjustment without a serious loss to Christianity itself, at least as accepted by them; the loss of a belief in Scripture as really inspired by God, and, therefore, perfectly and absolutely true according to that interpretation of it which an honest and impartial mind must accept. If it is a "nose of wax" to be twisted to one side and the other by a process of accommodation to suit new views of truth, or to be explained away to mean the very opposite of that which it seems to mean, what will be the result of such a process, but that Christianity itself, with all its supernatural dogmas, will ultimately disappear? (P. 5.)

The argument of this passage is clear and unanswerable. Regard for the Bible as an inspired authority must disappear if it be treated as "a nose of wax," and twisted to one side or the other according to the exigencies of the discoveries made by the intellect of man. A book that is made to say whatever the reader thinks it ought to say cannot be relied upon as "perfectly and absolutely true." In such a case the reader becomes the master of the Bible,

practically altering its meaning whenever scientific research demands a change; and the Bible no longer speaks for itself to the reader.

Following this line of reasoning, Dr. Cotterill does not attempt to make the Biblical history of Creation "*fit in with the scientific view*;" he still, however, regards it as "inspired," and believes that it cannot contradict such truth "as the enlightened reason of man can discover in nature."

Putting this position into plain words, does it not amount to this:—that what is scientifically incorrect may yet be revealed as the "perfect truth"?

As a scientific student, I may be permitted to say that the facts of nature cannot be harmonised with the Biblical narrative, but as a Christian I am bound to believe that the Biblical narrative is absolutely true.

Dr. Cotterill's treatise is an ingenious attempt to maintain the truth of these two contradictory propositions, and to enable "those that believe" to retain their faith in the book of Genesis as the unerring word of God, yet at the same time to accept scientific conclusions which cannot, by any ingenious "process of accommodation," be harmonised with it.

It is urged that "the purpose of Revelation" is *not* scientific, and that it is not intended to communicate such knowledge of natural things as man's own faculties can themselves acquire. This appeal to the supposed purpose of Revelation is completely answered by the plain fact that the book of Genesis actually *does* what we are told it was not intended to do.

As a matter of fact Genesis is full of statements, the truth or falsehood of which can and *must* be decided by scientific investigations.

A book which makes assertions that come within the range of scientific research—as Genesis does—cannot be protected from criticism by the plea that it was written for another purpose. Why were such subjects alluded to at all, if it was not intended to furnish accurate information about them?

Genesis asserts that the creation of plants and animals took place in a certain order of succession. The order given is either correct or incorrect; and Science is perfectly competent to decide the point.

Genesis describes a series of definite creative acts—one class of organisms being finished before another class was fashioned. Science is quite able to discover whether the Creator did or did not really act in quite another way, and achieve His purpose through wonderful processes of development.

Genesis gives an account of the spreading of the waters over the whole earth. The action of rain and denudation generally in its effects on the earth's crust are matters for purely scientific investigation.

Dr. Cotterill further urges that "the inspired history of the creation of heaven and earth could not (we may say with all reverence) have used the language of science, because *this language is not the truth*. If any one is disposed to demur to this, let him ask himself what science it is, the language of which is perfectly true, and expresses the whole truth as to nature and its phenomena." (P. 27.)

Because the whole truth cannot be expressed, it does not follow that language should be used suggestive of positive error. The language of Genesis, interpreted in its plain, natural sense, has been employed to oppose the greatest scientific discoveries which have been made from the first centuries of the Christian era until the present day. In a scientific sense, it has proved itself not merely inadequate, but misleading.

But why argue these questions so seriously as I have done in this review, many may be disposed to ask. On the death of Bishop Colenso, the ablest of Gazettes—the *Pall Mall*—assumed that all interest in the Biblical studies which made his name famous among heretics had died out, and belonged to a past generation. I can scarcely imagine a stranger misreading of the signs of times. Whatever may be the feeling prevalent among a few circles of culti-

vated men, spiritual forces are not played out in England and will largely shape its destiny.

The solution given to the problems connected with the Bible and its meaning, will decide the question whether England is, or is not, to become a nation of sceptics—a decision fraught with the mightiest political and social, as well as religious, issues.

At this moment the scepticism so rife among the great masses of our hardworking people has been largely caused by the untenable claims made on behalf of every book of the Bible. The "Freethought" publications that circulate among them in enormous numbers, are full of jokes and caricatures which would be without point or power, were it frankly admitted that the Bible contains the record of human errors and passions, as well as the revelation of an eternal righteousness and love.

The arguments of almost all the sceptics I have ever conversed with, among intelligent working men, have been connected with passages in the Bible to which objections have been taken as containing statements which are either opposed to the facts of nature, or unworthy of a God. The knowledge of science is rapidly spreading in every direction, and when the Mosaic cosmogony is generally known to be erroneous, the shadow of uncertainty will fall upon the religion which has been so unwisely identified with it.

The diffusion among the people at large of a knowledge of the fundamental facts concerning the composition of the Bible is the special and pressing duty incumbent upon religious men. The eternal instincts of the soul will then be permitted to assert their power, and a heavy burden, grievous to be borne, which now checks the free activity of the spiritual life, will be uplifted.

At the authoritative and resistless command of the hearts and consciences of men, a new temple will be upbuilt, in which science itself will humbly bow its head, and worship Him "who saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good."

HENRY W. CROSSKEY.

JOHN WILLIAM COLENZO.

All the (missionary) bishops are bound . . . not only to rule and instruct those of their diocese, furnishing them with all spiritual food, but also to defend them from all evils, afflictions, and oppressions.—*Las Casas*.

IN the last month of the year 1853 John William Colenso, the newly-consecrated Bishop of Natal, sailed from Plymouth (in company with the Bishop of Cape Town), to take a preliminary survey of his diocese (chiefly *in partibus infidelium*) and gain information to aid him in making arrangements and enlisting support for his future work.

This determination to see things for himself, and the energy with which it was carried out, are thoroughly characteristic of Bishop Colenso, and the delightful record of his "Ten Weeks in Natal,"—to say nothing of the often pathetic interest thrown back upon it by subsequent events—deserves on its own account to occupy a permanent place amongst popular books of travel.*

A few particulars of Colenso's first impressions of the native races with whom he was to be thrown into such close relations can hardly fail to interest our readers.

At noon on January 30, 1854, Colenso "stepped out upon the jetty at Port Natal, a stranger among strangers," and in a few minutes was in the saddle on his way to Durban, with open eyes and ears, making observations and receiving advice. "We saw some very elegant butterflies on the way, and some far from elegant Kafirs, whose first appearance, in complete undress, was by no means prepossessing. . . . My two friends had very little confidence in the success of missionary operations among the

* *Ten Weeks in Natal, &c.* By JOHN WILLIAM COLENZO, D.D., Lord Bishop of the Diocese. Cambridge, 1855.

Zulus. 'The missionaries are too familiar with them. You must never indulge a Kafir—never shake hands with him. He does not understand it, and will soon take liberties.' However, they both admitted that the advice and example of Mr. Shepstone was the very best to be followed."

With the energy that always characterised him, Colenso arranged at once to make a journey amongst the native chiefs, in company with this same Mr. Shepstone, and in a few days he was deep in experiment, inquiry, and observation as to the best methods of approaching the native mind with Christian teaching. His quick sympathies soon taught him that great mistakes had been committed in this matter, and, novice as he was and as yet unacquainted with the native dialects, he was able from the first to put his thoughts into a form which appealed to the religious feelings of the natives, and showed them that there was more in common between the white man and the black than they had ever known. His questions drew from them expressions of the higher aspects of their own beliefs, and indicated points of attachment for Christian teaching which were a surprise to men who had lived amongst them and been familiar with them for years.

The Bishop on his side soon felt his heart drawn towards his black brethren. He found it very hard to preserve the distant bearing that was prescribed by his friends. "With all my heart I would have grasped the great black hand, and given it a good brotherly shake. . . . I confess it went very much against the grain; but . . . I looked aside with a grand indifference as long as I could (which was not very long), and talked to Mr. G., instead of paying attention to the Kafir's presence."

In spite of this assumed stiffness, the Kafirs saw the character of the man at once. They have a way of inventing names for all the Europeans with whom they come into special relations. "Thus a tall, slight English lad received the name of *um Kontu*, or 'javeline'; an English lady is very likely to be distinguished by the title of 'the great white elephant.' . . . Miss Barter once rejoiced in this

appellation; but it has latterly been exchanged by them for one more appropriate, namely, *No-musa*, 'mother of mercy.' Before Colenso had been three weeks in Natal, the natives, with a touching and prophetic instinct, had given him the name of "Sobantu," Father of the People.

Presently the Bishop got well beyond the pale of European civilization, but his happy way of addressing the natives (always through an interpreter as yet), secured their respectful attention. Their comments were sometimes very suggestive. They told him the progress of Christianity had been much hindered "by persons saying that the world will be burned up—perhaps very soon—and they will be destroyed. They are frightened, and would rather not hear about it, if that is the case." But they liked the Lord's Prayer—especially as expounded by Colenso. Then he told them whose prayer it was; how the Great God—Umkulunkulu [a significant native word, to which Kafir hearts instantly responded, which Colenso substituted for the unmeaning *u Tixo* of the missionaries]—sent his Son to become a man, and He lived among men, and loved them, and taught them about the Love of their Father in Heaven," to which they replied, "Their old women had stories something like this."

It is interesting to note that on this little tour amongst the chiefs Colenso met with Langelibelele, whom he so generously defended in later years, and was much pleased and impressed by him. The only unmitigated savage he came across was Pakade. This chief listened with marked attention to Colenso's exposition of the Lord's Prayer, and then remarked that it would be very proper for public use at his great festivals—but how did they make *gunpowder*?

These few glimpses must suffice. The book from which they are derived shows us Colenso full of strength and enterprise, with a warm heart and a clear head, with an elastic spirit of enjoyment, a simple and manly piety, boundless hope and boundless love.

No one could have anticipated Colenso's future career

from these beginnings ; but it is none the less true that they enable us distinctly to trace, already at work, the forces which were ultimately to shape that career. Especially we discern a fresh and ready sympathy with the native mind, a capacity for approaching things from the native's point of view, and realising his actual feelings, which will play havoc with the mass of conventional beliefs and traditions in which the Christianity of the Church of England is swathed. A man of unprejudiced and candid mind, with a sensitive touch for realities and sufficient power of sympathy to be able to change places in imagination with his pupil, cannot possibly submit his beliefs to a severer process of sifting than that which is involved in his beginning *de novo*, and imparting them to a receptive, but fresh and unconventionalized mind. Teaching confirms a hard and narrow soul in its intolerant isolation, cuts off all its stores from contact with reality, and gives them a cut-and-dried dogmatism that is inaccessible to any vivifying power, and becomes "furiously or stupidly fanatical" whenever disputed or assailed ; but it gives to such a mind as Colenso's an expansive force, which might, under other conditions, have lain dormant or undeveloped, teaches it to discriminate between the essential and the accidental, sets all the vital juices flowing, and fails not to emphasize anew the fact that God has revealed many things to babes and sucklings which he hides from the wise and prudent. And in this same quickness of sympathy and (at least potential) freedom from prejudice we may likewise find the root of that championship of native rights which so fully justified the title of "Sobantu," and which virtually placed the crown of martyrdom upon Colenso's brow.

It was not till May 20, 1855, that Colenso arrived for the second time at Natal and fairly settled to his work. He was about forty years of age, and as yet had little suspicion of the latent heresies that lay in his own bosom, or of the work he would have to do in defence of native rights.

It is true that his sermons show him to have been

keenly alive already to the evil influence of such "colonists" as the one of whom Wordsworth wrote

Deliberately and undeceived
Those wild men's vices he received
And gave them back his own,

but the larger questions of "Native Policy" do not seem to have engaged his attention. As concerning heresy, however, the bloodhounds of the *Record* were already on his track; but the heresy hunters complained that the scent was cold. In their laudable desire "to ascertain the religious sentiments of the new bishop," they found the materials for their inquiry "few and meagre." It was clear, at any rate, from the preface and dedication to a volume of nine "Village Sermons" which he had just published, that he was a fervent admirer of F. D. Maurice, and the *Record* found it "not a little ominous that a colonial bishop should publicly avow himself the disciple of such a teacher." This is only worth mentioning because of the rather amusing fact that the Bishop warmly resented the charge of sharing Maurice's "universal hope" for the wicked, and culled from his own village sermons a little bouquet of hope-excluding passages in refutation of it. He feels imperatively called upon to make some reply to the "accusations" of the *Record*, and to show that he will be justified when the time arrives in solemnly avowing himself "ready with all faithful diligence to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrine contrary to God's Word." *

With this cheerful confidence in his own orthodoxy, then, but with unabated warmth of admiration for Maurice, Colenso set off to Natal, and put his shoulder to the wheel of his work there.

What that work was we learn from himself, for, like Paul, he was driven by the ungenerous attacks of his theological opponents into an unwilling but manly and straightforward account of his almost superhuman toil. When he landed

* See *A Letter to His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, &c.* By JOHN WILLIAM COLENZO, D.D., Bishop-Designate of Natal. London. 1853.

in Natal there were practically no books printed in the Zulu language, and none from which to learn it. "The whole work had to be done from the beginning, the language having to be learned from natives who could not speak a word of English, and written down, and analysed, with infinite, intense, labour." Colenso had no special gift for languages. His mastery of the Zulu tongue was the reward of stubborn work, of "sitting with [his] natives day after day, from early morn to sunset, till they as well as [himself] were fairly exhausted, . . . and when they were gone, still turning round again to [his] desk, to copy out the results of the day."

Seven years of such toil produced no fewer than eighteen works expressly designed for the use of missionary students and native scholars, including Zulu grammars, dictionary and reading books, and translations of a great part of the Prayer Book, the whole of the New Testament, and several books of the Old Testament into Zulu. These translations were not executed in a perfunctory manner. Colenso never trusted to his own wording. He had taken some naked young savages from their kraals on condition that they should be allowed to stay with him for five years, and had educated them into intelligent and devoted fellow-labourers. He passed every word of his translations through their mouths, and while adhering more or less to his phraseology, they "would introduce also those nicer idioms which at once mark the difference between the work of a European and a native." He would never rest till he had satisfied himself, however long it might take; and we need hardly wonder that one of his native assistants while greatly admiring "that Paul," declared that he always got a headache when he helped to translate his epistles!*

All this evidence of the intimate relations that subsisted from the first between Colenso and his natives will prepare us to find him entering with the warmest interest into a

* See *Remarks upon the recent proceedings and charge of Robert, Lord Bishop of Cape Town, &c.* By J. W. COLENZO, &c. London. 1864.

controversy, which he appears to have found ready to hand on his arrival, concerning the proper treatment of polygamist converts to Christianity. "In daily familiar intercourse with heathens and converts from heathenism" he had come to realise very distinctly that to require a convert to divorce all his wives but one, as a condition of baptism, was to require him, on the threshold of the Christian Church, to do violence to his own conscience and outrage the native sense of justice and of honour. The arguments, however, by which he supported his conclusion were unimpeachably orthodox. The Scriptures and the Fathers were called to the rescue. Monogamy, as the ordinance of Eden and as alone consonant with the Christian ideal, must of course be ultimately introduced, and no native Christian should be allowed to *add* to the number of his wives, but was not Abraham a polygamist? Was not David a polygamist when he wrote his most beautiful Psalms? Nay, did not the prophet insist upon the fact that God had given him (David) all Saul's wives, as well as his own, as a special mark of divine favour? How could he (Colenso) read such passages as these to his natives, if he had insisted on their divorcing all their wives but one? *

The heaven is working, then. Scriptural authority is still recognised, but we see that when it comes into conflict with the "testimony of the holy spirit," whether that testimony is borne by white lips or black, it will have to yield. Colenso searches the Scriptures and the Fathers for arguments in favour of what he knows—from "daily familiar intercourse with heathens," and otherwise—to be right and true, and if at any time he should fail to find what he seeks it will be so much the worse for the Scriptures and the Fathers!

Polygamy, under the special circumstances, was an

* These views, maintained in public and private from the first, were printed and published by Colenso at a time when, one would think, the conclusions must have appeared to him a good deal sounder than the argument. See *A Letter to His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury upon the proper treatment of cases of Polygamy, &c.* By J. W. COLENZO, &c. London. 1862.

institution over which Colenso was not disinclined to throw the ægis of divine authority and approval, and he could therefore read some passages of the Bible to his Zulus which might otherwise have caused him much perplexity. But there are other institutions accepted with equal frankness by the Old Testament writers, not so easy to accept as appropriate even amongst recent Zulu converts. For instance, Colenso read to one of his assistants—with a view to getting it into good idiomatic Zulu for his translation—the passage, “If a man smite his servant, or his maid, with a rod, and he die under his hand, he shall be surely punished. Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished: for he is his money.” But the Zulu’s “whole soul revolted against the notion, that the Great and Blessed God, the merciful Father of all mankind, would speak of a servant or maid as mere ‘money,’ and allow a horrible crime to go unpunished, because the victim of the brutal usage had survived a few hours.”* Colenso said he supposed Moses really wrote these words himself and used the formula “Jehovah said unto Moses,” because he thought his ideas rose in his heart by the inspiration of God. But, adds Colenso, when relating this incident, “this was . . . a very great strain upon the cord which bound me to the ordinary belief in the historical veracity of the Pentateuch.”

Or again, when Colenso and his Zulu were at work on the story of the deluge, the latter looked up and said, “Is all that true?” and the Bishop was brought face to face with ancient doubts which he hoped he had laid for ever. He had been troubled by such questions long ago in England, but had satisfied his mind “sufficiently for practical purposes” (however much that may be) with the ordinary evasions of the commentaries. “Practical purposes,” however, are not the same in England and in Africa, and the allowance of conviction which is “sufficient” for them may likewise vary. Besides Colenso had studied geology since those days. “Shall a man speak lies

* *The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua*, &c. Pt. I. p. 9.

in the name of the Lord?" he said to himself. He dared not do it. "I gave him, however, such a reply as satisfied him for the time [one wonders what it was!] without throwing any discredit upon the general veracity of the Bible history." *

What would all this lead to? Colenso had no idea. He was deeply troubled. He was determined to face the whole question like a man. But he had to go forth, not knowing whither he went. There were others, however, who knew pretty well where he was going—and did not think it was the land of Promise! Bishop Gray, of Capetown, Colenso's Metropolitan, was not a man to let even the faintest indication of heresy pass unobserved, and nearer home too there were very keen eyes intent upon its detection. In 1858 one of Colenso's clergy complained of his heretical teaching concerning the Eucharist. But on this occasion the Metropolitan assumed a conciliatory attitude, though much regretting the language that his Suffragan had used. But a little later (Nov. 20, 1860) we find him writing: "Natal is a very wilful, headstrong man, and loose, I fear, in his opinions upon vital points." And again on Jan. 1, 1861: "I am very anxious about Natal. His views are dangerous. I fear that we may have taught in Africa 'another Gospel which is not another.' It is curious and painful to see how the reaction of his mind from the utter Calvinism in which he was brought up, is driving him to the contemplation of God solely as Love, the Loving Father of all creation,—into opinions which seem to me to undermine the whole Gospel scheme—no Atonement in the true sense of the word—no need of any—no eternity of punishment—ultimate universal salvation. I do not say that he has worked out all this into a scheme, but I think he speculates most dangerously upon these points."† Let us give Bishop Gray credit for penetration at least!

* *Op. cit.*, pp. vii., viii.

† *Life of Robert Gray, Bishop of Cape Town*. Rivingtons, 1876. Vol. II. pp. 20, 21.

Not long afterwards the storm came. Colenso published his *Commentary on the Romans*,* in which he formally recanted the profession of faith in eternal torment which he had made to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1853, declaring that he could now only lay his hand upon his mouth and cherish a hidden hope that God might hold in reserve remedial disciplines in a future life which should ultimately draw all His children to Him. There were other heresies in the book likewise. The doctrines of justification and predestination which are found in the Epistle to the Romans by many liberal as well as by orthodox readers, were translated or explained away by Colenso. "The justice of his conclusions," wrote Kuenen with reference to this book, "may be disputed. But he could not escape them without either freeing himself completely from the apostolic authority, or else becoming more of a dogmatist and less of a human being himself."† Colenso was not prepared to "free himself completely from the apostolic authority," but that other "cord," which had held him to a belief in the substantial accuracy of the narratives of the Pentateuch had at last broken under the strain to which it had been submitted.

Colenso had been deep in German criticism of the Pentateuch—especially orthodox criticism. He had been deep, too, in personal investigations as to the possibility of the events recorded in the Pentateuch. His position amongst a pastoral people enabled him to realise with singular vividness and minuteness what it really was that was recorded, and what it involved. The result was a definite conviction that the detailed statements in the Pentateuch were not true, and therefore could not be inspired.

Having reached this conclusion Colenso felt that he must

* *St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans newly Translated, and Explained from a Missionary Point of View.* By the Right Rev. J. W. COLENZO, D.D., Bishop of Natal. Cambridge and London 1861, also at Ekukanyeni, Natal.

† See an article by Kuenen on "De Kerkelijke beweging in Engeland" in *De Gids* for 1865. Vol. III. I shall have occasion to refer to this article again more than once.

speak. He had counted the cost of speaking. "It would be no light thing for me, at my time of life, to be cast adrift upon the world, and have to begin life again under heavy pressure and amidst all unfavourable circumstances,—to be separated from many of my old friends, to have my name cast out as evil even by some of them, and to have it trodden under foot as an unclean thing by others, who do not know me,—not to speak of the pain it would cause me to leave a work like this, which has been committed to me in this land, to which my whole heart and soul have been devoted, and for which, as it seemed, God had fitted me in some measure more than for others,—a work in which I would joyfully still, if it please God, spend and be spent."*

Mr. Matthew Arnold subsequently explained that there was no occasion for Colenso to do anything involving such terrible consequences at all; and referred him to the saying of the Hebrew sage, "If thou hast heard a word, let it die with thee. And be bold, it will not burst thee!"† But constitutions differ. There are men—and Colenso was one of them—whom it *would* burst to be conscious of living a life every act of which had become tainted with insincerity and unreality, and to whom no life could escape this taint if consciously dedicated to the support of a system fit to "edify" (?) the multitude, but held in benevolent contempt by the apostles of light who work it. There are men—and Colenso was one of them—who cannot breathe in an atmosphere of esoteric enlightenment, and profound reticence towards the profane—not because they have the itch of the babblers' tongue, but because the *suppressio veri* becomes a *suggestio falsi* that poisons the moral nature of him who palter with it, that is treachery to the cause he has sworn to serve, that confounds the simplicity of human speech and shakes the foundations of mutual trust.

So Colenso (*O sancta simplicitas!*) thought he was bound

* Extract from a letter printed in the Preface to Part I. of "*The Pentateuch, &c.*"

† See "The Bishop and the Philosopher" by Matthew Arnold in *Macmillan's Magazine* for Jan., 1863. It was this article that called out Mr. W. B. Greg's "Truth versus Edification."

to make his position clear to himself and to all whom it might concern, and to take the consequences.

In 1862 he came to England with his family, and in the autumn of the same year Bishop Gray also arrived (on other business) in England, sorely perplexed and exercised by the Commentary on the Romans, concerning which he had been in correspondence with Colenso, and for which he contemplated the possibility of his having to "try" him.

And now the first part of Colenso's great work on the Pentateuch* burst upon the world—episcopal and other—like a bomb-shell. The Preface to this "last sad book of the Bishop of Natal," as Bishop Gray called it, recapitulated in ever memorable words the circumstances which had led the author to his searching examination of the composition and historical credibility of the Pentateuch; declared with simple and manly directness his conviction that the truths of religion rested on far other foundations than the accuracy of the records of the Pentateuch, and demanded in the name of common decency that if the facts on which he had insisted in the body of his work were in the main substantiated the clergy of the Church of England should no longer be called upon explicitly or implicitly to deny them. "*We*, indeed, who are already under the yoke, may have for a time to bear it, however painful it may be, while we struggle and hope on for deliverance. But what youth of noble mind, with a deep yearning for truth, and an ardent desire to tell out the love of God to man, will consent to put himself voluntarily into such fetters?" †

The book itself was a truly remarkable one. Occupied chiefly with the story of the Exodus, it submitted the Biblical narratives to such a searching examination as no previous scholar is ever known to have conducted. Colenso knew all about sheep and cattle runs, and could see what was meant by a population of two and a half millions

* *The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua Critically Examined.* By the Right Rev. JOHN WILLIAM COLENZO, D.D., Bishop of Natal. London 1862—1879.

† *Op. cit.* p. xxxvi.

wandering about a barren district in a single body and accompanied by their flocks and herds. Even his greatest enemies did not deny that he understood how to manipulate statistics and could tell whether the number of "first-borns" agreed with the number of adult males. These and other lines of enquiry Colenso pursued to the bitter end, leaving nothing vague, and liable to vague evasion. And the result was (as we shall see) to throw a light upon the character of the narratives in question which was new even to the most learned and unprejudiced students of the Old Testament, and by which the general public was simply thunder-struck!

Most of my readers will remember the extraordinary impression produced by this book. Its abiding record is in the two hundred and twenty-three entries in the British Museum Catalogue under "Colenso," the great majority of which are cross references to "answers" which appeared in 1862—3.

The rage and horror of clerical and orthodox England was only natural. But Colenso had to encounter coldness or ridicule from quarters whence he could hardly have expected anything but encouragement, or, at the worst, respectful silence.

Mr. Matthew Arnold, in the article already referred to, declared that "the uncritical spirit of our race" had performed "a great public act of self-humiliation, in sending forth as its scapegoat into the wilderness, amidst a titter from educated Europe, the Bishop of Natal." His "weak trifling," Mr. Arnold was good enough to inform us, failed to comply with either of the two conditions which alone could justify its production. It did not "edify the uninstructed" and it did not "inform the instructed" (*Macmillan*, Vol. VII., pp. 241, 253, 256).*

Now, for Mr. Arnold to admit that he had himself been

* One might be inclined to ask why a man may not "inform the uninstructed," but this is precisely the task which Mr. Arnold (in his admirable arrangements for the general conduct of human affairs) had assigned to the "*Zeitgeist*," and it was presumptuous for Colenso to interfere.

"informed" on any subject by a Bishop would certainly involve the "public act of self-humiliation" which could hardly be expected from him. But amongst "instructed" persons, with reference to Old Testament studies, he will probably allow a place to Professor Kuenen; and that scholar was proud to declare himself "informed" by Colenso's book in a way which materially helped him to hasten on the revolution in Old Testament studies with which his name is so closely associated.

Germany was supercilious. "Not much that is new in it." "Behind the scholarship of the day." "Very inferior to Ewald," and so on. But Kuenen (to whom I owe this account of German opinion) denounced such "arrant idolatry of '*Wissenschaft*' and '*Wissenschaftlichkeit*,'" and, with his usual sagacity, declared that Colenso's book was in an emphatic and special sense *a deed*,* and that it must be reckoned with and estimated as such. Moreover, he declared that so far from being barren of results to "scholarship," this book had demonstrated the necessity of a revision of their theories by Ewald, Bunsen, Bleek, and Knobel, man by man, for it had demonstrated the unsoundness of the foundations upon which they had built.

The specific contribution thus made to Biblical studies by Part I. of *The Pentateuch*, &c., grows immediately out of the special character of the inquiry therein pursued. The relentless and exhaustive manner in which the Bishop's researches were pushed home revealed (more clearly to Kuenen's† eyes than to his own) the fact that the document which had hitherto been regarded as forming the oldest stratum of the Pentateuch, was in reality not a naively embellished and exaggerated set of traditions, but a symmetrical and highly elaborated *construction*. In fact, it was not an early and natural record, standing comparatively near to the facts, but a finished and systematic ideal representation, the latest and most artificial form into which the

* In the article already referred to in the "*Gids*."

† See his article in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift* for 1870 (pp. 398—401) from which Colenso himself made extensive extracts in the preface to his Part VI.

traditional matter had been thrown. The momentous nature of this conclusion will be obvious to all students of recent Biblical criticism. It involves a revolution in the conception of Israel's religious history; and perhaps Colenso will owe his place in the future records of pure "scholarship" principally to the powerful, though indirect stimulus which he gave to this epoch-making change of front.*

It is not a little remarkable, however, that Colenso himself did not perceive, and when they were pointed out to him did not accept, these inferences from his own researches. It was not until quite the end of his life that, by a different line of reasoning, he came to substantially the same conclusion concerning the "stratification" of the Pentateuchal narratives as that which had meanwhile been expounded and defended by Kuenen, Graf, Duhm, Wellhausen, Reuss, and a host of other writers.

Early in 1863, Part II. of the *Pentateuch and Book of Joshua* appeared, and it was followed in the same year by Parts III. and IV., and in 1865 by Part V.; together with a popular edition of the whole five parts.

In these successive works Colenso brought within the reach of English readers a vast store of materials for the criticism of the Pentateuch; and in two years accomplished a work in familiarising the English-speaking public with the methods and results of Biblical criticism, in dispelling prejudices and in stimulating a free and healthy interest in Old Testament studies, which a whole generation of scholars might be proud of accomplishing.

But it was characteristic of Colenso to work out to the very last any task which he took up. In the cause of truth and justice he knew no weariness himself, and he expected his readers to be like him. To him there was no common measure between the expenditure of time and toil and the discovery and elucidation of truth, whether he was writing on the origin of Hebrew customs or the origin of Kafir wars. Part VI. (1871) and Part VII. (1879) made

* Cf. the article on "The Literature of Israel," *Modern Review*, January, 1883.

still greater demands upon the reader's time than their predecessors. Part I. was under 200 pages, Part VII. was over 870 pages. The sturdiest readers began to feel that life was short.

Moreover, while falling in with the rising school of criticism as far as the legislative portions of the Pentateuch are concerned, Colenso had gone off on what he himself came at last to recognise as a false track with regard to its narrative portions. The great antiquity which he assigned to the "Book of Origins" was closely associated with his peculiar views as to the early and in many cases Davidic authorship of the "Elohistic" Psalms, the Phœnician origin of the divine name Yahveh (Jehovah), the spuriousness of that venerable document of Hebrew antiquity, the "song of Deborah," and the comparatively late origin of the "Ten Commandments." He was himself fully aware that "our whole conception of the development of religion in Israel will be greatly affected by the date assigned to these portions of the Pentateuch [*i.e.*, the narrative portions of the Book of Origins]" (Part VII., pp. xxx., xxxi.), and when he changed his views on this subject he must have felt that, as the basis of a constructive scheme, his great work suffered from an almost radical defect.

But it is high time we returned to Kuenen's pregnant saying that the *Pentateuch and Book of Joshua* was a *deed*. It was perfectly well understood and accepted as such by the clergy of England and South Africa. It was a challenge. Colenso had flung down his iron gauntlet, and made all England ring with the sound. It might be well to refute the book, but the essential thing was to condemn the author. There could be and there was no manner of doubt about this. In the preface to Part II. Colenso wrote, "I assert . . . without fear of contradiction, that there are multitudes of the more intelligent clergy, who do not believe in the reality of the Noachian Deluge, as described in the book of Genesis. Yet did ever a layman hear his clergyman speak out distinctly what he thought, and say plainly from the pulpit what he himself believed, and what he

would have them believe, on this point? Did ever a *Doctor* or *Bishop* of the Church do this—at least, in the present day? . . . Have you ever heard your minister—able, earnest, excellent, as you know him to be—tell out plainly to his people the truth which he knows himself about these things?” What a flutter in the dovescotes such language from a bishop must cause! Clearly it was useless to argue and refute, and most needful to prosecute and eject him! Meanwhile he could at least be “inhibited” by the Bishops.

Bishop Gray was not amongst those who attempted to “answer” his suffragan. But he returned to Cape Town, erected an ecclesiastical court, over which he himself presided, summoned Colenso before it to be prosecuted by three clergymen, condemned, and ultimately deposed and excommunicated him. Colenso was in England. He did not defend himself, but simply protested against the proceedings as illegal, declined to submit himself in any shape or form, and appealed to the Committee of Privy Council.

It is impossible not to feel sorry for Bishop Gray. He had himself created the See of Natal, and it was at his recommendation that Colenso had been appointed Bishop. He had been on terms of affectionate intimacy with his suffragan, and was deeply and genuinely shocked by his opinions. But it is equally impossible to deny that his conduct throughout this affair was masterful and high-handed to the last degree; while he swelled the hue and cry that was raised against Colenso so lustily that the latter declares “I found it necessary, after reading the vehement charge, to turn for a while to the quiet reading of my own books, that I might know myself again, and satisfy myself that I was not really such a monster of iniquity as is here depicted.”* But what is hardest to forgive is the attempt which was made under his countenance, and apparently by his direction, to alienate Colenso’s faithful natives from him. Here is the account sent by one of them to his absent friend and master under date of May 29, 1864. “The other day, May 10, there came the Bishop of Cape Town along with.

* *Remarks on the Recent Proceedings, &c.*

Mr. Robertson [who acted as his interpreter, the Bishop knowing nothing of Zulu]. . . . They came in both together into the printing-office, and looked at my work. Afterwards we went out together with them in the afternoon; and we talked with Mr. Robertson, and asked, 'Where is the Bishop [of Cape Town] going to?' Said he, 'Aha! that Bishop has come to put all things properly. For Sobantu [Colenso] has gone astray greatly; I don't suppose that he will ever come back here.' Again he said, 'The Bishop has come to tell the people to abandon the teaching of Sobantu; for Sobantu has gone astray exceedingly; he has rebelled; he does not believe in God our Father, and in Jesus Christ our Lord.' William* and I, however, contradicted, saying, 'As to Sobantu, we know that he, for his part, is a man who believes exceedingly. When has *that* come upon him?' Said he, 'When he was in England he rebelled; his book, too, speaks badly.' I wish now, to hear plainly whether, indeed, they have spoken truth or not, Mr. Robertson and others, to wit, that you no longer believe. But I know that there is not a word of truth in what they say. Just the one thing is, that we believe in God our Father, who knows everything."†

This was when Bishop Gray was in Colenso's diocese to give effect to his "sentence."

I shall not enter upon the technicalities of the legal proceedings either in Africa or England. The upshot of it was that Bishop Gray's and Bishop Colenso's "letters patent" were found to be alike informal and incapable of conferring legal privileges or imposing legal obligations upon them. Bishop Gray's proceedings were from first to last null and void in law. An attempt to withhold Colenso's salary likewise failed, though it detained him for some time in England, thereby enabling him to "fire another barrel of his revolver," as he put it in a letter to Kuenen, or to leave Part V. of the *Pentateuch*, &c., "as a token of farewell

* This William was the original "intelligent native" of *Pentateuchal* fame.

† *Remarks*, &c., pp. 93, 94.

at once to [his] friends and to [his] adversaries," as he more decorously expressed it in his preface.

And so at last Colenso returned, legally entitled to perform his duties and enjoy his salary without let or hindrance from Robert, Bishop of Cape Town, or any one else. But did all other difficulties disappear with the legal ones?

We have seen that in the preface to Part I. (subsequent to the celebrated judgment of the Court of Arches on *Essays and Reviews*) Colenso had declared that he regarded it as impossible for any "youth of noble mind, with a deep yearning for truth, and an ardent desire to tell out the love of God to man," to "consent to put himself voluntarily into such fetters" as were imposed on her clergy by the Church of England. In the preface to Part II. his language was still more emphatic.

But what are they [the clergy] to do under these circumstances—those, I mean, who have their eyes open to the real facts of the case, and who cannot bear to utter what they know to be untrue in the face of God and the congregation? Many, probably, will get rid of the difficulty, with satisfaction to their own minds in some way, by falling back upon the notion above referred to, that the account in Genesis is a legendary narrative, however incorrect and unhistorical, of some real matter of fact in ancient days. Others—though I imagine not many—will justify themselves in still using such a form of prayer, though they know it to be unreal and unmeaning, by considering that they are acting in a merely *official* capacity, as ministers of the National Church, and administrators of the laws which the main body of the Church has approved, and has not yet rescinded.

But what shall be said to those who cannot conscientiously adopt either of the above methods of relieving themselves from the burden of the present difficulty, and yet feel it to be impossible to continue any longer to use such words in a solemn address to the Almighty? I see no remedy for these, but to *omit such words*—to disobey the law of the Church on this point, and take the consequences of the act—should any over-zealous brother-clerk or layman drag them before a court, and enforce a penalty, in the face of an indignant nation.*

* Part II. p. xcii.

After this it must surely be with keen disappointment, and indeed with something like dismay, that we find Colenso in the preface to Part III. appearing to declare that he is not himself amongst those for whom this last piece of advice was intended. He intimates that he can himself adopt one of the above methods—he does not say which—of escaping from his own dilemma, though there may be some “of more scrupulous conscience” who could not do so, and whom he could therefore only advise to break the law and take the consequences (Part III., p. xxxvi.). This was in answer to a memorial from “the great majority of the Archbishops and Bishops of the Church of England” requesting Colenso to resign his office, inasmuch as it appeared to the memorialists that he was by his own admission unable to perform its prescribed duties without doing violence to his conscience. We should have been prepared for the answer that the legally prescribed duties of an office may differ widely from its moral obligations, and may even become inconsistent with them, but hardly for the declaration that the author of the words we have quoted could find nothing that his conscience prevented his complying with in the legally prescribed duties themselves.*

Reconciling himself, it would appear, to the Prayer-Book as it stood, Colenso returned to his work. His “large and attentive congregations” in the cathedral church of Maritzburg listened to such heresies as that men ought not to pray to Christ,† and were provided by their Bishop with hymn books‡ containing only one trinitarian hymn each. Those who preferred it joined the African Church set up by Bishop Gray, who had appointed an African Bishop (of Maritzburg); and the Anglican Bishop (of Natal) went on

* Cf. further *The Pentateuch*, &c, Part I, p. xii. (text and note) and the Bishop's letter on the Voysey judgment in the *Theological Review*, vol. viii., pp. 582-4. The inherent moral viciousness of our present ecclesiastical system would not be better illustrated than it is by the shifts into which it drove so robust a conscience and so clear a mind as Colenso's.

† See *Natal Sermons*. A series of discourses, &c. By J. W. COLENZO, &c. London: 1866. Second series, 1868.

‡ Two separate hymn books, alike in the marked absence of orthodoxy, if not presence of heterodoxy, that characterises them.

working at his *Pentateuch and Book of Joshua*, and translating and annotating Dutch books on the Bible,* published a volume of popular lectures on *The Pentateuch and the Moabite Stone*,† produced an elaborate reply‡ to the semi-official answer to his book that had at last appeared in the so-called “Speaker’s Commentary,” continued his work for the natives and seemed to have reached calm waters again.

But, alas, he was soon to learn that the champion of justice may have to reckon with a still more bitter and fanatical opposition than has to be encountered by the champion of truth.

Where two widely different civilisations come into close contact with each other there is scope for the exercise of the noblest virtues, and for the indulgence of some of the most ignoble vices of human nature.

To be in constant relations with an “inferior” race will bring out the best or the worst that is in a man. He may become to his “inferiors” the very embodiment of a higher wisdom and power, waking new thoughts and opening a new life to them, and himself becoming the object of a devotion and a trust like that which young children give to their parents. But, on the other hand, the practically irresponsible exercise of power has a subtle force to corrupt the sense of justice and of moral obligation. Under circumstances to which the conventional rules of morality hardly apply, a great man will be thrown back upon the fundamental dictates of justice, generosity, and tenderness; but a small man will feel that he is released from all moral restraints whatever. The “nigger” stands outside the pale within which alone he recognises the binding force of mutual obligations. His inherent “supe-

* *The Worship of Baalim in Israel*, translated from OORT. *Pentateuch and Book of Joshua*, translated from KUENEN. 1865. *Contributions to the Criticism of the Pentateuch*, in part translated from KOSTERS. 1873.

† With appendices. London: 1873.

‡ *The New Bible Commentary by Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church critically examined*, by J. W. COLENSO, &c. London: 1871, &c. (Six parts.)

riority" absolves him from the necessity of observing any terms with the savage. He resents as insolence or stamps down as incipient rebellion in him, what he would admit to be reasonable and just in even the poorest or most abject European. Add to this that he is naturally distrustful of the "nigger" whom he treats in this way, firmly believing that if he had his chance he would stick at nothing that hatred or inborn barbarism might dictate. Here we have all the elements of a "scare" ready to hand—a scare which may urge men of no better and no worse character than average Englishmen into deeds of injustice and cruelty which will seem absolutely incredible (and accordingly will not be believed) amongst their brethren at home, of like passions but not of like opportunities with themselves. It is only thus that we can account for the native "policy" of diplomatists who seem in their dealings with Europeans to be honourable men, and for the barbarities perpetrated by colonial troops when the diplomatists have let them loose.

In such a society as I have described let any man have the courage to look facts in the face and demand equal justice for white and black, and he will have to encounter opposition, misrepresentation, and slander, the virulence of which has no parallel even amongst theologians. The feelings once entertained towards the "abolitionists" in the United States, and the fury recently occasioned amongst Anglo-Indians by the "Ilbert Bill," may serve, in different degrees, to assist the imagination in conceiving the position of the colonist who opposes the "native policy" of his rulers.

Colenso had been eighteen years in the colony before he took any prominent part in politics. This must be accounted for partly by his preoccupation with his own more immediate work, partly by the fact that no crisis had occurred during his residence of a character to force the general question of native policy upon his attention, but most of all, perhaps, by his personal confidence in Mr. (now Sir Theophilus) Shepstone, who was Secretary for Native Affairs in the colony.

In 1873, however, events took place which rudely shook

Colenso out of this tranquil confidence, and compelled him to take such a stand that "there has never, during the last nine years, been a break or a pause, in the enmity and the slander"* heaped upon him by those whose evil doings he has thwarted or exposed.

I have no intention of entering in detail into the miserable history of our wars in South Africa, but it is due to the cause of justice and mercy, no less than to the memory of Colenso, that a few words should be said.

In 1873, then, a Kafir chief of the name of Langelibelele, residing on Natal territory, became the object of dislike and suspicion to the Natal officials. The specific charges made against him were very trifling, but when summoned to headquarters to answer them he made excuses for not complying—we shall see presently with what good reason—and was therefore regarded as a "rebel." A military force was at once sent to secure him; whereupon he with all the fighting men of his tribe fled in panic over the mountains, leaving their old men, women, and children behind them, in perfect confidence that they would not be molested. A small force intercepted the fugitives in a mountain pass (Langelibelele himself not being present), and a skirmish ensued in which three soldiers were killed, the natives being the first to fire. This was regarded as "murder" by the colonists, and the "youthful enthusiasm" of the irregular colonial levies was so roused that it had to display itself by feats performed in the defenceless territory abandoned by the warriors.

The women and children with the remaining men were hunted out of their places of refuge with circumstances of great cruelty or smoked to death in caves. Then the survivors were driven down to Pietermaritzburg, many of them dropping down and dying on the way, to be held as prisoners.† Some few had escaped to the peaceful little

* *Natal Witness* for June 23, 1883.

† They had been stripped of all their personal possessions, down to their blankets and clothes, for the benefit of the natives who were acting as our allies in "eating up" the tribe. Amongst these was our old friend *Pakade*. What an astonishing aptitude for understanding the Colonial Policy that

tribe of Putini. This was enough to involve the latter in their "rebellion," and accordingly our troops swept upon them, seized all their possessions, and drove them, too,—men, women, and children—down to Pietermaritzburg.

At last Langelibelele himself fell into "our" hands, through the treachery of another chief, was tried by an anomalous court, in which certain natives sat as assessors, and was condemned to imprisonment for life.

Colenso watched the trial narrowly, and soon perceived the contradictory character of the evidence of one of the chief witnesses against Langelibelele. (His training in analysing the narratives of the Pentateuch doubtless did him good service here!) This led him to make private inquiries amongst his own natives, and in the end to represent the case to his friend Mr. Shepstone. The matter was gone into privately. Mr. Shepstone himself confessed that Colenso's informant made out his case. The evidence of a chief witness was shattered. No action, however, was taken in consequence. But worse than this was to come. In the course of the trial frequent reference had been made by natives to "the affair of Matshana," as a reason why Langelibelele had been afraid to obey the summons to meet Mr. Shepstone. This phrase, which was wholly unexplained by anything known to the European inhabitants of the Colony about this Matshana (a refugee chief living in Zululand), excited Colenso's interest and induced him to make inquiries. To his surprise and horror he heard from natives who came from different districts, and gave independent evidence, the same story. Sixteen years before, Mr. John Shepstone (brother of Theophilus) had made a treacherous attempt to seize or kill Matshana, under pretext of a friendly interview. Matshana had narrowly escaped. Many of his people had been slain.* This was

culminated under Sir Bartle Frere this chief had shown, when he remarked that the Lord's Prayer would be very suitable for use on public occasions—but he should like to know how gunpowder was made!—*Cf. Sup. p. 699.*

* These charges were subsequently made the subject of official inquiry. It was found that Mr. John Shepstone had been guilty of the treacherous attempt to seize Matshana. That in this attempt he had the sanction of

why Langelibelele, when ordered to come down to meet Mr. Shepstone, had "rebelled" by sending a polite excuse!

Colenso laid all these facts concerning his brother before Mr. Shepstone, and was met with an indignant denial, but no offer of investigation. Nothing more could be done privately. Colenso "allowed a friendship of twenty years to be broken for the sake of one nigger," and set himself doggedly to work to expose the iniquities of which he had become aware.

His exhaustive investigation of the whole affair, conducted in the face of a stubborn official opposition that threw every impediment in his way, and a fire of hostile criticism, is recorded in his printed (but not published) treatise *Langelibelele and the Amahlubi Tribe, &c.** A brief but admirable summary is given by Miss F. E. Colenso in the early chapters of her *History of the Zulu War*.

Having failed to secure redress in Natal, Colenso came over to England to lay the whole matter before the Colonial Secretary (Lord Carnarvon).

What would his reception be? He was still known in England simply as the author of the *Pentateuch and Book of Joshua*. When he left us in 1865 he had said, "If I should return, a few years hence, it is my firm belief that . . . I shall find . . . my fellow-countrymen and fellow-Churchmen ashamed of that religious fear and frenzy, which has raged so furiously in these our times. . . . Nay, I am not without hope that some even of those who have been most severe upon me . . . may give to me again the right hand of fellowship . . . as a fellow-labourer with

his superiors. That "the weight of direct evidence" was altogether in favour of the supposition that he had attempted to shoot Matshana, but that as he was a very good shot the fact of his not having hit him might be taken in proof of his own assertion that he only fired the gun into the air as a signal. Mr. John Shepstone was severely reprimanded for his "underhand manoeuvres,"—and in due time promoted to the important post of "Secretary for Native Affairs," which he still occupies. Cf. Miss F. E. Colenso's *History of the Zulu War*, chap. vii., and the work mentioned in the next note.

* I have placed this unofficial Blue-book (which was printed for the convenience of the Colonial Secretary and circulated amongst a few persons interested in native affairs) in the British Museum.

them for the Kingdom of God " (*Pentateuch, &c.*, Part V. xlv., xlv.). But the England of 1865 had learned nothing and forgotten nothing in 1874. Colenso was "inhibited" from preaching by the Bishops. He might not give a word of spiritual counsel and encouragement—after an absence of all these years—to the many friends who loved and honoured him, without the storm of fanaticism bursting and howling around him as of old. And after preaching in the oasis of Balliol College Chapel (where no Bishop could rise up and trouble him), he patiently but sadly submitted to his fate, and confined himself to the mission on which he had come.

The case which Colenso laid before Lord Carnarvon was so overwhelming that, after listening to the fullest explanations on the other side, his Lordship sent orders that the Putini tribe should be restored and as far as possible compensated—(an order which, owing to the untiring exertions of Major Durnford, had been partially at least anticipated by the action of the Colonial Government)—that Langa-libelele should be released from Robben Island, where he was imprisoned, and that when proper preparations had been made any members of his tribe who wished it should be allowed to join him again and settle in some suitable district. This was avowedly less than strict justice demanded, but it was all that it seemed to Lord Carnarvon prudent to insist on.

So Colenso returned, having apparently succeeded in this mission to a very important extent. In 1865 he had been met on his entrance into Natal "by a far more numerous cavalcade than ever welcomed a governor," but "bitter hostility" greeted him when, in 1874, he "returned from his second visit to Europe as the representative of a policy of humanity too complete and far-seeing to be understood by those whose minds had been half-poisoned by interested misrepresentation." *

* *Natal Witness* for June 23rd, 1883. It is encouraging to be able to quote such words from a Colonial paper, and to know that this same paper—which once prided itself on giving Colenso the lie direct—has itself for some time been an advocate of the policy of justice.

The victory Colenso had won by such dauntless courage and perseverance was but a barren one. Lord Carnarvon's orders were not absolutely disobeyed. Langalibelele was released from Robben Island—and imprisoned in the nearest convenient place on the mainland. The members of his tribe will perhaps be allowed to join him when the preparations are made—but no one is making them yet.

The explanation of the fact that Lord Carnarvon, while in no way modifying his own view of the question, allowed his orders to be so insolently evaded must be looked for in the political necessities laid on him by his great scheme for unifying South Africa. Miss Colenso points out how important Mr. Shepstone's co-operation and the practical ratification of his acts were supposed to be for the success of this project, and makes it seem only too certain that we find in these considerations the clue to the action (or rather the inaction) of the Colonial Office.

Be this as it may the policy of consolidating South Africa was soon pushed on with a vengeance. A glance at the map will show that the annexation (however named) of Zululand must form a part of it. In 1876 Sir Theophilus Shepstone had set about the annexation of the Transvaal, and with the Transvaal we "annexed" an old outstanding boundary-dispute between the Boers and the Zulus. The Zulu King, Cetshwayo,—a monarch who had done great things for his nation, in reducing almost to the vanishing point the execution of the barbarous criminal code and the indulgence of the mischievous spirit of warfare* which his predecessors had instituted or fostered—was a staunch ally of our own. It was at our urgent and repeated request that he had abstained from taking the law into his own hands and settling the boundary dispute with the Boers as he very well knew how.

But after the annexation our views of the merits of Cetshwayo's claims underwent a marked change, and when

* Cetshwayo's "national anthem" is "He keeps quiet for himself. He does not begin to attack anyone." But I do not know what the history of this cry (which is given on p. 524 of Colenso's papers on Cetshwayo) may be.

we appointed a commission to inquire into and settle the affair it was generally assumed that the Boer claims would be allowed. Sir Bartle Frere, our High Commissioner, was quite of this opinion; and as he did not for a moment suppose that the Zulus would quietly submit to being turned out of the portion of the disputed lands which they were occupying, he openly prepared for war. But the evidence on the Zulu side turned out to be too overwhelming; and the award was given against the Boers.

This rendered some other pretext for war necessary. It was found in negotiations that were going on at the time between Cetshwayo and the British authorities concerning certain men who had followed some Zulu women (who were criminals by Zulu law) into Natal territory, seized them and carried them back to Zululand, where they were tried and executed. The British authorities desired Cetshwayo to surrender these men, and Cetshwayo wished to pay a fine of cattle instead. The matter was still under apparently friendly discussion.

Our High Commissioner, then, had to announce to Cetshwayo that the award as to the disputed territory was in his favour. In doing so he took the opportunity (to the surprise and mortification of the home Government) of presenting him with an *ultimatum*! He demanded, amongst other things, a fine of fifteen hundred cattle, the surrender of the men who had violated British territory in pursuit of the women, and the disbanding of the Zulu army. A space of thirty days was allowed for the execution of these orders. Cetshwayo promised compliance with some of the terms, and would consult his chiefs as to others. But the limit had been fixed so as to make compliance impossible, and punctuality was insisted on. The troops had already taken their positions in Zulu territory in anticipation of the non-fulfilment of the terms, and as soon as ever the thirty days were over the invasion was hastened on.

The first victories of the Zulus laid the colony of Natal for months helpless at the feet of the "bloodthirsty monster" whose presence had been represented as a

standing menace to its safety. The use he made of the opportunity was to send frequent messages to ask for peace and to declare that his troops had engaged against his orders. His messengers were detained as prisoners. When reinforcements came his army was destroyed, his faithful subjects were flogged and threatened with death to compel them to reveal his hiding-place, and at last he was seized—extorting from his captor the confession that he was every inch a king.*

"It has been terrible to see this great wave of wickedness," says Colenso, "rolling on, and to be powerless to help it, to be debarred all possibility of showing the injustice of the war, until it was too late—too late to prevent the shedding of innocent blood and the ravaging of a whole country—too late to save the lives of 2,000 of our own soldiers and natives, and of 10,000 patriotic Zulus—too late to prevent the name of Englishman from becoming in the native mind the synonym for duplicity, treachery, and violence, instead of, as in the days gone by, for truth, and justice, and righteousness."†

But when at last he could make himself heard Colenso was again able to show things in their true light. Zulu and Natalian alike attributed it to his efforts that in 1883 Cetshwayo was "restored."‡

Alas! it is the same story again. The Home Government gave orders, but allowed the Colonial Government to evade them. Cetshwayo's "restoration" was a miserable mockery. Nearly half his land was taken from him and put under his inveterate foe Zibebu or the John Shepstone whom we already know. He was not allowed to have an army, and was therefore placed at the mercy of the enemy who was put under no such restriction. None of his wealth was restored to him, but he was saddled with the expense of a "resident." The arrangement was deliberately intended to break down, and to involve Cetshwayo in its fall.

* See Miss Colenso's *History of the Zulu War*.

† Preface to "*Cetshwayo's Dutchman*," pp. xi., xii.

‡ See the Colonial Press *passim* and Cetshwayo's letters to Colenso and to Miss Colenso.

The heroic Bishop bent himself to his task once more. Sheet after sheet of closely-printed matter issued (for private circulation) from his printing press at Bishopstowe. He reprinted, analysed, and annotated every leading article, every official proclamation; every correspondent's letter, that appeared in Natal on the Zulu question. He collected information with a diligence and determination that never flagged. He printed everything. Those who wish to know the history of Cetshwayo's restoration may know it ;* but to do so they must go into an atmosphere thick with a brutality of feeling and a recklessness of statement of which happily we have no conception here. "The truth will come back upon colonists," says the *Natal Witness*, "that the man whom they daily pierced and crucified in their midst was the warmest and truest friend that ever the colony had." Meanwhile it is a task that makes the heart bleed, to follow the history of these recent events and to think of Colenso's ebbing strength as in his noble, patient heroism he tracks up to its source and exposes every slander and misrepresentation that strikes his Zulu friends, unravels the "web of force and fraud" by which Colonial officialism seeks to hide the facts, but pays no heed to the shower of coarse abuse that rains relentlessly upon his own head.

Such were the labours in which Colenso was engaged,† till on June 23rd his daughter wrote to the Zulu King, "To-day, my brother, I have heavy news to tell you. . . .

* I have seen these papers (which include many touching letters from Cetshwayo) through the kindness of Mr. William Shaen. I hope they may be ultimately placed in the British Museum.

† It is pleasant to think that to the last Colenso found some relief and pleasure in his critical studies. Only a very short time before his death he wrote to the Editor of this Review announcing the change in his critical conclusions as to the age of the Elohist narratives in Genesis to which I have referred in the text, and indicating the importance he attached to his conviction—based in part on the comparative faintness of the picture of Ezra given in the book called by his name, compared with the striking personality of Nehemiah—that Ezra was a mere legal figment, a "second Moses" indeed, but on that very ground a symbol rather than a personality in history. Cf. the chapters on Ezra and Nehemiah in "*The Pentateuch*, &c." Part VII.

We are orphans, all of us, our Father Sobantu having left us. You know that he was getting in years, and that he had for long carried a heavy burden—I mean the troubles of the people—a burden not fitted for a man alone. So his Father, the Almighty, saw that he was very weary, and called him, and has taken him home to rest with Him.”

Miss Colenso takes comfort from the thought of the “very many hands which wish to help his orphans, and his work, too, for love of him.” And I would ask my readers whether they will suffer the martyr-Bishop to have died in vain, whether they will let his heart break without its touching theirs ?

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

THE TALMUD AND THE NEW TESTAMENT.

II.—COMPARISON OF CENTRAL PRINCIPLES.

THE illustration of the New Testament from the Talmud and other Jewish writings does not date from to-day or yesterday. A long list of the earlier attempts in this direction may be found in the *Prefatio* to J. G. Meuschen's *Novum Testamentum ex Talmude et Antiquitatibus Hebræorum illustratum*, while the more recent essays are chronicled in the *Vorwort* to A. Wünsche's *Neue Beiträge zur Erläuterung der Evangelien aus Talmud und Midrasch*. Such "illustrations" lead spontaneously to comparisons, and the resulting impression in the minds of Christian scholars is best set forth in the concise and lucid introduction to the *Horæ in Matthæum*, in J. Lightfoot's *Horæ Hebraicæ et Talmudicæ in quatuor Evangelistas*. "There are no authors," says Lightfoot of the Jewish writers, "who more shock and grieve the reader; and yet there are none who more attract and delight him. In no others is greater or equal folly shown; and yet of hardly any others is greater or equal use to be made. More bitter foes than these the teaching of the Gospel has never had and yet clearer expounders than these the text of the Gospel has not. In a word,—on their Jewish fellow-believers they bring down nothing but folly and pest and poison: but Christians, by their own art and labour, may make them most useful servants of their studies, rendering them most seasonable aid in the interpretation of the New Testament."* That the Jews on their side were as eager

* Non sunt autores qui lectorem magis terrent et torquent; et non sunt tamen qui magis alliciunt et delectant. Apud nullos major est aut æqua

to pour contempt upon the New Testament may be learned, for example, from the works incorporated by Wagenseil in his *Tela ignea Satanae*.

Times are changed! Whilst there are many in either camp who still maintain the old attitude of hostility, and attack without attempting to appreciate each other's position, more friendly approaches have been made here and there on either side. Some Christian scholars, astonished to find so many admirable sayings in the Talmud and Midrashim, extol the Jewish writings; and some Jewish scholars do their best to prove that the morality preached by the New Testament is the same as that commended in the Talmud. There is every cause to rejoice in these attempts; for, expressly or tacitly, they abandon the ground of traditional authority, and allow that every religion must base its claims to respect on a direct appeal to its power of raising those who profess it in the moral scale, rather than on any external sanctions of custom or authority. It is encouraging to see that this truth is winning its way to recognition.

But if we welcome the spirit in which the comparison of New Testament and Talmud is made by the scholars of whom we are speaking, we are compelled to add that its method is most unsatisfactory and barren. It consists in simply putting texts from the New Testament and Talmud respectively side by side in pairs, especially selecting the sayings of Jesus (which lend themselves most readily to this treatment) for comparison with aphorisms or injunctions from the Talmud. The resemblance is striking; and Christians may feel amused and gratified by the undisguised delight with which the Jewish scholars dwell upon it. "The truth is," they exclaim; "that Jesus taught nothing new, or at least nothing at once new and sound. His

nugacitas; et vix tamen apud nullos major aut æqua utilitas. Acriores hostes quam istos non habuit doctrina Evangelica, et tamen planiores interpretes quam istos non habet textus Evangelii. Verbo omnia: Judæis suis nihil nisi nugas propinant, et perniciem, et venenum: at Christiani arte et industria sua eos sibi reddere possunt studiis utilissime famulantes, atque inservientes commodissime interpretationi Novi Testamenti.

ethics are those of the Pharisees, so admirably expounded by Hillel. What was special to himself was the morbid exaggeration of the moral commandments, together with the belief in his own Messiahship, and other delusions."

Sometimes when real or nominal Christians are told that all the petitions in the Lord's Prayer, together with many other sayings of Jesus, occur in the Talmud, they are startled beyond measure. Some of them are simply scared, as though Christianity were robbed of its crown. Others, who have little sympathy with worship or religion in any form, rub their hands in glee and declare that, after all, Christianity is nothing more than a trifling modification of Judaism.

The dismay and the triumph alike reveal a most woful superficiality; but the facts upon which they are based deserve every attention.

It is true that considerable deductions must be made from the alleged similarities. When we strike out the sayings that only half coincide with each other, and in the coincident portions simply contain some general moral precept, and when we further remove all those sayings which are drawn directly from the Old Testament teaching, the similarities which we may still trace are by no means so numerous as they appeared at first. But there still remain certain coincidences too striking to be explained by a simple appeal to the common country, language, and usages of Jesus and his apostles, on the one hand, and the men whose sayings are recorded in the Talmud, on the other. Indeed there are some cases in which we can hardly avoid suspecting that the one authority has borrowed from the other, or both from a third.

Now, although the Talmud is much later than the time of Jesus and his apostles, the idea that the former has borrowed the sayings in question from the latter is usually rejected as intrinsically absurd. "We need not urge," says Deutsch,* "the priority of the Talmud to the New Testament, although the former was redacted at a

* *Literary Remains*, p. 55, Note.

later period. To assume that the Talmud was borrowed from the New Testament would be like assuming that Sanskrit sprang from Latin, or that French was developed from the Norman words found in English." But Deutsch is mistaken. The supposition is by no means so foolish. The Jews and Christians had not always been as hostile to each other as they were when the Talmud was compiled, and for a long time previously. In the first and second centuries measures were concerted by the Jewish authorities to prevent the *minim*, that is the Christians (Jewish Christians of course), from uttering heresies when leading the devotions in the synagogues; and it is recorded of certain rabbis that they "charmed" wounds and diseases in the name of Jesus, or that they were accused of heresy because they had expressed admiration for sayings of Jesus. There is nothing absurd, therefore, in the supposition that sayings and ideas of Jesus, which were not specifically anti-Jewish, became the common property of the Jewish communities by the mediation Christians who still retained their connection with the synagogue, or who subsequently rejoined it. Nothing is more natural than that this should take place. Indeed we can hardly doubt that it did. May not this be the source, for instance, whence the saying came into the Talmud that pious heathens have a share in the eternal life?

But we need not enter further upon this question. Even if we assume that Jesus and his apostles borrowed from the rabbis all the expressions that occur both in the New Testament and in the Talmud, it does not prove anything. The gospel of Jesus remains an altogether new thing, and the spiritual life that he awakened is still diametrically opposed, in many respects, to the religious life that the Talmud fosters.

In using the expression "altogether new," I do not mean to deny that there is a sense in which no reformer or founder of a religion, any more than the greatest of statesmen, poets, inventors, or scholars, accomplishes any new thing. Every one of them stands on the shoulders of the generation that

has gone before, and receives from his predecessors the impulse to his teaching and the material out of which his spiritual creation is woven. Emerson's saying is strikingly true that "The great poet makes us feel our own wealth." The new things that the heroes of the spirit bring to us they produce for the most part by their way of combining and grouping the old and acknowledged truths so as to bring one into the foreground, throw another into the shade, and thus give the whole an entirely new character. Jesus himself is obviously the heir of the Israelite prophets, law-givers, and psalmists, and in proclaiming his deepest thoughts he attaches himself closely to Moses and the prophets. But for all that, his appeal—except when he was forced in his polemical encounters to adopt another method—was always to the judgment of his hearers. And well it might be, for the deepest truths of religion and morality are but the expression of man's own destiny and calling. They are written in our heart, and all the prophet can do is to bring the appeal home to us. Now the great ones of Israel had already brought home this appeal with living force up to a certain point, and both Jesus and the rabbis were their heirs, and had to carry on and complete their work. How did they respectively acquit themselves of the task? That coincidences of expression would occur between them was almost involved in the circumstances, and to point out such coincidences is of small avail unless we can show that in each case alike they represent a further carrying home of the direct appeal to the divine law written on our hearts.

With these limitations and explanations it is no paradox to assert that the very same words may be made by one man the instrument for revealing and enforcing something "altogether new," and may be in the mouth of another a mere repetition or imitation of what has gone before.

There is another reason, closely connected with the one we have considered, which makes the comparison of isolated sayings unsatisfactory. If a man is not always consistent even with himself, still less can we expect complete agreement amongst all the members of a special group. Thus

even if certain persons (*in casu* the rabbis) are of kindred faith and spirit, it by no means follows that everything which any one of them may utter, in his best or his worst moments, reflects the conviction of them all. When the Jews have the Talmudic saying cast in their teeth that "even the best heathen ought to be murdered," they very properly urge in reply that this saying was uttered by rabbi Simeon ben Jochai, a notorious foe of the Romans. But it would be quite as fair to attribute to all the rabbis the sentiment he expressed as it would be to regard their views as being fairly represented by Hillel's celebrated saying: "Whatever is hateful to you abstain from doing to your neighbour. This is the whole law, and the rest is only commentary." The question is: Does this saying fit in with the whole Talmudic conception of man's calling and destiny? Did Hillel himself really mean what he said, and show it by attaching no greater importance to all the ritual ordinances than is due to an exposition of the injunction of love to one's neighbour? If not, it may have been nothing more than the happy inspiration of a moment.*

The real question is: What are the principles of either book? What is the character of the religion upheld in each? What is the spirit that inspires them?

The New Testament, as well as the Talmud, is inconsistent with itself. It contains varying, and sometimes very divergent, conceptions of the religious life. One book stands higher, and another lower. Often, especially in the Synoptic Gospels, contrary views are expressed side by side. If then we would understand the New Testament as a whole we must bring clearly into view the guiding principles and drift, the way of looking at things, the conception of life, which gave rise to the great religious movement which

* In point of fact, the context shows that Hillel's remark (made, be it observed, to a heathen, not a Jew) was intended not to show the relatively small importance of studying the details of the law; but, on the contrary, to excite in the heathen the desire to devote himself to this very study. It is one of a series of sayings recorded in illustration of the tact and gentleness by which Hillel drew on half converts to a just recognition of the Jewish tradition.

we find recorded in this collection of writings, and which gives us the key to the conceptions of the divergent schools—Petrinism, Paulinism, Johannism, and their various modifications—which are therein reflected.

This vital centre for which we are seeking is unquestionably found in what we may best call "the gospel of Jesus." In endeavouring to describe what this is we may put aside, in order to keep the main point more clearly in view, all the historical questions that surround it; such as whether this or that saying is really due to Jesus himself, or whether it was simply put into his mouth by his disciples; or under what special influences, and with a view to what special occasion, this or that word was spoken. Nay, if any one chooses to assert that Jesus never existed at all, and that the image presented to us in the Gospels is a pure creation of the Christian community—a contention which I hold to be nothing short of an absurdity—even that leaves this great fact untouched:—That in the New Testament a conception of man's destiny and calling is expressed, worked out and applied—in its greatest purity in some of the sayings attributed to Jesus in the first three Gospels, and elsewhere more or less hampered, distorted, or unevenly developed—so new, so pure, so exalted, so true, that a moral re-birth of humanity dates from the time when it came into the world, and mankind has no hope of redemption unless it yields itself up to these glorious conceptions and moves forward in the direction of the Gospel.

And this, so far as I can apprehend it, is the Gospel that Jesus preached and lived:—Every human being is a child of God, male or female, bond or free, learned or unlearned, Jew or heathen, good or bad, each one is His child. And that means that to be good is the real nature of every one. If only what is already present in germ be developed, if only his destiny be fulfilled, then each one will be wholly purified. And therefore God loves each one of us. How else could it be that the Holy One should love man?

"Glory to God, salvation upon earth, and *in men* may he be well-pleased!" And therefore, too, a pure man may be the friend of sinners. How could one who loves God and all that is fair associate with what is base and hideous, did he not believe that beneath the unlovely exterior there is a hidden glory, and that the woeful to-day contains within itself the germ of a beauteous to-morrow? And because this is so, it is also God's will that not one of these should be lost.

Every human being is a child of God. And so it is his natural and healthful state to love God with all his heart, with all his understanding, with all his might, and to bring Him no divided affections. And together with God, or rather in God, it is natural for him to love the fellow-man whose needs he best knows, whom he can best help—his neighbour. For is not he his brother, a child of God like himself? No such thought can rise in our minds as that God asks too much of any man, for God asks nothing more of him than what his own heart expressly tells him is the only true and good. He can find no rest short of perfection. Self-satisfaction is never justified. "Why callest thou *me* good?" said Jesus to a virtuous but shallow admirer, who had enthusiastically addressed him as *good*. "There is none good but God." And every man who feels himself to be a child of God repeats these words of Jesus from the bottom of his heart, and with all the deeper conviction in proportion as he rises higher.

Every man is a child of God. And he is therefore to be pitied the more in proportion as he is estranged from God and is hindered by his passions or his sloth from doing the will of God. Sin manifests itself in widely different forms. In one it appears to leave the character, comparatively speaking, little affected; in another it so eats into it that it seems to be utterly destroyed. But however these comparisons may deceive us as to the nature of sin when we think of others, our own experience teaches us its fearful power and effects in every case. Sometimes we are as those who have a heavy debt to pay, sometimes as though we were

grievously sick ; sometimes it is as if we had fallen from a purer state and we are tortured by remorse ; while the worst of all is a sense of powerlessness and a fear that it can never go well with us, since evil is mightier within us than good. But this cannot be, for we are children of God and there is forgiveness, redemption, hope, even for the most guilty.

Every man is a child of God. The one great means of redemption, then, is faith, the unreserved trust in God's unquenchable love and irresistible might. We keep no reckoning with God, calculating how much we are in his debt and defining how much we may be called upon to give Him. To bargain with "our Father in Heaven" cannot so much as come into our minds. The believer has but one sorrow : that he shows too little love to Him. And yet every deed that is done in faith, or even in obedience to any noble impulse, has its infinite worth in the sight of God, for it is a pledge and symbol of our true destiny.

Every man is a child of God. And since God is the Almighty the future of every man and of all mankind is assured, for that which is of God is immortal.

Such is the content of the glad tidings brought into the world by Jesus.

On the one hand it is sadly enfeebled by my way of presenting it here, for I have tried to set it forth more or less systematically, and, as far as may be, in plain, prosaic words. Such an epitome must always have something of a scholastic air in it. It is dry. It is a body of doctrine. Now the words of Jesus never suggest anything of the kind. They glow with life. And we must never forget this absence of set system when we are studying his preaching.

On the other hand—and this is the justification of the attempt I have made—the leading principles of his teaching may become clearer to us if we distil them, so to speak, out of his images, parables, aphorisms, and paradoxes, having stripped them of all that is incidental, local, and accidental. This may be done with all the more profit, inasmuch as the gospel of Jesus was naturally clothed in the forms of

his own age, and that not only as to language and style, but as to ideas and conceptions which he shared with his contemporaries, such as belief in angels and devils, in the sacred writings of his nation, in the Messiah and the visible Kingdom of God.

No circumstances arose to force him to a clear understanding with himself as to all these points, neither was he compelled to draw all their legitimate deductions from the great moral and religious principles for which he himself contended. He did make these applications with reference to the questions with which the circumstances of his life brought him face to face, but not with reference to those which were only presented to his followers after his death. We must not forget this in attempting to estimate the attitude he assumed towards the religion of his contemporaries and towards the law which the fathers had revered and handed down.

It is often said that the significance of a reformation lies in what it annuls. The remark is a very shallow one. True reformers involuntarily hold in honour the existing usages and beliefs until they come into conflict with their own vital principles, and then they sink of themselves into the background and die of inanition. It is only when others insist on dragging them forward, or when they become positively hurtful to the spiritual life, that uncompromising war is waged against them.

It follows of necessity that reformers are not systematically consistent. While casting one thing aside they leave another equally opposed to their principles unchallenged, simply because they have never been led to pronounce judgment on it. Their attitude towards traditional beliefs and practices gradually develops, and as time goes on they are compelled, at the cost of much pain and much misunderstanding, to relinquish many things that have long been dear to them.

The brief period during which Jesus taught in public allowed no time for many questions to come up for decision which must at last have forced themselves upon him;

and we may safely assume that in outward conduct he was what we might call conservative. Instinctively following the practices in which he had grown up from childhood, he was doubtless steadily observant of the sabbath worship, and would say his daily prayers at the appointed hour. No unclean food would be set before him. He would make no journeys on the sabbath day; and if he had contracted any ceremonial uncleanness would perform the prescribed ablutions. Hence we may explain the fact that many of his followers, especially those who had associated most closely with him, believed that in strict obedience to the Law they were following out their master's teaching.

But this was an error. Through all the conflicting utterances that the controversialists of the succeeding age laid upon the lips of their master, we may see clearly enough what was the general tone of his teaching with respect to outward observances. He never defied them wantonly, but never let them stand in the way of his work. Fasting, almsgiving and sacrifice were good, if they were genuine, and if they covered no evil thoughts and gratified no love of display; but what were the laws of respectability and ceremonial purity to him if they would prevent his reclaiming the lost and going wherever he could do good?

The goal to which all this tended is obvious. Jesus could not possibly place a Jew above a heathen in virtue of his descent. The temple-worship could only be maintained as long as it nourished the devout feelings of the soul. If the preaching of Jesus should make way it was all over with the Law. And accordingly not even the most extreme Jewish utterances in the New Testament go so far as to declare the whole Law obligatory. Even where Jesus is made to say that whoever absolves men from observing the least of the commandments shall be the least in the kingdom of God, he utters a redoubtable heresy in admitting such a man into the kingdom at all, and no scribe would endorse his words.

It is only natural that the gospel of Jesus should have been very variously and very defectively understood and

promulgated by his disciples. They were so far below him! Even Paul, who perhaps understood him best, applied his principles in a very one-sided manner. Jesus would never have uttered such words as Paul's: "if you allow yourselves to be circumcised, Christ profits you nothing;" but whoever, with him, insisted on the "one thing needful" must sooner or later let the whole Law fall into abeyance. This was instinctively felt by Israel's leaders, and hence their persecution of Jesus.

The Jewish critics bring a serious charge against these moral and religious principles of Jesus. His doctrine, they say, is good for angels, but not for men. His demands are exaggerated. Not to injure one's enemy, but on the contrary to help him, is noble—and the Old Testament, too, enjoins it; but to *love* him is as impossible as it is for a man of spirit to turn the left cheek to one that smites him on the right. Every Jew whose words I have heard in conversation, or read in print, on this subject raises the same objection to the ethics of Jesus. On the other hand the Talmudic ethics are extolled as practical, human, and possible to carry out. I may refer once more to Deutsch as an example.* "It has always been the unanimous opinion of both friends and foes that [the general character of the legislation of the Mishnah] is humane in the extreme: in spite of certain harsh and exceptional laws. . . . There is an almost modern liberality of view regarding the 'fulfilment of the Law' itself, expressed by such frequent adages as 'The Scripture says: "he shall live by them"—that means, he shall not *die through them*. They shall not be made pitfalls or burdens to him, that shall make him hate life.' 'He who carries out the precepts to the full is declared to be nothing less than a Saint.' 'The Law has been given to men, and not to angels.'"

The religious and moral precepts of the Talmud, then, are "humane," because they reckon not with the divine destiny of man, but with his actual weakness. This idea is

* *Literary Remains*, p. 38.

nothing accidental. It is thoroughly characteristic of Talmudic Judaism. It is diametrically opposed to the Gospel of Jesus which finds in the command, "Be perfect as God is perfect" no random or hyperbolic utterance, but the one all-embracing demand with which the promise of unspeakable joy is in fullest harmony.

So long as Judaism ranges itself against this—and it cannot do otherwise—hundreds of parallel passages from New Testament and Talmud can do nothing towards showing agreement between the two. The difference is one of principle.

The necessity under which Judaism lies, unless it should renounce itself, of rejecting this exalted conception of man's calling, stands in close connection with the legal character of the rabbinical ethics.

We need not enter upon the historical questions as to when and how the Jewish legalism arose. It is enough to indicate the unquestioned fact that from the middle of the fifth century before Christ downwards the watchword of the pious Jews was: "Conformity with the Law!" and that this cry became in ever-increasing measure the expression of the vital principle of Judaism.

If we would understand the moral and religious life of the Jews, we must above all things get at a clear conception of their faith in the unapproachable glories of the Law.

The Law, according to the rabbis, is from eternity. Thousands of generations before the creation it existed, not only in God's decree but objectively, and through it the world was made. God loves it as a daughter, and not only studies it three hours a day, deducing and promulgating fresh *halachas* from it, but even regulates his own life in accordance with it. Prayer and sacrifice give temporal life alone, but the study and observance of the Law give life eternal. It is the only road to blessedness. As he travels alone the believer must think of it, as he parts from his friends he must speak of it. No privation is too great to be faced to gain the means of studying the law, and it is

better to let one's children starve than to forsake the school.

The knowledge of the Law is of no avail without its observance. Let no man study Scripture and Mishna and yet be rebellious against his parents, his teachers, and God. And yet when, in Bar-cochba's time, the rabbis discussed, in dire straits, whether the knowledge or the observance of the Law was the weightier matter, they decided unanimously in favour of its knowledge. For many commands which could only be observed by an agricultural people were given at Sinai forty years before Israel entered Canaan. And at the judgment of God knowledge of the Law will be more richly rewarded than observance of the commandments. So, too, the study of the sacrificial system, when the Temple had long been in ruins, was defended not only because when the Messiah came it would be put into practice again, but also because the knowledge of the precepts was itself meritorious though it should lead to no practical result whatever.

The Law was studied before Moses. Shem and Eber had their schools. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob studied the Law diligently. When the Messiah has come it will be studied still, and even in the future life the Law will be taught, for it is eternal.

Such was the old Jewish conception of the Law. Of course one teacher went further than another on certain points, and there may have been some who rejected, or at least disliked, the tendency to "make God a Jew"; but, whatever qualifications we may make, it remains the fact that the idea just expressed reappears constantly, and in every variety of form, and that the all-surpassing glory of the Law is the central principle of the scribes.

The "Law" which is thus glorified included the Pentateuch in the first place, but also the thousands of regulations contained in the "oral tradition." With regard to this latter there was some difference of opinion; for certain scribes said that it was only given direct by God to Moses in the sense of being implied in the written Law. Others

(and Maimonides follows them) distinguished between *halachas* given to Moses by God, and other *halachas* deduced from the former and from the Scripture. Concerning these latter it was possible for various schools of scribes to dispute.

The common opinion, however, was that Moses had received from the mouth of God the whole system of interpretation and application. R. Simeon ben Lakish (Berachôth 5 a) said "What is the meaning of the text (Ex. xxiv. 12) 'Come up to me into the mountain, and I will give you the stone tables and the law and the commandments, which I have written, to teach them'? The meaning of this text is as follows: 'The stone tables' are the ten commandments, 'the law' is the Scripture (i.e. the Pentateuch), 'the commandments' are the Mishna, 'which I have commanded' the Prophets and Writings (i.e. all the Bible except the Pentateuch), 'to teach them' means the Gemara." Some teachers went so far as to declare that Mishna and Talmud, together with the *tosephta* and *haggada* were all written on the tables of stone!

It is true that many of the *halachas* were known to have proceeded from this or that rabbi of later times, and that they were sometimes voted upon and decided by a majority. How did this agree with their Mosaic origin? Well! they had been forgotten meanwhile. And the cause of this forgetfulness was a subject of rabbinical speculation and discussion. In the mourning for the death of Moses, three thousand *halachas* were forgotten, so that even Joshua could not remember them; and it was only in Othniel's court of judgment that they were restored.

But no speculations as to the origin and history of the *halachas* were allowed in the smallest degree to qualify their binding nature. More importance was practically assigned to the words of the scribes than to the words of scripture itself; and whoso transgressed the words of the rabbis was liable to the penalty of death.

This belief in the divine origin not only of the written

Law, but of all the regulations built upon it and indissolubly connected with it, naturally led to a reliance upon external authority, which was carried to incredible lengths. No scribe professed to know anything from his own reflection or independent study. The only difference between them was that while some would teach nothing that they had not heard in so many words from their teachers, the majority went so far as to draw fresh inferences, in accordance with fixed rules, from the traditional matter they had received. Hillel and the other great lights of Judaism teach us "to avoid doubt, and choose a master; and not trust our own insight, even till our death." Nor could anything be more un-Jewish than the contrast drawn by Jesus between what "you have heard that they of old times said," and what "I say unto you."

Closely connected with this is the Talmudic conception of guilt and merit. Just as the ideal conception of man's calling preached by Jesus shuts out the very possibility of account-keeping between God and man, so does the legal conception necessarily involve it. Everything a man does or leaves undone is registered with its appropriate punishment or reward; and even though we cannot always trace the cause of what befalls us, yet whenever we suffer we may ask "how have we deserved this?" and whenever good fortune is ours, we may boast "God has not overlooked our good deeds!" One of the favourite subjects of the *haggada* was the calculation of the way in which this "measure for measure" worked out; and when the result seemed to contradict the theory, recourse was had to the well-known expedients (not peculiar to the Jews!) of an appeal to man's short-sightedness, to the secrecy alike of sin and repentance, to the recompenses of a future life, to the forgiveness secured on the Great Day of Atonement, to the inherited merits of fathers, to the intercession of the holy ones, and so on.

On this field of speculation far greater freedom was allowed than in what touched the Law, and occasionally we meet with clever and witty sayings in the *haggadas* on

the subject. Thus at the beginning of *Kohleth rabba* we read: "A beast may be hung upon the hook by a single one of its own sinews. But if all these are cut, what ropes and cords we need to hang it with! So too did Solomon hang upon his own merits before he sinned, but afterwards on the merits of his fathers."

But however profound or childish their speculations might be, the rabbis always kept to the idea of "deserts." It is the central principle of the Talmudic conception of man's calling, and is diametrically opposed to that of Jesus. To almost all the sayings in the fifth chapter of Matthew parallels—more or less apposite or inapposite—have been produced from the Talmud, but for the closing words "Be ye therefore perfect as God," it appears as impossible to produce a parallel as it is for the story of the pharisee and the publican. And it is this "be perfect" that throws the clearest light on what goes before. Jesus shows the utmost confidence in human nature, and contents himself with setting the moral ideal in clear broad lines before his disciples; whereas the Talmud, with an entire lack of any such confidence, ties men up as closely as possible, leads them along a strictly fenced path, and never ceases to hold before their eyes the reward of every right and the punishment of every wrong step.

The moral result of this legalism is inevitable formality and service for a reward. It was in vain that Antigonus of Socho gave the noble precept, "Be not like servants who work for a reward," in vain that many another scribe adopted, and perhaps laid frequent stress upon it, when all the while the whole tendency of their system necessarily led to the very thing against which they uttered their warning. It was in vain for the scribes to insist from time to time that it was not the mechanical performance of outward acts, but heartfelt prayer, joyous observance of the precepts, and mercy, that pleased God, when their ceaseless insistency on strict observance of the legal ordinances rendered such exhortations futile and made formalism a necessity. It was in vain that a single rabbi here and there ventured to

declare that even heathens might inherit the life eternal, or that a righteous heathen was better in the eyes of God than a wicked Jew, when even his own teaching was perpetually quickening the Jew's consciousness that he was a member of the chosen people, and that "all Israel" in the first place "had a share in the life everlasting." We are not speaking of the intentions or dispositions of the Talmudists, but of the tendencies of their system; and when, in the expectation of a reward, a man strives above all things strictly to observe the external duties of religion it is inevitable that the moral duties should fall into the background.

It was considered a great blessing for Israel that the precepts of the Law were so innumerable; for—as we are told at the close of the treatise *Makkôth* of the Mishna, and elsewhere—"God multiplied law and commandments that he might multiply Israel's deserts in observing them." In *Mechilta* on Ex. xiii. 2 much may be found to the same purpose worked out in detail, and including the following story: Once the disciples of Rabbi Joshua (about 100 A.D.) at Jamnia had attended service, when he was not present himself. He asked them what Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaria had preached about, and (after politely saying "It will be nothing new to you") they answered that he had preached on Deuteronomy xxix. 10, where the little children are mentioned in the enumeration of the classes of the people who witnessed the revelation of the Lord. Hereupon the rabbi had asked what the children were doing there, since they could not understand anything of the matter, and had answered his own question by saying that they were mentioned because the grown-up people who brought them had been rewarded for so doing, which he had proved out of Isaiah xlii. R. Joshua was so delighted with this explanation that he exclaimed: "There is no recent word that excels that! I am now seventy years old, but I never understood this before. Blessed art thou, Father Abraham, that Eleazar ben Azaria is descended from thee. The generation is not orphaned in which he lives!" In *Pirke Abôth* we read "If you learn much of the Law then shall a great

reward be given you. Be assured that He who has laid the task upon you will also deal out your reward, though it may be not till the next life." Moreover the mere mechanical performance of a religious act, or even the doing it with an evil intention, would be rewarded. Balak made sacrifice to Israel's God by Balaam's direction, in hope of moving him to lay on the prophet's lips a curse upon Israel. Nevertheless he would be rewarded for having offered the sacrifices.

Hillel said, "What you would not have done to you, do not that to others. This is the essence of the Law. All the rest is only application;" but it is utterly impossible to regard the system of which Hillel himself was so zealous an expounder as simply giving expression to the devout or humane natural feelings. To observe the sabbath, for instance, might and may be a religious act in the true sense, the expression of a natural impulse of piety which has become associated by habit and education with the special consecration of one day in seven to thankful rest and joy. But to learn by heart the nine-and-thirty occupations which one must not engage in on the sabbath; to be able to define them all and understand how to guard against transgressing with respect to them at every point, to count the number of steps one has taken from the house door so as not to pass the limits of a sabbath journey; to cudgel one's brains over the question how one is to keep a lamp alight that seems as if it would go out, and yet not to strike fire—how can all this be the expression of the piety of the heart?

Many of the rabbis evidently saw at times how worthless, or rather how hurtful, this merely external religiousness really was. Some of them were truly devout men, whose zeal for the Law was guided by the purest intentions and motives. They hoped to preserve Israel from the pollutions of heathendom by fidelity to the legal precepts, and they fought against many a moral evil. But by doing this in the only way they knew of they were, as a matter of fact, leading their people on a false track.

And the same legalism which produces formalism and externality on the one side must of necessity produce

systematic evasion on the other. They are the twin births of one mother. In spite of the sternness with which they insisted on the observance of the Law the rabbis saw very well that in many cases it was either impossible or in the highest degree perilous to observe it; and in spite of all their heroic memories and impulses they were not a race of martyrs. Such formulæ as "a door must be left open," "that the world may exist," "for the sake of peace," appear again and again in connection with the ingenious methods of escaping inconvenient or unpractical commandments while still appearing to reverence them; and in the background there is always the renowned decision of the council of Lydda to fall back upon, in which it was determined by a majority of votes that a man might break the Law in all points save those of idolatry, incest and murder, in order to save his life, for the Scripture says that man must *live* by the Law—not die by it. Even idolatry might under certain circumstances be committed to escape death.

Short of this extreme necessity, however, and the frank transgression of the Law which it was held to sanction, we find that the scribes invented methods of escaping the laws for the periodical cancelling of debts, allowed the marriage laws to be shamelessly evaded, and systematised the mental reservation which enabled a man to take oaths which he never meant to keep.

Perhaps this last is the weakest point in the Talmudic morals. Space forbids me to go into detail as to the four classes of oaths which need not be kept; but worse than all is the principle of mental reservation which allowed a man to take an oath which would be understood as sacred in the highest degree, and as he did so to make a (mental) explanation to himself which rendered it nugatory. Thus a man might say "Let it be to me as *cherem*," which would be understood to mean "I vow not to use it any more than I would use what had been devoted by the ban to God!" But he might mean *cherem* to the priests, not *cherem* to God, and so he might use the thing in question without perjury. Or, since *cherem* means a "fish-net" as well as the "curse of

devotion," he might say "I only swore by a fish-net." Or a man might say "may I myself (*atsmi*) be *korbân* (a gift to God) if I do this," and since *atsmi* may also mean "my bone," he might have put away a bone somewhere and meant that he would make *it* (not himself) *korbân*. If a man did such things as these he need not consult the scribes. If, however, he did consult them R. Meir said that he must be held to his oath; but the scribes decided that "a door must be opened for him," though he should be admonished not to take oaths lightly.

Quite in harmony with all this is the story told twice over of R. Jochanan. He once went to a woman (a heathen) to be cured of toothache. He saw her on Thursday and Friday. Then he said, What shall I do to-morrow? (for he had to preach). She said, You won't want it (*i.e.*, the remedy). He: But suppose I do want it? She: I will tell you the secret if you swear not to reveal it. Then he swore, "*Lalaha* of Israel, I will not reveal it." [This she could only understand to mean, "By the God of Israel I will not reveal it."] Then she told him the secret, and the next day he revealed it to the congregation. But (how could this be?) since he had sworn her an oath? He had sworn *lalaha* of Israel—*i.e.*, to the God of Israel I will not reveal it, but I will reveal it to the congregation of Israel. But was not this profaning the name of God? (Inasmuch as she would think that he had committed perjury). (No) for he told her at once. (*i.e.*, when he had got the receipt he told her that he had sworn *lalaha* not *balaha*, and the oath would not hold).

And besides formality and evasion the Talmudic system must foster a spirit of exclusiveness and national pride in the Jew, which only too easily degenerates into hatred of others.

Extreme expressions cited respectively in condemnation and defence of the Talmud may be found in the horrible utterance of R. Simeon ben Yochai: "The best of the heathens must be murdered" (to which *Mechilta* adds "as we break the head of the best of serpents,") and in R.

Jochanan ben Zakkai's declaration "as the sin-offering makes atonement for Israel, so does righteousness make atonement for the heathens." But on the one hand we must note that R. Simeon was notorious for his hatred of the Romans, and on the other that R. Jochanan was so well known for his gentle and yielding character that he was considered unfit to stand at the head of Judaism when the fall of Jerusalem rendered a strong hand more than ever needful. He was therefore succeeded by R. Gamaliel (the second)—the man who declared that all the good deeds of the heathen were done out of ostentation and were therefore worthy of the pains of hell.

But whatever sayings of individual rabbis may be produced it admits of not the smallest doubt that the ordinary doctrine of the scribes made a marked distinction between heathens and Jews and the duties that must be performed respectively to them.

The *Tanna'im* had taught that heathens and shepherds (who had a very bad name) might not be thrown (into a pit) but must not be helped out of one. R. Joseph desired to qualify this by allowing the rescue of such a one for a reward and from fear of consequences. But R. Abayi thought that even in such a case the man appealed to must excuse himself by saying, for instance, "I must get my son down from the roof (or he will fall)," or "there is a summons against me, and I must hasten to the court." R. Ababu taught in the presence of R. Jochanan: One must not rescue heathens and shepherds from danger, nor throw them into it; but heretics, traitors, and apostates one must throw into danger and not rescue from it. R. Jochanan would except the apostates from this rule, on the strength of Deuteronomy xxii. 3,—on which a discussion follows as to who are included amongst the "apostates."—The teacher said: "One is to throw into danger, but not rescue." If one is to do the former how much more must one abstain from the latter? (so why should it be expressly added?). To this R. Joseph ben Channa in the name of R. Sheshet replied: The meaning can only be that if there is a ladder

in the well, one is to take it out, under pretext that the cattle will run into it. Rabba and R. Joseph both said : The only meaning is that if a stone lies at the mouth of the well one must cover it up with it and say : "I have to drive my cattle over it." Rabbina said : If there is a ladder in it one must take it away and say : "I have to get my son down from the roof."

Elsewhere it is expressly said that when the Scripture speaks of "your brother" and "your neighbour," this has no reference to a heathen fellow-countryman, so that one is not bound for example to pay a non-Jewish workman his wages before the sun sets, as the law enjoins in the case of an Israelite. If one finds anything one must return it to the owner—if he is a Jew, but not otherwise ; and the rabbis seriously discuss the question what is to be done if one finds anything in a place in which there were more heathens than Jews when it was lost. The conclusion is that one may keep it. If a man finds a keg of wine in a city that is chiefly inhabited by heathens, then he need not have it cried but may keep it. But the finder may not drink any of it unless an Israelite proves to him that the wine is *kosher*.

The consistent application of these principles was qualified by two motives. Firstly by fear, or as the rabbis more mildly express it "for the sake of peace," and secondly by the shrinking from bringing God's name into dishonour amongst the heathen—a feeling which in other cases too led the rabbis to condemn an open transgression more severely than a secret one.

I have tried to indicate, and as far as space permitted to illustrate the difference between the ethical principles of Jesus and the precepts of the Talmud. Have I not justified the assertion that a chasm gapes between them which nothing can bridge over? The Talmud only develops what is necessarily involved in the principle of legalism, and what is essentially opposed to the idealism of Jesus. We may choose between them but we cannot combine them.

There is a chasm between the gospel of Jesus and the Talmud; but are we to add: between Christians and Jews? By no means! Many Jews, thank God! are better than the Talmud would make them, and the Christians, alas! are not only far worse than they ought to be if they lived out the principles of Jesus, but are incapable of doing full homage to those principles even in theory.

The very attempts which are so frequently made by cultivated Jews to show that the teaching of the Talmud is essentially catholic and ethical, prove that they themselves are no longer satisfied with what is narrow and ceremonial; and on the other hand it would be only too easy to illustrate from the history of the Christian Church, and the things which are going on at this very moment in so-called Christian countries, every form of obliquity, of formalism and of national and religious hatred. We are no more able to hold the Jews responsible for all that stands in the Talmud than we are to point to the Christians as living witnesses of the glory of the gospel of Jesus.

But if I have truly sketched the character and spirit of the Talmud, the question remains to be answered: "By what secret does it retain its hold upon men who have really risen above the level of its ethical principles?"

The answer is not hard to find.

The result has shown that the Talmud is eminently qualified to perform the colossal work of holding the Jews together. The tendencies of which it is at once the fruit and the evidence possess a prodigious *church-making* power. It defines exactly what the believers are to do; and a distinct programme is the first necessity for the formation of a compact body. This programme must not require too much, and it must make it clear to the multitude exactly what it does require. The Talmud has done this. One need not be an exceptionally good man to be a Jew according to the Talmud. And again, if one wishes to do something more than others, the Talmud shows how it can be done without insisting on a real regeneration. Be a scribe, and

you are a prince in Israel! If you can be a moral hero as well, so much the better; but in any case your knowledge of the Law in itself exalts you very high.—Just so! That is how to make a compact community, a church. Rome trod the same path, and secured the same success. More than one Protestant communion has attempted it, but by the side of Judaism and Romanism they cut but a sorry figure. Nay even Rome has never understood the art as the heroes of the Talmud did.

But the less any community understands of this art the better. For it can only be practised at the expense of morality of the truest and noblest stamp. It keeps alive the spirit of narrowness, intolerance, slavery to the letter, and formalism; it cherishes mediocrity, and hampers the man whose soul soars upward.

Compared to the churchmaking forces of Judaism and Christianity, Jesus is a mere cypher. He could not even get together for a single hour a handful of followers formed after his principles.

But something very different from this he both purposed and accomplished in proclaiming war on the spirit of exclusiveness, and so breaking in, ever anew, upon the peace of the "Churches." He casts the purifying fire amongst men. His image, his words, his spirit, handed on by tradition from generation to generation, and the principles to which the noblest heart of humanity so fully responds, leave mankind no rest. The less we draw the sinews of the Gospel, the more we leave it free to work its way, the less outward unity will there be, the mightier will the protest be against any attempt to chain the thoughts, the feelings or the aspirations, but the bolder will be the development of every good disposition, the deeper will be the sense of personal responsibility, the richer the blessing that will rest on the work undertaken for mankind.

The Gospel makes no Churches, but it makes men.

Leiden.

H. OORT.

MR. BEARD'S LECTURES ON THE
REFORMATION.*

THE history of the Reformation in Europe has not been, and perhaps never will be, satisfactorily written. Much good and valuable work has been done in clearing up the course of the movement in special countries and at special periods: but the very bulk of the materials accumulated repels the inquirer, and their quality is even more formidable than their quantity. An unbiassed authority is the rare exception; and the prejudices of the immediate actors and narrators of the past events have in great measure descended to the writers and readers of history at the present time. All students know how apt an historian is, even in matters which possess only an antiquarian interest, to form a theory, and warp the facts to fit into its framework. But in this case there is hope that some particularly stubborn truth will resist distortion, and compel a reversal of opinion. After all, the writer's chief aim is to get at the real facts, and he may give up his theories without any loss of character or credit, without any important change in mental attitude. With the study of the Reformation history it is not so. An inquirer with any well-defined

* *The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century in its Relation to Modern Thought and Knowledge.* The Hibbert Lectures, 1883. By the Rev. CHARLES BEARD, B.A.

A brief notice and analysis of these Lectures having already appeared, in the *Modern Review* for last July, I have not tried to follow the order of the Course, but have discussed in an unavoidably desultory manner such points as especially struck me. As I have abstained from a connected review of the work, I take this opportunity of expressing my sense of its high historical merit, and even higher suggestiveness. It is seldom that so scrupulous a fairness is joined with so firm a grasp of the intricate details of the most difficult period in history.

religious belief must needs approach his subject with a preconceived notion of what he will find in it; and the worst is, that he will be sure to find many plausible authorities to support almost any view he may chance to hold. And a change in the fundamental view of the historian or student would almost necessarily involve a change in religious belief, with all the consequences implied in this.

These disadvantages are inevitable; but they may be partially obviated by other means. Greater care in collecting and weighing authorities will do much; a habit of keeping fact rigidly separate from inference in thought and statement, will do more; but the main requisites for a history that shall be both just and convincing are two—the first, a wide and charitable sympathy, a temper that seeks rather to understand than to approve or condemn; and the second is akin to it—the dramatic instinct of the poet or novelist. The former faculty makes the narrative just; the latter makes it a record of possible human actions.

There are not a few writers of what is regarded as history or biography who do not seem ever to have formed a connected and consistent idea of the men and women whose actions they record—nay, they do not even seem to realize that any such notion is required. To take the instance that lies nearest to hand, there are worthy, learned and ingenious persons who devote their time to proving, in newspapers, magazines, and books, the complete innocence of Mary Queen of Scots. They point out with care the weak points in the accusations, the compatibility of this or that suspicious circumstance with the guiltlessness of the Queen, the probable or possible way in which the blame might have been unjustly cast on her by slanderous rumours or artifices—and do not see that when they have done, the woman whose personality impressed itself so strongly on all whom it touched is left without any character or individuality at all, an innocent nonentity, helplessly blown about by warring winds.

The number of those who allow their historical work and judgment to be not only touched, but seriously impaired

by prejudice and lack of appreciation and sympathy, is still greater. Those who have the power of seizing and depicting the individual character most clearly, are often unable to comprehend the views of those who opposed their favourite party, or to realize that any honest and sensible man could sincerely hold such views. Especially is this the case in histories of the Reformation, and, above all, of the Reformation in England. For the complex compromise in which that change ended lends itself peculiarly well to almost any kind of distortion. Every writer on this subject has a thesis to prove, which occupies all his attention—the complete continuity of doctrine in the Church, the wise and virtuous nature of Henry VIII., the reforming zeal of Wolsey, or something equally probable. For instance, one of the latest writers of the High Church school cannot account for the strong and often coarse language used by the ultra-Reformers and Puritans against the Mass and the Altar, by anything less than the prevalence of an “epidemic monomania” of hatred against “the blessed Eucharist.” It would be difficult for an author more plainly to write himself down as incapable of serious historical work; such a helpless apology for an explanation amounts to a confession of inability to see more than one side of a question.

It was with a fresh experience of the defects of many historians of the English Reformation—defects which had strongly coloured their views of the Continental religious movements—that I came to read the Hibbert Lectures for the present year. Though Mr. Beard’s treatment of his great subject is not only or chiefly historical, I felt that on the soundness of his historical judgments would rest the credit of his inferences from the past to the present and future; and that his account of the English Reformation, though not an essential part of his work, would form the truest test as to his fairness and sympathetic appreciation in the discussion of those phases of the movement with which Englishmen are less acquainted. And in this expectation I was not disappointed; though the sketch of the English Reformation is a sort of backwater in the stream

of the Lectures, it still gives sufficient evidence of the spirit that animates the whole. The unbiassed fairness and wide sympathy displayed in this Lecture are signs of the value of those parts that cannot so easily be tested.

Mr. Beard, like the best of modern historians, wishes to study events as the marks of a general development of human thought, and to grasp the *differentia*, the central characteristic of each period. Details to him are chiefly valuable as helping to make up the complete picture; and viewing the English Reformation thus fully, he pronounces on it an opinion that helps to explain the facts as no lay or clerical dogmatist's theory can, and yet recognises what of truth there is in each special interpretation.

In brief, the elements of the situation in England before the Reformation may be summed up as follows: a king arbitrary, violent and rapacious, but desirous of popularity, a Church dissatisfied with itself and making half-hearted attempts to reform itself, and a nation discontented with its condition, and leavened with old traditions of resistance to Rome and the clergy, and old social and religious grievances. The first change of the Reformation came from the sovereign; it was forced on the nation from above, before the doctrinal revolt had gained strength among the people. Hence, this first part of the movement involved little shifting of dogma. The English murmured at Henry VIII.'s changes and confiscations, but acquiesced in them, largely from a feeling that the royal power was the one firm and stable thing left, and that its overthrow would be fatal.

In the next reign the doctrinal change was imposed on the people by men whose theology was drawn from abroad, and represented a far more advanced state of thought than generally existed in England. Indeed, till the persecutions of Mary's reign, there is little trace of the new doctrines largely influencing the masses.

Having been begun by the rulers, the movement was checked by them also. Change had been forced on the people before they were ready for it; when they were desirous of further change, it was forbidden. The pace

which had been too fast for the old generation, was too slow for the new, and the same policy that had stirred up the Pilgrimage of Grace in the sixteenth century, aroused the Puritan revolt in the seventeenth. Party compilers may refer the latter to a "monomania," or to the evil fruits of the anarchical speculations of Continental Protestantism; but to the unbiassed mind, the most natural explanation would seem to be that the rulers of Church and State, having started before the nation was ready to follow, now halted before the nation was prepared to stop.

Such substantially is Mr. Beard's view of the English Reformation, as indicated in his brief summary of its progress. The non-popular character of the change up to the reign of Elizabeth prevented England from having any great heroes of religion, any of those noble enthusiasms which arise among the people; but it saved the country from a religious war, such as desolated France, the Netherlands and Germany. When religious dogmatism and the polemical spirit reached the masses, all classes had been already in a considerable degree, if not Protestantized, at least modernized by the action of the government. Political and religious troubles had to be combined to beget a civil war; and even this was carried on in a manner which, at its harshest, was mildness itself compared with the methods of a Guise, an Alva or a Tilly. If Archbishop Laud became one of the best-hated men in all England—a fact somewhat slurred over by those who have accorded him a sort of informal canonization—it was hardly so much because of his religious views, as of the petty and tyrannical meddlesomeness of his ecclesiastical courts—a form of supervision intolerable to the full-grown intellect. Among the bulk of the nation the wish not to be interfered with was probably stronger than any religious views; and as they had helped the Puritans to overthrow the Church, they afterwards helped the restored Church to put down the Puritans.

In pointing out the political influences which moulded the English Church, the continuity of its development, and

the composite character of its doctrine and ritual from the first, Mr. Beard has shown that he can appreciate the views of ecclesiastical partisans without agreeing with them. To some of his statements it would be possible to take exception, as when he classes the "Ten Articles," the "Institution of a Christian Man," and the "Six Articles," as all asserting the same uncompromising Catholicism. The "Ten Articles," and the "Institution" as expounding them, surely show a strong tendency to refine away the cruder Roman forms of certain doctrines so as to make them more spiritual and Scriptural; while the "Six Articles," though probably intended "*quoad terrorem populi*," to frighten rather than hurt the Protestants, are distinctly reactionary in tone, and even in substance.

But such matters of detail are comparatively unimportant. The main point to notice and commend is the fair and judicious way in which the Lecturer points out how the ritual and dogma of the Church alike bear traces of compromise between Protestant and Catholic, and how, consequently, neither of the parties now representing these divisions can claim exclusive supremacy with the support of history. The High Church party has seemed to profit most by recent investigations—partly, no doubt, because its historians have been first in the new pastures of State papers; but there is a sufficient historical ancestry left for the Low Church also.

The wide sympathy which I have attributed to Mr. Beard is a large claim to make for any one in matters theological. Therefore, although this digression on the English Reformation has already extended to too great a length, I must quote one or two passages in which questions debated even to this day are treated by him. It is a pleasure to transcribe such fair, clear and moderate statements, after seeing the distorted versions of sectarian history which are weekly furnished to those receptacles of bad taste, bad temper and bad English—the "religious" newspapers.

At the same time, we must take some pains to understand a fact which more than any other differentiates the English Refor-

mation—I mean the continuity of the Anglican Church. There is no point at which it can be said, Here the old Church ends, here the new begins. Are you inclined to take the Act of Supremacy as such a point? I have already shown that Henry's assumption of headship was but the last decisive act of a struggle which had been going on for almost five centuries. The retention of the Episcopate by the English Reformers at once helped to preserve this continuity, and marked it in the distinctest way. I speak here as an historian, not as a theologian, and I have nothing to do with that doctrine of apostolical succession which many Churchmen hold, though the Articles do not teach, and the Prayer-book only implies it. But it is an obvious historical fact that Parker was the successor of Augustine, just as clearly as Lanfranc and Becket. Warham, Cranmer, Pole, Parker—there is no break in the line, though the first and third are claimed as Catholic, the second and fourth as Protestant. The succession, from the spiritual point of view, was most carefully provided for when Parker was consecrated: not even the most ignorant controversialist now believes in the Nag's-Head fable. The canons of the pre-Reformation Church, the statutes of the Plantagenets, are binding upon the Church of England to-day, except where they have been formally repealed. There has been no break, unless by what we may call private circumstances, in the devolution of Church property. The Church may be Protestant now, as it undoubtedly was Catholic once; but it is impossible to fix the point at which the transition was legally and publicly made. (Pp. 311, 2.)

These lines might have been written by an Anglican; but Mr. Beard's estimate of the Puritans is no less fair, no less generous and sympathetic, as the following extract will show:—

I am not concerned to vindicate either the character or the aims of Puritanism; it is sufficient to have affiliated it on the true stock of the Reformation. Now, after two centuries and a half, historical students whose judgment is not disturbed by the fascination of old controversies in new forms, are beginning to discern that the roots of all that is noble in English life to-day go down to Roundhead and Cavalier alike, and that piety and learning were not the monopoly of either Churchman or Puritan. Let George Herbert the Anglican, Colonel Hutchinson the Independent, Lord Falkland the Latitudinarian, stand side by side

as the best that that troubled time could produce, and let each of us leave it to the force of natural attraction to adjust the order of their precedence. One word only I would say as to the charge of pettiness in controversy often brought against the Puritan party. What they perpetually asked from Elizabeth and her Bishops, what they begged of James I. at the Hampton Court Conference, what they urged upon the triumphant Church of the Restoration, touched the same points: the kneeling posture at the Lord's Supper, the sign of the cross in baptism, the use of the surplice, the bowing at the name of Jesus, the reading of Apocryphal lessons. All external things, it will be said; things indifferent to a man of robust conscience who can look below the surface into the essence of controversies; certainly not matters upon which to divide a Church and rend a nation in twain. Nor am I prepared to deny that in the course of the hundred years during which these ceremonies were in dispute, they assumed the nature of shibboleths, became standards of bitter contention rather than matters of reasonable debate, and were eagerly defended or assailed by many who had no real conception of their significance. But a glance at the list which I have given sufficiently shows that these ceremonies had to the Puritan a very definite symbolic meaning. They stood for the old Church, for its authority over Scripture, for its doctrine of the Real Presence, for its theory of priests and sacraments. Looked at in this light, the external conformity which was asked of the Puritans involved a transition from the Protestant to the Catholic side of the Reformation. It meant the substitution of the authority of the Church for the authority of Scripture and Conscience. (Pp. 322, 3.)

And the Broad Church also receive their historical ancestry in those who forbore to lay stress either on the mediævalism of the ritual or the Lutheranism of the Articles, and contented themselves with practically following out the ethical parts of religion, either neglecting dogma or giving it a wide and elastic meaning. In other passages, too long for me to quote as I should wish to do, the good and ill effects of Dissent on the sects themselves and on the Established Church are weighed with the same even hand.

The same wish to comprehend and explain rather than judge is evident in Mr. Beard's treatment of the Conti-

mental Reformation—the most important part of the historical section of his Lectures. In this, too, the dramatic faculty comes in to help. The Revival of Learning in the North, the doctrinal Reformations of Germany, Switzerland, and France, the sects and systems of the many new religious bodies, all tend to group themselves round a number of great, or at least influential men. The records of the changes on the Continent falls naturally into the biographical form; Erasmus, Luther, Melancthon, Zwingli, Calvin, sum up in their own lives the movements they led. Mingled as the Reformation was with the home policy of the states in which it arose, saved as it often was from overwhelming attacks by their foreign policy, it was primarily the result of the action and reaction between the popular thought and the minds of great men. In spite, therefore, of the wide subjects of the separate Lectures—with which readers of the *Modern Review* will be sufficiently familiar from the brief notice in the last number—several of them resolve themselves into sketches of personal character and work.

Especially valuable is the explanation of Luther's mental conflicts, contained in the Fifth Lecture. In the wide and very human nature of the great Reformer, two opposing tendencies may be traced. There is the sound strong common-sense which had swept away many ecclesiastical figments and mediæval superstitions; but there is also a passionate desire for a sure belief, a dread of the threatening religious anarchy, which tends to return to old doctrines and distrust reason and criticism. Mr. Beard skilfully traces the apparent contradictions of theory and practice into which Luther was drawn by these opposing tendencies as each got the mastery in turn. Wavering from the critical rationalism towards which Erasmus had cautiously begun to advance, to a more than mediæval faith in dubious dogmas, he at last entrenched himself behind the plenary inspiration of Scripture as a last citadel of authority, and cast out as a deadly enemy the reason which had helped to lead him to his present position, and

now threatened to draw him further. In the Lecturer's opinion, the Satanic visitations of Luther (the apparently physical manifestations of which, after all, were few, and such as have come to many overwrought brains) were in general merely the "mythological" form in which he clothed the assaults of his own practical reason on the weak points of his dogmatic faith. For he had himself seen and clearly stated the obvious discrepancies between different books of the Old and New Testament; his dislike of the book of Esther and the Epistle of James was expressed in terms too familiar to need quotation. He could feel, in certain moods, that his doctrine of Consubstantiation was, if anything, harder either to understand or to believe than the Trentine dogma of Transubstantiation.* In this conflict of the mind there is nothing unfamiliar to us; most men's religion is a compromise between the critical temper that questions all, and the craving for a sure and strong faith. But in many cases either the reason acquiesces in its exclusion from the precincts of faith, and cultivates its own field without daring to look over the wall of the sacred enclosure, or else freely ranges over the whole space, undeterred by the presence of some scarecrow dressed in the cast-off clothes of belief. With Luther belief had got the upper hand, but reason was too strong to be "strangled" and constantly returned in a diabolical character, not to be finally slain by physical or spiritual weapons. Even the famous stain on the wall of his chamber may be made the text of an allegory; it has unfortunately been in all ages the way of dogmatic theologians to treat reason as a demon and try to exorcise it by throwing a little ink at it.

The whole treatment of Luther, in its sympathetic insight, is the most attractive part of the Lectures. The great Saxon Doctor had perhaps the most thoroughly human nature, in strength and weakness, of all the eminent men of that time. In almost all the other Reformers there is some barrier to shut us off from full comprehension of

* Though the Lutheran theory seems to me to have the advantage of not involving an unscientific hypothesis as to the nature of matter.

their characters and full sympathy with their thought. Erasmus never throws off entirely the timidity and isolation of the scholar. Melancthon's timorous and yielding coldness of nature is not true mildness. Calvin seems to work with the remorselessness of a theological machine. Zwingli's common sense is tinged with the *bourgeois* spirit. In most of these men, too, there is a sort of detachment from the common joys and relationships of human life, which seems a survival from the monastic spirit of mediæval churchmen. If Calvin had lived some five centuries earlier, he might have been Hildebrand; one can never figure Martin Luther as an inquisitor or an ecclesiastical autocrat. Doubtless, as the Lecturer admits, the Reformer's views on "Wein, Weib und Gesang" were tinged with the coarseness of his age; but even the inevitable touch of the animal was natural and healthy, and as alien from the curious foulness of the monastic imagination as from the vicious prudery of modern conventionalism.

Too many of the Reformers seem to have taken wives rather as a convenience or a protest against the system of celibacy than because of a true love or even fellow-feeling. They remained bachelors at heart while substituting the wife for the housekeeper. Most of them had a sort of academic contempt and neglect of women, and an ignorant scorn of the whole female sex, for which their successors paid dearly during the Romanist reaction of the Counter-Reformation. While the later Lutherans and Calvinists were grinding out libraries of now unreadable theology for the men, the Jesuits had been providing religion for the women.

The intelligent and hearty following out of Luther's own example, would surely have enabled the Reformation to spread further, and take more hold on the hearts of men; it would have substituted a little love for a great deal of logic, and might even have saved many communities from vacillating between a Catholicism that stultifies the intellect and a Protestantism that ossifies the affections. It is one

of Luther's highest merits that he rescued marriage from the ascetic theories that had desecrated it into a sacrament, and had made a wife a concession to man's weakness—a sort of exorcised concubine—and he at least did not reduce her again to the state of a wageless servant. The genial household of Doctor Martin and his Kate must have been a green oasis in the desert of dogma and polemic; even now it is one of the pleasantest things to read about in the history of the times. That marriage by which Luther set the seal upon his revolt from the old system, his most unpardonable sin in the eyes of his enemies, was perhaps the most thoroughly useful and true act in his career. The rebellion against a corrupt Church, the attack on superstition and vice, the return to the plain language of Scripture, were no new things, as is abundantly shown in the lecture on "Reform before the Reformation;" the Pauline or Augustinian scheme of theology, though developed independently by Luther, was not new either; but the enduring force of his action lay in the fact that he threw down the cloister wall to return to Nature, just as he pushed aside the priest and the crucifix to reach Christ. His followers failed to repeat his success largely because they built up the gaps he had made with new barriers of intellectual formalism and scholastic theology.

The immediate effect of the Reformation on morals is touched on by Mr. Beard in a short note which gives the result of long reading. He sums up in the following manner:—

I am afraid that we must admit that, whatever its after effects (and certainly no grave moral charges can be justly made against English and Scottish Puritanism), the Reformation did not at first carry with it much cleansing force of moral enthusiasm. The question is only indirectly connected with my main subject; but it will require much more careful treatment at the hands of any future historian of the Reformation than it has yet received. (P. 146.)

This is wisely said; but though historians of Protestant views should sift all evidence on either side carefully before

pronouncing judgment, they need not be afraid if the sentence seems to go against them. An interregnum is always a period of disorder and confusion; and it must have been some time before the new influences of the Reformation replaced the restraints of the mediæval system which had broken down. That European morals seemed, for the time, to deteriorate, is not to be wondered at; for the revolt against religious forms was sure to destroy those conventional decencies and customs by which all are greatly, and many exclusively controlled. But if we treat the Reformation in the large historical manner which Mr. Beard employs (pp. 2, 3)—regarding it as the work of the spirit of the Renaissance applied to religion—we may find reason to be thankful that this mighty destructive and constructive force was applied first to theology in the North, and not, as in Italy, to art and literature. The wildest crimes of the maddest Anabaptists were better than the cold atrocities of cultivated wickedness in the South.

The spirit of dogmatism still survived, and a new scholasticism of Melancthon and Calvin, and their disciples, replaced the old. But the capital advantage of the Reformation to modern thought and science was that the new chains could never be riveted like the old; the new rulers of theology had to start with far less power to repress revolt than had been possessed by those whom they overthrew. All such efforts—natural as they might be—as Reformed churches could make to accumulate tradition and enforce authority, were certain to be rather hurtful than helpful to them. Those whom they sought to retain by giving them their accustomed infant-food of authoritative statements, were sooner or later drawn into the organisation where they could have these advantages in greatest perfection. The Romanist's stereotyped question, "Where was your religion before Luther?" is hardly put correctly. Though there is no heathen Greek or Roman to ask him where *his* religion was before—Peter, to concede the maximum—yet the Buddhist, and even more, the member of the

Greek Church, could retort with some very awkward questions. What the question really means is, "Where was the authority of your Church before the Reformation?" for religion as such needs only truth, not antiquity, and is generally best at its source. It is in this latter form that the inquiry is so damaging to a certain class of minds; only the Church of England, among all the Reformed bodies, can make any plausible answer, and even this response is sometimes inadequate to satisfy the anxious.

It seems, indeed, perfectly natural that members of the extremely "High" party should periodically join the Roman Church. There are persons who have inherited or acquired a taste for authority, tradition, dogma, and ceremony, and require larger and larger doses to satisfy them. The habit of confession, as a sort of spiritual sedative, grows on the penitent like the custom of taking chloral. Soon the increased appetite will have consumed all the stores of the English Church, kept down as they are by the encroachments of the State and the nibblings of "aggrieved parishioners," and any one who craves for more must go to the only place where he can find it. The wonder is that those who nourish the taste for tradition do not see whither it will lead.

The English Church indeed has this quality, that under its external unity it can make room for very different schools of thought. The scientist, humanitarian, or socialist can find a place in the Broad Church, the middle-class Protestants *par excellence* in the Low, and lovers of the past in the various stages of the High, according to the fervour of their love. This is in some ways an advantage; but it may be doubted whether it is destined to prove an unmixed good. A Church so constituted may represent the nation, much as the army of Xerxes represented the Persian empire, and may prove almost as helpless against a small band of resolute and disciplined assailants of its ecclesiastical status or its standards of belief. The movement in favour of comprehension, so often begun, so often failing, in order to be finally successful, must be preceded by a general agreement

to yield on minor points of dispute, and a general conviction of the smallness of small things—which latter is unfortunately slow in penetrating the average theological mind, to whose microscope no doctrinal point is small.

Macaulay has asserted that the essence of the Revolution of 1688 lay in the fact that it broke the line of succession in the monarchy; it may be thought that the essence of the Continental Reformation lay in its breaking the line of spiritual and ecclesiastical succession. Lutheranism and Calvinism for some time stood to Roman Catholicism in the relation of William III. to James II. This was by no means an unmixed advantage; for the temper of the age was intolerant, and the new churches were often in the unpleasant position of displaying pretensions little less than those of their older rival, while lacking the necessary force and authority to make these claims good. It may even be thought by some that the victory of science, criticism, and philosophy over dogmatic theology has been too speedy in Germany, for instance, and that the weakness of the Reformed Churches apart from the State has hindered the equable development of thought.

But, as I have already stated, this inevitable break in tradition, slightest in England, but noticeable even there to all but those determined not to see, was what settled the course of modern thought in the northern nations. The Schoolmen of the reformed theology, whose rise is clearly sketched in Mr. Beard's Eighth Lecture, might build up fresh Babels of logical systems, using even the bricks of the old edifices which Luther and Zwingli had broken down; but the "confusion of tongues" of countless warring sects soon showed that these new towers would never reach the heaven, nor even equal the height attained by their predecessors. None of the Protestant churches could recall a time when they had ruled undisturbed with no precarious sovereignty; there were always dissidents who could neither be finally confuted nor completely suppressed. The idea of the true functions of a Church has changed greatly, and seems destined to change even more. The old idea was a

sort of reduction to literal fact of the parable of sheep and shepherd. It was the office of the priesthood to lead out the laity as sheep, to feed and tend them, and the duty of the laity to follow—still like sheep—without questioning or misgiving. The tides of men were to be ruled wholly by the attraction of the two worlds of light, the Church and the State.

The notions of government, civil and ecclesiastical, are now much altered. Though theorists, in angry recoil from the faults of modern systems, call for the benevolent despotism of a heaven-born ruler, the general set of opinion is unmistakably towards the higher democratic theory, according to which the State has two functions—to govern the people, and to teach them to govern themselves. And as it is in politics, so in religion; the Church is to rely, not on the blind faith and unreasoning submission of ignorant multitudes, but on the intelligence of those who know what they believe, and why; and whose creed, if it deals with matters above their comprehension, does not outrage either their sense of justice or their reason.

The rise of the critical spirit and the development of science and philosophy (to each of which Mr. Beard has devoted a lecture) have had a considerable share in bringing about this state of opinion; but they have done so rather indirectly than directly. On the masses of men, even science has as yet made comparatively little impression; the higher criticism does not speak to them. It is rather the change in the moral atmosphere, as I may call it, that has brought about the more important alterations. A dogma that palpably contradicts the common sense or wounds the moral consciousness of the society on which it is forced, must eventually fall; and the church that upholds it will be endangered by such ill-timed support. Even the Canaanites whom Joshua slaughtered have found means, long after their death, to inflict a deadly wound upon much Hebraistic theology. In order to justify the divine commands for such deeds, Mansel started, or revived, the notion of the fundamental difference between divine and

human morality, and the incomprehensibility of the former except through revelation ; and this theory led on to Agnosticism by an obvious inference. The historical method of the higher criticism was a real refuge from such opposition between dogma and morality.

It is this shifting of public opinion that really brings about considerable changes in religious belief ; criticism, though it ceases destroying and begins to construct, can never command general assent by its purely intellectual means. Hence the position *credo quia impossibile*, may remain for a long time unassailed, for "impossible" is not a scientific word, and Science is more concerned with doing than with determining what cannot be done ; but *credo quia absurdum* is surely doomed. Of course all religious beliefs whatever can, by the expenditure of a little cheap ingenuity, be put in a ridiculous light ; but this is a far different case from that of those doctrines which ascribe to God conduct which would generally be regarded as unjust or trivial in a man. It is difficult, for instance, to suppose that the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration will long continue to be generally held—that "forged bond with a forged release indorsed on the back of it," according to which a child is freed by a rite of which it knows nothing from the guilt of acts which it has not committed.

It is this change in what I have termed the moral and mental atmosphere that determines the course of reform. Feelings are more important than events, even in politics. The governments of the Holy Alliance, we know, were far more rigid and despotic, and apparently far stronger, than those that had preceded them, before the French Revolution ; the difference lay in the minds of their subjects, over whom the breath of liberty had once passed. Again, it was the remembrance of the Great Rebellion in English history that made the Revolution of 1688, if not possible, at least easy of accomplishment. The worth of an unsuccessful or incomplete revolt lies in the fact that it makes men realise the possibility of its full success.

So, too, with the Reformation ; it did not always bring

about much advance in doctrine. Its leaders kept much that they should have rejected, rejected not a little that could well have been kept. Even the poor misguided Anabaptists, who served as the scapegoat of the Reformation, had some notions higher and truer than those of Luther or Calvin. The extreme Calvinistic dogma of predestination and reprobation leads more logically to antinomianism than that extreme and sordid form of the doctrine of Indulgences against which Luther first rose up. If sin cannot alter a destiny fixed from before the foundation of the world, a man may feel even freer to sin than if he could escape the consequences of his wrong-doing by a mere money-payment. Even Luther, the most large-hearted of the Reformers, though he sometimes claimed liberty of conscience for all, was inconsistent in withholding it from others; while Melancthon and Zwingli had no scruple in repressing heresy, and whatever the share which Calvin personally had in the death of Servetus, there can be no reasonable doubt that he would have had fifty Servetuses burnt, could he have laid hands on them.

All these greater or lesser failings are assiduously gathered up and exaggerated by a certain class of writers and thinkers, who wish to represent the Reformation as a senseless, or at least over-violent and unnecessary revolt from a venerable and sacred constitution of society. With a method, which, though it has recently been proclaimed as a new and scientific discovery by (I think) Mr. Mallock, has been practised from time immemorial by all who, for party purposes, seek to degrade history to the level of society journalism, they refute the Reformers, and prove the wickedness of their followers by unsavoury little bits of court and other scandal about Philip of Hesse and his two wives, or Henry VIII. and Mary and Anne Boleyn; and Protestant writers are apt, in the same petty spirit, to retort with Popes Alexander VI. and Leo X., with Philip II. and Mary Queen of Scots. It is time that this useless bandying of old taunts should cease. Since it is well that the details of our narratives should be correct, let them be

settled dispassionately, according to admitted rules of evidence, and left once for all. All the wrangling that has ever been, or can ever be, expended on these questions will never help us one step forward towards the true comprehension of the Reformation.

The tendency of narrow minds to attribute vast results to small and petty causes, has been most banefully evident in the treatment of Sixteenth Century history. What we must recognise, if we are to understand anything of the relation between past and present, is that with the Renaissance and the Reformation began a really great change; as M. Taine vividly puts it, "men opened their eyes and *saw*." Men began in many ways to think and act for themselves, not as members of some great institution, but as individuals. There had been attempts at reform before the Reformation, attempts to raise the standard of culture before the Revival of Letters; but the compelling power of some vast organisation, often feudalism, too often the Church, had doomed them to failure. It was by an irony of fate that the Italian Popes of the Renaissance seemed to bring about the overthrow of their own supreme spiritual dominion. Their good, as well as their bad characteristics, helped to undermine their power. Some of them actively encouraged, and most of them permitted, not only the ardent study of the classics, and of the original language of the Scriptures also, but even a sort of intellectual scepticism and freedom of thought on religious matters which surprise us on the threshold of the age of intolerance, and at the end of the age when toleration was not so much as thought of.

Italy soon lost her pre-eminence of learning; but from her lamp was kindled the more enduring light of the Northern lands. A series of great discoveries, coming near together, had widened the material, and with it the mental world; the press stood ready to spread among the people the new thoughts that were sure to arise. Some great change was inevitable; and the keynote to all the changes that happened is the new sense of the importance of the

individual. Architecture, formerly carried on by some patient company of unknown fellow-workers, fell under the power of some single great man, from whose brain all proceeded, and soon fell into imitation of classical work, while painting, the most personal of the arts, replaced it. The Universities showed little new life, and indeed generally lagged behind the advance of learning; but scholars arose, who were universities in themselves. Everywhere men, great by genius or position, spring up, and the events of history group themselves round their lives. All the Reformers agree in this, that to them Religion is a relation of each single soul to God. It was this rejection of intermediaries that made reconciliation hopeless between the old church and the new sects. All else might have been forgiven, but not this.

It was in vain that the clergy and theologians of the Reformation tried to take away with one hand what they had given with the other, and to substitute for the *dicta* of an infallible church a system drawn from their own interpretation of Scripture. All the arguments by which their independence had been vindicated against Rome could be brought forward to vindicate the freedom of others from their rule. For the Reformation so called in history was only one important stage in the progress of one phase of a mighty change; the force of the main movement has gone on without ceasing, and is still carrying us forward whether we will or no. The old instinct of authority and systematizing for a time stiffened religious thought into elaborate and rigid creeds, and enabled the Roman Church to rise again by its own renewed vigour and the faults of its rivals. But even the Roman Church was changed in spirit by the movement which it condemned.

From religion men turned to science, to literature, to philosophy. Whether they brought their new and wider knowledge to bear on theology or not, they contributed by every discovery, every masterpiece, to change the conditions under which faith must henceforth live. Criticism took up the records of the past, and with one touch revealed the

literary character and ancestry of old records, showing the mythical character of what had been thought history, and the historical value of what had been neglected as myth. Archæology, the critical and the historical methods have explored together the obscure annals of the past; and our view has widened and cleared backwards as well as around us.

Of all this the average man knows, or at least thinks little; the change is in his environment, and he does not remark it. He does not think as his forefathers did in regard to the material world, or the facts of history, simply because he has been taught differently. He retains the religious beliefs or unbeliefs of his ancestors as they have come down to him through the society to which he belongs; what has altered is the *way* in which he holds his creed. It is this which is specially characteristic of the state of modern thought; not so much disbelief as nebulous doubt, not so much hostility to faith as an inability to believe, often joined with a real desire to do so. Perhaps even that mildness of the age which is revolted by any attempt at religious persecution is partly the fruit of this instability of doctrine; hardly any one, infidel or Christian, is quite sure that he can follow out his belief to its logical outcome. Has not the educated body of religious men in this country practically, though tacitly, abandoned the crude doctrine of Eternal Punishment? Among the many clergy who preach it, how many do so with any real conviction of its truth? Who cares to expose himself to the inexorable *sortes* that drives him to state at what point of the infinite gradations of human character the "great gulf" should open?

Those who hold that in matters of religion men ought to think for themselves, and not confine the action of their independent thought to such a space of time as may be sufficient to convince them of the excellence of a Church, must soon take account of the new conditions of the time consciously, as they have long been doing unconsciously. It is not so much a question of what we ought to believe,

as of what we can believe. The kind of half-faith that thinks it expedient to try to seem to hold a doctrine, has had too long and too wide a sway. The curious modern form of theology which holds a creed in gross and abandons it in detail at the same time, natural and even inevitable as it may sometimes be, and prevalent as it undoubtedly is now, is as undoubtedly neither wholesome nor creditable as a permanent attitude of mind. Mr. Beard's question, which he propounds at the commencement, and seeks to answer at the close of his Lectures, is this—what must we do as regards those creeds and confessions of the Reformation which we still suppose ourselves to hold fast as statements of our belief? His answer practically is that there is a considerable part which must be abandoned; and that our whole mental attitude towards them must be revised.

In brief, we are now called upon to make the ancient affirmations of the Churches, in an age when the evidence on which they were based has either changed or must be estimated by other canons of judgment. We cannot read the Bible, or interpret history, or look out upon Nature as the Reformers did. If we are to accept their creeds at all, it must be either by boldly putting our own meaning upon their phrases, or by resolutely shutting our eyes to the best knowledge of our time.

There is a sense in which the issue between progress and stagnation in theology may be said to be decided by the Reformation itself. For it was a revolt against finality, and it would be strange if finality were to be its result. If, as I have tried to prove, it was the first effect of the intellectual movement which is still in full operation, why should it withdraw itself from its influence in its latest and most important stage? I cannot help thinking that Luther, could he live now, would breathe the common air of the intellectual world, and answer to its inspiration as he did to that of his own time. About the greatest minds there is an ever fresh receptiveness; they stand close to the sources of truth, and desire no better than to drink and be satisfied: it is a second and weaker generation, accustomed *jurare in verba magistri*, who subject facts to creeds, and will not permit even God to contradict His own servants. I know, of course, how this argument is sought to be evaded; the Reformation, it

may be said, though in appearance a forward, was really a backward step; it was a recurrence, past an intercalated period of corruption, to primitive purity of belief and a standard which is independent of intellectual progress. But this, after all, only begs the question. If it was admissible for Luther to examine the interpretation put by the Catholic Church upon the Bible and Christian antiquity, it is equally admissible for us to examine Luther's. We are but following his example in testing religious ideas by the surest knowledge of our own day. What if it turns out that his work was only half-done, and could be no more than half-done with the materials at his command? What if the Bible shows by its history and structure that it is unfit to occupy that seat of authority from which, in its favour, he displaced the Church? The truth is that one Reformation always carries in it the seed of another. There are two elements in religion, the permanent and the transient, the divine and the human—a duality which rests upon the fact that what is given by God can only be partially apprehended by man. And it is necessary, in order that the permanent should shine out in its pure and simple splendour, that the transient should gradually drop away. (Pp. 404-6.)

It is possible, however, that the Lecturer over-estimates the importance of the impending change. In all old creeds and systems there are some statements which their warmest supporters explain away; there are still more which many would abandon if forced to give a clear and consistent opinion on them: and the change in doctrine, if made, would be greater theoretically than practically. That some alteration is necessary in the current theology of many Protestants, is hardly doubtful; and it is difficult to believe that some such change will not be forced upon the apparent unity and submission of the Roman Catholic Church. The class of mind which accepts statements on authority solely, or is pacified by the concession of an occasional reason, is not that of a full-grown man. The inroad of the Liberal spirit is manifest even now in the change of attitude from the wrong-headed and devout ignorance of an infallible Pius to the conciliatory and enlightened temper of an equally infallible Leo. If the commands of the Church be

just and true, there must be abundant reasons for them ; and the statement that it is inconvenient to give these reasons will tend more and more to rouse suspicion. The *present* attitude of the average devout Catholic I conceive to be accurately stated by the writer of a letter in the *Tablet*, who stated that he accepted Scripture *because* the Church commanded him to do so. This of course leaves the Church free to yield up any untenable position as regards the Bible ; but, if Scripture stands on the Church, the Church stands on tradition and succession, and the inquirer will soon ask what is the foundation that underlies this last—the tortoise of the Hindoo mythology.

A wide course of ecclesiastical history, studied in an unbiassed spirit, is perhaps the most powerful solvent of a belief in the infallibility of any Church. We find some of the most eminent founders of tradition engaged in quarrelling very violently about matters of which neither they nor their opponents had much knowledge, and making rigid and precise definitions of things which entirely transcend the scope of human language. The customary answer, that by these wranglings they settled Christian doctrine on a sure foundation, seems eminently unsatisfactory. It is difficult to see what, except common-sense, prevents any one who should wish it from disputing on the very same topics that exercised the Councils. Surely it is more rational and charitable in the historical student to conclude that the often infinitesimal differences of dogma were rather the pretext than the cause of dispute among all but the very subtlest minds. We can recognise the good work which Athanasius and his followers did in securing the triumph of the higher form of faith, while considering the Latin confession (or mixture of two confessions) labelled with his name, no invaluable possession.

It is not therefore from the scientific spirit as such that I expect danger to come to the Roman Church, so much as from that more common temper that grows weary of leading-strings, and suspicious of authoritative assertion without proof. If Science and Religion are ever to fight an

Armageddon, they will find difficulty in selecting the field for a decisive battle. Some conflict, however, there must be between the old forms and the new spirit, and this is what Mr. Beard looks for in a new Reformation which shall carry on the unfinished work of the old to a further stage of development.

Granting that the Reformation was a real step forward in the evolution of civilised society—granting that its work was in part left undone, and in part wrongly done—granting that a new Reformation is needful, and might well arise in our days, I must yet feel considerable doubt as to whether there will be any large and noticeable movement at all akin to the historical Reformation, or any prophet of the new faith such as the Lecturer foresees. Local movements, or a general agreement among the learned of several countries, there may indeed be; but the Reformation itself, by localizing forms of religion and thought, has circumscribed the possible influence of any human reformer; the ground is full of inequalities to arrest the progress of his chariot-wheels. There may be men as great as Luther, but they will not tower as high above their neighbours as he did, nor will they have his opportunity.

Again, there are few European countries where religion—or rather clerical influence—enters so closely into private life as before the Reformation. It is not easy to move the masses except by common grievances and desires, and these will be hard to find. That some new awakening of religion, some reconciliation between science and faith, is about to be inaugurated by a modern prophet in some one country, is not, as far as we can judge, specially improbable, and it is certainly an event much to be desired; but in the present divided state of Christendom, it is hard to see how anything short of supernatural power should give the regenerator of one nation the facility to quicken another, except by long centuries of evangelization through disciples, for which the hurry of modern life hardly leaves time. The Roman Empire levelled the civilised world for Christianity; the Roman Church levelled part of Christendom for the

Reformation : such a condition of society, as far as we can tell, comes not again. It is not so much a prophet of change that is needed as a comprehension of what change has been unconsciously made. Evolution, not revolution, is the watchword of the age ; by devious and different paths we believe that all are gradually climbing the slopes of progress, and though the track is misty below and hidden above, we may well believe that the Power which has brought us so far in the long deliberate working out of a mighty purpose, will not desert us in the future. Although we may watch in vain for the coming of a human guide and prophet, yet

Through all Nature's sun-pierced shadow-wall
Our souls behold one ceaseless-working Soul.

ARTHUR R. ROPES.

ERNEST RENAN'S RECOLLECTIONS.—II.

RELIGIOUS progress, to be genuine, must, as we conceive, partake of the characteristics of all natural and mental progress. It must combine tranquillity with force and growth. A tree tends to the light, slightly bends before the storm, and through vicissitudes pushes forth its roots and branches with calm persistent energy: fit symbol of the growth of the tree of life.

M. Renan has rendered eminent service to religious truth by the union of calmness and of reverence with the force of just critical conviction.

When Rationalism is impetuous, irreverent, contemptuous; men of fine mind and sensitive heart shrink from it, and but too frequently fly timidly into the arms of Absolutism. Victor Hugo in a noble burst of sentiment exclaimed, "Christ redeemed the world by his tears; Voltaire regenerated it by his smiles." But it is a happy token of our times that the country which owes its deliverance from intolerance to the brilliant sarcasms of Voltaire, shivering the chains of ages, as with the reckless waywardness of lightning, is now mentally aided by the refined, sympathetic, and accurate criticisms of Renan. The foremost of religious Rationalists is now the most prominent in reverence to Religion, and in tender consideration to the feelings, the foibles, and the fables of man. It is surely high time for us to treat Religionists as men, not as sectarians separated from man, and to be judged by a distinct law. The Jews regarded themselves as God's people, other nations as God's enemies. The Romans saw in Syria and in Asia, only Barbarians. The Roman Catholic Church in

like manner would fain separate her subjects from the rest of mankind, claiming for her Faith and Sacraments all the deeds of virtue which have ever flourished within her borders. This fatal error has been deeply imprinted on the Roman Catholic Church, imitated by other ecclesiastical bodies, and intensified by creeds, rites, liturgies, and admonitions. The result is a severance of man from man. We hear of Christians and Heathens: of the Believers and the Unbelievers: of the Converted and the Unconverted: of the Saved and the Lost. What is this but to perpetuate the "Faithful" and the "Infidel," as used by Roman Catholics and Mahomedans to express in each case their separation from the human race and superiority over the human race? Such claims increase the power of the Sect, but at the sacrifice of great human virtues. These arrogant and inhuman pretensions produce another result: those who have been always treated and spoken of as outside the charmed circle of the elect, easily become unfair on their side, and impute to the rites and teachings of the Sect weaknesses and crimes which belong to human nature, not sectarian nature. Some Protestants have expressed regret and apprehension at the appreciative language wherewith M. Renan commends the priests of Brittany and St. Sulpice: such regret need not excite our surprise, though we are quite aware that the generosity of appreciation is not reciprocal. But the generous are generous because they do not expect a return. Through the agencies of commerce and of science, and the consequent increased intercommunication throughout the world, there is arising more and more of a blending of ideas amongst nations and amongst religions. The higher Rationalism is daily more and more recognising the cosmic unity of mankind, and the fact that Religion is an essential development of man. Religion is part of man and of human life, not something separate, which has come down from the skies as a gift to some favoured few. Thus Religion is whatever human nature is. When human nature is ignorant, sensual, selfish; then the Religion of such men is ignorant, sensual, selfish.

When man is noble, pure, generous, thoughtful; then his religion is noble, pure, generous, and to the best of existing knowledge—truthful. The history of Religion is the history of man striving to rise above himself: it is the heaving of the human mind touched, stirred, thrilled, by the unceasing miracle of nature and of man.

Never from lips of cunning fell
The thrilling Delphic oracle.
Out from the heart of Nature rolled
The burdens of the Bible old.

Surely the time has come when Rationalism is strong enough in Europe to enable men like Renan to praise, nay, to make us love men as men, without thereby by word or act striving to perpetuate what we deem their errors. The monks ridiculed the gods of ancient Greece and Rome, but preserved for us the classical poems which have rendered their Elysian fields immortal.

It would carry us too far from our immediate subject to consider the various reasons which have combined in producing the marked dissimilarity between the priests who seceded from the Papal Church in the sixteenth century and founded the Protestant Churches in Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and England, and those who have seceded in our own time; but we are immediately concerned to notice two particulars regarding M. Renan. First, his almost entire reticence as to the injurious workings of the Papal system. The indictment of Paul Bert, so terribly and minutely true, contained in the *Morale des Jésuites* might belong to another religion, for aught we learn from Renan: and yet the very books which supply Paul Bert with his facts, are now the ordinary guides of all French confessors. It is perhaps due to an over-strained delicacy and susceptibility, that M. Renan never gives any opinion calculated to warn those who are but too prone in England to introduce the Confessional or to frequent it. It is true that he devotes two chapters to a curious and melancholy history from which a thoughtful reader might infer a warning. The narrative is remarkable, if only taken as a psychological fact.

It regards a priest who from first to last seems to have been perfectly innocent, good, discreet ; and a lady until the final catastrophe utterly devoid of malice, though becoming the cause of disaster and sad misery to others and to herself. It would have been well if M. Renan had stated what is intimately known to Roman Catholic Bishops, that the incident is one of repeated recurrence, and therefore deserving of attention.

M. Renan seems to have learned the sad history from his mother : it obviously had gravely struck him, for he occupies nearly three chapters with the picturesque but melancholy narrative.

Mademoiselle de Kermelle lived with her father in a quaint antiquated farmhouse near the village church of Tredarrec, a hamlet adjoining the birthplace of Renan. The family of Kermelle was ancient and honourable but reduced to comparative poverty by the Revolution. The parish priest was a man irreproachable, with a serious air tinged with melancholy and subdued by resignation. He was the confessor of the De Kermelle family. The daughter gradually became immersed in a deep love for her confessor. Virtuous and mystical, her love was pure and enthusiastic like that of the devotee to St. Joseph or St. Aloysius, like that of the young man to the Virgin Mary or St. Agnes. It grew and intensified, and she longed for each return to the confessional to hear his voice and to receive his corrections and admonitions. The good priest, either unconscious or deeming it best to seem unconscious, seldom spoke to her outside the confessional. She longed to receive from him some innocent sign of his regard. During an entire year this love which became a worship, increased until her imagination dwelt on wild schemes whereby she might obtain means of rendering him a service and obtaining thereby the reward of some kindly expression of gratitude.

She passed her time in hemming and marking household linen. She marked it with the initials of her confessor, sometimes uniting his initials with her own : still she was dreaming how to get these into his use.

The festival of Christmas approached : the priest's house adjoined the church : it was his custom after the midnight Mass to entertain at supper the mayor and other notabilities of the village. The table was laid out before Mass, so that the housekeeper might be able to attend the service. Mademoiselle de Kermelle secretly obtained the key of the back door of the Rectory, went in and removed the tablecloth and napkins, hiding them in the Manor house. When Mass was over, the theft was detected, causing great surprise, the more so since nothing was removed but the linen. The priest was unwilling to let his guests go away supperless, and while they were consulting what to do the young lady arrived, saying, " You will not decline our good offices this time, Monsieur le Curé, you shall have our linen in a few minutes." The priest, little suspecting the trick, thankfully accepted, and thus her object was accomplished.

The following day this singular robbery was investigated. It seemed perfectly clear that but one person could be guilty, namely, the Clerk's wife. She had been in and out of the Parsonage house for incense during the time of Mass. No one else could have been there ; all the doors were locked. This unfortunate woman, who had for many years been in the service of the Church, was seized and walked off between two gendarmes, calmly protesting her innocence : all the spectators were in tears. Consternation filled the village. Mademoiselle de Kermelle, infatuated by her egotism and imagination, wickedly remained silent. In the meanwhile the priest noticed the initials, and was electrified to see his own interwoven with hers. Immersed in wonder and in thought, he raises his head and sees the venerable form of M. de Kermelle : pale as death, the old man exclaimed amidst his tears, " It is my miserable girl. I have failed ; I ought to have kept a closer watch over her and to have found out what her thoughts were about, but with her constant melancholy, she gave me the slip." The secret was revealed ; the linen was restored. The delinquent had hoped that then all was over. Lost to all moral sense, she forgot that the Clerk's wife was in prison awaiting her trial ;

and she remained plunged in a kind of stupor which had nothing of remorse, and was still more prostrated in consequence of the evident failure of her attempt to move the feelings of the priest. After an innocent woman had been several days in prison on the charge of theft, it was very difficult to let the real culprit go unpunished. She was arrested and taken to St. Brieux for the assizes. Her prostration was so complete that she seemed to be out of the world. The aged father came into court, erect and self-possessed, with a look of melancholy resignation. He came to the bar of the witness-box and deposited on the ledge his scarf and Cross of St. Louis. "Gentlemen of the jury," he said, "I can only put these on again if you tell me to do so; my honour is in your hands. She is the culprit; but she is not a thief: she is ill." His utterance was choked with tears: the court was profoundly moved: the case was instantly dismissed. In the dark of the evening she returned with her father to a home where no one ever smiled again. The Manor house became a tomb from which issued no sign of life. But the Clerk's wife was the first to die. The emotion had been too much for her simple soul. The old man lived on a few years, dying inch by inch in his seclusion. The unfortunate culprit became insane, and an inmate of the hospital of Tréguier.

Those who are acquainted with convent life could tell many such sorrowful histories. Those who advocate the restoration of the confessional and point to benefits resulting from its use, ought to learn from the experience of those who know, and they would discover that thoughtful men do not much dread the rare cases of bad priests using the confessional for bad purposes, but dread gravely the frequently injurious effect of confession when the intentions on both sides are good, as also the not unfrequent effect of confession when one or the other, without being bad, is either weak or imperfect.

The second observation suggested by M. Renan's autobiography, is, that he seems to hold the view that only the *élite* can be justified in leaving the Roman Catholic Church.

This seems to us a grave fallacy, if we are correct in inferring it from the tone of some of his remarks. Requirements must vary with the knowledge of the individual. Renan, with a mind of singular acuteness and keen perception, had been familiar with all the defences of the Roman Catholic position; thus a longer intellectual conflict was required from him, than from another man not equally learned. His intellect discovered the fallacy of all those arguments: another man has not been trained to believe these fallacies, and therefore has less to unlearn. Surely we must allow something to the common sense and common conscience of unsophisticated men and women. The Roman Catholic controversialist claims that he can present the argument for his Church in a very brief compass. Then the reverse must be reasonable—to disprove as briefly what can be so briefly proved. In the Roman Catholic countries—France, Italy, Austria, Spain, South America—there are millions of nominal Roman Catholics who disbelieve, rejecting entirely the Divine Claims of the Papal Church. These belong to all degrees of learning and of thought. With some, disbelief is the result of long and patient research; with others it is the result of clear common sense and a practical conscience; with others, contact with piety and virtue from some more attractive source; with others, contact with the scandals and inferior morality from which the Papal Church seems to be only saved by the presence of a powerful unbelieving majority.

Surely these millions must count as something; we must not limit our regard to the intellectual giants who by accumulated stores of knowledge have vanquished the accumulated forces of skilful sophistry and dogmatic absolutism. Moreover, amongst a large and increasing number, belief has become impossible, quite irrespective of all critical investigations and ecclesiastical controversies, in consequence of facts of science, of history, of comparative religion. It may be asked, whether disbelief is not also caused by a desire to be free from moral restraints. Roman Catholic theology, with cruel and presumptuous

audacity, affirms that disbelief can never occur except as the result of vice, a statement too absurd to treat with gravity ; but it may be reasonably asked whether vice may not be one of the causes of disbelief. It would seem not improbable, if we argued theoretically ; but, guided by experience, we are inclined to think that the reverse is the fact. When a Roman Catholic becomes bad, experience proves that he clings with all the greater tenacity to his Church. Sin makes cowards of us all, and when the conscience reproaches, it causes the guilty person to shrink from losing those means of pardon to which he has been wont to trust. Facts in Ireland, Spain, and Italy will, it is thought, be found fully to substantiate this statement. The more we learn of the operations of the human mind as to change of religious opinion, the more do we find it to be generally quite irrespective of personal sin. Moreover, those who leave a powerful sect, have nearly always far more to lose than to gain by the change. This, we take it, applies equally in whichever direction the change is made, whether *from* Roman Catholicism, or *to* Roman Catholicism. If this view be, as we judge, correct, it raises the whole question of conversion out of the range of vulgar crimination, and spiteful scorn. M. Renan has helped us to this noble appreciation. But, it may be asked, why has he produced an autobiography which would rather tend to make a hesitating Roman Catholic try to banish his doubts and to abide in his Church, than to pursue his investigations and enter upon the solitary and painful pilgrimage in quest of truth ? It is clear that he, personally, has no misgivings. Amidst the happiness of his present life, one fear alone appals him :

I should be very grieved to have to go through one of those periods of enfeeblement during which the man once endowed with strength and virtue is but the shadow and ruin of his former self ; and often, to the delight of the ignorant, sets himself to demolish the life which he had so laboriously constructed. If such a fate be in store for me, I hasten to protest beforehand against the weaknesses which a softened brain might lead me

to say or to sign. It is the Renan, sane in body and mind, as I am now—not the Renan, half destroyed by death and no longer himself; as I shall be if my decomposition is gradual—whom I wish to be believed and listened to.

There is no hesitation in those words, no feeble desire to raise from the ashes the corpse of a buried illusion. But let not the reader be surprised if the departing vision was followed with tearful gaze, full of pathetic memories. Those who, rejecting the Roman Church, came to believe it to be the anti-Christ, might be excused if they turned upon it with the bitterest religious scorn. But those of us who have recognised in the Roman Church many of the lineaments of the Christ of Nazareth, and have learned, within its enclosure, many sacred lessons, and realised therein many forms of human goodness, must inevitably assume an attitude more tender than that of the first reformers, though, as we trust, not less firm, or less truthful. To us the Roman Church is part of the great human family: the Pope to us is not anti-Christ, but an aged man, neither revered by us nor hated by us because he is Pope, but possessing our sympathy, because he is a man. He has his errors, and we have our errors, and all that each man can do is to eschew the errors he perceives.

M. Renan tells us that he is singularly reluctant to give offence, or to assert himself; hence, perhaps, he hardly gives to the inquiring Roman Catholic the encouragement we might have anticipated. But the state of France is probably partly the cause of this reticence. He knows that though Religion is natural to man, and part of man, it needs man's aid. Whatever is a part of man needs aid and culture. This aid in France has never yet been formulated. Until the first Revolution, the Church reigned supreme; and the reign of the Church had proved as fatal to morality as it had been to liberty. The clerical power was soon re-established by Imperialism, with only a partial concession, recognising and maintaining two other Religions, viz., the Synodical Protestant and the Jewish. Therefore the French people have for a long period of time been trained to the

habit of silent dissent when unable to believe one of the three established religions.

The religious status of M. Renan would appear now to be that of the Cosmic Theist ; holding in loving reverence all the religious past ; adoring the Divine Spirit animating the Cosmos, and regarding the Moral Law as part of the Divine Unity of things. Yet he not unfrequently uses expressions implying vagueness as to these fundamental ideas, as if they formed to him a state of mental feeling rather than a profound energising conviction adapted to cheer the sorrowful, to support the tempted, to raise up the fallen. His appears to be a contented tranquil life ; perhaps not needing the support of a profound and clear conviction. But to many, life is full of care and trouble, needing a solid hope ; and without conscious rational and deep trust in the Living God, how shall hope come to cheer the heart of the forlorn ?

But let us resume the story of his life.

To M. Renan the rupture with the Church was full of deep pain : to the convictions of reason and conscience, he yielded all the interests and sentiments calculated to beguile man. The Sulpicians, strong in faith, did not fetter his reading so much as might have been expected : he studied Pascal, Malebranche, Euler, Locke, Leibnitz, Descartes, Reid, Dugald Stewart, Cousin, Jouffroy. Doubts kept forcing themselves before his acute, critical, and sincere mind. His confessor gave him the usual reply : " These are only temptations ; they are of no consequence." But he saw that the doubts were truthful and touched the entire question ; he absolutely refused to obey his confessor and to enter the subdiaconate : minor orders did not seem to bind him so much :

There were times when I was sorry that I was not a Protestant, so that I might be a philosopher without ceasing to be a Christian. Then again, I recognised the fact that the Catholics alone are consistent. A single error proves that a Church is not infallible : one weak part proves that a book is not a revealed one. Outside rigid orthodoxy, there was nothing except Free Thought.

The teachers in St. Sulpice, he says, were quite right in refusing to make any concessions, inasmuch as a single confession of error ruins the whole edifice of absolute truth, and reduces it to the level of human authorities, in which each person makes his selections according to his individual fancy.

In a divine book everything must be true, and as two contradictions cannot both be true, it must not contain any contradiction. But the careful study of the Bible, while revealing to me many historical and æsthetic treasures, proved to me also that it was not more exempt than any other ancient book from contradictions, inadvertencies and errors. It contains fables, legends, and other traces of purely human composition. It is no longer possible for any one to assert that the second part of the book of Isaiah was written by Isaiah. The book of Daniel, which, according to all orthodox tenets, relates to the period of the captivity, is an apocryphal work composed in the year 169 or 170 B.C. The book of Judith is an historical impossibility. The attributing the Pentateuch to Moses does not bear investigation. . . . He is not a true Catholic who departs in the smallest iota from the traditional thesis. What becomes of the miracle which Bossuet so admired: "Cyrus referred to two hundred years before his birth?" What becomes of the 70 weeks of years, the basis of the calculations of universal history, if that part of Isaiah in which Cyrus is referred to was composed during the lifetime of that warrior, and if the pseudo-Daniel is a contemporary of Antiochus Epiphanes? Orthodoxy calls upon us to believe that the biblical books are the work of those to whom their titles assign them. The mildest Catholic doctrine as to inspiration will not allow one to admit that there is any marked error in the Sacred text, or any contradiction in matters which do not relate either to faith or morality. . . . This theory of inspiration implying a supernatural fact, has become impossible to uphold. An inspired book is a miracle. It should present itself to us under conditions totally different from any other book. It may be said: "You are not so exacting in respect to Herodotus and the poems of Homer." This is quite true, but then Herodotus and the Homeric poems do not profess to be inspired books. With regard to contradictions, for instance, no one whose mind is free from theological preoccupations can do other than admit the irreconcilable divergences between the

three synoptical gospels and the fourth gospel, and between the synoptical gospels compared one with the other. For us Rationalists this is not of much importance ; but the orthodox reasoner, compelled to be of opinion that his book is right in every particular, finds himself involved in endless subtleties. Silvestre de Sacy was very much perplexed by the quotations from the Old Testament which are met with in the New. He found it so difficult to reconcile them, that he eventually admitted as a principle that the two Testaments are both infallible of themselves, but that the New Testament is not so when it quotes the Old. Only those who have no sort of experience in the ways of Religion will feel any surprise that men of such great powers of application should have clung to such untenable propositions. In these shipwrecks of a faith upon which you have centred your life, you cling to the most unlikely means of salvage, rather than allow all you cherish to go to the bottom. Men of the world who believe that people are brought to a decision in the choice of their opinions by reasons of sympathy or antipathy will no doubt be surprised at the train of reasoning which alienated me from the Christian faith, to which I had so many motives both of interest and inclination for remaining attached. . . .

One of the worst kinds of intellectual dishonesty is to play upon words, to represent Christianity as imposing scarcely any sacrifice upon reason, and in this way to inveigle people into it without letting them know to what they have committed themselves. This is where Catholics who dub themselves Liberals, are under such a delusion. Ignorant of theology and exegesis, they treat accession to Christianity, as if it were a mere accession to a party. They pick and choose, and explain away, and then are indignant if well-informed people tell them that they are not true Catholics. No one who has studied theology can be guilty of such inconsistency, as in his eyes everything rests upon the infallible authority of the Scripture and the Church ; he has no choice to make. To abandon a single dogma or reject a single tenet in the teaching of the Church, is equivalent to the negation of the Church and of Revelation. In a Church founded upon divine authority, it is as much an act of heresy to deny a single point as to deny the whole. If a single stone is pulled out of the building, the whole edifice must come to the ground.

Nor is there any good to be gained by saying that the Church will perhaps some day make concessions which will avert the

necessity of ruptures such as that which I felt forced upon me. I am perfectly well aware how far the Church can go in the way of concession, and I know what are the points upon which it is useless to ask her for any. The Catholic Church will never abandon a jot or tittle of her orthodox system. I have no doubt that there will be schisms, more, perhaps, than ever before, but the true Catholic will be inflexible in the declaration: "If I must abandon my past, I shall abandon the whole; for I believe in everything upon the principle of infallibility, and this principle is as much affected by one small concession as by ten thousand large ones." For the Catholic Church to admit that Daniel was an apocryphal person of the time of the Maccabees, would be to admit that she had made a mistake; if she was mistaken in that, she may have been mistaken in others, and she is no longer divinely inspired. I do not therefore in any way regret having been brought into contact, for my religious education, with sincere teachers, who would have scrupulously avoided letting me labour under any illusion as to what a Catholic is required to admit. The Catholicism which was taught me is not the beguiling compromise, suitable only for laymen, which has led to so many misunderstandings of the present day. My Catholicism was that of Scripture, of the Councils, of the Theologians. This Catholicism I loved, and I still respect it; having found it inadmissible, I separated myself from it. This is a straightforward course, but what is not straightforward is to pretend ignorance of the engagement contracted, and to become the apologist of things concerning which one is ignorant. I have never lent myself to a falsehood of this description, and I have looked upon it as disrespectful to the faith to practise deceit with it.

During two years of inward labour, he strove to regard his difficulties as unfounded. He called this crisis of his life *Naphtali*, and often repeated to himself the Hebrew saying, *Naphtoulé Elohim niphtali* (I have fought the fight of God).

My inward feelings were not changed, but each day a stitch in the tissue of my faith was broken; the immense amount of work which I had in hand prevented me from drawing the conclusion. My director, to whom I confided my difficulties, replied in just the same terms as M. Gosselin at Issy, "Inroads upon your faith! Pay no heed to them: keep straight on your way:

these are only temptations and afflictions common to most persons who achieve any progress."

In the meanwhile the traditions of ancient goodness lost not their hold upon him, but rather intensified. Whatever is holy in the past yet lives and will ever live in the heart of humanity. "I come late to the threshold of the mysteries of Him whose worship signifies reason and wisdom, whose temple is an eternal lesson of conscience and truth: Ere finding Thee, I have had to make infinite search."

In March, 1845, during the Holy Week at St. Sulpice his anxious doubts tortured and perplexed him, and we find him writing to a friend, that he had made up his mind not to accept the grade of sub-deacon at the next ordination.

This would not excite any notice, as, owing to his youth, he would be compelled to allow an interval afterwards to elapse. Not that there was any reason why he should care for what people thought. "I must accustom myself to brave public opinion, so as to be ready for any sacrifice. I suffer much at times. This Holy Week has been particularly painful for me. I console myself by thinking of Jesus, so beautiful, so pure, so ideal—Jesus whom I hope always to love;" but, as he wrote afterwards to that same friend, "To be a Platonist, it is not necessary to adore Plato and to believe in all he says."

I sometimes regret that I was not born in a land where the bonds of orthodoxy are less tightly drawn than in Catholic countries. For, at whatever cost, I am resolved to be a Christian; but I cannot be an orthodox Catholic. When I find such independent and bold thinkers as Herder, Kant, and Fichte, calling themselves Christians, I should like to be so too. But I cannot be so in the Catholic faith which is like a bar of iron; and you cannot reason with a bar of iron. Will not some found amongst us a rational and critical Christianity? I will confess to you that I believe that I have discovered in some German writers the true kind of Christianity which is adapted to us. May I live to see this Christianity assuming a form capable of fully satisfying all the requirements of our age! May I myself co-operate in the great work! What so grieves me is

the thought that perhaps it will be needful to be a priest in order to accomplish that; and I could not become a priest without being guilty of hypocrisy.

The long summer vacation of the Seminarist he passed in his native Brittany, and here each person and each place added to the anguish of his heart. "It would be nothing if there were only public opinion to brave. But the pity is that all the softest ties of life are woven into the web that entangles me, and one must pluck out half one's heart to escape from it. Many a time have I wished that man was born either completely free, or deprived of all freedom." It grieved him to give pain to his old Brittany masters who retained such kindly feelings towards him, but his greatest trial regarded his mother.

Although gifted with much native intelligence, she was incapable of understanding that a person's religious faith can be affected because he has discovered that the Messianic explanations of the Psalms are erroneous, and that Gesenius, in his commentary upon Isaiah, is in nearly every point right when combating the arguments of the orthodox. . . . You will understand that I must be very circumspect with regard to my mother. I would rather die than cause her a moment's pain. O God! shall I have the strength of mind to give my duty the preference over her?

He returned to St. Sulpice desolate and sorrowful; the charm of the fairy land was dispelled, everything seemed aimless and gloomy. "*Laqueus contritus est, et nos liberati sumus*:" but the wounded bird escaping, has at first no joy in its liberty. During the vacation, his mother had often sung in his hearing her favourite hymns, especially one beginning,

O Joseph, ô mon aimable
Fils affable.

And when he thought of it, his heart melted within him. As a child he had been in the habit of asking her ten times over in the course of the day, "Mother, have I been good?" And now the idea of a rupture seemed terrible. But his

sister, whose high intelligence had for years been the pillar of fire which lighted his path, wrote from Poland to encourage him.

It sometimes happens that a dreaded and deferred action is accelerated by an unexpected incident. To his amazement he was informed that he was no longer to be attached to the Seminary, but to the Ecclesiastical College of Les Carmes, recently founded by the Archbishop of Paris. His embarrassment was still further increased upon learning that the Archbishop had just arrived at the Seminary, and wished to speak to him, and to arrange his new career. "To accept would be immoral; I felt unable to give the true reason for my refusal, and I would not give a false one." An explanation was therefore made by M. Carbon, and in the course of one single day was completed the rupture which he had intended to spread over several weeks. "Thus on the 6th of October, 1845, I went down, never again to remount them in priestly dress, the steps of the St. Sulpice Seminary. I crossed the courtyard as quickly as I could, and went to the hotel [of Mademoiselle Céleste], which then stood at the north-west corner of the esplanade. The transition from the priestly to the ordinary dress is like the change which occurs in a chrysalis: it needs a little shade. Assuredly it would be of profound interest if any one could narrate all the silent romances associated with this ancient hotel." Many a history of blameless suffering.

M. Le Hir having unlimited confidence in study, advised M. Renan to devote a few years to free study at the Collège de France and at the school of the Eastern languages. But M. Carbon, seeing how miserable must be such a life under pecuniary difficulties and such altered circumstances, offered to find for him some quiet and suitable position. M. Dupanloup, then no longer Superior of St. Nicholas, could not appreciate his difficulties: allusion to German criticism surprised him; for even the labours of M. Le Hir were unknown to him; "Scripture in his eyes was only useful in supplying preachers with eloquent passages;" but as ever, he was kind and generous, and he wrote, "Do you want any

money? This must be in your position. My humble purse is at your service. I should like to be able to offer you gifts more precious than money. I hope that my simple offer will not offend you." M. Renan declined the kind offer with thanks, for his sister had sent him 1,200 francs to tide over this crisis. It is to her that he afterwards dedicated his *Vie de Jésus*. "A l'ame pure de ma sœur Henriette, morte a Byblos, le 24 Septembre, 1861." "Rememberest thou, from the bosom of God where thou reposest, those days when alone with thee, I wrote these pages inspired by the places we visited together? Silent by my side thou didst correct each page and copy it, while the sea, the villages, the mountains, and the valleys lay unfolded at our feet . . . Reveal to me O good Genius, to me whom thou lovest, those truths which survive death, and taking away the fear of it cause one almost to love it."

It was not until the 2nd of November that he was provided with an assistant mastership in a school attached to the Lycée Henri IV., in the Rue de l'Abbé de l'Épée. There he had a room to himself, and was only occupied in teaching for two hours each day, and ere long formed an intimate and attached friendship with a young man interested in the same studies. This friendship and the letters of his sister cheered his solitude. For a little time he kept up intercourse with M. Le Hir, but soon found that the relations between them became strained, and "I broke off an intimacy which could be profitable and pleasant to myself alone."

His sense of desolation during that first month can be gathered from his letters; for whilst declaring "I could only return to Catholicism by the amputation of one of my faculties, by definitely stigmatising my reason and condemning it to perpetual silence," he also says, "Anxiety unnerves me; I have become a laughing stock, as one who is believed to have made a foolish blunder: they laugh at my simple mindedness and look upon me as a fool."

I was terrified at seeing so many ties destroyed in a few hours, and I should have been glad to arrest this progress which seemed too fatal and too rapid. The days which followed were

the darkest of my life. I was isolated from the whole world, without a friend, an adviser, or an acquaintance, without any one to appeal to about me, and this after having just left my mother, my native Brittany, and a life gilded with so many pure and simple affections. Here I am alone in the world and a stranger to it. Good-bye for ever to my mother, my little room, my books, my peaceful studies, and my walks by my mother's side. Good-bye to the pure and tranquil joys which seemed to bring me so near to God; good-bye to my pleasant past, good-bye to those faiths which so gently cradled me. Farewell for me to pure happiness. The past all blotted out, and as yet no future. And then I ask myself, Will the new world for which I have embarked receive me? I have left one in which I was loved and made much of. And my mother, to think of whom was formerly sufficient to solace me in my troubles, was now the cause of my most poignant grief. I was as it were stabbing her with a knife. O God! Was it then necessary that the paths of duty should be so stony? I shall be derided by public opinion, and all the future before me pale and colourless. [It seemed to him so hard a thing to recommence life at the age of three-and-twenty.] I could scarcely realise the possibility of having to fight my way through the motley crowd of turbulent and ambitious persons.

At double that age such a prospect might indeed have seemed terrible, but surely the system must be fatally bad, which can thus at once captivate and destroy the young man of twenty-three, threatening to render to him any future impossible. Perhaps some sentimental dreamers who have been born free may be less prodigal in their commendations of Ecclesiastical Romanism, less censorious on the party of free thought abroad and at home, when they learn how deep are the wounds caused by chains they have never experienced. Those who have been emancipated may speak generous words as to the good, and restrain with difficulty other words that might with terrible truth be uttered; but surely it ill becomes those who have never suffered to have all their defences for the mental and moral oppressors of man, all their reproachful criticisms for those who have been or are being oppressed, and whose efforts may not be entirely in harmony with the notions of those

who can use, palliate, and explain away the language and the deeds of orthodox absolutism. The accusations are suspected, of those who have suffered, and whose lives and hopes have been blighted; but those who have suffered nothing need not become the defenders and palliators of Ecclesiastical evil, when they might be its impartial opponents. Then might be left to those who have suffered, the graceful words of gratitude for well-meant intentions. The poet sees in the past, the golden age : a poetic Rationalist like Renan recalls with picturesque emotion the memories of his youth, exulting in the fragrance of its innocence. He has illuminated these with the tranquil splendour of his genius—by the force of that genius he has more than surmounted all the impediments he perceived, all the difficulties he dreaded : the joy of life has gladdened him as he never dared to hope. “ My experience of life has been very pleasant ; and I do not think that there are many human beings happier than I am. I have a keen liking for the Universe. . . . I have found a fund of goodness in nature and in society. Circumstances have always thrown me into communication with very worthy men.” He claims for himself an almost unchangeable good temper, the result of moral healthiness ; a well-balanced mind, tolerably good bodily health ; a spirit of quiet philosophy and grateful optimism. “ The infinite goodness which I have experienced in this world inspires me with the conviction that Eternity is pervaded by a goodness not less infinite, in which I repose unlimited trust.” As a Cosmic Theist, he professes his belief in a Divine afflatus inspiring and guiding for the sake of the whole, the ever growing Totality, the Universal Unity. Unrestrictedly Rationalist, though conservative in his application of the critical process to the sacred Books, he deems his conclusions sounder than those of the Tübingen school.

He has endeavoured to be polite and kind to all, giving credit for goodness to every human creature. “ I could not even behave unkindly to a dog ; or treat him roughly, and with an air of authority.” “ I am not aware of having told

a single untruth since 1851 " or " stabbed another author with my words." Year by year an anonymous letter threatens him with hell, " but hell is a hypothesis very far from being in conformity with what we know of the divine mercy. Moreover I can lay my hand upon my heart and say that if there is such a place, I do not think that I have done anything which would consign me to it. A short stay in purgatory would perhaps be just." Through M. Augustin Thierry who has been " in the true sense of the word a spiritual father for me," he was introduced to the Scheffer family " whom I have to thank for a companion who has always assorted herself so harmoniously to my somewhat contracted conditions of life that I might be at times tempted to believe in predestination."

So has this lover of truth fought his battle and prevailed : for truth he suffered : in truth he rejoices. " A Paradise lost is always, for him who wills it so, a Paradise regained. Truth is, whatever may be said to the contrary, superior to all fictions." He has loved those who in any age, loved goodness and sought truth : he has never calumniated those who moulded his nation's history : he has never derided the poetic legends of credulity. " I never feel my liberal faith more firmly rooted in me than when I ponder over the miracles of the ancient creed, nor more ardent for the work of the future, than when I have been listening for hours to the bells of the imaginary town of Is." Once to him the Church alone was sacred, the World profane and desolate. He has now found a Universe, the All Holy and Beautiful One immanent therein.

ROBT. RODOLPH SUFFIELD.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF COMTE.

OF the many utopian schemes that during the last fifty years have agitated Europe, there are few at the present hour in England that show the least signs of vitality. While the Continent has been, and is being, rocked to its base by Nihilism and other wild projects for the regeneration of society, we have escaped almost entirely unscathed. Fourierism, St. Simonism, and other forms of Socialism have each had their day, and, after exciting a transient and ephemeral interest, have almost completely disappeared. No name of note is now to be found on the roll of their followers; and, if here and there an occasional adherent be met with, he will probably be some obscure, uncultured dreamer who, shut out from the great currents of healthy political activity, has become the slave of merely abstract and one-sided speculation. But there is one school of utopists which numbers in its ranks some of the most cultured minds of the time, whose influence and following are extending from year to year. I allude to the Society of Positivists—the avowed followers of Auguste Comte. That this particular school of thought should have drawn to itself some of the foremost minds is due largely to the splendid genius of the master, whose commanding insight, ranging as it does over the whole field of speculation, is still up to the level of the most advanced thought. That it should now be attracting many from among the general public is due, not only to the powerful and sustained advocacy of its small body of eminent disciples, but also to the attitude taken by them on the great political questions of the day. The reader will, no doubt, have observed that when any

political crisis occurs, and the different churches and sects stand halting between two opinions, not knowing whether to follow God or Baal, the Positivists, prepared for the emergency, step boldly to the front with their manifestoes, in which will be found a clean-cut opinion on the situation and issues involved. These manifestoes contain no traces of political expediency; but, on the contrary, are characterised by the consistency with which they apply to the concerns of nations and peoples and classes the same eternal principles of justice that are universally recognised as binding between individuals. In the trade disputes, for example, which excited so much animus between masters and workmen some years ago, they uniformly supported the rights of the workmen to combine against the oppression of masters, who, strong enough to ignore the workmen in detail, were forced to respect them when aggregated in great organised combinations. They are always found on the side of the weak against the strong, of justice against expediency. They claim for Ireland the right to Home Rule, and for India the blessings of self-government. They have no political bias, are entirely free from party ties, and, like a great moral force, deal out their censures to Whig and Tory indifferently. They condemned alike the Zulu and Afghan wars of Lord Beaconsfield, the Boer and Egyptian wars of Mr. Gladstone. They would have us give up Gibraltar to Spain, and thereby set an example of political magnanimity to the other nations of Europe.

By thus raising their voices for liberty, for justice, and for political magnanimity, they have excited the interest of the high-minded and enlightened; while, by standing firm and unbending when all around is distracted and vacillating, they have drawn to their side many of those who, amid the general wreckage of all old faiths, are fascinated by the spectacle of consistency and steadfastness of principle. And yet neither their principles nor their attitude have about them anything that is distinctively and peculiarly Positivist. The Christian religion announces precisely the same principles, and in the earlier periods of its history it maintained pre-

cisely the same attitude towards the then existing powers. For it is the privilege of young and militant sects to preach their doctrines in all their naked purity, and to bring all matters for judgment before the bar of simple morality. But when once they have risen to supremacy, and have to bear the responsibilities of power and action, their principles become largely diluted with expediency, and so lose that elevation and purity which first drew after them the sympathies of men. We can easily understand, therefore, that the Positivists, being free from power and responsibility, should not only bring all international complications for judgment before the moral law pure and simple, but should also escape the vacillation and inconsistency which must inhere in the calculations of expediency. Indeed, were the principles of the Positivists the noblest, and their attitude the most stern and unbending, we should still expect that in the rough work of the world their principles would lose some of their lustre, and their attitude something of its stoical and uncompromising nature. But the truth is, their principles are not as liberal as they would appear. There could be no greater delusion than to imagine that because in treating of current politics the Positivists are found on the side of liberty, of individual and national expansion, these great ends are therefore the soul and animating principles of their social system. Roman Catholicism has always united with other sects in demanding religious toleration when there was no chance of its own supremacy. It is so, too, with the Positivists. Despairing of establishing their own *regime* until they have converted the greater part of the world to their opinions, they bend all their energies in the meantime to the task of clearing away those old despotisms of government, of opinion, and of tradition which stand in the way of their own ascendancy. But it is not for the cause of liberty that they do this. On the contrary, did they succeed they would replace these old worn-out despotisms by a despotism of their own, more subtle and far-reaching than any the world has yet seen.

To make this apparent, I shall endeavour so to exhibit

the political system of Auguste Comte as best to disclose its secret structure and tendencies. I shall then attempt to show that all his errors arise from a single source, viz., the making of humanity, *as a whole*, the centre of his system, instead of the elevation of the individual, and so, by throwing his weight on Order, at the expense of Progress, repressing expansion and liberty. I am, of course, aware that in making Comte the representative of Order at the expense of Progress, I am running counter to his own express announcement. He distinctly asserts that Progress is the end of his social scheme, and that Order is merely his basis, his means, his instrument. Nevertheless, if we examine his system carefully, we shall find that he has sacrificed his end to his means, and that in his zeal for Order he has gone far to strangle Progress. For a writer's principles are, after all, to be judged, not by the magnificence of his scheme in general, but by the tendencies of its provisions in particular, as a man's aims are determined, not by the grandeur of his professions, but by the objects he is actually seen striving to realize. Comte was an accomplished thinker, and was fully cognisant of all the conditions essential to the solution of the great problems of modern society. It was not likely, therefore, that in his general outline he should overlook any important factor. On the contrary, he has been careful to surround himself with a philosophical network so extensive and all-embracing as to leave little chance of anything important escaping him. He has made provision for order and progress, for culture and aspiration, for action and contemplation. But when we strip off the superficial phrases and generalities that obscure his real plan, and examine its true bearings, we shall find that each of its parts is so constructed as to promote the order and stability of society as a whole, at the expense of individual expansion and enlargement. In saying that Comte has gone far towards sacrificing Progress to Order, I do not mean to infer that he was indifferent to Progress. On the contrary, he has declared that Order and Progress are both equally necessary to the welfare of society. But Order and Progress, although equally

necessary, are mutually opposed, and in consequence it is as difficult to hit both with equal directness by one scheme as by one blow to hit two objects that lie in opposite directions. For just as the harmonious movements of the stars are secured, not by one compound force, but by the two opposite centrifugal and centripetal forces, so the orderly progress of States is best secured by the existence of two political parties, each of which is pledged to one side alone. If no one scheme, then, can hit with equal directness both Order and Progress, the only alternative for a speculative thinker is to decide which of these ends he thinks most important, to aim at that, and trust that the other will be hit in the rebound. Comte preferred Order, and his choice drew after it the same artillery of means as if it had been his exclusive aim. For it may be laid down as a law that although in practical life you can temper your principles to the exigencies of the occasion, it is impossible to do so in any general scheme of life constructed without reference to time, place, or circumstance. A good instance of this is seen in the teaching of Carlyle and Emerson. These eminent thinkers both saw that men on the one hand were radically *alike* in their essential natures, and, on the other, that they were *unlike* in their range of thought and sentiment. But to lay out a scheme of life and conduct that would equally embrace these opposite truths was not possible. They were obliged, accordingly, to choose which they would prefer to satisfy—the identity or the diversity. Emerson chose the identity or likeness of man as the basis of his teaching; Carlyle the diversity. The consequence was that Emerson's teaching ran into the extreme of liberty; Carlyle's into the extreme of despotism. So, too, with Comte. Having made Humanity as a whole the centre both of his religious and his social system, he was bound to subordinate the expansion of the individual to the symmetry and stability of society as a whole, until at last, by the very nature of things, he was driven into drawing the cords of Order so tight as to strangle individual expansion and development.

With these preliminary observations, I now propose to

examine Comte's political and social scheme, with the view of pointing out the great laws of human life which he has neglected. But before we can grasp his scheme in its logical completeness, we must discover the reasons for his making Humanity the central point of his system. Previous to his time there was no general science of Sociology ; that is to say, no general laws had been discovered to which the progress and development of Mankind as a whole could be referred. Humanity at large was regarded much in the same way as a flight of crows or a forest of trees is regarded, viz., as a mere aggregate of isolated individuals. And as each of these individuals was liable to be moved by influences—supernatural and other—which defied all law and calculation, no one was likely to dream that a science of society was possible. But from the time when it began to appear that these supernatural conceptions themselves were the products of human thought, that they were not capricious and casual, but followed a regular course and order of development, men began to entertain the hope that great general laws might be discovered to which the total movements of Humanity could be shown to conform. Comte professed to have discovered these laws, and to have marked out the stages through which mankind had passed in its course and development ; and so, for the first time, he was enabled to figure Humanity, not as a mere *aggregate* of isolated individuals, but as a *unity*, an *organism*, a *life*. Hence it is that he represents Humanity as a Great Being, and pictures it as some immense mammal, which in its growth and development has come down from the Past, and is stretching onwards into the Future ; the Individual being but a cell or molecule in its huge frame. And just as it is only the animal organism as a whole that can be regarded as a real entity, the cells of which it is composed having no distinct independent life, so Comte constantly repeats that " Humanity is the only real existence, the Individual being a mere metaphysical abstraction."

Such is the train of thought by which Comte arrives at his conception of Humanity as a Great Being, and by

which he makes it, and not the Individual, the centre of his system. Now, from this conception and from the analogies that exist between Humanity and other vital organisms, his whole scheme of social reorganisation may be logically deduced. A few broad instances will suffice to make this apparent. In the animal body, for example, the organs, tissues, and cells of which it is composed do not exist on their own account, but to do the special work assigned them; they are not independent and unrelated, but have vital connections with every other part, and are kept in strict subordination to the welfare of the body as a whole. So in Comte's scheme the special classes and individuals of which society is composed have each to do the special work assigned them, and keep themselves strictly subordinated to the welfare of society as a whole. Priests and bankers, manufacturers and merchants, women and working men, have each their respective functions minutely defined by him—functions not to be altered except at the behest of high necessity. For just as any attempt on the part of an organ or tissue to set up for itself and to do as it pleased, would end in the disruption of the body, so any attempt on the part of an individual to follow the bias of his own genius or character would, Comte thinks, end in the disruption of society. Accordingly, he preaches the *duty* of each individual to occupy the position assigned him, not the *right* of every man to choose his own path according to the secret impulses of his nature. Liberty and the Rights of Man, he thinks, lead to anarchy, and are therefore to be repressed. His new watchword is "Duties, not Rights." But as the power of deciding what particular function a man is to fulfil must be vested in the hands of one or more persons, the scheme, as we should expect, ends in despotism. For it is the essence of despotism that the lives and fortunes of men should be placed, not in the hands of Fate and Nature, with their just and equal laws, but in the hands of some poor creature like ourselves, who, ignorant of himself perhaps, impudently professes to gauge the hidden depths and capacities of other souls, and with easy

assurance proceeds to distribute them into the niches which he thinks they are best fitted to occupy.

But this analogy between Humanity and the animal organism is carried by Comte still further into his scheme of social reorganisation. He figures the animal body as made up of two distinct and independent sets of organs—the nutritive and the cerebral—which have distinct and independent functions. The nutritive organs consist of lungs, heart, liver, and other tissues, and carry on the nutrition and support of the body. The cerebral organs consist of the brain and nervous system, and their function is so to co-ordinate and regulate the action of the nutritive organs that they shall all work harmoniously for the good of the whole. Now, corresponding to these organs of nutrition and cerebration in the animal body are the Temporal and Spiritual powers in the body politic. The Temporal power consists of governors, directors, and administrators; and its function is to superintend the organisation of industry and carry on the work of practical administration. The Spiritual power consists of the philosophic Priesthood, and its function is to moderate by its moral pressure the exercise of the Temporal power for the benefit of the community at large. And just as Comte finds the organs of nutrition and innervation distinct and independent, so he would make the Temporal and Spiritual powers distinct and independent. The Spiritual power is to be concentrated in the hands of the High Priest of Humanity, backed by women and working men (the former of whom represent the sympathetic side of Humanity, and the latter its active side), and will act by the purely moral methods of persuasion and sympathy. The Temporal power will be concentrated in the hands of Three Bankers (as dealing with the widest relations of Industry), supported by a staff of merchants and manufacturers, who will be arranged according to the greater or less generality of the functions they perform, and who act on their own initiative, subject only to the advice of the Spiritual power; the wealth they administer being held, not as private property, but as a public trust.

Such is a broad outline of Comte's scheme of social reorganisation, founded on the analogy he finds to exist between Humanity and other organisms—an analogy that might be carried into minute and minuter details. It has analogies, too, with that Catholic Feudalism for which Comte had so great an esteem ; Humanity taking the place of God ; the High Priest of Humanity, of the Pope ; and a number of small republics, presided over by Three Bankers, the place of the kingdoms and principalities of the Middle Ages.

Now, in this scheme of social reorganisation, Comte has neglected two great laws of human life—laws which must consign any scheme constructed in disregard of them to the dreamland of utopia. These laws are—

- 1st. That men are alike in their essential natures.
- 2nd. That they are led by the Imagination.

However different men may be in their special gifts and capacities, there can be no doubt that they are alike in their essential natures. Compared with that deep likeness that is common to them all, any mere superficial difference in kind or degree of faculty is as insignificant as is the difference among the billows when compared with the deep unity of the great underlying sea. No one denies that men are alike in their physical conformations—in their lungs, heart, stomach, bones, muscles, and tissues. Why should not their minds be alike also—their impulses, feelings, tendencies, and passions? Is there any faculty wanting in the average man? Is there any trade, art, or profession which he cannot learn? Will education and training not make of him a better or worse tailor, shoemaker, lawyer, doctor, statesman, or scholar? Is there, indeed, any human sentiment that he cannot comprehend? Shakspeare, the most profound and subtle of all writers, is universally intelligible ; so also would be the metaphysicians and philosophers, were it not for their use of a technical and forbidding nomenclature. If, then, the differences among men are poor and insignificant compared with their common likeness, to regard Humanity as an organism in the strict

sense of that term, and on that basis to construct a scheme of social reorganisation, is equally absurd and chimerical. Of course, as a creature, man has feelings of pride, vanity, love, pity, mercy, which *connect* him with his fellow-man. By reason of this relationship he must act and react on others, must modify and be modified by them. But to suppose that Humanity is an organism merely because the individuals of which it is composed act and react on one another, and so, in a certain sense, form a kind of corporate existence, is about as reasonable as to suppose that the Solar System is an organism because sun, moon, and planets act and react on each other; or that the animal kingdom at large is an organism because, during the long ages of the past, each animal has, in the struggle for existence, modified and been modified by all the rest. If then, we seek for the differences between Humanity as a corporate existence and the higher animal organisms which it is supposed to resemble, we shall find that they are so radical and profound as to destroy any political scheme founded on the assumed likeness. In the first place, the higher vital organisms have a fixed and definite structure, the cells and organs of which they are composed having a definite relationship to each other and to the whole. But Humanity has no fixed structure, no definite relationship either of individuals or classes, but changes its structure and character from age to age. At one time we have Feudalism, with its popes, kings, nobility, and serfs; at another, Theocracy, with its supremacy of priests and hierarchy of castes; and again, Republicanism, with its liberty, equality, and rights of man. In the second place, in vital organisms the condition of the organism as a whole is of primary importance, the condition of the parts being of importance only in so far as they affect the whole; whereas in Humanity the condition of the individual is the important point, the condition of society as a whole being but a sequence and after-effect of the state of the individual; any revolution in individual thought and sentiment altering entirely the character of society as a whole. And lastly (and here we see

the neglect of the fact of the identical nature), we have a still more fatal and radical difference between Humanity and the higher organisms. In the higher vital organisms the cells and organs are so constructed as to do one special kind of work, and one only; the higher the organism the more specialised and limited being the work of its separate parts. The cells of the liver and brain have each their separate functions which cannot be interchanged; so also have the lungs, stomach, and heart. But the individuals of which Humanity is composed are, on the contrary, so constructed as not only to do one kind of work and adapt themselves to one set of circumstances, but to do any kind of work and adapt themselves to any set of circumstances. Each man has, equally with every other man, an inlet into the common sea of knowledge and truth, although the conditions of life usually restrict his energies to some one or more special department of labour. For just as the eye is made to sweep the horizon, although it is directed from moment to moment on the different objects around us, so the mind of man is made to span the arch of heaven and travel through all the constellations of genius and virtue, although it must bend its energies on the practical problems that present themselves for solution from hour to hour. While each man, then, has a bias or special power which is his strong point and makes one particular kind of work easier to him than another—whether it be mechanics, art, poetry, philosophy, or practical administration—he has also within him a general or universal power which can grasp indifferently each or any of these different branches of knowledge. Any system, therefore, that ignores this deep likeness of nature common to all men, and on the superficial likeness existing between Humanity and other vital organisms would erect a scheme of practical politics, is doomed to failure. Any system that without consulting a man's special bias and genius would condemn him (on the judgment or caprice of others or another) to become a mere cog or wheel in the vast machine of society, to be eternally grinding out his own particular product, without right of

entry into the open field of universal truth, has already passed into the cloudland of utopia. The Hindoos were taught to believe that certain classes sprang from the head, others from the trunk, and others again from the feet of Brahm. By accepting this degrading superstition, and, in consequence, denying the native identity of all men, they split themselves up into a hierarchy of castes, the result of which may be seen in the stagnation in which India lies at the present hour, her sweltering millions being as uninteresting to the aspiring mind as a swarm of moving insects—the more, the worse. Would Comte have us repeat this Hindoo superstition, and again erect a social system on the basis of Caste? He does not, I am aware, in theory go to this extreme length; but his system, if put in operation, would end in a caste despotism. For example, he makes provision in his scheme for a priestly class, for an administrative class, and for a working class. These classes are to take rank according to the greater or less generality of the functions they perform, and in the higher ranks are to recruit themselves by choosing their own successors. They are also expected to remain satisfied with their respective positions, and to do the work assigned them without aspiration and without choice. Who can doubt that this scheme would become an intolerable despotism before it had well time to set? Comte partially perceived this, and proposed to guard against it by giving all men alike the same education, and thereby satisfying the feeling of common equality. But he apparently did not perceive that if he ranged men in a fixed hierarchy of classes, the higher would despise the lower to the end of time, spite of all education; and so would be brought back all those evils which his system was intended to avoid. And, furthermore, in spite of the fact that he would have all men equally educated, he still thought it necessary to put them in leading strings, and that, too, in an age when the only plea for despotism that still survives and retains any show of plausibility is the fact that men are *not* educated, and, in consequence, are not able to manage their own affairs. The

truth is Comte believed in Caste, that is to say, he laid more stress on the small superficial differences of men than on their great fundamental likeness; and so, instead of allowing each man to know best what was the proper direction for his genius and character, would place our whole spiritual and temporal concerns in the hands of a High Priest of Humanity and Three Bankers, who (being phrenologists) would by some such "cheap signboard as the shape of the head or colour of the beard, sum up the inventory of our characters and fortunes." Let us hope, on the contrary, that the time is not far distant when any attempt to prevent a man from having a chance for the full development of his genius and character, as a bird is allowed to build its nest according to its own nature, will be regarded as a conspiracy against the dignity of the human mind and treason against the laws of God.

Having pointed out some of the consequences of Comte's neglect of the great law that men are *alike* in their essential natures, I come now to the second great neglect in the scheme of positive polity—the neglect of the law that men are led by the Imagination.

In making Humanity as a whole the end of his social system, Comte treats individual men as if they were so many pieces in a Chinese puzzle, and expects—nay, believes—that when he has discovered the way in which they are to be arranged so as to form a stable and harmonious structure, they will remain in the positions in which he has placed them. It is not surprising that he should believe that individuals are so easily manipulable when we remember that he regards them as mere metaphysical abstractions. We have seen the way in which he constructs his social scheme, with his checks, balances, and compensatory movements; how he separates the Spiritual from the Temporal power; the former acting by purely moral means (supported by the sympathy of women and working-men), the latter by its material power and command over the products of industry. Having disposed the different classes of society in this way, Comte believes that the individuals

of which they are composed will accept the positions assigned them, and will continue to occupy them from a sense of duty alone, without inclination, aspiration, or choice. The practical difficulties that lie in the way of his scheme he makes as little of as Captain Bobadil did of the numbers and force of the enemy to which he was opposed. He has no fear that men will refuse to keep the positions assigned them, as they will be judged entirely by their intellectual and moral qualities, and not by their social position. And as he asserts that there will be no desire for fame, power, or applause, but only to do one's duty, there need be no fear of any conflict of jurisdiction, of any encroachment of one class on another. The priesthood of philosophers will not dream of interfering in practical politics, as it would be beneath their dignity, and besides would weaken their speculative faculty by its attention to petty details. Any such unworthy ambition for vulgar power would be regarded, both by themselves and others, as a sign of moral weakness and mental deficiency. Practical politicians, on the other hand, he believes, will restrict themselves entirely to their duty of keeping order, and would deem it an impertinence to claim any authority over thought. And in like manner women will renounce their utopia of what is called "woman's rights," and will concern themselves entirely with their household duties, the education of their children, and the giving of their moral support to the spiritual power. The working man, too, will be equally reasonable and self-denying, and will be as easily managed as either the women, the politicians, or the priests. He will be content to remain where he is. He will not seek power; indeed, he would not have it were it thrust on him. It is only exceptional persons, Comte thinks, who care for power on its own account. Neither will he care for fame—a bauble beneath the concern of sensible men. And when it has to be bought by meditation, as among the philosophers and priests, or is burdened by care, as among the practical statesmen, Comte distinctly declares that the working man will have nothing to do with

it. Is it not enough for the working man, he asks, that all other classes should be working for his benefit? Why, then, should he give himself either thought or trouble for so unreal a phantasm? And, as to wealth, the working man will ask himself what connection it has with true happiness; and finding that it has none whatever, but that, on the contrary, true happiness depends far more on the free play of all our powers (in which respect, indeed, the working man is in a much better position than those above him in the social scale), he will feel it no sacrifice to renounce it entirely. "The working man," says Comte, "will cease to aspire to wealth and power, leaving these to those whose political activity requires that strong stimulus. Each man's ambition will be to do his work well."

Such is the beautiful utopia which Comte expected to see realised in a generation from the time in which it was promulgated. That generation has already come and gone, and as we are apparently as far from its realisation as ever, there must have been some great law of human life neglected in his calculations. That law, as I have already said, is that men are led by the Imagination. I am aware, of course, that Comte made the acceptance of his political scheme conditional on the acceptance of his religious and scientific views, and that it was only because he imagined that these views would be accepted as soon as they were promulgated that he anticipated so speedy a realisation of his political scheme. He is constantly declaring that before his practical scheme can be realised there must be what he calls a spiritual reorganisation; that is to say, a reorganisation of opinion and belief, and not of caucuses, electors, or ballot-boxes. Now, I have already endeavoured to point out the scientific fallacies in his speculative opinions, when regarded from their political side. On some other occasion I may endeavour to point out the spiritual fallacies in these opinions when regarded from their religious side. For the present, however, we may fairly assume that they will not meet with that immediate acceptance which he imagined. But even admitting that his speculative theories should prove

to be abstractly true, to believe that men will hasten to realise the political scheme founded on them, merely because he has demonstrated that such a scheme would be for the greatest *absolute* good of all concerned, is as utopian as to believe that a reign of universal peace will follow on a demonstration of the benefits of peace by the Peace Society, or, varying the analogy, that a woman will fall in love with a man merely because he can be proved to be the possessor of all the virtues. The truth is, men are not led by what is *absolutely* best for themselves, either in this world or the next, but by recondite and subtle combinations of thought, feeling, and fancy which have fascinated their *imaginations*, and are *proportioned* to their stages of culture. Proportioned to their stages of culture—for while a cruder conception would disgust by its coarseness, a more refined one would repel by its comparative coldness and tenuity. There could not have been, perhaps, two men more antagonistic in nature and attributes than Shelley and Tom Sayers, and yet if the world were canvassed as to which was the better man, it is a question whether the prize-fighter would not poll as many votes as the ideal poet. The Christian Heaven is a much more refined conception than that of the Mahomedan or Norseman; and yet, I doubt not, the Mahomedan with his Heaven despoiled of its bright-eyed houris, and the Norseman with his Valhalla stripped of its bloody trophies, would feel as if their principal incentives to virtue had been withdrawn. In the same way, the Religion of Humanity is a much more abstract belief than Christianity, and the rewards it holds out to virtue are of a much more thin and transcendental character. If Christianity, therefore, with a creed which was believed in and which was supported by rewards more tangible and alluring than any which the Religion of Humanity has to offer, could not, in its nineteen centuries of organised effort, subdue the spirit of the world and the fascinations of Power, Wealth, and Fame, much less will the religion of Auguste Comte. The truth is, Power, Wealth, and Fame are the most potent influences in human life, and are so

proportioned to our present stage of civilisation and culture as to fascinate the imaginations of the great masses of men more than aught else beside. Any political scheme, therefore, that ignores them, or disposes of them as by a wave of the hand, has already passed into that land of dreams to which Plato's Republic and More's Utopia have long since been relegated. And although it was a fine illustration of Comte's innocence and simplicity that he should have imagined that philosophers would have no practical schemes, and practical politicians no political theories; that women would efface themselves; that working men would renounce fame, wealth, and power, and that all classes would live only to do their duty in the positions in which they were placed, it nevertheless exhibited more faith in the power of an abstract system of thought than either history or the nature of things will warrant. The fact is, neither the past nor the present organisation of society has been due to conscious forethought or speculative considerations as to what would be best for the general welfare, but rather, is the resultant of the efforts and struggles of many different men, each of whom was pushing his own way, led on by ideas and designs that had fascinated the Imagination. Were the Temporal and Spiritual powers of the Middle Ages, for example, separated because popes and kings had come to the conclusion that such a separation was best both for themselves and for the peoples living under their sway? On the contrary, it was the result of centuries of struggle between these respective potentates, in which each foot of ground gained or lost was contested inch by inch. Did the popes cease to interfere in Temporal affairs because they believed that such interference was detrimental to the general weal? On the contrary, they ceased to interfere only when the power of doing so had been taken from them by the kings. The kings, in like manner, ceased to interfere in Spiritual affairs, not from any speculative considerations, but because the power of interfering had been taken from them by the popes; for no sooner had the Reformation arrived, and the popes lost their prepon-

derating power over the people, than the kings stepped in again and took up the rôle of defenders of the faith. The Press, too, which in our own time is believed by some to be the most real and vital Spiritual power extant—has it not had to fight its way up to its present high position inch by inch? And Democracy, which many believe to be the political creed of the future—has it won its successes without a struggle? If Comte's scheme, then, of the division of the Temporal and Spiritual powers is ever again to be realised by the world, it will not be because men will have consciously abnegated their own special schemes, and will then proceed to carry into effect the cut-and-dried system which he has evolved; but it will be because it is the natural outcome and resultant of the efforts of innumerable men, each of whom has been following the course of thought and action which has most charmed his Imagination.

But it may be said that society will always be made up of different classes—working men, tradesmen, professional men, magistrates, rulers—and that Comte merely professes to have given them that scientific arrangement which shall be for the highest and truest welfare of all concerned. Here, again, we see the neglect of the same great fact that men are led by the Imagination. For there is all the difference between my following a particular trade, art, or profession of my own free will and choice, and my being compelled by another to follow it because I am told it will be ultimately for my best and truest welfare. In the first instance, the Imagination is free to range at large, without let or hindrance, amid an infinite variety of thought and aspiration, and with no limits to its flight save those which arise from Fate and Nature themselves. The result is that men awake to a sense of responsibility; they learn the great laws of the world in their contact with the many sides of life; their manhood becomes firmer in its fibre, like trees that have to hold their own against the wintry blasts; and, as in America, they can turn their hands to anything, and, toss them how you will, they will always fall on their

feet. But, on the other hand, when a man is pressed into an occupation by the will of others or another, without regard to the secret aspirations which have fascinated his own mind, then Imagination is crushed, life becomes a dreary mechanical routine, without excitement, ambition, or hope; sinking, at last, into torpor or despair, relieved only by intrigue, insurrection, or crime. And who is to claim this omniscient power of determining the position each man is best fitted to occupy? In the last resort, it is some poor creature like ourselves.

Such are the utopian schemes to which Comte commits himself by making society *as a whole* the end of his political system, and not the elevation and expansion of the individual.

Such, too, is the difference between the attitude of the Positivists and of Positivism itself. The Positivists, as I pointed out at the beginning of this paper, being a militant power without official responsibility, and entirely free from party ties, are able to preach the great ends of liberty, justice, and political magnanimity in all their fulness and purity. Believing, too, as they do, that political institutions are good or bad *relatively* to the wants of the people among whom they exist, rather than *absolutely* in accordance with the demands of the highest culture and wisdom, they are bound to advocate the rights of all peoples and nationalities to develop themselves in their own peculiar way, without interference from without, and in consequence to make the moral law as binding between nations as between individuals. But Positivism itself, on the other hand, when once it had become supreme, and had gathered the nations under its own *régime*, would end, as we have just seen, in the most intolerable of despotisms. The fact that the Positivists are very often right in their political judgments is not the result of their system, but is due rather to the circumstance that they are men of wide political knowledge, of varied culture and intelligence, and to the habit (not peculiar to themselves) of judging all questions from the highest of all standpoints—the moral standpoint.

J. B. CROZIER.

ON THE READING "ONLY-BEGOTTEN GOD."

JOHN i. 18.

THE greater number of various readings in the MSS. of the New Testament are unimportant, and the preferableness of one over another may be left to the decision of critics. But some have a doctrinal significance, and as the interest of these is not confined to a class, so their evidence may be understood without any special qualifications. A reading of this kind, long known to scholars and almost universally rejected, has obtained lately some additional support; and has been brought before the world, with a measure of commendation, in the Revision of the New Testament. The last verse of the Introduction of S. John's Gospel (i. 18) stands unchanged; but in the margin to "*the only-begotten Son*" we have "Many very ancient authorities read *God only-begotten.*" Before noticing these ancient authorities, we would direct attention to the evidence respecting this reading, which is open to all readers of the Bible. In most subjects of dispute there are many arguments of various kinds. When some are based on what is clear, certain, and appreciable by all; and others on what is obscure, doubtful, and intelligible to few; it is most reasonable to begin with the former. The Internal evidence for any reading is its fitness to the context and scope; its agreement with the writer's language and statements, and with other contemporary or preceding writings; the improbability of its being an accidental error, or a supposed emendation; and the explanation which it gives of other readings. Internal evidence, if taken for that which is *internal* to the reader—agreement with peculiar tastes and opinions—is no doubt of small value. But the evidence which is *internal* to the

text, is of all evidences the nearest, clearest, and surest ; and it is fundamental to all others. There is no reason for supposing that ancient copyists disparaged *internal* evidence, as some modern critics do ; but it is certain that they used it wisely and unwisely. By the exclusive use of *external* evidence, new errors will be avoided, but old errors will be retained.*

I.—INTERNAL EVIDENCE.

1. The first thing to be observed of the reading *only-begotten God* is, that there is nothing like it in the Gospel, or in any writings of S. John. The adjective stands once by itself (i. 14), and three times with Son (iii. 16, 18 ; 1 Ep. iv. 9), and it is applied to Jesus Christ only by this apostle. It is therefore probable that "Son" belongs also to ver. 18, being the full expression of what is implied in ver. 14. Mention is made in the Gospel of "the *only* God." When accused by Judæans of placing himself on a level with God, Jesus replied, that they were not "seeking honour from the *only* God" (v. 44) ; and in prayer He addressed the Father as "the *only* true God," by whom He was sent (xvii. 3). There is a critical canon, that a *rare* reading may be preferable to the common ; but its *rarity* can be no reason for preference. It will account for the rejection in some MSS. of a genuine reading, and so remove objections : but it can never be evidence in its favour. It can be no argument for a person's once speaking in a peculiar way, that he did it *only* once. What has no parallel must be on this account improbable.

2. There is nothing like it in the Bible. In the Old Testament God is often declared to be the *only* God ; and this testimony is referred to and repeated by our Lord (Matt. iv. 10 ; Mark xii. 29). In the New Testament we read of "the *only* wise God" (Rom. xvi. 27)—"the *only* God" (1 Tim. i. 17)—"the blessed and *only* Potentate"

* It is certain, from the testimony of Origen, that two hundred years before the oldest MSS. were written, there were many various readings, and some quite arbitrary. Old readings are both good and bad, and therefore the goodness of a reading is never proved by its antiquity.

(vi. 15)—“the *only* God our Saviour,” to whom “through Jesus Christ our Lord, be glory, majesty, dominion, and power” (Jude 25).

3. The expression “*only-begotten God*” is not found in the Apostolical Fathers, nor in those nearest to them. Justin Martyr gives to the Logos the titles Son and Christ, but apparently with a meaning different from that of these names when applied to Jesus Christ. (2 Apol. 6.) He styles the Logos “the firstborn of God” (πρῶτον γέννημα, 1 Apol. 21). By later writers the name Monogenes was given to the Logos, and to Jesus Christ; and after the time of Justin these were by many identified. But the expression *only-begotten God* is not found in the earliest Christian writers. If it had been introduced by S. John, it might be expected to appear in the writings which followed. Arguments from silence are not conclusive, but they are sometimes important; and the absence of the expression in early writers completes the proof, that the phrase “*only-begotten God*” does not belong to Christian literature till after the middle of the second century; when the influence of Greek philosophy on Christian theology is manifest and undisputed.*

4. The expression *only-begotten God*, or *God only begotten*, cannot be interpreted from the Bible, and is intelligible only through the writings of later philosophical theologians. The distinction between the “begotten God,” and the “unbegotten God,” has been made familiar to many by ecclesiastical language, but it is not scriptural. The primary use of such terms was mythological, and belongs to one of the

* The earlier Latin translations of *Μονογενής* is *Unicus*; the other term, *Unigenitus* being afterwards adopted from the Greek Fathers. They use the term as equivalent to *μόνος γεννηθείς*: but it does not appear to have borne this signification previously. In Hebraistic and in common Greek *μονογενής* denotes *solitariness of state*, and not *singleness of origin*. It was applied to the Logos by Philo and the Greek Fathers; but by S. John it is given only to Jesus Christ. He is called in the New Testament “the First-born among many brethren” (Rom. viii. 29); but never the *only-begotten* (*μόνος γεννηθείς*). All the children of God are declared to be begotten of God (John i. 13). The phrase *only-begotten* is now used, because this is the patristic meaning of *Μονογενής*, though not the scriptural.

lower forms of Paganism. The later philosophical use was to indicate the difference between the *known* God, and the *unknowable*; which only partially agrees with the Scripture use of the Name of God. To readers of the Old Testament the phrase *a begotten God*, would be either unintelligible, or false and self-contradictory. The full expression, *only begotten God* is still more objectionable, for it implies that others might be so thought of. The term *begotten* God must refer to the *unbegotten*; and the term *only begotten* God, to others who might be supposed to be such. In heathen mythology, where *many* begotten Gods might be supposed, the statement would be consistent, that only one should be so called. But it has no proper place in Hebrew or Christian Theology. One Son may be distinguished from others, but not one begotten God from another. In all common language the term *begotten* denotes the *derivation* of one being from another: but in patristic phraseology it is explained to mean *dependence*, without either commencement or inferiority.

5. There is nothing in the context to favour the reading *God only-begotten*, and much that is contrary to it; while the reading of *Son* is perfectly suitable and proper. Son is a *relative* term to God at the beginning of the verse, and a *correlative* to Father at the end; but God only-begotten is neither. This would require at the commencement of the verse, *God unbegotten*. The Son is distinguished from the children of God mentioned in ver. 12, in that He only has the perfect knowledge of God, and is above and over all other sons. Jesus declared that He alone had "seen the Father" (vi. 46), and had received from the Father "authority over all mankind" (xvii. 2). The expressions *unbegotten God* and *only-begotten God* are common in patristic phraseology, but neither of them can be found in the Bible.

The statements which precede ver. 14 plainly refer to the Logos, the Word, the Creator of the world: but the statements which follow ver. 14 plainly refer to Jesus Christ, as seen by men and conversing with them. To Him the

testimony of the prophet refers (ver. 15), from Him the apostles received grace and truth (ver. 16), and His ministry is compared with that of Moses (ver. 17). The verses which follow the 18th, repeat and enlarge the testimony of the prophet John, declaring that the man Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God (ver. 30, 34, 45, 49). According to the context before and after, the statement of ver. 18 refers to the highest knowledge of God, the Creator and the Father, now given through the Son Jesus Christ; and not to the whole knowledge of God, the Incomprehensible, given to men from the beginning through the Logos, the Word. The revelation in Jesus Christ is added to that given in Nature, as His teaching is added to that of Moses (ver. 17). The statements of ver. 14 which declare the new connection of the Logos with humanity, thus unite all that precedes with all that follows. In ver. 14 the Logos is not identified with the Monogenes; but the glory of the former is said to be as that seen in the latter; and this follows from the union of the Divine and the Human. It is certain that Jesus Christ is referred to in ver. 18; but while He is very often in the Gospel called the Son, in not one passage is He styled the Logos, or the Word, or described as the Creator of all.

The evident *suitableness* of the reading for Son, is said to *account* for its introduction in so many MSS.: but this assumes that it was not in the original. Surely the more suitable reading is more likely to come from the evangelist, whose high qualifications are known, than from any unknown copyists.*

* It has been supposed by many that in verse 14 the name Monogenes is given to the Logos; but this has never been shown; and the Logos is never in the Bible called Monogenes, or Son. This verse has two parts, the subject of the first being the Logos, and that of the second being the apostles; and no parenthesis is required or proper. In each part there are two principal terms, and of these the Logos is declared to be God in verse 1, and the Father is God throughout the New Testament. Therefore the two other terms are most consistently associated,—the general term for humanity in the one (*σῶψ*) agrees with the definite term Monogenes in the other. This is confirmed by the comparative particle. The glory of the Logos is *as* that seen in the Son who is alone; *as* the glory of God is

6. The received reading needs nothing to account for it ; it could not be a supposed emendation, and it naturally gave occasion to the other reading. The term *Monogenes* is used five times by S. John—three times with Son expressed, and once alone, Son being suggested by the mention of *children* in ver. 12, and also by the associated term Father. It might therefore be expected that the same subject would be referred to in the other passage : what is understood with the adjective in ver. 14, being expressed in ver. 18. The language and the meaning are certainly such as the evangelist would use ; but there is no proof that he could have written the other expression. This would naturally be used in after ages, when the Logos was called *Monogenes* and Son, as well as God. Both the Greek and the Latin Fathers frequently thus wrote of the Logos, though all the latter and several of the former used only the received text in the Gospel. This general usage is admitted by all, and by Dr. Hort attributed to the influence of some early creeds. They who identified the Logos with the *Monogenes*, and habitually wrote the "only-begotten God," would naturally add the name of God to that of Son, as an explanation ; or substitute the former for the latter, as more definite. That this should be done in a few cases is surely much more probable, than that the contrary change should be made in very many MSS.

as that seen in Jesus Christ—the image of the invisible God. (2 Cor. iv. 4, Col. i. 15). That the glory of the Logos is as that seen in the Son, Jesus Christ, is a simple, scriptural, and important addition to the preceding statements ; but that the glory of the Logos, by whom all things came, was as that of an only son, gives little instruction. Dr. Hort urges in support of the reading "only-begotten God," that, without this, the Logos is not in the Introduction identified with the Son. This is quite true, but it seems to be a conclusive argument against the proposed reading. The names Logos, and God, are not in the Gospel given to Jesus Christ ; nor is the creation of all things attributed to Him by the evangelist. The Logos who is identified with God in verse 1 is identified with the Father in verse 14, and in verse 18 God at the beginning of the verse is Father at the end. The Logos of S. John,—the Word which is God,—agrees exactly with the Name of God, so often mentioned in the Bible. Both mean God as *known* ; the simple term God being used for all that is *known*, with all that is *unknown*. The Father is in the Bible the highest name of God ; with philosophical theologians it is simply the name of Being, apart from attributes.

without any apparent motive. The philosophical theologians of the second century identified the Logos with God, according to the statement of the Gospel; and they also identified the Logos with the Monogenes, according to a system of philosophy, but contrary to the usage of Scripture. Their example was in after ages generally followed. If the evangelist had written *only-begotten God*, this expression, being common to the ecclesiastical writers of the following centuries, would not have been generally exchanged for another. As not a single MS. has assimilated ver. 18 to ver. 14, it is very unlikely that many would change ver. 18 to make it agree with iii. 16, 18. The general substitution of Son for God, would be without parallel and utterly unaccountable. But if the evangelist wrote Son, as he did elsewhere, it is very likely that those who believed the Monogenes to be God, and were accustomed so to write and speak, should put the name God, sometimes instead of Son, and sometimes as an explanatory addition. That the reading *only-begotten God* thus arose is shown by the great variety of readings which appear in the quotations and references of the Fathers, combined with the absence of its use in controversy. Besides the two principal readings there are many others,—the only-begotten,—the only-begotten Son of God,—the only-begotten Son, God,—the only-begotten, being God,—the only-begotten, being God of God,—the only-begotten Logos. There is no discussion of the genuineness of any of these readings, and all might be used with little difference of theological opinion.

Every part of the internal evidence leads to the same conclusion that ΤΙΟΣ is the true reading. We may now briefly consider the “many very ancient authorities which read God only-begotten.”

II.—EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

This evidence has been fully discussed by Dr. Hort in a Dissertation on ΜΟΝΟΓΕΝΗΣ ΘΕΟΣ (John i. 18), by Dr.

Ezra Abbot in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* (1861), and by Dr. Drummond in the *Theological Review* (1871). A general view will be sufficient for most readers. The external evidence consists of old MSS. versions and quotations. Of the MSS. it is admitted that the greater number agree with the Received Text. The uncial MSS. which give the reading for Son are four times as many as those which give the reading for God; and the cursive MSS. are four hundred times as many, being all but one. The absence in all later MSS., with a single exception, of an old reading found in a few ancient MSS., shows that it was rejected as bad, notwithstanding its age. These later MSS. are of every class; they come from every part of Christendom, and show a plurality of independent witnesses. The same testimony is given by some of the oldest versions, both in the East and the West; by the majority of the Greek, and by all the Latin Fathers. Thus the External evidence appears fully to agree with the Internal, to support decisively the common reading. The other reading is, however, maintained by Dr. Hort, and is given in the recent edition of Dr. Tregelles, and in that of Dr. Westcott and Dr. Hort. Tischendorf and all other editors retain the common reading, which is defended by Dr. Abbot and Dr. Drummond, and approved by De Wette, Meyer, Scrivener, Godet, and many other critical writers.

The acceptance of the reading ΘΕΟΣ is owing chiefly to the very high value attributed to a few ancient MSS. But antiquity, however venerable, is only one of several conditions affecting the value of MSS., and it is not the most important. The general correctness of the text is of much more consequence than the age of the MSS. It is assumed that the oldest must be the best, because subject to fewer changes in transcription; but this is not certain, nor is it the chief thing. A MS. of the tenth century may be written with more care and a wiser judgment than one of the fifth: and may have been copied from a better and earlier MS. An edition of Chaucer in the seventeenth century would have little authority simply from its date. Ancient

documents are witnesses, of whose worth nothing is known till their testimony is examined. Their trustworthiness depends on the general goodness of the text, and this is known by internal evidence. Some coincidences show a common origin, and some have an independent value, apart from that of the separate testimonies: but the evidence of these peculiar agreements is not supposed to go back to the originals. No one knows by whom any old MS. was written, nor from what it was copied, nor what were the writer's critical ability and principles, nor how his work was received by contemporaries. All the oldest MSS. were thought afterwards to need many corrections. This being the case, external evidence, taken simply and separately, must rest mainly on conjectures; and the coincidences of a few are of less moment than are the agreements of many. External evidence is, therefore, far inferior to Internal, which is present, direct, manifold, consistent, and open to all; and cannot lose its value by any new discovery of MSS. and readings. There are many reasons for the *separate* consideration of this part of the evidence, but none for making it *supreme*.

The reading ΘΕΟΣ is given by \aleph . B. C., probably the oldest MSS. of the New Testament, written in the fourth or fifth centuries: and by L. 33, which are of later date. The value of the ancient MSS. is much lessened by manifest errors in the preceding verses. In ver. 4 \aleph has ἐστὶ for ἦν; in ver. 15 it has ὁ εἶπων for δὲν εἶπον; and in ver. 18 it omits ὁ ὦν. In ver. 4 B omits τῶν ἀνθρώπων, and it has ὁ εἶπων in ver. 15. The last reading is also given by C., and it has a correction to υἱὸς in ver. 18. In these verses even Tregelles rejects the testimony of the MSS. he so much extols. If they are wrong here, it is not unlikely that they are wrong in ver. 18.

The MSS. from which versions and quotations are taken are very much later than their originals; and they are of unknown date and authority. In few cases is it certain that the reading is that of the author, and not of the copyist. The earliest writings of the Greek Fathers give both

readings. Both are found in the writings of Irenæus, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Origen. Tertullian and Hippolytus give only the reading for "Son." In the second and third centuries no writings give only the reading for "God"; and after a few centuries it was rejected in the East, as it always had been in the West. This verse is not referred to in controversy, till so used by Epiphanius at the close of the fourth century. With the reading ΘΕΟΣ, it would certainly have been used, as other texts were, which are much less relevant. Age adds something to the value of *testimonies*, but nothing to the worth of *criticism*. There were old readings good and bad, and some found in ancient documents were properly rejected. It seems impossible to determine the critical value of most of the quotations from the Fathers, partly because of the free way in which they are accustomed to quote from the Scriptures, and partly because of the many changes introduced by copyists. Where there are such manifest diversities the gain is very small in adding a few names on either side. The testimony of MSS. is the most important part of the External evidence; and here the preponderance of testimonies is so great, that no addition need be desired.

It has always been important to distinguish between primitive Christianity, and that which was set forth in after ages. This is especially important in the present day. To some it seems a great gain, if Scripture can be shown to agree exactly with Patristic teaching. It is really a greater advantage, that the New Testament is not responsible for the interpretations and speculations of the Fathers; nor for the misunderstandings of later times. If the reading ΘΕΟΣ were genuine, the authority of a few old MSS. would stand against all others: and the superiority of External evidence to Internal would be established. But if the whole evidence shows that ΤΙΟΣ is genuine, the value of these MSS. will be very differently estimated; and no change will be made in the Received Text, because of their supposed authority.

JOHN H. GODWIN.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

THE LIFE OF SAMUEL SHARPE.*

THIS graceful, appropriate, and sympathetic biography is something more than the life of Samuel Sharpe as an Egyptologist and Translator of the Bible, setting forth as it does in a lively manner the characteristics of a career of self-denial and earnest promotion of liberality beyond what those titles comprehend. The author has also done well to give relief to his immediate subject by a well-finished background of family history. This history is curiously rounded within a century. Samuel Sharpe died in 1881, the last of a family of four brothers whose elder half-sister was born in 1782. As the mere history of a private family the book is full of interest. It begins with the victory by that sister over the bitterness of the position of step-daughter, and what follows even to the end is the record of the best reward that she could have wished for in return for that training of her half-brothers and sisters to which she deliberately sacrificed her personal prospects and wishes. But this family history has the larger interest of illustrating the position of the Unitarian community, during a period reaching back from the present time to the days when Unitarians were still excluded from the benefit of the Toleration Act of William and Mary, and even up to the times when such exclusion was still to be feared as a threat because not so remote from times when it had been felt as something more. As to the value of Mr. Sharpe's labours as an Egyptologist, it is for specialists to give an opinion; but even from these we must not expect an authoritative decision until they are found to have made more progress in agreement among themselves as to the points on which they may differ from him. It was in a certain manner in harmony with his leaning to frugality adopted as a principle for the sake of indulging splendid and useful munificence, that he cared chiefly to check extravagance even in chronology, and, while fully appreciating the vast antiquity of the Egyptian monuments was always jealous of a tendency to account for them by too reckless drafts on the infinite past. His *History of Egypt from the Earliest Times* is the best book we have which can aspire to such a title. Other service which he did in this direction was the incitement and aid which he gave to his affectionate

* *Samuel Sharpe: Egyptologist and Translator of the Bible.* By P. W. CLAYDEN. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1883.

friend Joseph Bonomi in publishing the hieroglyphic texts, which no artist ever drew with equal spirit and correctness. Here, again, century seems to shake hands with century as we remember that the well-remembered, buoyant Bonomi was son of the friend of Sir Joshua Reynolds.

As regards Mr. Sharpe's work on the Bible those who are not competent to judge him as a translator of Hebrew or even of Greek may well be grateful to him as an editor. His edition of 1881 was planned to show in the text by greater exactness and typographical distinction of paragraphs, speeches, poetical parallelism, quotations and so forth, "those peculiarities which others had been content to point out in Notes and Commentaries." The scope for differences of opinion as to the judiciousness of particular treatment is of course unlimited. But the book is of high merit from the point of view of liberal criticism, and as a Bible for habitual reading and use as well as to have at hand for reference has approved itself most satisfactorily. Mr. Sharpe contented himself with Griesbach's text for the New Testament. All the most important changes in translation which he had advocated long previously are found directly represented in the "Revised Version," which so far is in favour of this text being sufficient. He had the greatest confidence in this editor's conscientiousness and, however unwillingly, did not go behind his authority, and even Tischendorf's, to change St. Paul's aspiration that the Lord might repay Alexander the coppersmith according to his works for an observation that doubtless he would do so.

That Mr. Sharpe's proper style in writing was clear, indeed, but dry, and simple to tameness, was an observation natural enough in an age which has become habituated to being pampered with artificial enhancements of realism and metaphor combined. Again, he was true to his rule of frugality and restricted himself to the sufficient, and expected others to be satisfied and even grateful for not being detained and troubled with more. It was quite at the end of his life that he indulged himself with a little more diffuseness in short communications which he made to *The Christian Life*, edited by Mr. Spears. The result of this relaxation was to develop a flexibility at once and a pointedness of expression which go far to show that he might have been not only a solid but a charming writer had he cared to be so. One of his friends was used to call these short articles his Table Talk, and was never more pleased than when he came in time to read the pithy sentences aloud at the tea-table before the proof was returned to the printer. The suggesting topic was always some incident of the current date, but always treated with that wisest form of good sense which sometimes blends into wit and sometimes even into humour. His very last thought would have been to seek popularity for his most valued convictions by sophistical artifice. He said of Renan's "*Vie de Jésus*,"—"it reads like a continuation of Paul and Virginia."

He was always impatient of frivolous talk and gossip. At the first chance he was likely enough to interpose, it has been said, with "But

now as regards the pyramids." The result was apt to be in such cases that conversation was only brought by jerk into the grooves of his well-worn favourite topics. But the fault lay with those who did not introduce some subject more interesting to themselves, and worthy of serious attention. Those who did so might always congratulate themselves on receiving useful assistance towards clearing their ideas, and so long as they did their own duty to their own topics, needed not to be in dread of any sudden revulsion to "but now as regards the pyramids."

His observations were above all remarkable from their combination of the practical with true highmindedness. The high value which he set on the mental training of business did not prevent his describing a well-known active Whig as "a poor creature,—a mere man of the world ;"—the very politician indeed who but a few days before had depreciated an acquaintance as "a poor creature ; not at all a man of the world."

It was his value for sincerity at any cost that made him an opponent to the last of Ballot in Parliamentary elections ; it seemed to him to be a screen and an encouragement for false dealing.

He took as serious a view of dishonesty in religious profession as he would have done of a falsified entry in a ledger in Clement's Lane ; and whether subscribers to discredited articles signed them, in the words of Gibbon, "with a smile or a sigh," made no difference from his point of view. The status of a Bishop presented itself to Mr. Sharpe in as amusing an aspect as it did to Sydney Smith, but, unlike the Canon of St. Paul's, he not only did not covet it, but thought the very amusingness a very serious matter indeed. He was never satisfied, for all his personal regard and primary admiration, with the pause which supervened upon the criticism of Colenso ; even that his criticism should have lingered where it did was trying, though he never, like Thirlwall, followed up early daring in criticism with advocacy of the Athanasian Creed, or emulated the *gran rifiuto* of the divine who put his contribution to *Essays and Reviews* behind the fire, and so qualified himself by inconsistency for a bishopric.

Of all such Mr. Sharpe would speak as men in masks, and quoted the comfort given by a right reverend suborner of insincerity to one who objected that to sign articles which he disbelieved would be to condemn himself to wear a life-long mask, "I assure you, after you have worn it for a little time, you will not know it from your own face."

It will be easily understood that Mr. Sharpe had but scant sympathy with the peculiar style of breadth in religion which was the ideal of Dean Stanley. He was not likely to set high value on a scheme of comprehension which seems to proceed on an agreement all round, that those who differ most shall take it in turns either to seem to accept each other's profession of faith, or not to be aware of the seriousness or even existence of such differences. The suspicion is excusable that in reality no difference of opinion exists, though it is thought politic for the time to keep congregations hoodwinked.

Such compromises he would class with that accepted perforce by the

Scottish laird, who, unable to obtain "a sensible man and a good Calvinist" for his kirk, was fain to put up with Dr. Robertson's substitute of a sensible man who was willing for a consideration to preach Calvinism.

In these days, when so many who have been brought up as members of the Church adopt opinions which are indistinguishable from those of Unitarians, yet are shy of committing themselves to unknown conditions which may impose new restrictions, Mr. Sharpe's tenacity of the title Unitarian was apt to be misunderstood. No one could be more jealous of the hardening tendencies of Sectarianism. He was the sturdy opponent of endowed tenets, positive or negative; and objected as strongly to Mr. Grote's exclusion of ministers from professorships as to University stratagems for reserving the teaching of geology to clergymen.

Mr. Clayden in this biography has done a service which merits acknowledgment from even a wider circle than comprises the many for whom the memory of Mr. Sharpe is linked with personal associations of gratitude, respect, and affectionate regret.

W. WATKISS LLOYD.

GREEN'S PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS.

THIS important book, which is no doubt destined to occupy a permanent place in philosophical literature, takes a middle course between the intuitional and the experiential schools. The thought is essentially Kantian; but it is Kant corrected by Hegel, and then further largely modified by Green, so that although the foundations of the treatise rest on German ideas, it is a genuine British structure, of which we may well be proud. While both schools of thought will be sure to recognise the substantial value of Mr. Green's work, and to acknowledge grateful indebtedness to it, each party will probably declare that against the great merit of the book in one direction, we must set off serious error in another. The Theistic intuitionalist will be comforted and confirmed by Mr. Green's most powerful and convincing contention that the spirit of man which knows nature can be no part of the nature which is known, and, therefore, cannot be accounted for and historically explained on evolutionist principles; but, on the other hand, most theists will be disappointed to learn that Mr. Green strenuously upholds the doctrine of determinism, and regards an uncaused free choice between motives as inconceivable and unmeaning. The experientialist, inversely, will be delighted with the latter doctrine, but will hold the great distinction which Mr. Green draws between spirit and nature to be an imaginary and intolerable barrier to the infinite possibilities of physical and mental science.

The volume is divided into four books, which treat respectively of the

* *Prolegomena to Ethics*. By the late THOMAS HILL GREEN, M.A., LL.D., Fellow of Balliol College, and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Edited by A. C. BRADLEY, M.A. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1883.

Metaphysics of Knowledge, the Freedom of the Will, the Moral Ideal, and Moral Progress, and the Application of Moral Philosophy to the Guidance of Conduct.

In the first book the author discusses the question: Does not the knowledge of nature imply a principle in man which is not natural? The answer which he gives is, that all mental functions may be materially conditioned, but that the material conditions, being constituents of the world of experience, cannot originate or explain the conscious principle which makes that world possible. He thus endorses the Kantian dictum that "the understanding makes nature," but whereas Kant adds "but out of a material of sensation which the understanding does not make," Green follows the post-Kantian thinkers and considers that the data of sensibility which Kant regards as the material given to the consciousness by "things in themselves" are elements of experience furnished by consciousness itself.

We must refer the reader to the treatise itself for the conclusive reasoning by which Mr. Green reaches the fundamental position that the spirit of man cannot be an object or part of nature, and content ourselves with quoting the passage, in which he sums up his conclusion:—

Nature with all that belongs to it is a process of change: change on a uniform method no doubt, but change still. All the relations under which we know it are relations in the way of change or by which change is determined. But neither can any process of change yield a consciousness of itself, which, in order to be a consciousness of the change, must be equally present to all stages of the change; nor can any consciousness of change, since the whole of it must be present at once, be itself a process of change. There may be a change into a state of consciousness of change, and a change out of it on the part of this man or that, but within the consciousness itself there can be no change, because no relation of before and after, of here and there, between its constituent members—between the presentation, for instance, of point A and that of point B in the process which forms the object of consciousness. (P. 21.)

It is, according to Mr. Green, self-consciousness, or, as Kant called it, "the synthetic faculty of apperception," which gives us a unified experience, and so makes for us a knowable world, and it is the eternal consciousness of God which constitutes both the world which human minds experience, and all possible cosmical facts which are discoverable by intelligent beings. The question accordingly suggests itself, How is this consciousness of the eternal thinker, God, related to our consciousness? Does the Eternal One by his creative thinking furnish us with those sensational elements, out of which, as Kant tells us, the understanding shapes an intelligible universe? Mr. Green strenuously argues that we cannot consistently speak of elements of feeling coming to the mind from a foreign source, such as by the action of "things in themselves." Feeling, he says, can only be a fact when it is determined by relations; and as it can be only so determined by the self-conscious mind itself, it can have no *reality*, apart from the action of a self-conscious intelligence. The self-consciousness which knows nature, and the nature which is the object of self-consciousness are not two distinct things, but only two

aspects of one indivisible thing, and hence the elements of sensation or feeling are not, as Kant maintains, material out of which the understanding organises the cosmos of experience, but are themselves a part of the indissoluble unity of the rational self. A difficulty here presents itself with which Mr. Green several times attempts to grapple, but which, it seems to us, he never succeeds in mastering. How about the sensations of *animals*? Mr. Green does not deny that animals feel, but he sees no reason to believe that they possess self-consciousness. Is, then, their feeling a reality? or, if not, what is it? It is not a reality to them, he says, for it can only be reality to a mind that can make it an object of thought, and so organise the relations which constitute the feeling. It can, then, only be a reality to God or to man, who can think it, and by thinking it, on Mr. Green's theory, constitute it. But surely sensation is something more than a phase either of our thinking, or of the eternal consciousness. It is something to the animal; for though the animal cannot think it, this inability to think it does not make it non-existent save in the consciousness of God, else it would be God alone that feels the pain when the animal cries out in apparent agony. As to what this animal feeling is on his theory Mr. Green gives no satisfactory reply.

Another difficulty occurs in the attempt to determine the relation between the eternal self-consciousness which constitutes nature and the human self-consciousness, in which, as Mr. Green says, the eternal self-consciousness reproduces itself. When this reproduction takes place, is the reproduced thinking simply due to the further agency of the original thinker? In other words, is there only one active self-conscious principle or personality in both God and man? As it seems to us, our consciousness distinctly testifies that while our thinking is conditioned by the Divine thinking, there is also a volitional activity of our own in reproducing God's eternal thought; Mr. Green apparently does not recognise this duality, and so entirely merges the human in the Divine self-consciousness that we cannot see how his system is to be distinguished from Pantheism.

Our impression that Mr. Green regards the *intellectual* action of the human mind simply as a phase of God's eternal thought, is confirmed by the position which he takes up when, in the next book, he treats of the *moral* activity of the self-conscious principle in man. In this book his inability to distinguish between the action of God and the action of man conspicuously displays itself and renders his account of the Will and its Freedom eminently unsatisfactory and at variance with consciousness. He begins this discussion with a very true and important distinction between the mere *feeling* of want followed by an instinctive impulse such as we may suppose to exist in the animals, and the *knowledge* of the wanted object with intentional effort to attain that object, such as is characteristic of self-conscious man. Just as in the sphere of intelligence the animal has *impressions* where the man has *perceptions*, so in the sphere of practice the animal has wants and instincts where the

man has objects of desire and purposive efforts to reach them. In regard to intelligence the human mind attains to a knowledge of what *is*, in regard to practice, or the satisfaction of its wants, it forms a conception of and attempts to realise what *should be*. A "motive" is not merely an appetite or want. Such appetite only becomes a motive so far as upon the want there supervenes the presentation of the want by a self-conscious subject to himself, and with it the idea of a self-satisfaction to be attained in the filling of the want. As a motive is thus constituted by the super-vention on the want of the action of the self-conscious principle, it is taken out of the class of merely *natural* events, and therefore there can be no such natural history of man's moral consciousness as evolutionist moralists aspire to construct. This explanation of the meaning of "motive" is introductory to the consideration of the question of the Freedom of the Will. Mr. Green thinks that the secret of reconciling the doctrine of determinism with our moral consciousness consists in understanding that, although motives are determined and determine the conduct, yet they are not *naturally* determined. What determines the conduct is always the agent's conception of his own greatest personal good at the moment of acting. To the position of the Libertarian that while motives of various degrees of importunity appeal to the self-conscious will, it is the characteristic of that will to originate an act of choice whereby the attention is directed to one motive rather than another so that the motive thus exclusively attended to becomes the prevailing one. Mr. Green's only reply is that "to a will free in the sense of *unmotived* we can attach no meaning whatever." To this we answer that, of course, we cannot attach a meaning to it in the same sense in which we attach a meaning to the occurrence of a natural phenomenon, but it sounds very strange that Mr. Green, who is never tired of telling us that the self-conscious subject which knows nature cannot be itself an object of nature, should himself apply to this timeless act of the self-conscious will that category of phenomenal causation which only holds good of the objects of nature. It is the action of the mind, in his view, which constitutes the orderly nexus between natural phenomena, and therefore that which is the source of this phenomenal causation cannot be bound by the conditions which it itself imposes. Mr. Green tries to evade this objection by saying that the mind is *self-determined*, but as, according to him, the mind can only determine itself in one definite way, it seems to us that all notion of moral freedom and of moral responsibility for past actions is as effectually dissipated by his theory as it is by the materialist and sensationalist systems which he so successfully assails. The question is not whether we have made the moral choice of ourselves or have been forced to make it by external pressure, but whether it was possible for us not to have made it, and it seems to us evident that if mankind in general could be thoroughly convinced that in the moral history of each man there have never really been two possibilities of action open before the mind between which it was free to choose, all rational ground for the sentiments of praise and blame would be undermined, and con-

sistent persons would admit with Spinoza that repentance is the outcome of ignorance, and remorse the bugbear of fools.

Again, Mr. Green does grave injustice to the Libertarian theory when he says that on that theory "I could be something to-day irrespectively of what I was yesterday, or something to-morrow irrespectively of what I am to-day" (p. 115). This charge is wholly without foundation, for the Libertarian maintains that the way in which a man decides a moral problem to-day conditions inevitably the nature of the problem which he will have to solve to-morrow. He does not believe that we are free to choose our motives, but only that we are free to choose between given motives, and the nature of the motives will be determined by our character. In each act of moral choice we alter our character for good or ill, and this change of character produces a corresponding change in the future motives between which we shall be called upon to choose. The way in which a man behaves in a moment of temptation to-day exercises a determining influence over the nature and force of the temptation to which he will be exposed to-morrow. Hence on the Libertarian theory the moral history of a person is no capricious and arbitrary matter; it is a gradual process in respect to which man exercises real, *i.e.* free and original, causality and for which, therefore, he is justly held accountable.

We have dwelt at so much length on the fundamental principles in respect to which we feel ourselves unable to follow wholly Mr. Green's leading that we can only very briefly refer to the remaining books of this masterly treatise. The discussion in the Third Book of the Moral Ideal resolves itself into the question:—"Granted that, according to our doctrine in all willing a self-conscious subject seeks to satisfy itself—seeks that which for the time it presents to itself as its good—how can there be any such intrinsic differences between the objects willed as justifies the distinction which 'moral sense' seems to draw between good and bad action, between virtue and vice? And if there is such a difference, in what does it consist?"

In answering this question Mr. Green first points out that the Hedonistic doctrine, that the moral quality of an act depends on the pleasurable or painful character of its effect, owes its plausibility to a confusion of thought. The Hedonist sees that in all desire self-satisfaction is sought, and that in all self-satisfaction there is pleasure, and hence he illogically and erroneously concludes that the object desired is pleasure. Having refuted this error, as, indeed, Mr. Sidgwick has done before him, Mr. Green then argues that experience teaches that the ultimate or unconditioned good is self-realisation, and that as our true self is social, our highest good must include the good of others. Ideal virtue, then, is defined as self-devoted activity to the perfection of man. What constitutes the idea of human perfection is determined by a study of the moral idea which has realised and is realising itself in human thought and life, and as the mind devotes itself to the realisation of the ideal, the ideal attains to greater clearness and fulness. In reference to the question, how far this idea as embodied in society will, apart from philosophy,

suffice for the guidance of conduct, Mr. Green says :—"The effort after an ideal of conduct has so far taken effect in the establishment of a recognised standard of what is due from man to man, that the articulation of the general imperative, 'Do what is best for mankind' into particular duties is sufficiently clear and full for the ordinary occasions of life" (p. 341). Philosophy has much to do *speculatively* in examining the history and relation of moral ideas, and at times this speculative inquiry has a practical value in determining doubtful questions of duty. It is then shown that these questions of duty cannot be solved on Utilitarian principles, for while Utilitarianism endorses adherence to conventional morality, it is only on the principle that the highest good is not pleasure, but is perfection, that we can explain and justify all morality that recognises higher claims of duty than society imposes. One of the most valuable sections of the book is that in which Mr. Green acutely examines Mr. H. Sidgwick's ethical theory, and shows that, though professedly utilitarian, it is in substance a "rational" system akin to that which Mr. Green propounds. The gulf between Egoistic Hedonism and Utilitarianism can only be crossed by appealing from the "Senses" to the "Reason."

This notice gives but a very inadequate idea of the worth of Mr. Green's treatise. Never before have Materialism and Utilitarianism received so thorough an examination and, as we think, so complete a refutation. Most successfully has Mr. Green established that the spirit in man must never be confounded with the natural objects which science can explain. The chief fault of the book appears to us to be that it so identifies the human thinking and willing with the eternal self-consciousness that the distinctively human will vanishes; so that our knowledge is rather God reproducing His own thought than we thinking God's thoughts after Him. In morals, too, this system seems to preclude the possibility of sin, or real opposition between the human and the Divine self: and in religion it renders unintelligible the consciousness of inter-communication between man and the Father within him.

C. B. U.

CONCORD LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY.*

IF as Heine asserts "John Bull is a born materialist," the same cannot be said of his relatives on the other side of the Atlantic. In the American mind, "slow, sure Britain's secular might and the Germans' inward sight" are to some extent combined, and a widespread and vivid interest is felt in "divine philosophy," such as does not exist and can hardly be awakened among ourselves. A parallel to the "Concord Summer School of Philosophy" cannot, we fear, be looked for in this country.

* *Concord Lectures on Philosophy.* Comprising outlines of all the Lectures at the Concord Summer School of Philosophy in 1882, with an Historical Sketch. Collected and arranged by RAYMOND L. BRIDGMAN. Moses King, Cambridge, Mass.

This school was instituted in July, 1879, by Mr. Bronson Alcott, Dr. W. T. Harris, and others, but the proceedings of the first three sessions do not appear to have been printed. A list, however, of the subjects of the lectures given since the commencement is placed at the opening of the book before us. The lectures extend annually over four weeks, two lectures a day being delivered for five days in the week. We are told in the Introductory Notice, and a perusal of the outlines bears out the statement, that "no lecturer is supposed to conform his ideas to what may be said by others, and there is no 'Concord School' of philosophy, except that the lecturers generally agree in an utter repudiation of Materialism and in maintaining the existence of a personal, self-conscious, spiritual cause above the material universe." The name of the venerable President of the Society, Mr. Bronson Alcott, and the warm affection and reverence felt by many of the lecturers for the memory of Emerson, link the society in some degree to the old Transcendentalism of New England, but the lecturers are of various types of thought, though, as above stated, hardly any of them have any sympathy with that materialist or sensational form of the evolution theory which finds so much favour in this country at present. The lectures, of many of which far too brief and tantalising an abstract is given, are of very various degrees of merit. The strongest thinker among the lecturers is, we think, the distinguished Hegelian Dr. W. T. Harris, who is the Editor of "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," and well-esteemed for his eminent services in the cause of Education. His contributions to the present volume are a striking paper on "The Dialectic Unity of Emerson's Prose," and ten very thoughtful lectures on various phases of ancient and modern philosophy. There are also two excellent lectures by Professor Howison on "The Present State of Philosophy in Germany," and one by Dr. McCosh on "The Scottish Philosophy," while readers who are mystically inclined will find in Mr. Alcott's utterances a genuine vein of inspiration. Many other lectures are worthy of notice, and we may say in general, that along with some vague and declamatory talk of slight importance, there is enough of solid learning and vigorous thought in the book to excite a warm interest in the doings of this "Concord School," and to create the hope that the proceedings of 1888 and future years will also be published, and, if possible, in a completer form than that in which they are now presented.

C. B. U.

MR. BAX ON KANT AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.*

WE are glad to be able to give a few words of hearty welcome to the latest of the many recent English contributions to the study of the Kantian Philosophy. This book will be a really useful companion to Professor Meiklejohn's translation of the "Critique of the Pure Reason;" for the "Critique" and the "Prolegomena" mutually illustrate each

* *Kant's Prolegomena and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Translated from the Original, with a Biography and Introduction. By ERNEST BELFORD BAX. London: George Bell and Sons. 1883.

other. The "Prolegomena" has been previously translated by Professor Mahaffy, but the price of this earlier translation places it beyond the reach of many readers; and in the present version Mr. Bax endeavours to reproduce "the *ipsissima verba* of Kant." In this he appears to have been fairly successful, and yet his English is very readable. As to the other work by Kant mentioned in the title, this now appears for the first time in an English dress. The account given by Mr. Bax of "Kant's Position in Philosophy" is a very luminous introduction to the study of this philosopher. Nor is the new biography of Kant presented in this book at all superfluous even to those who have read Professor Wallace's biographical sketch in Blackwood's "Philosophical Classics," for the former biography presents very vividly some most interesting details of Kant's life, and especially of its closing scene, which are by no means so fully described in Professor Wallace's book.

C. B. U.

THE CREED OF A MODERN AGNOSTIC.*

THIS is a small book of 150 pp., the expansion of a paper read before the London Dialectical Society two years ago. It has been published because, in the author's opinion, "it has become a pressing necessity on account of the notions and prejudices prevalent about Agnosticism, and the inquiries of intelligent young men who, unwilling to stop at the point to which they were carried by the Sunday-school, seek to acquire more extensive and accurate views of the principles of religion."

Here, then, is the first position of the author, that Agnosticism is a Religion, or, at least, offers a firm ground of principles upon which, religion may be based. It is very carefully stated that Agnosticism is not Atheism, and an Agnostic is described as "one who usually knows quite as much of God, Immortality, the Soul, as most other men, but who does not pretend to know what he does not, and cannot know; nor dignify with the name of knowledge traditional beliefs incapable of proof, and unverified by experience." The Atheist is taunted with "making a universal declaration assuming an amount of knowledge, and knowledge of such a kind, as never was possessed by any human being;" but it does not seem to have struck the author that the declaration that we do not and cannot know anything about God, immortality, or soul, is quite as universal an assumption as to the possibilities of human powers, and the extent of human experience, on the one hand; or the facts of the Divine revelation, on the other. He defends Agnosticism against being considered as a refuge for the thoughtless and mentally indolent; a charge to which it certainly is not open in face of the fact that the most prominent Agnostics are men of great intellectual activity and industry. A penetrative estimate would rather show it to be a disease of mental over-activity that has missed the central point of repose, and fails to be held in any orderly orbit for lack of a supreme attraction. As generally professed it is not

* *The Creed of a Modern Agnostic.* By RICHARD BITHELL, B.Sc., Ph.D. Routledge and Sons. 1883.

intellectual indolence so much as intellectual despair ; which has given up, as insoluble, the problem of problems, and finds itself tossed helplessly between instincts which cannot help but inquire, and blank silence out of which no answer can come. Scepticism which still pursues investigation, and keeps itself hopeful of some ultimate knowledge, is fine discipline, and is not without dignity ; but the temper of mind which says, " I do not know ; I never can know ; inquiry is idle and fruitless ; I will make the boundary of my senses the limit of my aspirations ! "—this is not scientific ; indeed, it is hardly human.

For all our author's laboured attempt at definition, it is not easy to grasp what he means by Agnosticism. He talks about divine worship as if that represented some reality, and tries to justify the consistency of the Agnostic joining in it, as if it could have some meaning and help for such a thinker. He attributes the increased reverence and reticence of speech about transcendental matters, the decreased tendency to dogmatism concerning them by theologians, and the less common use than heretofore of Bible quotations as sufficient proofs in argument, all to Agnosticism ; which he says, " has, in virtue of its inherent vitality, permeated all creeds while it is antagonistic to none." A simple-minded man may well be a little staggered at this. Is it any gain to worship we know not what ? How can a rational reverence rest upon confessed ignorance, and a contented blank incapacity for knowledge ? And according to what understandable definition of Agnosticism can it be said to be antagonistic to no existing creed, and capable of permeating them all ? And as to the last point, does it not much better interpret the facts of the case to say that the increased reverence and modesty of theological expression, and the lessened disposition to use the Bible for dogmatic proof, represent, in the direction of progressive religion, the result of that reasonable and fearless criticism which, in the direction of scepticism and materialism, has produced Agnosticism itself ?

Mr. Bithell, with commendable modesty, claims, in this statement of his creed, only to speak for himself, and this is well ; for though his clear and careful statements would probably be all endorsed by the most thoughtful of his school, they are much too qualified, and concede too much, to content the more rash and iconoclastic of those who call themselves Agnostic. Having very carefully read the book, noting not only what it says, but what it involves, we have not been able to escape the conviction that Mr. Bithell's argument cannot be left at the point where he is content to pause, but must be followed on the path along which its own momentum carries it, to Theistic conclusions. Agnosticism, as we have hitherto understood it, says, " We do not know. We cannot know. These things are outside the range of the human faculties altogether. It is vanity, waste of time, perversion of power, sacrifice of opportunity, to inquire. The whole business is so much ' lunar politics,' and all the results of it a most gigantic and useless monument of human folly." This is a perfectly understandable position, and is rightly named Agnosticism ; but a theory that finds it necessary to use the names God,

Creator, as equivalents of the unknowable; that maintains the consistency of worship; that declares its capability of permeating all religions and being antagonistic to none; that considers long ages of inquiry into that which never can be known, and which we have no power to know, as of incalculable benefit to mankind; that speculates upon the possible evolution in man of new faculties by which God and other transcendental matters may be known sometime, but does not recognise even the rudiments of such faculties as existing now, is another thing, and will probably not content Agnostics generally, though it may encourage Theists to hope that the more thoughtful and cultured Agnostics are already feeling, and fretting against, the limits of their system, and breaking their way out into a larger realm of spiritual possibility. Indeed this last expresses what seems to be the whole spirit and tendency of this very readable book, which are much more obvious in the book itself than can be made apparent in this brief and inadequate notice.

The creed of the modern Agnostic is stated in six propositions, given as the heads of so many chapters, each of which is not so much argumentative as illustrative of the proposition with which it deals. We can do little more than state these propositions, referring for their more elaborate treatment to the book itself.

It is first declared that, "of absolute truth, man knows nothing; nor does it appear that in the present stage of human development he has the mental faculties for acquiring such knowledge." The weak points here are the assumption that man knows nothing of absolute truth; that such knowledge could only come through mental faculties; and that man has not at present any other powers of apprehending "things, in themselves," even in a rudimentary stage. This is, surely, allowing too little for the spiritual nature of man, and for the religious experience of mankind.

The second proposition affirms that "there is a large body of practical truth which we are capable of knowing as positively as we can know anything; not absolutely, but with a certainty beyond which we have no interest in knowing anything." This may be readily granted, but it is a somewhat narrow foundation upon which to make the senses, and deductions from them, the only ground of our knowledge; and to ignore what rational Theists are always careful to maintain, that their knowledge of transcendental things does not claim to be absolute, but to represent the truth of these things to the soul sufficiently for all practical purposes, and as far as we have any interest in knowing it. Is there any reason why a man should not be as sure of the correspondence between his thoughts and transcendental realities, as he can be between his sense-perceptions and the realities of the outward world? What he knows, in both cases, is the state of his own consciousness; and the balance seems rather in favour of the truth of his spiritual impressions than of the perceptions of his senses.

The third proposition states that "between the domains covered by the known and the knowable, there is a vast, unexplored region of

unknown but knowable truth, which constitutes the proper and legitimate field of speculation and research." This is doubtless so, but it begs the whole question if it seeks to lay down a limiting line within which the unknown is knowable, but beyond which the unknown is unknowable. Of course the unknown-knowable is the proper and legitimate field of speculation and research, and these would surely be exercised in vain in the field of the unknown-unknowable; but supposing this latter to exist at all, which we, who believe in immortality and progress, do not by any means admit, who is to draw the line between it and the former? And is this point in the mere childhood and nonage of scientific and spiritual thought the time even to attempt to draw it?

In the fourth proposition it is said—"There are many things which we believe, but which we do not know: and we believe these things either on account of the evidence by which they are supported, or because we have to some extent the means of verifying them." Here the whole question rests between belief and knowledge, the assumption being that only that can be known which can be proved by the senses, or deduced from their impressions by a stern logical process; while all other things can only be believed, no matter what the force and value of their evidence may be. There can be no serious objection to a distinction which thus narrows our use of the word knowledge so long as nothing important is made to rest upon it, and what is called belief, in its highest instances, is not made inferior to what is called knowledge, in its lowest instances; but it is surely contrary to human experience to assume that a man cannot, in his own consciousness, be quite as certain of his thoughts on some so-called transcendental matters, as on other things clearly dependent upon sense-perception. Our author himself seems to have felt this difficulty, for in this chapter he yields entirely to the intellectual necessity of postulating a supreme power as the basis of the Universe, in such a way as reduces the difference between himself and a Theist to mere words and names. True, he contends that we can know nothing of the attributes of the Supreme Power, but this can hardly be possible in the face of what follows in the next chapter.

Our author's fifth proposition is that "the proper objects of human knowledge and belief are phenomena, that is, the forms and modes in which the Unknowable manifests itself. These manifestations, as they affect the intellect, furnish the groundwork of science; as they affect the emotions, the rudiments of religion." Is it not a contradiction in terms to speak of an Unknowable that is always manifesting itself to beings, like men, who have power to know; and doing this in two ways; in the infinitude of phenomena, and in all the thoughts and emotions of which men are conscious in their own minds? How can the ever-revealed be the ever-unknown? How can that, which is constantly being evolved, hide for ever the secret of its own inward being? Is it not simply impossible that as the nature of man elevates itself into the loftiest truths, and purifies itself into the sublimest emotions, and grows into sympathetic communion with what is most inward and inexpressible in nature,

he should not come to know, as surely as he knows anything, as truly as it concerns him to know anything, that these things, revealed to, and faintly represented in himself, are, in some infinite way, attributes of the Supreme Power?

There is much that is very fine and beautiful in this chapter, and which shows that a reverent nature and a religious heart will put much more meaning into Agnosticism than it can fairly be made responsible for, or be made to bear. The man who can so write is to all intents and purposes at one with the Theist, who knows that all his speech about God is but faint symbolism. One cannot quarrel with an Agnostic, whose very reverence cuts him off from names and phrases often used too flippantly by thoughtless people.

The last proposition concerns morality, which is declared to have "its origin in human needs, arising from the instinctive desire of individuals to form themselves into social groups; it is often enforced by sanctions embodied in religious creeds, but exists before, and independent of, them: it also becomes more imperious in its demands, as societies become more highly organised." This is a very inadequate account of morality, making it the result of the merely gregarious instinct in mankind instead of a reflection of the Eternal Righteousness, which is inwrought into the very structure of the universe, and, because so inwrought, grounded in the being of man, and so a part of the manifestation of the unseen and so-called unknowable; from which it may be inferred that it is of itself a quality of the Supreme Power.

The conclusion of our book is a somewhat ill-tempered and unphilosophic attack upon the recent essay of Dr. Porter, published by the Religious Tract Society, which is an attempt to show that Agnosticism is a doctrine of despair. As may be inferred from the foregoing, there is Agnosticism and Agnosticism. Considered in its extreme form of negation, what can it be but a doctrine of despair? But there is no need for so hopeful and aspiring a man as Mr. Bithell to trouble himself either to protect or defend a doctrine which every page of his book shows would be as unsatisfactory to him as it would be to any Theist, who cared at the same time to conserve reverence and modesty of expression and to maintain the right to treat the whole question with the utmost freedom of rationalism.

T. W. F.

MR. DRUMMOND'S 'NATURAL LAW IN THE SPIRITUAL WORLD.*'

THE author of *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* is a clear, scientific thinker, thoroughly at home in the great field of Nature, and well acquainted with the various speculations of our day as to the deeper meaning of things. His book, after the introduction in which its general principles are stated, is a series of parables pointing out various analogies between the phenomena of the spiritual world

* *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*. By HENRY DRUMMOND, F.R.S.E., F.G.S. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1888.

and those of the material, especially those of animal life, from which analogy of phenomena he infers an identity of law in the two worlds. And the burden of the book is that this tracing of natural laws in the sphere of spiritual life, in so far bringing the "supernatural" into the region of the natural, will give greater clearness to our knowledge of unseen things, and be very helpful to those who have been trained in the school of science and acknowledge no authority but that of law, in leading them to accept the truths of religion. It is not claimed that such a recognition of law in the spiritual world will *prove* the reality of any fact in that great realm, for a law is only an ordered method of working discovered in phenomena already known; but just as now we feel that we have a firmer hold on the material world by our knowledge of its laws, than when everything was uncertain, or only dimly understood, so must it be in the spiritual world; the presence there of some of the same great laws of life as biology reveals must bring the substance of things unseen within the circle of more definite knowledge, and render doubt in these matters an impossibility.

It is clear therefore that the value of this work will depend on the exactness with which the phenomena of the spiritual world have been observed and the skill with which they are treated. For if the facts are distorted or misunderstood, any tracing of laws by which they are ordered can be of little use. And although Mr. Drummond's discourses on the laws of Biogenesis, Degeneration, Growth, Death, Conformity to Type, Environment, &c., contain many beautiful and suggestive thoughts, and many practical truths of the higher life are clearly dealt with, it appears to us that in two most essential points his statement of facts is altogether mistaken, and that his arguments are therefore vitiated.

In the discourse on Biogenesis the fundamental distinction between those who are "born again" and those who live "after the flesh," is shown to involve a new departure in the evolution of life as complete as that between the organic and the inorganic in the material world. But the question as to who are the regenerate, who live "after the spirit," is decided on the basis of the text, "He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son hath not life," and this not in the sense of having the spirit of sonship to God, but of accepting Jesus Christ, according to the orthodox interpretation of the Christian Gospel; so that the most enlightened, the most saintly in any other fold, and even of those who accept the gospel of Christ in a different sense, are put down as merely products of the natural world, and as having no part in the higher life either here or hereafter. And morality is treated throughout as a product, however beautiful in its way, still only of the "natural man," a fine moral character is spoken of as "the highest achievement of the organic kingdom;" as though the recognition of righteousness and moral obligation required no fresh influence of the divine spirit, but was unfolded simply in accordance with biological law. So narrow a conception of revelation and inspiration can hardly commend itself to those who have a wide view of the spiritual

facts of life, and believe in the abounding grace of God, and renders it unprofitable to enter with any further detail into conclusions drawn from such starting points. The method of the book we believe to be good; but there must be a truer statement of the fundamental facts before completely satisfactory results can be obtained. V. D. D.

AN OLD TESTAMENT COMMENTARY FOR ENGLISH READERS.*

THIS Commentary is intended as a companion to that already published on the New Testament under the direction of the same editor. It is apparently designed to appeal to a rather wider class of readers than the Speaker's Commentary, and perhaps aims a little more emphatically at edification as well as the strict elucidation of the text. Since the publication of the earlier volumes of the older work, large quantities of new material have become available for Old Testament illustration. Babylonian, Assyrian, and Egyptian discoveries have proceeded, as all the world knows, with amazing rapidity. Investigations into primitive forms of society have unfolded the meaning of many customs whose origin and significance had hitherto escaped the ordinary historian. And critical theories which could scarcely gain a hearing a dozen years ago are swiftly advancing to a more general acceptance among scholars than could have been at all anticipated. There is certainly room, therefore, for a new Commentary on the Old Testament; and the volumes before us are offered as an earnest contribution towards the enlightenment of educated persons on the latest phases of Biblical questions. Of the piety and devout intention of the writers there can be no suspicion; but of too many of them it must be frankly said that they do not realise the conditions under which their task must be executed, and that their labour is consequently in vain.

The different Biblical books have been for the most part entrusted to different hands, and Bishop Ellicott takes just credit in the Preface for not attempting to reduce divergent opinions to a prescribed uniformity. Thus a cautious and sober introductory sketch of the growth of Hebrew literature by Dean Plumptre claims no more for the Mosaic period than that "on their entry into the land of Canaan the Israelites brought with them, not indeed the whole Pentateuch in its present form, but many documents that are now incorporated with it, and which served as a nucleus for the work of future compilers." Dean Payne Smith, however, in his preliminary essay on the Pentateuch, boldly affirms the Mosaic authorship of the whole five books, with the exception of a few insignificant modifications or additions, such as *Gen.* xxxvi. 81—48. Canon Rawlinson (dealing with Exodus) supports him, enquiring "who but Moses could know that before he 'slew the Egyptian,' he 'looked this way and that' (chap. ii. 12)? Who but he would remember that he 'buried him

**An Old Testament Commentary for English Readers*, edited by the Right Rev. C. J. ELLICOTT, D.D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. Vol. I., 1882. Vol II., 1883. London: Cassell, Petter, Galpin, and Co.

in the sand' (ib.) ?" &c., &c. This conclusive argument does not suffice for Dr. Ginsburg, who significantly passes by the question of the date of Leviticus with the remark that he does not believe it was written in its present form by Moses, and then proceeds to draw all his illustrations (and very valuable and interesting many of them are) from the usage of the second Temple. The commentators on the Pentateuch and Joshua, however (with the exception of Dr. Ginsburg into whose theme the problem does not enter so conspicuously), have plainly no conception of the grounds on which different chapters or parts of chapters are assigned to different schools of authorship. They make merry over the apparent arbitrariness of Ewald; but they are obviously ignorant of the vast array of linguistic and other phenomena so laboriously collected by critics of very different schools in Germany, and displayed with such minuteness and patience in the writings of Dr. Colenso. In other cases, where tradition has erected no such claim to unity of authorship as the Church in the persons of these divines still persists in attributing to the Pentateuch, critical faculty has a little freer play. Thus Archdeacon Farrar recognises at once the composite structure of the book of Judges, though we cannot agree with him in assigning the second appendix, chaps. xix.—xxi., to the author of the introduction. And if De Wette succeeded in 'entirely refuting the conjecture of Stähelin that it [the book of Judges] is by the same author as the book of Deuteronomy,' it deserves mention that the last edition of De Wette's *Einleitung* unhesitatingly assigns the editorial framework of the book to the Deuteronomic School.* In like manner, Canon Spence has no difficulty in perceiving that two different traditions lie behind the accounts of David's introduction to Saul, though his attempt at harmonising them by suggesting that the events in 1 Sam. xvi. 21—23 belong to a period subsequent to the Goliath-combat, must be pronounced very unsatisfactory.

Special attention has been paid, so Dr. Ellicott assures us, to the scientific, historical, and moral difficulties which perplex readers, and consequently demand the attention of interpreters. The commentators who maintain the literal significance of the stories of Balaam's ass and the staying of the sun at Joshua's behest, must at least be credited with courage. But what is to be said of the following funny attempt to give an air of scientific exactness to *Gen. i. 11* (the vegetable creation of the third day) for which Dean Payne Smith is responsible?

"Geologists inform us that cryptogamous plants which were the higher forms of the first-class [endogenous plants] prevailed almost exclusively till the end of the carbonaceous period: but even independently of this evidence we could scarcely suppose that fruit trees came into existence before the sun shone upon the earth; while the cerealia are found only in surface deposits

* We have not at hand the edition from which Archdeacon Farrar quotes. But it would seem that he must have written *Deuteronomy* by a slip for *Joshua*. In Theodore Parker's translation, Stähelin is cited as ascribing Judges to the author of Joshua; while the presence of Deuteronomic formulæ is declared to "refer us to the time after the date of Deuteronomy," which is placed in the age of Josiah.

in connection with vestiges of man. Vegetation, therefore, did not reach its perfection until the sixth day, when animals were created which needed these seeds and fruits for their food. But so far from there being anything in the creative record to require us to believe that the development of vegetation was not gradual, it is absolutely described as being so; and with that first streak of green God gave also the law of vegetation, and under His fostering hand all in due time came to pass which that first bestowal of vegetable life contained. It is the constant rule of Holy Scripture to include in a narrative the ultimate as well as the immediate results of an act; and moreover in the record of these creative days we are told what on each day was new, while the continuance of all that preceded is understood. The dry land called into existence on the third day was not dry enough to be the abode of terrestrial animals till the sixth day, and not till then would it bear such vegetation as requires a dry soil; and the evidence of geology shows that the atmosphere, created on the second day, was not sufficiently free from carbonic acid and other vapours to be fit for animals to breathe, until long ages of rank vegetation had changed these gases into coal."

This may or may not be true science, but it is certainly false interpretation. Dean Payne Smith is welcome if he pleases to explain the days as æons (though his statement that we are now living, "by the common consent of commentators," in the seventh day, must be taken with reserve), but he is not at liberty to twist the statements of the text to accommodate his harmonising process. No one who is not bent on recklessly forcing the narrative at all costs into some sort of accord with a totally different order of facts, could doubt that verses 11—18 mean that seed-bearing plants and fruit-trees were all created on the third day as well as the endogens which Dean Payne Smith understands by *deshé*. It might be amusing to see how the nebular theory may in like manner be reconciled with the creation of the heavenly bodies on the fourth day, were it not inexpressibly sad to find so much perverse ingenuity and so much pious intent expended on an impossible task. There can be little hope that divines of this school will ever realise the futility of their labours; but the question must press on all liberal students of the Bible whether they have done all that they ought to make these ancient documents intelligible in what they believe to be the light of a larger knowledge and a faith no less sincere.

The second group of difficulties to which this Commentary is designed to pay special attention is historical. But these receive no more adequate treatment than the scientific. The narrative of the Exodus and the wanderings needs no further support than such general remarks as that "Every Christian must accept miracles. . . . In the present case it is observable—(1) that the miracles were needed; (2) that they were peculiarly suitable and appropriate to the circumstances; (3) that they were of such a nature that it was impossible for eye-witnesses to be deceived with regard to them." Details fare no better. The most glaring contradictions in the story of the Conquest excite no remark and are passed over in silence; and even Archdeacon Farrar seems unable to discern the discrepancies between the account of the settlement in Judges i. and that in Joshua. Nay, even such inconsistencies as the opposite statements of verses 8, and 21 suggest no suspicion. The historical

criticism of the law books is on the same level. It is well known for instance that Deuteronomy regards all Levites as lawful priests. Mr. Waller, however, who says he had not time to acquaint himself with modern commentators, dismisses *Deut.* xviii. 1 ("the priests the Levites, and all the tribe of Levi") in very easy fashion.

"The fact that there is no 'and' here in the original, and the look of the sentence in English, might dispose a superficial reader to find some ground here for the theory that priest and Levite are not distinguished in Deuteronomy. No such idea occurred to Rashi. He says 'all the tribe of Levi, not only those that are perfect (who can serve), but those who have a blemish (and cannot).'

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And so one of the most important questions recently raised concerning the development of the cultus, and with it of the religion of Israel, is brushed aside with a flourish, which does not touch it at all, out of the eleventh century!

The frank recognition of moral difficulties in the characters portrayed and commended in the Biblical stories is far more satisfactory. A theory of progressive enlightenment enables Archdeacon Farrar, for example, to give free play to his thoroughly healthy sentiments; though it seems to us that he unduly minimises the significance of the narrative of the assassination of Eglon by Ehud. In other passages we are left somewhat in doubt as to the author's meaning. Thus Dean Payne Smith appears anxious to establish the literal exactness of the second as well as of the first chapter of Genesis, yet we find him remarking that "the whole of this second narrative is pre-eminently anthropomorphic. . . . It is a picture fitted for the infancy of mankind, and speaking the language of primæval simplicity." Apparently, then, the Eden story is pictorial, not historic: it is only a symbol, not a record of facts. The writer's position is not indeed very clear. He has read the late Mr. Smith's *Chaldean Genesis*, and he sees very plainly that there is a close relation between the narrative of Genesis and the Mesopotamian legends. But he inverts the commonly received order of dependence. Unlike M. Lenormant, who regards the Hebrew stories as spiritualised out of the Babylonian, and guaranteed as to their inspiration by the sanction of the Synagogue and the Church, he gives the priority of revelation to the original possessors of the representations of Genesis, from which the cuneiform records were corrupted. This is, doubtless, a more satisfactory way of vindicating their truth; only it has the misfortune to be totally destitute of evidence in its support.

Altogether, then, this commentary must be said to fail in its design. It has many commonplace excellences. It is not deficient in useful geographical materials. Everything relating to the topography of Palestine, for instance, has been worked up with care from the latest investigations. Archdeacon Farrar's notes on Judges abound in felicitous historical parallels, and apt poetical quotation (though there is no need for the same passage to reappear twice in the same connection, as on ii. 18 and x. 6). And attention has been already

called to the value of Dr. Ginsburg's illustrations of Leviticus. Sociological evolution, however, is grievously neglected. And in the higher requisites the commentaries on the more difficult books are vitiated by their dominant principle. *Hæc omnia spectant ad Christum* is their pervading idea, which cuts athwart all true criticism founded on the recognition of historical development. Mr. Waller cites the reason drawn by Deuteronomy from the exodus for the observance of the Sabbath as an illustration of "the observation that in Deuteronomy we find 'the Gospel of the Pentateuch.' If for the exodus of Israel we substitute here 'the exodus of Christ which he accomplished at Jerusalem,' not so much by His death as by His resurrection, we have a reason for keeping *not the Sabbath, but the Lord's day.*" A still more surprising instance, surpassing any of the specimens of patristic interpretation which Canon Spence cites with so much sympathy from Bishop Wordsworth's commentary, will be found in the same writer's note on *Deut.* x. 6, 7. But perhaps the most extraordinary piece of exegesis is Dean Payne Smith's explanation of *Gen.* iv. 1, where he translates Eve's words, "I have gotten a man who is (or even) Jehovah." In an excursus on the Divine name, the Dean declares himself in favour of the pronunciation *Yehveh*, which he renders "he shall be," or "shall become." This is interpreted to mean "the coming one," and is identified with the *ἐρχόμενος* of the Gospels, and of *Apoc.* i. 4, 8, &c. In the language of Eve, then, in which she prophesies of the Messiah, "I have gotten a man, even he that shall be," or "the future one," lies the real origin of the divine name, and the Jehovah of the Old Testament becomes the Jesus of the New. On this exhibition of theological scholarship further comment is superfluous.

J. E. C.

THE WORKS OF FREDERICK HUIDEKOPER.*

THE main thesis which these volumes are written to prove,—at least, the main idea pervading them, seems to be, that the progress of civilisation depends on the diffusion of monotheistic belief, and that monotheism is of supernatural origin, having its source in the two revelations contained in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. In support of this view the author has brought together a large number of very interesting facts, and may be admitted to have shown that, in the reaction from the old view that whatever is good or true in the writers of Greece and Rome was borrowed from the Scriptures, the influence of Judaism as a factor in the civilisation of the Roman Empire has of late been somewhat undervalued or insufficiently recognised; but whoever will follow Mr. Huidekoper throughout will find himself compelled to reverse many accepted historical judgments, to give up some facts on which hitherto no doubt has been thrown, and to adopt some very extravagant conclusions.

* *Works of Frederick Huidekoper.* Volume I., Judaism at Rome. Volume II., Indirect Testimony; Acta Pilati; Christ's Mission to the Underworld. New York: David G. Francis. 1883.

It may be, of course, that the history of the early Roman Empire requires rewriting. It may be that Tiberius, so far from being the sensualist and debauchee he has been painted by Tacitus, was in reality a man whose deep moral earnestness coloured his entire life. Professor Beesly, in this country, it may be remembered, some years ago, asked for a revival of the judgment of history on this character, and Mr. Huidekoper quite independently arrived at his own view; but admitting its correctness, it would, we suspect, be difficult to show that Tiberius owed anything to monotheistic influences. Caligula, again, is in these pages depicted as a man of a most loving and lovable nature, fond of an occasional pleasantry, tenderly affectionate in his family relations, and entirely free from personal vice. This Emperor, who began his reign by forbidding that any one should set up images of himself, never gave orders that his statue should be erected in the temple of Jerusalem; the story is a fiction of Philo and the Jewish aristocratic party. What our author says on these points is well worthy of consideration; but when, in the sequel of his work (on Judaism at Rome) he goes on to ascribe, not only the moral advancement, but the scientific and æsthetic culture, of Greece and Rome, to the influences of monotheism, we can only express our amazement that any one should be found to advocate a view so entirely opposed to all the plainest facts of the case. Science would never have originated among a people with whom "it is God's will" was a formula which accounted for every phenomenon; and of science, therefore, the Jews remained profoundly ignorant until they came in contact with the freer speculation of the West. Art, we had imagined, was to the Jews almost unknown, and there is certainly nothing in their literature to show that they were peculiarly alive to beauty of form and colour. We are surprised therefore to be informed that "the beauties of nature found recognition almost exclusively among monotheists." In support of this statement Mr. Huidekoper quotes Ps. viii. 3, 4: "When I consider thy heavens . . . the sun and moon (*sic*), which thou hast ordained, what is man that thou art mindful of him?"—a very impressive passage no doubt, but one which derives its power not from its appreciation of natural beauty, but from its sense of the contrast between the glory of Him who made the heavens and the littleness of man. Let it be admitted, however, that there is in the Scriptures, as assuredly there is, a recognition of the beauties of nature, it is as nothing in comparison with the fulness of delight in nature and nature's works, which is apparent in the great poets of Greece and Rome; and although this writer quotes from Paul (1 Cor. xv. 41), "There is one glory of the sun, and another of the moon, and another of the stars," we must express our own conviction that there is not a single touch in the works of that apostle to show that he ever looked lovingly or with real joy on any natural object. But we cannot pursue this subject, neither can we notice at length the works of which these two volumes are composed. Indeed, a writer who, in treating of "the indirect testimony of history to the genuineness of the Gospels," declares that "of all this controversy and conflict"—between the

Jewish and Gentile Christians—"not a trace appears in the Gospels," at once confesses his incompetency to discuss the subject. Of any acquaintance with the literature of the Gospel question on the part of Mr. Huidekoper, there is hardly a trace in these volumes, and next to himself, it must be said, the author to whom he most frequently refers is Mr. Norton. In dealing with the Apocalypse, he falls back, for the number of the beast, on the old explanation of Irenæus, making not the slightest allusion to the true solution; while he seems quite unaware that the weight of critical opinion now refers the book of Enoch, making allowance for Christian interpolations, to the second half of the second century B.C. Strauss he seems to know through the New American Cyclopædia; of Baur there is no mention whatever, and when he names together "Hone and Tischendorf" as two modern writers, who expressed, "in a crude shape," the view, "that various Gospels existed in the second century from which the four now in use were selected, or out of which they were formed, or in opposition to which they were fabricated," it is difficult to help asking if he has the slightest idea who Tischendorf is. But we have no wish to speak disparagingly of these works, especially when we consider the disadvantage—that of failing eyesight, to which the author more than once makes pathetic reference—under which they were composed. They contain a great deal of very interesting matter; and in particular the view that, independently of, and prior to, Christianity, monotheism, not necessarily in its Judaic form but having in Judaism its main support, was an active and aggressive power at Rome, is well deserving of the attention of the historical student.

R. B. D.

PROFESSOR VOLKMAR'S 'JESUS OF NAZARETH.'*

ABOUT two years ago it was rumoured that Professor Volkmar was publishing his "Magnum Opus" which was to give to the world the final results of his long-continued and minute study of the history of Jesus and the earliest Christian documents. The work was to appear in about thirty parts of some sixty pages each. It soon appeared, however, that rumour, as usual, was only partly right. The work was to consist of about thirty *sheets* and proved to be virtually little more than a popular edition of the Professor's well-known work on the Gospel according to Mark. It is in one sense less, not greater, than the work practically on the same subject which we already possessed from the same hand. Yet in another sense it is the Professor's greatest work. In it he has attempted most successfully the difficult task of bringing the methods and the results of the *Tendenz* criticism of the Gospels within reach of those who have had no special theological training and who have no knowledge of Greek. In the winter semester of 1875-76 Prof. Volkmar delivered in the University of Zürich an open course of lectures

* *Jesus Nazarenus und die erste christliche Zeit, nach den Schriftzeugen des ersten Jahrhunderts*, von GUSTAV VOLKMAR. Zürich: Cæsar Schmidt. 1881-2.

on Strauss's *Old and New Faith*. The object of this course was to place the increasing number of persons who were coming to regard Strauss's work "as a kind of quintessence of all theology" in a position to judge of the matter for themselves, by giving them some insight into the true character of the sources of our information with regard to the life and work of Jesus. In the spring of the year 1876 the Professor was appointed lecturer on Religious History, with special reference to the Monotheistic religion of Israel and primitive Christianity, at the State Training College for Elementary Teachers in Zürich. This gave him fresh opportunities of ascertaining what was required by a different class of persons from those who attended his lectures in the university, and having been compelled by the pressure of other duties to relinquish his chair at the training college, he has published in a form suited to a far wider class of readers, and especially to those who are preparing for the position of teachers in elementary schools, the substance of the lectures given at Zürich in 1875-6. Such is shortly the history of the work now before us.

In a few introductory pages Professor Volkmar first points out the unique position of Christianity among the religions of the world, as the one religion which is always guided by the spirit of its founder and yet is confined to no set code, and so is always open to every reforming movement, and is destined and able ultimately to bring all the world to true and lasting peace under one form or another of Christian faith. The history of Christianity he divides then into three main periods—the period of its foundation, its spread, and its reformation. With the first of these only this work has to deal. The documents on which the Professor relies almost entirely for information regarding the founder of Christianity are Paul's epistles to the Galatians, Romans, and Corinthians, the Revelation of John, and the second Gospel, which he believes to have been originally written either by John Mark or a younger disciple and follower of John Mark. But as is well known, the author's view of this literature is that none of these writers are in the strict sense historians. The purpose of the Evangelist, as of the Apostle to the Gentiles, and the Seer of Patmos, is to set forth *the Gospel*, the good tidings of Christ and Christianity.

In general terms we may say that Paul sets forth the Gospel in the spiritual things of the present. Christ is risen from the dead. He is the true son of David. Those who believe in him are the true children of Abraham, to whom the promises were made, and to whom salvation is now offered. Jews and Gentiles alike are being saved through Christ. John sets forth the Gospel in the form of a prophetic vision, in imitation of the apocalyptic literature. Mark throws his preaching of the Gospel into the form of a narrative of the earthly life of Jesus. Each writer has a great religious purpose in view to which all else must bend, and consequently the student who desires to ascertain from these writings the facts of the life of Jesus must be on his guard, and watch constantly to detect any signs of their having been influenced by the writers' ideas of

the true nature of the Gospel itself. Every utterance and every act attributed to Jesus must be carefully weighed in connection with the life and circumstances not only of the founder of Christianity, but of early Christianity itself. Only after such consideration is it possible to say, and not even then always with certainty, whether the historical fact which underlies the narrative is a fact of the life of Jesus or of the life of early Christianity. Of course the Professor does not discuss each detail in a popular manual, but the value of the manual is due to the unwearied care which he has devoted to the minutest details during his life-long study of the New Testament literature.

Even those who already possess Professor Volkmar's former work on Mark and the Synoptics, will be glad to possess this, and will read it with pleasure and profit. It is indeed a more "readable" book, and awakens recollections of the Professor's own voice, when he is in his most characteristic and happiest vein. It will go far, moreover, to show that he is by no means one who denies the possibility of a veritable history of Jesus of Nazareth. He is not so ready to admit all that will serve the purpose of a biography as some well-known and popular writers on the subject are, nor will he draw out the slender thread till it snaps a hundred times in the process; but his rejection of the unhistorical only serves to confirm that which is historical, and to set more plainly before us the actual Jesus.

It is impossible not to regret that one who is so eminently fitted to popularise the best results of Modern New Testament Criticism should have been compelled to retire from a chair which brought him into personal contact with those in whose hands is to be placed the elementary education of the important canton of Zürich: but he has left them a valuable legacy, and the inheritance is happily one that is open to all.

FRANCIS H. JONES.

NEW TESTAMENT STUDIES OF A LAYMAN.*

TO the student of New Testament literature a double interest always attaches to the writings of a layman. First they may very probably contain some fresh practical view of Christ or Christianity which has been overlooked in the midst of more purely literary inquiries, and, secondly, they are almost sure to reveal more or less definitely the extent to which the latest results of New Testament criticism have become known beyond the study and the classroom. "A layman" in the volume before us contributes some good common sense to the consideration of the political and ethical ideas of Jesus, but at the same time his opinions should be received with some caution. He rejects the Fourth Gospel as evidence for the ideas of Jesus, and confines himself to the synoptics, but he takes them *en masse*, scarcely ever discriminating between their various and often contradictory statements. He admits, indeed, a

* *Jesus, his Opinions and Character*; the New Testament Studies of a Layman. Boston: G. H. Ellis. 1883.

suspicion that some passages "were injected into the conversations of Jesus after the crucifixion," but naively adds "But as this suspicion carried into its details and its consequences, as has already been shown, will rob us of nearly all historic data concerning Jesus himself, it must be repressed." A writer, moreover, who quotes the Book of Acts for the conduct of Paul, and the Pastoral Epistles for his opinions, and contentedly accepts the statement of the Book of Daniel that Jehovah obtained in the royal proclamation of the Assyrian monarchs the title of the "*Most High God*" (p. 73), can scarcely be regarded as speaking with authority.

The writer has not escaped from the old and unjust custom of quoting verses or phrases apart from their context, or in ignorance of the sense in which they would be generally understood. He refers to Matt. xii. 39, to show that Jesus set down the "industrious, frugal, and devout people of his own provincial Galilee" as a "wicked and adulterous generation, of whose evil ways the heavens had grown weary," and Matt. v. 28—30, as a condemnation of marriage and the good old Jewish pride in a flourishing and numerous family as a gift of God. In his consideration of the attitude of Jesus towards the Pharisees, he neglects the important fact that the most severe, and doubtless unjust, denunciations of them are not found in Mark. An inquiry into the opinions and character of *Jesus* requires the most minute discrimination between different accounts, a careful weighing of every verse and every word, familiarity with the original language, and a good general knowledge of the literature and spirit of the age in which he lived. Without these it is impossible to say what really springs direct from Jesus, and what from other sources, in the primitive Christianity of that period extending from about A.D. 55 to about A.D. 175, of which alone we have contemporary evidence in the New Testament. Our author, however, has simply taken the synoptics as they stand in the English Version, ignoring even the corrections of the Revised Version. If he had called his book an Inquiry into the Character and Spirit of Primitive Christianity we could have given it a less qualified welcome. Any reader who will remember that that is what it really is, will find it a useful and suggestive volume.

F. H. J.

MR. FREEMAN'S 'ENGLISH TOWNS AND DISTRICTS.*'

IT is somewhat difficult to characterise this last instalment of Mr. Freeman's essays. The collection includes two different classes of papers, different both in length and scope, between which the only point of agreement is their common reference to English localities. Nor is the topographical element so predominant as to justify the title of the book: "English towns and districts" certainly are there, but English churches and monasteries appear in far greater abundance. We have before us in fact simply a companion-volume to the author's "*Historical and Architectural Sketches, chiefly Italian*;" and it is not in reproach to

* *English Towns and Districts.* A Series of Addresses and Sketches by EDWARD A. FREEMAN, M.A., Hon. D.C.L. & LL.D. Macmillan & Co. 1883.

the book, but only to its name, that we complain of the prominence given to Mr. Freeman's architectural notes, which appeal to a distinct audience from that which we may suppose to be addressed by the title. But if the contents of the book are to a certain extent heterogeneous, it would be perverse on that account to underestimate their wide interest and permanent value. We are grateful to have these essays rescued from the oblivion of periodical journals, or from the scarcely less penetrable obscurity (to most readers) of the transactions of learned societies. But we are not sure that it was wise to reprint them without a more thorough revision than the present series has undergone. In collected essays a certain amount of repetition is perhaps inevitable, but a man of letters of Mr. Freeman's eminence might have been expected to have cancelled at least some of the constantly recurring comparisons of the same things in the same connection which make his book often really wearisome and irritating reading. To enjoy it one must carefully avoid reading it straight through; one must always bear in mind that it is not strictly speaking a book at all, but rather a set of isolated papers, knit together indeed by a slender bond of union, but written at different times and for different readers. With this understanding, those who think they know a good deal about the by-ways of English topography, may promise themselves a variety of fresh information, lit up by that steady sense of the life and continuity of English history which Mr. Freeman has done perhaps more than any other writer to introduce into the common thoughts of every-day Englishmen.

There is little or nothing positively new in the book before us, but it is no slight gain to the historical student, who can seldom know more than a small district intimately, to have even detached essays on scattered points from Exeter to Carlisle, written with the easy familiarity which Mr. Freeman possesses, not only of the places themselves, but also especially of the characteristics in them which illustrate, or determine, their proper relation to the history of England as a whole. It is probably the shorter papers to which the student will first turn. Their subjects are more limited, and their treatment more minute. A salient feature, as we have already mentioned, is the care and fulness with which architectural matters are discussed. Sometimes, as in the lengthy parallel drawn between Lincoln and York Minsters, the examination is likely to prove tedious to those who are not professed students of architecture. But as a rule Mr. Freeman uses his trained technical knowledge simply in order to throw light on obscure points in our local history; as, for instance, to bring out the steps by which Norman influences penetrated into the remoter parts of England. Evidence of this sort is the more valuable because it is so rarely turned to account, and no man is better qualified than Mr. Freeman to estimate its value, and point out its true bearing. His remarks upon the growth of churches, the changes wrought in them in successive ages, and the meaning of those changes, are full of suggestion. In particular, we may refer to the lucid explanation he gives of the distinct character of the churches and monastic buildings reared by the various orders, the Benedictines, the Austin Canons, and the Cister-

cians; though we are sometimes tempted to think that he exaggerates the regularity and uniformity of their several styles. Thus he states, with perfect correctness, the reasons which produced the remarkable individuality of the Cistercian houses, but when he talks of the existence of such a house without the attendant surroundings of hills and valleys, as a practical impossibility (p. 806), he brings in an accidental consideration which is apt to draw the reader's attention away from the main point. The Cistercians established themselves where their work was required, and this happened to be in a country abounding in hills and valleys. Mr. Freeman himself does not pretend that the choice was determined by the attraction of natural beauty (p. 296).

Passing to the longer chapters,—most of them are presidential addresses delivered at meetings of the Archaeological Institute,—we find a series of papers more likely to engage popular attention than those of which we have hitherto spoken. They are, indeed, highly interesting fragments of a topographical history of England. The professed student may be inclined to leave them on one side, partly because they contain so much that is now common-place of history, partly because they are so full of repetition, because they say exactly the same thing so many times over. But even to the student they present a great deal which it would be hard to find elsewhere expounded with the same masterly grasp. The chapters on Exeter, Lincoln, Chester, and Colchester are models of what such chapters should be. They place before us the continuous or hardly interrupted, or again, the absolutely broken and then recovered, life of a Roman, a British, and an English city, and recall our minds to the independent and individual springs of that society which we are always too apt to confuse in the civilisation of our own day which centres in what (to use Mr. Freeman's words) is "vulgarly called 'the metropolis.'" To the general reader possibly the most interesting address is that on "The Shire and the Gá," which gives the best popular outline with which we are acquainted of the broad characteristics which distinguish the growth of Southern England from that of the Midlands. But we are inclined to wish that these longer and more popular sections had been collected in a volume by themselves. In such a form they would certainly find more readers than as they are now arranged. Many people would willingly take up a book strictly answering to the title of the present work, who would be discouraged by its mixed contents, not to speak of its size, as it actually stands.

R. L. P.

MR. JOEL BENTON ON EMERSON'S POETRY.*

MR. BENTON is an enthusiastic admirer of Emerson's poetry, and his enthusiasm carries him away sometimes into heights to which we are hardly able to follow him. Our own admiration, though it is very strong and sincere, and dates from the appearance of the "Poems" in 1847, would seem, we are afraid, to such a perfervid critic, not sufficiently unqualified. We must, however, venture to hint that

* *Emerson as a Poet*. By JOEL BENTON. New York: M. L. Holbrook. 1883.